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Since the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has faced serious 
problems and has been subject to criticism, particularly from African states. More 
specifically, some African states have argued that the operation of the Court has produced 
outcomes that are vastly different from what was imagined and hoped for at the time the 
Court was negotiated in 1998. The dissertation answers four interrelated research questions: 
(1) What kind of International Criminal Court (ICC) did African states want prior to and 
during the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998? (2) Why did African states ratify the Rome 
Statute more than any other region even though they did not get the kind of Court that they 
wanted? (3) What are the origins of the criticisms levied by African states against the ICC? 
(4) Why, despite the compromises reached in Rome, and the significant criticism levied 
against the resultant ICC since, would African states commit and/or stay committed to the 
Court by signing, ratifying, and implementing the Rome Statute into domestic law more than 
any other region? The dissertation employs constructivist international relations theory and 
makes the overall argument that the active and meaningful engagement on the part of African 
governments and African individuals in the Rome Statute/ICC project from its earliest stages 
of development has created a deep normative commitment to the resultant Court, which, at 
times, overrides rationality and self-interest explanations of state behaviour. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
This dissertation offers insight into the problems facing the International Criminal Court 
(ICC or Court) from African perspectives. The analytical focus is on the ICC’s interactions in 
Africa since the only completed cases at the Court have involved African situations and 
African suspects at the time of writing. The dissertation considers how the ICC was designed 
and constructed as a result of the multilateral negotiations at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference in 1998.  It then evaluates how the compromises reached in Rome have or have 
not affected the resultant Court’s work, especially on the African continent. With this in 
mind, the dissertation provides answers to the following four questions: (1) What kind of 
ICC did African states want prior to and during the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998? 
(2) Why did African states ratify the Rome Statute more than any other region even though 
they did not get the kind of Court that they wanted? (3) What are the origins of the criticisms 
levied by African states against the ICC? and (4) Why, despite the compromises reached in 
Rome, and the significant criticism levied against the resultant ICC since, would African 
states commit and/or stay committed to the Court by signing, ratifying, and implementing the 
Rome Statute into domestic law, more than any other region? The overall argument is that 
the active role that African states and African individuals occupied with respect to the ICC 
project from its earliest stages of institutional development provides an answer to all four 
questions. The dissertation provides a thorough account of African involvement in the ICC 
project, including the preferences of African governments at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference using a constructivist international relations theoretical approach. Such an 
understanding provides the necessary backdrop to evaluate the problems facing the ICC in its 
current institutional form, from the perspective of some African states and/or the African 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction  
The formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC or ‘Court’) was agreed to with 
the successful conclusion of the Rome Diplomatic Conference (Rome Conference) on 17 
July 1998. The Rome Conference was attended by representatives from 160 states; 
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs); intergovernmental organizations; and 
other specialized agencies. The successful adoption of the Rome Statute of the 
International Court (Rome Statute) signalled a collective commitment to the creation of a 
permanent international criminal court, which would function as a court of last resort to 
ensure criminal accountability for the most serious violations of international law (i.e. 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression) if domestic justice 
mechanisms prove unable or unwilling to do so. The ICC entered into force on 1 July 
2002, after the Rome Statute received the required sixty ratifications to become operable. 
The Court has undergone growing pains in the time since. But in particular, some of the 
African states have voiced their displeasure in what has been framed as the Court’s bias 
against or targeting of them. In the popular press and in some emerging scholarship, there 
has been much discussion about whether the African states understood that they might be 
treated as unequal partners when they signed on to the Court. And whether they would, 
indeed, remain a part of the Rome Statute System by remaining States Parties to the ICC.  
This dissertation measures the seriousness of the compromises made at the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court from the 
perspective of African states and explores the explanatory value of those compromises in 
the context of contemporary criticism of the resultant Court. It is well understood that 
African states took a particularly active role in the negotiation of the Rome Statute at 
various junctures. This engagement offers a means to establish what kind of court African 
states really wanted, as well as the ability to measure the correlative disparities that 
emerged in the final negotiated text of the Rome Statute. This approach contributes to the 
growing discourse on the relationship between the negotiated text of the Rome Statute 
and the well-documented operational weaknesses of the resultant ICC, which have 
revealed themselves largely through the Court’s behaviour in African situations and 
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contexts. The reasons for the Court’s hyper-focused engagement in African situations and 
contexts are manifold and justifiable in many respects. Nevertheless, the willingness of 
African states to remain committed to the ICC more than any other region, coupled with 
longstanding normative investment in the ICC project, fosters a sense that the criticisms 
raised by African governments and the African Union against the Court ought to be taken 
seriously and given due consideration.1 This is important for the holism of the ICC as an 
institution within the international political landscape that represents the values and 
norms surrounding principles of human rights, human security, and justice (broadly 
considered), and as a last chance judicial mechanism that ensures accountability for the 
most serious violations of international criminal law when all else has failed in the 
interest of achieving long-term peace, stability, and transitional justice objectives in the 
aftermath of serious conflict and violence.2    
 This research situates itself within the context of the Africa-ICC relationship, 
which can be understood and conceptualized differently throughout the Court’s history. 
Early development of the Rome Statute and the idea of an ICC was largely supported by 
African states. This support continued when the Rome Statute was adopted, most 
demonstrably evidenced by the fact that African states have signed, ratified, and 
implemented the Rome Statute more than any other region in the world. Notwithstanding 
this, African support for the ICC began to wane following the Court’s indictment of 
African leaders, particularly Omar al-Bashir of Sudan in 2009 and others such as Uhuru 
Kenyatta of Kenya in 2011, and to a lesser extent, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011. 
These indictments created a serious conflict of interest for African governments, which 
were forced to choose whether to continue diplomatic relations with government leaders 
 
1 It is important to highlight that the use of the phrase ‘more than any other region’ refers to the level of 
support and commitment to the ICC based on the geographic regions established by the United Nations and 
employed by the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC. It is important to note that 34 out of 54 African 
States have ratified the Rome Statute (63 per cent). While it may be possible to base comparative support 
for the ICC on the percentage of states that have ratified the Rome Statute within each region, it is well 
established that African States comprise the largest regional bloc of signatories and this is what is being 
referred to throughout this dissertation.  
2 It is acknowledged and understood that the aims and objectives of the ICC are understood and 
conceptualized differently within the literature and is the subject of wide debate. See, for example 
Catherine Gegout, “The International Criminal Court: limits, potential and conditions for the promotion of 
justice and peace,” Third World Quarterly 34.5 (2013): 800-818.   
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that were also indicted suspects at the ICC, or else to cooperate with the Court by 
arresting and surrendering those same indicted suspects. The unanimous decision by 
African governments not to arrest and surrender indicted heads of state was justified by 
them on claims of double standards, unfair targeting, and neocolonialism, since the ICC 
was failing to pursue perpetrators of serious international crimes from any region other 
than Africa.  
 This conflict came to a head in 2016, when several African states voiced their 
intent to withdraw from the Rome Statute. Often couched in rhetoric surrounding an 
‘Africa-ICC crisis,’ attempts by the African Union to incite a continent-wide mass 
withdrawal movement, supported in large part by a handful of vocal governments, 
seriously threatened the trajectory of the ICC’s role in the African region. The Gambia 
and South Africa filed formal notices of withdrawal in 2016 but reversed those decisions. 
Burundi did formally withdraw from the ICC in 2017. Yet, some of the most vocal 
opponents of the Court such as Kenya and Uganda have remained States Parties to the 
Rome Statute despite threats of withdrawal. This peculiar inconsistency between policy 
and rhetoric offers a nuanced lens through which to analyze the intricacies of the ICC’s 
involvement on the African continent, approaches to institutional reform or alternative 
mechanisms of justice on the continent, and the state of the international criminal justice 
norm in Africa, more generally.    
       
1.1 Research Questions and Explanation of the Research Project 
The dissertation answers four interrelated research questions: (1) What kind of ICC did 
African states want prior to and during the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998? (2) 
Why did African states ratify the Rome Statute more than any other region even though 
they did not get the kind of Court that they wanted? (3) What are the origins of the 
criticisms levied by African states against the ICC? and (4) Why, despite the 
compromises reached in Rome, and the significant criticism levied against the resultant 
ICC since, would African states commit and/or stay committed to the Court by signing, 
ratifying, and implementing the Rome Statute into domestic law, more than any other 
region? Africa is conceptualized as a ‘region’ throughout the dissertation as opposed to a 
continent, to provide consistency both within the existing discourse and the ICC’s use of 
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the five geographic regions of the world as established by the United Nations, i.e., 
African States, Asia-Pacific States, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, 
Eastern European States, and Western Europe and Other States. The dissertation employs 
constructivist theory and makes the overall argument that active and meaningful 
engagement on the part of African governments and African individuals in the Rome 
Statute project from its earliest stages has enmeshed a deep normative commitment to the 
ICC that at times, overrides rationality and self-interest in tangible ways.   
The dissertation also places a special focus on the conceptualization of the ICC 
project as a vehicle to reorder the global hierarchy. Thus, the most significant 
compromises throughout the Rome Statute negotiations for many African governments 
involved the role of the United Nations Security Council to refer cases to the ICC, or 
defer ongoing ICC cases, and the decision to exclude nuclear weapons from the 
prohibited list–both of which involved, insulated, and further protected only the smallest 
group of most powerful states. The dissertation emphasizes that African states were 
averse to the enmeshment of politics within the architecture of a prospective ICC and 
many of the issues raised by some African states and the African Union with the resultant 
Court’s operationalization can readily be traced back to concerns illuminated by African 
delegates and governments from as early as 1994 with respect to politicization and Court 
independence. Notwithstanding this, the longstanding historical involvement and 
ownership of the ICC project has created an environment where most African 
governments continue to support the ICC and governments that have openly criticized the 
Court have decided to express opposition from within the Rome Statute System.3 This is 
evidenced not only by sustained African membership to the Court compromising the 
largest regional bloc of States Parties, but also with active involvement within procedural 
processes, such as the comparatively high number of judicial nominations from the 
African region to fill vacancies on the ICC bench, for example.  
 
3 The Rome Statute System refers to the obligation placed upon States Parties to include the contents of the 
Rome Statute into domestic law, which is referred to as implementation. It also refers to the obligation of 
States Parties to cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of crimes under its 
jurisdiction. It also touches on the principle of complementarity, which says that the jurisdiction of the ICC 




In the context of the African Union (AU), it emphasizes pan-Africanism under the 
auspice of ‘African solutions to African problems,’ which includes efforts to regionalize 
international criminal justice through the expansion of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights to cover the same types of crimes as those enumerated in the Rome Statute 
in relation to the ‘Malabo Protocol.’ Interestingly, African governments have been slow 
to ratify the Malabo Protocol and have remained strongly committed to the Rome Statute. 
The dissertation argues that the expression of a pan-Africanist vision of an international 
criminal justice mechanism offers another layer of information about what kind of 
international criminal court African states want and the ways in which the ICC fails to 
satisfy those wants. While the AU efforts to regionalize international criminal law vis-à-
vis the Malabo Protocol can be framed either positively or negatively, the substance of 
this effort is revealed by digging deeper into the historical trajectory on the continent with 
respect to what an ICC was hoped to be and how the resultant court has manifestly failed 
to achieve those ideals in some significant respects. In many ways, attempts to 
regionalize international criminal law can be framed as a response to the aversion to 
disproportionate paternalism and subjugation by the international community–Europe in 
particular–especially if (more) local responses might be possible. Yet, the dissertation 
highlights that the African governments that have sought to include regional mechanisms 
within the Rome Statute System under the auspice of complementarity have sought to do 
so under a cooperative and integrative guise. This approach yields far more productive 
possibilities for the development and strengthening of the international criminal justice 
norm altogether and ought to be considered as an avenue for the continued development 
of the ICC’s jurisdiction regime.   
 
1.2 Overall Importance of the Research Project 
The research project’s greatest value is its contribution to a better understanding, 
contextualization, and situation of African concerns and criticisms with the institutional 
behavior of the International Criminal Court. Since at the time of writing the ICC has 
only completed cases that are located on the African continent, it is fundamentally 
important to take stock of the institutional shortcomings and problems that have become 
apparent through its engagement in those situations and contexts. This can only be 
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possible with genuine engagement with the issues raised by those most affected by the 
Court, coupled with ongoing communicative strategies whether in the academy or in 
practice under the auspice of remedy or else reform. While the argument that the ICC is 
still a ‘young’ institution is losing rigor, the problems that have been observed throughout 
its operationalization have persisted in many respects.  
Plainly, an evaluation of the ICC’s performance cannot be measured outside of 
the African contexts in which it has disproportionately operated. Since the ICC depends 
on membership from states, and African states comprise the largest regional bloc of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, it makes good sense to take African concerns 
seriously. This is in the broad interest of institutional self-reflexivity, including potential 
avenues for reform, but is also necessary for the long-term sustainability and holism of 
the ICC altogether. This is especially the case since the choice to be bound by the Rome 
Statute System is entirely voluntary and can be revoked at any time. While the ICC has 
become a permanent fixture in the global political and legal landscape, its ability to 
operate effectively is facilitated by an expansive membership that is committed to the 
shared normative values that undergird the Court through a cooperative arrangement 
between a broad membership of states and the ICC.     
This dissertation is important because it offers a more inclusive and complete 
historical narrative about the significant role that African states and Africans played in 
the negotiation of the Rome Statute from the earliest stages of its ideational development 
and African preferences expressed during the Rome Diplomatic Conference. In many 
respects, the existing literature acknowledges the engagement on the part of ‘Africa’ in 
the negotiation of the Rome Statute, though with limited detail and explanation. The 
account provided herein is in-depth and illuminates the substantive agency that African 
governments and African delegates exercised throughout the Rome Statute negotiation 
processes, which gives African concerns a considerable amount of normative weight. 
This level of engagement is important to document because it yields explanatory value in 
terms of sustained African commitment to the ICC, even among African states and the 
AU that have openly criticized the Court. A better understanding of the ways in which 
‘Africa’ authored the ICC project allows for a more accurate situating of the fluidity 
between the subject-agent relationship experienced by ‘Africa’ through its complex and 
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intersubjective engagement with the ICC. Notwithstanding this, the dissertation also 
bears in mind the political hierarchy of the international political system, which is 
acknowledged as a structurally limiting factor in any international negotiation or 
institutional apparatus created by states. Thus, it is even more crucial to acknowledge the 
ways in which traditionally weak states such as those in Africa influenced the Rome 
Statute negotiations, while simultaneously acknowledging the limitations of such 
influence with respect to the final outcome.  
In terms of the Rome Statute negotiations, the preferences expressed by African 
states are synthesized in this dissertation and provide a novel understanding of how 
African states imagined the design of the ICC in its ideal form. This is central to an 
understanding of how the final text of the Rome Statute either satisfied or failed to reflect 
the desired outcome as expressed by African states throughout the negotiations. The 
knowledge generated from this research provides a lens through which to evaluate the 
significance of the compromises reached in Rome, which has explanatory potential for 
making better sense of the observed problems with the resultant ICC’s operationalization 
in African contexts as well as African responses to those problems–i.e. the 
regionalization of the international criminal law at the AU Court in an effort to provide 
an alternative or extrajudicial mechanism to the ICC. In short, the dissertation offers a 
more complete account of African involvement in the ICC project, which provides a 
framework that generates more nuanced understandings of the origins of the 
contemporary criticisms of the ICC. The dissertation repositions African concerns with 
the ICC in their appropriate historical context, which reveals far more deep-seated 
political problems and manifestations of those problems that are worthy of 
acknowledgement and inclusion in any analysis that examines how African states engage 
with the Rome Statute and/or the ICC.      
         
1.3 Chapter Outline 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into eleven substantive chapters. Chapter 
two outlines the methodology employed by this research project. The chapter provides a 
formulation of the proposed research questions, relevant hypotheses, and research tools 
employed throughout. It  offers an overview and justification for the use of process 
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tracing as its chosen methodology; it explores the value of elite interviewing and content 
analysis as invaluable tools of process tracing research, both of which are employed 
throughout this dissertation.  
Chapter three provides a review of the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations, 
as well as the substantive aspects of the ‘Africa-ICC’ relationship, and generally 
observed problems with the ICC throughout the course of its operationalization. The 
literature has identified the role of African states throughout the negotiation of the Rome 
Statute, but has manifestly failed to provide a conceptualization of an ICC from an 
African perspective in substantive detail. Some research has begun to interrogate whether 
the compromises reached in Rome were too material but very few have situated this 
question within the Africa-ICC contention. This dissertation revisits the compromises 
reached in Rome and places them within the context of the more contemporary problems 
that some African states and the AU have cited with respect to the operation of the ICC. 
In this respect, the compromises reached at the Rome Diplomatic Conference are used as 
explanatory factors that have had long-lasting effects on the Court’s efficacy and 
legitimacy.  
 Chapter four provides background on the Rome Statute negotiation processes in 
the time period leading up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference. The chapter maps the 
historical development of the idea of a permanent international criminal court apropos the 
United Nations and the International Law Commission. The chapter places a special 
emphasis on the role of African states and African delegates within the United Nations 
processes to develop such a court. Chapter four provides the necessary context and 
background to better understand the political climate within which the idea of an ICC 
gained traction, its historical underpinnings and trajectory, as well as the relevant place 
that African states and African politicians occupied within the conceptualization and 
development of a permanent ICC.       
 Chapter five considers African preferences on the Court’s jurisdiction, with a 
special emphasis on the potential role of the United Nations Security Council, as well as 
the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation on his or her own volition, i.e.  
proprio motu. Chapter six is closely related to chapter five and considers African 
positions on key issues at the Rome Diplomatic Conference with respect to crimes, 
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including the inclusion of internal armed conflicts; the prohibition of terrorism and drug 
trafficking; and the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the prohibited list. In combination, 
the fifth and sixth chapters provide the foundation for the remainder of the dissertation, 
since it is the preferences expressed by African delegates in the plenary meetings at the 
Rome Diplomatic Conference on the most contentious issues of the Rome Statute that 
provide the means to construct an idealized ‘African’ construction of an ICC. This 
provides a basis to better make sense of the serious of the compromises reached in Rome 
from an African perspective and consider those compromises as explanatory of the 
subsequent operational deficiencies cited by some African states and the AU with respect 
to the Court.   
 Chapter seven provides an analysis of why African states have chosen to commit 
to the Rome Statute despite the substantive compromises reached at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference, more than any other region. It considers African commitment to the Rome 
Statute using constructivist and rational choice models of international relations theory 
and provides an explanatory analysis of ICC commitment using Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya 
as its case studies using two-level game theory. The chapter places an emphasis on 
domestic and international political contexts as factors that explain the choice to commit 
to the Rome Statute and stay committed to it, even if it runs contrary to traditional 
notions of self-interest to do so.  
 Chapter eight explores the emergence of the deterioration of the relationship 
between Africa and the ICC, using the indictment of former Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir as the primary catalyst for this deterioration. The problems that some African 
states, and the AU in particular, have had with the ICC as a result of the indictment of a 
then sitting head of state are considered in normative (and to a lesser degree) legal terms. 
The important contribution of this chapter is that it links the compromise reached in 
Rome to give the United Nations Security Council the ability to refer situations to the 
ICC, including those in non-states parties (as Sudan was at the time it was referred), as 
explanatory of the criticisms subsequently launched from an African perspective. The 
chapter highlights African aversion to the politicization of the ICC from the earliest 
stages of its institutional development. The integration of deep politics, especially with 
respect to the Security Council’s ability to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction, was a 
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significant compromise for many African states. The chapter does not dispute the 
justifications for the ICC’s intervention in the situation in Darfur, but instead places an 
emphasis on the interrelated political consequences of the Security Councils’ decision to 
do so in that situation but not others of comparable gravity. Even if the ICC had good 
reason to be involved in Darfur, the uneven application of the same norms in all 
situations triggered sensitivities and subjected the ICC regime to serious scrutiny. 
Coupled with the Court’s decision to indict a sitting head of state, concern that the Court 
could be used to incite regime change in Africa whether a state consented to its authority 
or not, with all of the correlative destabilizing effects associated by the creation of an 
internationally (politically) imposed power vacuum, were very real. This was the fear that 
African states clearly expressed as early as 1994, which in many ways has contributed to 
a pan-Africanist pushback against the ICC and attempts to establish alternative judicial 
mechanisms as a response to similar crimes.    
 Chapter nine evaluates AU efforts to regionalize international criminal law 
through the expansion of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights with reference 
to the Malabo Protocol, which includes many of the same crimes that are covered by the 
Rome Statute. This chapter interrogates whether regional mechanisms could or ought to 
fit within the Rome Statutes’ conceptualization of complementarity which, as written, 
only enumerates a relationship between the ICC and domestic courts. This chapter argues 
that the embodiment of international criminal law enumerated in the Malabo Protocol is 
inherently useful for an understanding of what African states want and need out of an 
international criminal justice judicial mechanism that is apparently lacking at the ICC. 
The chapter argues that the Malabo Protocol offers an opportunity to prosecute far more 
crimes than the ICC can, crimes that are most relevant to the continent and may actually 
undergird and/or finance the perpetration of the perhaps more serious crimes covered by 
the Rome Statute. Thus, it argues that the integration of regional mechanisms such as the 
Malabo Protocol within the international criminal justice schema offers an opportunity to 
contribute to the evolution of a robust system of justice.     
 Chapter ten explores the ways in which African states remain engaged and 
committed to the ICC by exploring the disproportionately high number of judicial 
nominations to the ICC bench from African states. This chapter maps African 
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representation on the ICC bench, as well as the number of nominations from the region. 
The chapter considers the reasons for African engagement in judicial nomination 
processes, and also considers what types of candidates are most likely to be successfully 
elected. The chapter provides a means to contextualize sustained commitment to the 
Rome Statute System, and an ability to further recast Africans as important authors of 
justice at the ICC.  
 Chapter eleven, the final chapter, concludes the dissertation. It maps the 
importance and significance of the research and summarizes its primary arguments with 
respect to the proposed research questions. The conclusion reemphasizes the role that 
African states and Africans played in the negotiation of the Rome Statute and highlights 
the importance of the fact that many African states and politicians viewed the ICC as a 
vehicle to restructure the global hierarchy. The ways in which the final text of the Rome 
Statute reflected the interests of the most powerful states represented the most substantive 
compromises required of African states when deciding to voluntarily sign, ratify, and 
implement the Rome Statute. Though African states have raised substantive problems 
with the ICC throughout the course of its operationalization, almost all have continued to 
remain States Parties, and many have sought to insight change from within the Rome 
Statute System. As such, the ways in which African concerns can be meaningfully 
considered and responded to remain a vitally important imperative for the long-term 
success of the Court, since Africa has been the disproportionate subject of the ICC’s 
intervention.  If the ICC is to continue to evolve in terms of its institutional robustness, it 
ought to take African concerns seriously in order to avoid repeating mistakes in future 
situations and contexts. The tenth chapter resituates the dissertation within the literature 
on the Rome Statute negotiations and the Africa-ICC relationship. Areas for future 





Chapter 2  
2 Methodology 
This dissertation interrogates whether the compromises made by states in the 1998 Rome 
Statute negotiations can help explain the problems with the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which have been most notably illuminated through the Court’s interaction with 
(and in) African states from 2003 to the time of writing. Process tracing has been 
employed as its methodology. This is an inductive qualitative study ultimately intended 
to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of the underlying complexities and the 
dynamism of concerns that are at the heart of the at-times strained Africa-ICC 
relationship.1Process tracing allows for an interrogation of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, as well as the sequence of the breakdown in the Africa-ICC relationship that 
precedes the purview of observable contemporary phenomena.2 The guiding hypothesis 
of the project was that the compromises made when drafting the Rome Statute in 1998 
could help to explain and better understand the identifiable problems that many African 
states have had with the operationalization of the ICC. The fact that African states had 
taken such an active role in the establishment of the ICC and have committed more to the 
Rome Statute than any other region, makes the breakdown of the relationship even more 
curious and significant. The dissertation uses Africa as a ‘region’ instead of a continent in 
keeping with the ICC’s use of the United Nations five geographic regions of the world 
(African States, Asia-Pacific States, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, 
Eastern European States, and Western Europe and Other States Group). This provides 
consistency and continuity in the discourse. The dissertation chooses to look at the group 
of African States because many of the criticisms levied against the ICC from the African 
continent have originated from a pan-Africanist purview – i.e., the African Union. 
Moreover, the group of African States had signed and ratified the Rome Statute more 
than any other geographic region at the time of writing and had also been subjected to the 
behaviour of the ICC comparatively more than any other region.    
 
1 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013): 11-12. 
2 David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44.4 (2011): 823-30. 
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The guiding questions of the dissertation were the following: (1) What did 
African states want out of a permanent international criminal court? (2) Why did African 
states ratify the Rome Statute even though they did not get what they wanted? (3) What 
are the origins of African criticisms towards the ICC? and (4) Why, despite the 
compromises reached in Rome, would African states commit and stay committed to the 
ICC by signing, ratifying, and implementing the treaty into domestic law, more than any 
other region? I hypothesized that the answer to the fourth question was related to the 
ownership, activism, and agency that many African states exercised in the establishment 
of the ICC from the earliest stages of its development (both ideationally and 
operationally). This history translated into a primordial normative commitment to 
international criminal justice and accountability that informed the identity and interests of 
many African states, over and above self-interest.  
 
2.1 Process Tracing 
According to Collier, process tracing is defined as the “systematic examination of 
diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses 
posed by the researcher.”3 In order to answer the first question, i.e. What did African 
states want out of a permanent international criminal court?, I began by conducting a 
content analysis of relevant United Nations documents. Specifically, I analyzed the 
following documents: the statements of African delegates as well as their publications 
and reports that were presented at the six Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) sessions 
before the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1994-1998); the statements of African 
delegates in plenary at the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1998); and statements made by 
delegates post-Rome at the Preparatory Commission and at the Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute. The research design relied on the selection of particular 
variables, for example, the independence of the Court from political influence, the 
automatic jurisdiction mechanism, the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor, and state 
cooperation obligations. While some depth may have been lost through the selection of 
 
3 Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” 823. 
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these variables, doing so did not undermine the greater value of the project, but instead 
provided the appropriate scope to begin to answer the proposed research questions.   
James Mahoney explains that “process tracing tests can be used to help establish 
that (1) an initial event or process took place, (2) a subsequent outcome also occurred, 
and (3) the former was a cause of the latter.”4 This is quite plainly what this research 
project is seeking to establish. That is, (1) there were substantive compromises made in 
Rome in order to ensure that the Diplomatic Conference was a success; (2) African states 
were once active supporters of the Rome Statute and the ICC, but that relationship was 
severely strained after the ICC began its operationalization; (3) and the compromises 
made in Rome caused, at least in part, the deficiencies in the ICC’s operationalization 
which have strained the relationship between some African states and the Court. Thus, 
process tracing is a logical methodological choice and is particularly well suited to the 
theoretical aims of this dissertation. As Mahoney explains, process tracing “is arguably 
the most important tool of causal inference in qualitative and case study research.5” On 
this basis, the hypothesis is evaluated to determine if there is a causal connection between 
two or more events or processes. This is achieved by applying rigorous research 
standards relying on what Collier, Brady, and Seawright refer to as causal-process 
observations (diagnostic pieces of evidence), which may or may not be used in 
combination with generalizations relevant to the analysis.6 While the research suggests 
that a causal connection might exist between two or more events or processes, the 
dissertation is not meant as a causal explanation, as such. Instead, it seeks to provide a 
richer explanation and understanding of those processes, which is valuable independently 
or combined with other analytical approaches.     
It is not the aim of this project to prove or argue that the ICC is ineffective or 
deficient. Rather, the project takes the existing literature and works backwards to better 
 
4 James Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,” Sociological Methods and 
Research (2012), 2. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. See also David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, “Sources of Leverage in Causal 
Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, 




understand the troubled relationship between Africa and the ICC, based on the 
institutional deficiencies cited in the literature. This could only be done with an effective 
data collection method. To this end, I gathered as much information as possible from 
primary and secondary literature and combined these findings with the content analyses 
mentioned hereto.  
 
2.2 Analysis    
As described, the research process began with primary and secondary document sources. 
I began with a review of the Rome Statute negotiation plenary transcripts, demarcating 
the participation (and influence) of various African states throughout the diplomatic 
process. While the task was largely one of ‘counting’ and in a basic way coding the 
preferences of African states, it provided a framework to situate my research question 
with respect to African preferences and agency with respect to the ICC. This content 
analysis also provided a lens to ascertain nuance among the preferences of African States, 
since there is not a monolithic ‘African’ vision of the ICC. However, the position of the 
African Union in the post-Rome period is weighed against the preferences of African 
states (as expressed in Rome and afterward), to elicit a broader picture of the complexity 
of the regional issue(s) with the resultant ICC. Thus, I triangulated the elite interviews I 
conducted by combining interviews with my content analysis/document review to 
balance any inaccuracies or bias.7 
 
2.2.1 Interviews 
After this work was completed and a satisfactory cursory understanding was established, 
I supplemented my research with fifteen semi-structured elite interviews carried out 
between 2018 to 2019, in order to make up for gaps in the data and to enrich my overall 
understanding of the Rome Statute negotiations, African involvement in the negotiations, 
and/or African concerns with the ICC. Most of the interviews ranged from one to two 
hours in length, over one to two-day time periods. 
 
7 See Rebecca S. Natow, “The use of triangulation in qualitative studies employing elite interviews,” 
Qualitative Research 20.2 (2019): 160-173. 
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The semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with those with the most 
relevant, first-hand experience. I asked each person about their recollections of the Rome 
Statute negotiation process and how it engaged with and involved African states in 
particular. I interviewed former state delegates, observers, academics, and NGO 
personnel who were directly involved in the Rome Statute negotiation processes. I 
interviewed ICC employees, including employees of the Office of the Prosecutor and 
ICC Judges. I conducted semi-structured interviews to elicit insight into any relationship 
between the outcome of the Rome Statute negotiations and the contemporary ICC-Africa 
problem(s). I also asked probing questions about the soundness of the African discontent 
with the ICC and proposed solutions thereto (i.e. a regional African court to prosecute the 
same crimes as those contained in the Rome Statute).   
2.3 Recruitment Methods 
I relied on targeted sampling to identify key actors with the most involvement in the 
negotiation process. I recruited key experts with relevant knowledge or insight to enrich 
my initial content analysis. As such, in-depth elite interviews were used to obtain 
information and to, as Tansey described, “probe beyond official accounts and narratives 
and ask theoretically-guided questions about issues that are highly specific to the research 
objectives.”8 The research project was approved and guided by the rules provided by The 
University of Western Ontario’s Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (NMREB) to 
protect the participants involved in my study.9 As such, I took care to avoid coercion, 
pressure, and obligation.   
The pre-interview stage was vital to the success of my interviews.  I had to know 
exactly who I was interviewing with respect to their individual history and background. 
According to Mikecz, this enhances an understanding of the researcher’s own 
positionality and decreases the status imbalance between the interviewer and 
respondent.10  I was cognizant and limited by the practical barriers that slowed down the 
 
8 Oisín Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,” Political 
Science and Politics (October 2007): 7. 
9 The project was approved as Western University NMREB protocol #107906. 




progress of my study significantly. Specifically, I experienced difficulties with respect to 
accessing elites, acquiring their trust, and establishing rapport.11 In this respect, 
anonymizing the responses of some interviewees was determined to be a useful strategic 
tool, and was often paramount to the success of the interview. This bears particular 
relevance among those who are currently employed by government or the Court. 
Adequate preparation for the interviews mitigated the challenges that act as a barrier to 
trust and rapport. I was able to determine the willingness of particular individuals to 
assist with my academic research, which informed who and how I asked my questions 
from the outset. The aim of this project was to obtain more than just ‘official’ account of 
the process–i.e. what can be delineated from the statements of delegates at the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference or the Assembly of States Parties. This required careful and 
strategic planning and a paramount respect for the stakes involved for the respondent. It 
is important to note that any interviews that were conducted under the promise of 
anonymity (i.e. the so-called “Chatham House” rules where ideas may be used but the 
identity of the speaker is not disclosed) did not compromise the overall value or weight of 
the answers given, but instead increased an understanding of mutual respect and trust.12 
Indeed, I attempted to adopt what Saunders et al. described as “context-sensitive 
strategies to preserve the richness of the interview material wherever possible while also 
protecting participants.”13 Anonymity provided a degree of protection so that elites could 
be more open and honest about their own opinions and points of view without disrupting 
their employment obligations or reputation within their professional capacities. 
The risk and potential bias associated with simply parroting official or ‘public 
relations’ answers with respect to the research question was a known concern that was 
taken into consideration throughout the course of the interviews.  A well-informed semi-
structured interview guide allowed for the flexibility and precision to avoid this concern, 
as it was clear when ‘official’ accounts emerged throughout the course of the 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 See William S. Harvey, “Strategies for conducting elite interviews,” Qualitative Research 11.4 (2011): 
431-441.  
13 Benjamin Saunders, Jenny Kitzinger, and Celia Kitzinger, “Anonymising interview data: challenges and 
compromise in practice,” Qualitative Research 15.5 (2015): 616. 
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interview(s). Being aware of official government or Court positions on particular issues 
made me aware of such responses and provided me with an opportunity to probe the 
respondent beyond these often superficial, politicized accounts. This was only possible 
with adequate preparation and background knowledge of both the institution/government 
and respondent. While it was not always possible to move beyond an official explanation 
or account, knowledge that the response was generated to promote a particular point of 
view allowed for a greater contextualization of the responses given. 
In-depth interviews were an appropriate choice for the study because the focus of 
the inquiry was relatively narrow, and the respondents were/are directly involved in the 
processes under investigation.  Moreover, the goal of the project was to acquire a better 
understanding of a particular phenomenon, and even more so to generate a narrative 
about the process in an interactive and relational way, based largely on the perceptions 
and experiences of those who were/are directly involved.  My evolving status between 
insider/outsider throughout the course of the study permitted necessary objectivity; self-
reflection was frequently used to account for biases and/or expectations that emerged 
throughout the course of the study, which were acknowledged, evaluated, and mitigated 
throughout the course of the project.    
Travel was required to conduct the necessary interviews for this study. I attended 
the 17th Assembly of States Parties (ASP) meeting as part of the Canadian Partnership for 
International Justice delegation from 3 December to 13 December 2018 in The Hague. 
My attendance at the ASP was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada. Once in The Hague, I took the opportunity to access elites 
and coordinate interviews with several Court employees. I also travelled to Pretoria, 
South Africa from 15 February to 20 February 2019, where I was able to interview 
several current and past government employees, particularly those from South Africa 
who played an active role in the Rome Statute negotiation efforts within the South 
African Development Community and the government of South Africa as an entity. I was 
also able to access those with first-hand knowledge about the contemporary problems that 
African states have with the ICC, and government responses to those problems.  
I exhausted all domestic resources first and foremost with respect to data 
collection.  Since Canada was so actively involved in the negotiation for an ICC well 
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before the Rome Conference, I started by talking to those with relevant insight and 
information with respect to the intricacies of the negotiations the compromises made by 
various states and the reasons for making those compromises. Similarly, several African 
delegations were provided with diplomats and lawyers from the United States and 
Canada, which provided an opportunity to access those who were involved in that 
capacity. I used these interviews, as well as my own independent research, to ascertain 
whom I needed contact next, provided that the interviewee had adequate experience to 
instruct me on the points of interest.  I contacted various elites by telephone and/or e-mail 
and determined whether or not in-person interviews were required.  In accordance with 
the guidelines provided by the NMREB, I did not incentivize any participant in my study, 
nor did I use language that gave the impression that I was incentivizing them in any way. 
I obtained full informed consent and had participants contact me directly to participate in 
my study. The nature of my study was considered to be of low risk to the participants by 
the NMREB and as a result, was not reviewed by the full board when it was granted 
approval. This was likely because I relied heavily on documents. The interviews I did 
conduct were with elites, as opposed to members of vulnerable populations.  
Nevertheless, I took caution to ensure that ethical standards were upheld, including the 
confidentiality of participants, if requested, and the proper storage of interview transcripts 
and project materials to ensure that the identity of any and all respondents are protected at 
all times. I greatly appreciated the time and participation of each of the individuals that I 
interviewed. Their insight was invaluable and imperative to the success of my study.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In summary, this dissertation examines whether the compromises made by states in the 
1998 Rome Statute negotiations can help explain the problems with the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), which have been most notably illuminated through the Court’s 
interaction with (and in) African states from 2003 to the time of writing. Process tracing 
is employed as its methodology and it is an inductive qualitative study ultimately 
intended to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of the underlying 
complexities and the dynamism of concerns that are at the heart of the at-times strained 
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Africa-ICC relationship. The dissertation relies on primary and secondary documents, as 





Chapter 3  
3 Literature Review 
This dissertation takes a collaborative and interdisciplinary approach and can generally 
be situated within the growing scholarship on Africa and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC or Court). It relies and builds upon key theoretical frameworks provided by 
international relations (IR) and, to some extent, international law (IL) literatures. This 
chapter reviews the most salient themes in the Africa-ICC discourse. Whereas most of the 
existing scholarship tends to focus on the operational problems that have plagued the 
Africa-ICC relationship from the Court’s establishment in 2002 onwards, this dissertation 
examines that literature but also focuses on the time that precedes the establishment of 
the Court. In doing so, this chapter also highlights literatures of institutional design, 
specifically in the context of the Rome Statute negotiations, to theoretically ground the 
design and architecture of the resultant ICC. The existing literatures on the Rome Statute 
negotiations and the Africa-ICC relationship illuminate the compromises that African 
States made in and after Rome when signing, ratifying, and implementing the Rome 
Statute into domestic legislation, and also frame the most prevalent debates concerning 
the problems with the ICC’s operationalization in African contexts and African responses 
to those problems. In short, the literatures of the Rome Statute negotiations; African 
commitment to the Rome Statute/ICC; African problems with the ICC; and African 
responses to the problems with the ICC each provide a theoretical framework through 
which to situate this dissertation’s contribution to the literature.    
 
3.1  Rome Statute Negotiations 
Much of the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations is descriptive in nature, as 
opposed to theoretical or argumentative.1 Some literatures focus on the development of 
 
1 See generally Fanny Benedetti, Karine Bonneau, and John L. Washburn, Negotiating the International 
Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014); Otto 
Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, 
Article by Article, 2nd ed. (C.H. Beck, Hart, and Nomos, 2008); Roy S.K. Lee, ed., The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, and Results (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999); William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court 2nd ed.: A Commentary 
22 
 
the idea of an international criminal court from the pre-Rome period and/or trace the 
emergence of the developing international criminal justice and accountability norm 
within the international political landscape, particularly at the United Nations (UN) and 
through the early work of the International Law Commission (ILC) in creating a draft 
statute for an international criminal court.2 With respect to pre- and post- Rome UN 
developments, Christopher Keith Hall carefully documented the meetings of the 
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court and the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court.3 While Hall 
 
on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R. 
W. D. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume 1 and 
Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); William Schabas, Introduction to the International 
Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998); Mauro 
Politi and Giuseppe Nesi, eds., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity 
(Ashgate, 2001); Leila Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International 
Law: Justice for the New Millennium (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002); Herman A.M. von 
Hebel, Johan G. Lammers, and Jolien Schukking, Reflections on the International Criminal Court–Essays 
in Honour of Adriaan Bos (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999). Note that some scholars do offer more a 
more analytical approach to the study of the Rome Statute negotiations. See for example Frédéric Mégret, 
“The Rome Conference: institutional design and the constraints of diplomacy,” in The Elgar Companion to 
the International Criminal Court, eds. Margaret deGuzman and Valerie Oosterveld (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., 2020), 20-47. 
2 See for example Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court; see 
also John Washburn, “The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and 
International Lawmaking in the 21st Century,” Pace International Law Review 11.2 (1999): 361-377. 
Washburn explained that many of the diplomats involved in the negotiation of the Rome Statute were 
involved from the earliest stages (1995) through the post-Rome period. This shared experience and 
commitment fostered a sense of trust among delegates. He also attributes the mutually shared experience 
within the United Nations system in the 1990s as a contributing factor for the successful negotiation of the 
Rome Statute, since many delegates felt an ideological and normative attachment to the project. See also 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 32.3 (1999): 443-469. See also Antonio Cassese, “From 
Nuremburg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal Court,” in The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, eds. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and 
John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 3-22. See also Adriaan Bos, “From the 
International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994-1998),” in The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, eds. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. 
Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 35-66. 
3 Christopher Keith Hall, “The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 91.1 (1997): 177-187; 
Christopher Keith Hall, “The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 92.1 (1998): 
124-133; Christopher Keith Hall, “The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 92.2 (1998): 
331-339; Christopher Keith Hall, “The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 92.3 (1998): 
548-556; Christopher Keith Hall, “The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the 
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primarily focused on the issues dealt with by the PrepCom, other scholars such as Fanny 
Benedetti and John Washburn described the practices undertaken by officers, 
governments, NGO representatives, and UN officials at the PrepCom meetings, which the 
authors argue, was a “high act of international creativity.”4  
Indeed, the Rome Statute negotiations have been rightly situated in the literatures 
concerning the new wave of multilateral diplomacy and treaty making of the 1990s. The 
approach taken in Rome has been described as akin to the strategy undertaken with 
respect to the Landmines Convention (i.e. the role of NGO campaigning and the 
formation of strategic negotiation blocs as an effective opposition to traditionally 
powerful states). In the context of landmines, Axworthy and Taylor explained that 
“governments and civil society worked directly together as members of a team.”5 
According to the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations, given the success of this so-
called ‘Ottawa Process’ approach in 1997, William Pace of the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court contacted former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Lloyd Axworthy, to reproduce this coordinated civil society-governmental approach in 
Rome.6 In a similar vein, Marlies Glasius highlighted the important role of the Like-
Minded Group (LMG) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the proliferation 
and diffusion of the idea of an ICC.7 NGO involvement was a keystone of the Rome 
 
International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 94.4 (2000): 773-789. See also 
Philippe Kirsch, QC and Valerie Oosterveld, “The Post-Rome Conference Preparatory Commission,” in 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, eds. Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 93-104. 
4 Fanny Benedetti and John L. Washburn, “Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to 
Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference,” Global Governance 5.1 (1999): 2. 
5 Lloyd Axworthy and Sarah Taylor, “A ban for all seasons: The landmines convention and its implications 
for Canadian diplomacy,” International Journal 53.2 (1998): 190. 
6 Lloyd Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2003). 
See Chapter 9: A New Court for a New Century; but see Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating 
the International Criminal Court, 74-5. The authors explained that William Pace differentiated the Rome 
Statute negotiations from the Ottawa Process because the Rome Statute negotiations were conducted within 
and under the auspice of the UN. Yet, the authors still concede that the Mine Ban Treaty offers the “most 
relevant precedent for civil society’s leadership in international negotiations and treaty making.” 
7 See generally Marlies Glasius, The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement 
(Routledge, 2007). See also William R. Pace and Jennifer Schense, “The Role of Non-Governmental 
Organizations,” in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol 1, eds. 
Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 105-143. 
See also William Pace and Mark Thieroff, “Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations,” in The 
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Statute negotiations and thus the merger of civil society and governments in Rome has 
occupied an important place in the literature. 
However, it is important to note that the influence of civil society and NGOs in 
multilateral treaty making is not always viewed positively. For example, Shirley V. Scott 
has argued that:  
The very openness of the system of international law that enables both democratic 
and authoritarian regimes to promote norms reflective of their policy preferences 
has also enabled civil society to advance norms, processes, and institutional 
structures that go beyond the policy preferences of dominant states. In doing so, 
civil society–a hallmark of what we might refer to as the ‘pseudo-democratic’ 
international legal system–has challenged the delicate balance between power 
politics and the realization of a pure international rule of law. The consequences 
appear serious.8 
Scott points out important difficulties with multilateral treaty making processes, notably 
that in trying to solve collective action problems, the text of the treaty could reflect the 
opposition calls from the staunchest resisters.9 However, she also identifies that 
international law is only capable of offering normative standards to create a better world 
if the gap between the substance of the law and what is agreeable to the most powerful 
states is not “too stretched.”10 She explained, “[i]f there is no gap, then law simply 
reflects policy preferences, but if the gap is too big, international law will be unlikely to 
exert any pull over the behavior of the most powerful.”11 She contended that middle 
powers and NGOs have stretched international law beyond what is acceptable to the most 
powerful states. In the context of the ICC, that overstretch is evidenced in the fact that the 
United States, China, and Russia have not ratified the Rome Statute at the time of writing. 
 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, ed. Roy S. 
Lee (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 391-398. 
8 Shirley V. Scott, “The Imperial Over-Stretch of International Law,” AJIL Unbound 114 (2020): 242. See 
also Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More 
Accountable,” Foreign Affairs 80.2 (2001). See also Robert Keohane, “Democracy Enhancing 
Multilateralism,” International Organization 63.1 (2009): 1-31. 
9 Ibid. See also Tom Ginsburg, “Authoritarian International Law?” AJIL Unbound 114 (2020): 221, 228. 




Thus, Scott said that “[t]he ICC is perhaps the classic example of over-reach within the 
empire of international law,” and the overall claim is that it is civil society and not the 
hegemon (the United States) that has acted as “the imperial power within international 
law.”12 It is thus argued by Scott that the ICC lacks an inbuilt design feature to balance 
legalism with realpolitik, which is an inherently limiting factor in terms of its institutional 
effectiveness. 
Despite these political limitations, it is important to make sense of how the Rome 
Statute negotiations unfolded in 1998. To this end, Roy S. Lee explained that most of the 
Rome Statute negotiations were conducted in informal meetings from the preparatory 
stage to the Rome Diplomatic Conference and “no official records were kept at those 
meetings.”13 As such, there is no other option than to rely on individual accounts of all 
stages of the negotiations to ascertain the most important controversies and themes 
concerning the institutional design of the ICC. Yet as Cherif Bassiouni pointed out in the 
context of observers of the Rome Conference, “personal views stem from the perspective 
of how they [experts or those who were involved in the drafting of specific provisions of 
the Rome Statute] perceived the intended purpose of each specific provision and its 
contextual relationship to related provisions.”14 This is a point that bears repeating since 
the literatures on the Rome Statute negotiations fundamentally depend on the 
intersubjective perspectives of particular individuals, rather than objective facts.  
Several works have documented the complex process of the Rome Statute 
negotiations in 1998. For example, Philippe Kirsch and John Holmes provided an account 
of how the negotiations unfolded in Rome.15 Philippe Kirsch was a member of the 
Canadian delegation and served as Chair of the Conference. Holmes was also a part of 
the Canadian delegation and took a leading role with respect to the provisions regarding 
complementarity. Kirsch and Holmes focused on the most controversial aspects of the 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, 
Negotiations, Results (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), vii. 
14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Preface to the 2nd ed.,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (C.H. Beck, Hart, 
Nomos, 2008), xxvi. 
15 Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process,” The American Journal of International Law 93.1 (1999), 2-12. 
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Statute as being most important to the success of the Rome Diplomatic Conference–that 
is, the political issues: the role of the Security Council in relation to the Court; the 
inclusion of aggression among the core crimes covered by the statute; how the 
jurisdiction of the Court could be triggered; the power of the Prosecutor to initiate 
proceedings proprio motu; the inclusion of terrorism and drug trafficking; and the 
inclusion of nuclear weapons among the list of weapons prohibited by the statute.16 Based 
on this list of controversial statutory elements, it is apparent that the influence of 
realpolitik heavily affected the institutional design of the ICC, since almost all of these 
components involved the United Nations Security Council (especially the permanent five 
members, or ‘P5’) directly or indirectly–a point that is highlighted by most scholars 
seeking to explain the outcome of the Rome Statute negotiations.17 To this point, Louise 
Arbour described the history of the ICC negotiations by article, with a particular 
emphasis on the inclusion of Security Council powers–i.e. to refer and defer cases at the 
ICC. She explained, “Many of the concerns surrounding the nature and parameters of the 
Security Council’s relationship to the ICC were raised at the negotiating stage of the 
Rome Statute… many delegates expressed concern that, should the two bodies be too 
closely linked, the ICC could become subject to political maneuvering that would 
undermine its independence and credibility.”18 
Philippe Kirsch explained that groups of states–particularly the Like-Minded 
Group (i.e. the sixty plus states that wanted an independent and effective ICC) and its 
engagement with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the permanent members of 
the Security Council, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)–largely structured the 
controversies and ideological conflicts at the Rome Diplomatic Conference. He said that 
“[t]he interaction of these groups and their competing views shaped the resulting 
 
16 Kirsch and Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court,” 4. For another account 
of contentious issues taken up in Rome, see also Ronald J. Glossop, “Creating an International Criminal 
Court: Giant Step Forward for World Law,” Peace Research 31.1 (1999): 1-12. 
17 See Lionel Yee, “The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16,” in 
The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, ed. Roy 
S. Lee (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 143-152. 
18 Louise Arbour, “The Relationship Between the ICC and the UN Security Council,” Global Governance 
20.2 (2014): 196. 
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Statute.”19 Observers most often credit the role of the Like-Minded Group, largely 
consisting of middle power and weaker states, as an effective counter to the political 
power wielded by the P5.   
The literature has made clear that several delegations in Rome were forced to 
make compromises with respect to the final version of the Statute. As Rome Statute 
observer Otto Triffterer explained,  
the only alternative to the establishment of a permanent ICC by the Rome Statute 
would have been the failure of the Conference, in spite of decades of 
comprehensive preparations, endeavours and various proposals. A compromise 
therefore, was required in many cases… Closing the Conference without the 
adoption of a Statute for the ICC would have delayed the whole idea for decades, 
if not destroyed it altogether. Nobody dared to carry the responsibility for thus 
refusing the mandate conferred to the Conference by the General Assembly.20 
This observation serves as an analytical basis to question ‘how much compromise 
is too much compromise.’ The institutional design of the Rome Statute reflects 
quintessentially important design features, particularly as a consequence of balancing the 
interests of powerful states with smaller coalitions or blocs of states that wanted a strong, 
independent ICC. Other Rome Statute participants such as Kirsch have similarly 
explained that “[t]he Statute is not a perfect instrument; it is the product of international 
negotiations on a sensitive subject between diverse groups. It includes uneasy technical 
solutions, awkward formulations and difficult compromises. But it is a balanced 
instrument, strong enough to ensure the effective functioning of the Court and with 
sufficient safeguards to foster broad support among States.”21 Other participants and 
observers have made similar claims. For example, the Canadian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs at the time of the Rome Statute negotiations, Lloyd Axworthy, said that “The 
 
19 Philippe Kirsch, “Introduction,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 
2008), xxxviii. 
20 Otto Triffterer, “Preliminary Remarks: The permanent ICC – Ideal and Reality,” in Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. 
Otto Triffterer (C.H. Beck, Hart, and Nomos, 2008), 36. 
21 Kirsch, “Introduction,” xli. 
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Rome Statute is by no means a perfect document and it will need a great deal of refining 
in the years ahead.”22 It is these imperfections that guide the research project herein.   
One form of compromise in the Rome Statute was to make use of ambiguous 
language to satisfy opposing factions during the negotiations. This strategy has been 
referred to in the literature as ‘constructive’ or ‘creative’ ambiguity.23 To be sure, early 
commentators on the Rome Diplomatic Conference tend to credit the diplomatic 
solutions and compromises made as fundamental to the successful negotiation of the 
Rome Statute and ultimately conceptualize the approach taken by the drafters as both 
effective and necessary for the success of the final package presented to governments for 
up and down vote in Rome.24 As observers Kirsch and Robinson pointed out, if the 
strongest possible statute was put forward, it would have received very little political or 
financial support, and would have received significant opposition from states.25 As such, 
it appears that the drafters of the Rome Statute were aware that the final document did not 
facilitate the strongest possible ICC, but this was indeed a strategic and diplomatic 
 
22 Ibid., 205. 
23 See Valerie Oosterveld, “The Definition of ‘Gender’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?” Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 
(2005): 55-84; Valerie Oosterveld, “Constructive Ambiguity and the Meaning of ‘Gender’ for the 
International Criminal Court,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 16.4 (2014): 563-580; David 
Hunt, “The International Criminal Court: high hopes, ‘creative ambiguity’ and an unfortunate mistrust in 
international judges,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2.1 (2004): 56-70; Leena Grover, “A Call 
to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court,” European Journal of International Law 21.3 (2010): 543-583; Michael 
Scharf, “The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court,” Cornell 
International Law Journal 32.3 (1999): 522, Scharf stated that Philippe Kirsch described in a personal 
interview that ‘creative ambiguity’ was an approach to unresolved issues during the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference. These were issues that were left up to the prosecutor and judges of the ICC to interpret (in the 
context of the article, the issue of amnesty). For literature that makes use of ambiguity in treaties, see also 
David McDowall, “Clarity or ambiguity? The withdrawal clause of UN Security Council Resolution 242,” 
International Affairs 90.6 (2014): 1367-1381.  
24 See generally Benedetti and Washburn, “Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty,” 33. The 
authors described the uniqueness of the Rome Conference in that it did not end in consensus but rather an 
up and down vote, as part of a take-it or leave-it package deal. The authors explained that “the package is 
clearly a unique tool to overcome indefinite obstruction by those who do not wish to achieve prompt or any 
results. The final broad view in Rome was that the package approach was the only way to achieve a statute 
in five weeks.” See also Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the Rome 
Conference,” in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, eds. 
Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 67-92. 
25 Kirsch and Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference,” 87. 
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decision.26 As Adriaan Bos explained, “the Rome Statute, as negotiated between the 
participating States, reflects the current political forces in the international community. A 
statute that would run counter to what States view as their fundamental common interests 
is a non-starter.”27 The observers of the negotiations have made clear that the Rome 
Statute’s fundamentally political foundation affected its construction in discernable ways. 
This is consistent with the literature surrounding institutionalism, global governance, and 
institutional design, which overwhelmingly points out that the challenge in creating 
international institutions is to “provide adequate assurance to nation-states that their 
interests will not be abused, while at the same time vesting the institutions with the 
independence needed for them to be effective in promoting global well-being.”28 The 
reality that the Rome Statute succeeded without the support of the most powerful states, 
especially the United States, and how that has affected the institutional effectiveness of 
the Court has been a focal preoccupation for many researchers.29 Others have considered 
 
26 See Otto Triffterer, “Part 1. Establishment of the Court, Preliminary Remarks: The Permanent 
International Criminal Court–Ideal and Reality,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court–Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (C.H. Beck, Hart, 
Nomos, 2008), 36. Triffterer explains that the failure of the Rome Diplomatic Conference was not an 
acceptable option for most delegates given the years of work that went into the project. He explains that “A 
compromise, therefore, was required in many cases.” He also explained that the timing was particularly 
good for the success of the Rome Conference, given the growing recognition and acceptance of the work of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda. 
27 Adriaan Bos, “The International Criminal Court: A Perspective,” in The International Criminal Court, 
The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, ed. Roy S. Lee (Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), 464. See also Richard Dicker and Helen Duffy, “National Courts and the ICC,” The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 6.1 (Winter/Spring 1999): 53-63. At p. 63: “Completed after four years of 
complex negotiations, the ICC statute embodies a delicate balance between divergent political interests and 
a synthesis of the world’s legal traditions.”   
28 Cary Coglianese, “Globalization and the Design of International Institutions,” in Governance in a 
Globalizing World: Visions of Governance for the 21st Century, eds. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and John D. 
Donahue (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 298. See also John J. Mearsheimer, “The False 
Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19.3 (Winter 1994-1995): 5-49; Robert O. 
Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20.1 (Summer 
1995): 39-51; John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20.1 (Summer 1995): 82-93. 
29 See generally David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Monroe Leigh, “The United States and the Statute of 
Rome,” The American Journal of International Law 95.1 (2001): 124-131; Marcella David, “Grotius 
Repudiated: The American Objections to the International Criminal Court and the Commitment to 
International Law,” Michigan Journal of International Law 20.2 (1999): 337-412; Andrea Betti, “Slay This 
Monster: The United States and Opposition to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court,” 
Human Rights Review 17.4 (2016): 417-438. For an account provided the head of the U.S. Delegation in 
Rome about the most contentious statutory elements for the United States, See David J. Scheffer, “U.S. 
Policy and the International Criminal Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 32.3 (1999): 529-534. For 
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how this observed inequality between states has in turn affected the equality of 
individuals, especially those before the ICC.30 
With the benefit of hindsight, some scholars have questioned the compromises 
made and the architecture of the Rome Statute as explanatory of the ICC’s institutional 
weaknesses. For example, William Schabas opined that “[t]here is as yet not much soul-
searching about the role of that the Rome Conference, for all of its glory, may have 
played in the creation of an institution whose achievements remain a disappointment. 
Perhaps the architecture of the Court has some serious flaws. Possibly some of the 
compromises were not as brilliant as was once thought.”31 This is precisely the 
intellectual space that this dissertation occupies–linking the compromises made at the 
Rome Diplomatic Conference to the problems that some African states have identified 
with the ICC throughout the course of its operationalization. In many respects, one of the 
motivating questions that guides this research project can be reduced to ‘how much 
compromise is too much compromise?’  
Some works have considered similar questions in the African context. For 
example, Lucrecia García Iommi posited that “the absence of meaningful engagement 
with issues germane to some ICC stakeholders before and during the Rome Conference 
 
a comparative analysis, see Martijn Groenleer, “The United States, the European Union, and the 
International Criminal Court: Similar values, different interests?” International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 13.4 (2015): 923-944. See also Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2013): “The tragedy of the ICC is its incapacity to exercise political jurisdiction 
over great powers, thus, creating a permanent two-tier justice system in which strong states use global 
institutions to discipline the weak.” See also Caroline Fehl, “Explaining the International Criminal Court: A 
‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches,” European Journal of International 
Relations 10.3 (2004): 357-394, at 357: “Regarding institutional design, rationalist theory helps identify a 
tradeoff between a weak court backed by the US and a strong court without US support; a complementary 
constructivist approach can explain why states opted for the latter.” See also Steven C. Roach, Governance, 
Order, and the International Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); Caroline Fehl, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European 
Responses to US Unilateralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Part II: Case Studies (5), The 
International Criminal Court; Stephen C. Roach, Politicizing the International Criminal Court: The 
Convergence of Politics, Ethics, and Law (Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006).  
30 Sarah M.H. Nouwen, “Legal Equality on Trial: Sovereigns and Individuals Before the International 
Criminal Court,” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 43 (December 2012): 151-181. 
31 William Schabas, “The dynamics of the Rome Conference,” in The Elgar Companion to the 
International Criminal Court, eds. Margaret deGuzman and Valerie Oosterveld (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., 2020), 19. See also Mégret, “The Rome Conference,” 22: “the adoption of the Statute was not the 
victory that it is sometimes described as being, as much as a complex compromise that contained what have 
turned out to be many potentialities as well as some severe limitations.” 
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facilitated the adoption of the Rome Statute, but also plausibly created difficulties for the 
Court in the long run… it postponed unavoidable conflict over contentious issues and 
undermined the likelihood that specific stakeholders would develop a sense of ownership 
over the Statute.”32 From a different point of view, Line Engbo Gissel conducted a study 
looking at the preferences of African states towards the ICC as expressed in the 
statements of diplomats made to the United Nations General Assembly from 1993-
2003.33 She concluded that African states wanted a very different kind of Court than the 
one that was ultimately established. She focused on key areas of departure, namely: 
understandings of universality, participation, complementarity, court independence and 
sovereign equality. Max du Plessis and Christopher Gevers have similarly focused on 
what they refer to as Africa’s ‘four fears’–that is, the understandings upon which African 
states supported the establishment of the ICC in Rome, which they reduced to the 
following: (1) the Prosecutor should be able to initiate investigations without interference 
from States or the Security Council; (2) the Court should contribute to furthering the 
equality of States; (3) the Court should be an effective complement to national criminal 
justice systems and respect the complementary nature of its relationship with such 
national systems; and (4) the Court should contribute to the attainment of international 
peace.34  Thus, some scholars have considered how the outcomes in Rome have affected 
African perceptions of the ICC and the general conclusions hint at the role of sovereignty 
and the hierarchy of states as both a statutory and operational weakness of the Court.   
 
 
32 Lucrecia García Iommi, “Al-Bashir didn’t start the fire: diversity, low contestedness, and the adoption of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 34.1 
(2021): 105-136. 
33 Line Engbo Gissel, “A Different Kind of Court: Africa’s Support for the International Criminal Court, 
1993-2003,” The European Journal of International Law 29.3 (2018): 725-748. 
34 Max du Plessis and Christopher Gevers, “The Sum of Four Fears: African States and the International 
Criminal Court in Retrosepct–Part I,” OpinioJuris (7 August 2019), blogpost available at 
https://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/08/the-sum-of-four-fears-african-states-and-the-international-criminal-
court-in-retrospect-part-i/; accessed 1 April 2021; Max du Plessis and Christopher Geveres, “The Sum of 
Four Fears: African States and the International Criminal Court in Retrospect – Part II,” OpinioJuris (7 
August 2019), blogpost available at https://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/08/the-sum-of-four-fears-african-states-
and-the-international-criminal-court-in-retrospect-part-ii/; accessed 1 April 2021 [emphasis in original]. 
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3.2 African Involvement in the Rome Statute
 Negotiations 
Some literatures offer a more nuanced and/or personalized perspective of the direct 
involvement of particular participants and/or groups of participants in the Rome Statute 
negotiation processes.35 Most relevant for the purposes of this research project, Sivu 
Maqungo and Phakiso Mochochoko have each provided an account of the important role 
taken by African states, African groups of states, particularly the South African 
Development Community, and African delegates within the Rome Statute negotiations 
from the earliest stages of its ideational development, based on their own personal 
involvement and experience in the processes.36 Indeed, most detailed commentaries of 
the Rome Statute negotiations have acknowledged the fundamentally important role 
taken by African states and Africans in the negotiation processes, with a primary 
acknowledgement of the important role taken on by the South African Development 
Community (SADC), as well as the regional meeting that resulted in the passing of the 
Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998–
though with mixed degrees of detail and explanatory depth.37 
In the context of NGO involvement in Africa throughout the Rome Statute 
negotiations, Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn explained that the NGO Human Rights 
 
35 See generally Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Each 
chapter was written by those with the most first-hand engagement and experience in the drafting of the 
article under discussion.  
36 Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo, “The African contribution towards the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court,” African Yearbook of International Law 8.1 (2000), 333-350; Phakiso Mochochoko, 
“Africa and the International Criminal Court,” in African Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 
eds. Evelyn A. Ankumah and Edward K. Kwakwa (Accra: Africa Legal Aid, 2005). 
37 See for example Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, “Africa and the International Criminal Court: Then and 
Now,” in Africa and the International Criminal Court, eds. Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, and Moritz 
Vormbaum (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014): 14-15. The author describes that “African States participated very 
actively during the whole process.” She details the developments of SADC and the regional conference in 
Dakar, as well as the role that Africans played during the course of the negotiations in Rome. But see Bos, 
“From the International Law Commission to the Rome Conference,” 52-53: discussions of controversial 
elements of the draft statute that emerged during the meetings of the Sixth Committee on the ICC were 
discussed during meetings of the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee, which was another form of 
increased participation in the negotiation processes on the continent. Bos also highlighted the important 
role of SADC and associated conferences that promoted cooperation and coordination of a common 
position for the establishment of an ICC.  
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Watch played a particularly supportive role and helped SADC states organize its 
Regional Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Pretoria 
in September 1997; the government of Senegal and the NGO No Peace Without Justice 
convened an ‘African Conference on the International Criminal Court’ in Dakar in 
February 1998.38 The authors also explained that Human Rights Watch and other NGOs 
“provided funds for developing countries’ legal advisers to attend the intersessional 
meeting in Syracuse. This allowed for some African delegates to participate more 
effectively in the negotiations and to associate themselves with the results of the Syracuse 
meetings.”39 For context, the Syracuse meeting was sponsored by Cherif Bassiouni and 
was intended to continue the advancement of the draft statute between formal 
negotiations and facilitate engagement between NGOs and state delegates in the interim 
period. It is important to note that this literature establishes that NGOs played a 
significant role in supporting and coordinating African engagement in the Rome Statute 
negotiations throughout much of the diplomatic processes in the pre-Rome period. It has 
also been pointed out that “Some 90 African organisations joined the NGO Coalition for 
an International Criminal Court (CICC). They lobbied in their respective countries for the 
early establishment of an independent and effective international criminal court.”40 
  Some literatures acknowledge African participation in the Rome Conference but 
fail to provide the amount of depth necessary for any substantive analysis of that 
participation. To illustrate this point, former ICC Judge Geoffrey Henderson said that “A 
careful historical review of the negotiations at Rome must acknowledge the strong and 
active participation of African States in the drafting and adoption of the Rome Statute… 
African states actively participated in the debates and did so with high level participants 
as their delegations were led by Attorney Generals, Ministers of Justice and Ministers of 
 
38 Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court, 82. 
39 Ibid., 83. See also Bos, “From the International Law Commission to the Rome Conference,” 53: “In 
order to stimulate still more participation, a proposal was… submitted to the General Assembly, for the 
establishment of a special fund for the participation of the least developed countries in the work of the 
PrepCom. States were requested to contribute voluntarily to the Special Fund. In 1997, thanks to 
contributions from Canada, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands, the Fund had about US $340,000 at its 
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Foreign Affairs.”41 ICC Judge Kimberly Prost similarly highlighted what she identified as 
“the important role that African States and Africans played in the adoption of the ICC 
Statute.”42 Max du Plessis opined that “The high ideals and hard work that marked 
African states’ participation in bringing the ICC to life in Rome should not too easily be 
forgotten.”43 Others have pointed out that forty-seven of the fifty-four African states 
attended the Rome Diplomatic Conference.44  
Notwithstanding this, other literatures have viewed African participation in the 
Rome Statute negotiations through a much more critical lens. For example, other 
literatures contend that “it cannot be overlooked that many African states and NGOs 
actively participated in the development of the Rome Statute. However, cloaked in the 
universalist language of the ICC, relations of dominance have privileged particular norms 
of ‘juridical justice’ over others. The reality is that during the negotiations on the Rome 
Statute, politically ‘weak’ states were rarely in positions to overpower ‘stronger’ ones.”45 
In order to fill in the necessary gaps and inconsistencies in the narrative, others 
have outlined why and how Africans were interested and involved in the creation of an 
ICC. In this vein, Phakiso Mochochoko, the Head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity 
and Cooperation Division at the ICC at the time of writing, and a former diplomat from 
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Republic as a sovereign state. At the time of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, South Sudan had not yet 
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three African states attended the Rome Conference.     
45 Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus, and Eefje de Volder, “Africa and the ICC: An Introduction,” in 
Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice, eds. Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11, 12-13. 
35 
 
Lesotho at the time of the Rome Statute negotiations, has explained that African support 
for an ICC was rooted in a desire to combat gross violations of human rights, which was 
understood to be inextricably linked to the goal of proliferating regional peace and 
security, including socioeconomic and political security–what he referred to as the 
‘rebirth of Africa’ in the new millennium.46 In this sense, African support for an ICC was 
linked to the primary objective of regional economic development, which Mochochoko 
argues can be eroded by political instability, violence, and civil war. Thus, he argued that 
“[i]nvestigating and prosecuting those responsible for serious crimes was amongst the 
measures that could be taken if Africans were to succeed in making Africa a safe haven 
for foreign investment and greater economic prosperity.”47 This account hints that 
African interest in the ICC project was rooted in the self-interest of states. With this 
historical context in mind, Mochochoko detailed the involvement of ‘Africa’ throughout 
the Rome Statute negotiation processes through several lenses. First, he described the role 
of African NGOs. Second, he highlighted the importance of SADC, particularly its 
formulation of ten basic negotiating principles for the establishment of an ICC in 1997. 
Third, he drew attention to the significance of the African Conference on the ICC, which 
resulted in the Dakar Declaration in 1998. Last, he explained how the then-Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers directed its Member States to support the 
creation of the ICC.48  
In the context of the Rome Conference itself, it was explained that African 
delegates had the SADC Principles and the Dakar Declaration at their disposal, both of 
which were compatible with the principles of the Like-Minded Group. As such, it was 
explained that “African delegates thus joined the so-called ‘like minded group’ whose 
diverse nature made it clear that support for and opposition to an effective Court was not 
a North South dispute.”49 Like former Judge Henderson, Mochochoko pointed out that 
Africans took leading roles throughout the negotiations by either chairing or coordinating 
 
46 Phakiso Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” in African Perspectives on 
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48 Ibid., 249. 
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various issues. For example, Egypt chaired the Drafting Committee, South Africa chaired 
the working group on the Composition of the Court, Malawi coordinated articles on 
cooperation, Tanzania coordinated discussions on the crime of aggression, and Lesotho 
chaired the Committee of the Whole and chaired the working group on international 
cooperation and judicial assistance.50 This account provided the necessary context to 
grasp how and why the level of engagement on the part of African governments and 
African delegates was so high throughout the Rome Diplomatic Conference. This account 
similarly explains the significance of that engagement for ‘Africa’ and the Rome 
Conference more generally.  
Other literatures focus on more particular African entities and efforts throughout 
the negotiation processes. For example, former South African delegate Sivu Maqungo 
provided a specific and detailed account of SADC’s engagement in the negotiation 
processes by explaining the role and participation of SADC in the Rome Statute 
negotiations before, during, and after Rome.51 Writing in 2000, Maqungo interrogated 
why, despite longstanding commitment to the Rome Statute during and pre-Rome, no 
SADC state had yet ratified the statute. Tracing SADC participation in the establishment 
of an ICC, Maqungo detailed that SADC states initially chose to negotiate in Rome as a 
bloc because “[i]t had been quite clear that, in order to make an impact on these 
multilateral negotiations, SADC states had to speak with one voice and thus negotiate as 
a bloc rather than as ‘small’ individual states.”52 This decision resulted in the 
development of SADC’s ten negotiating principles for the establishment of an ICC, 
which Maqungo described as an “instruction manual for SADC’s negotiations.”53 In 
 
50 Ibid. See also Monageng, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” 14: “At the Rome Conference, 
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order to implement SADC’s principles to the greatest extent possible, SADC delegates 
sought to occupy “strategic positions within the political structures in the conference.”54 
Linking this account back to the list of positions occupied by African delegates provided 
by Mochochoko, the fact that each of the listed delegations except Egypt belonged to 
SADC can be rightly contextualized and better understood. Importantly, however, 
Maqungo further enriched an account of African involvement throughout the negotiation 
process by explaining how SADC mobilized its influence over other groupings within 
Africa, specifically the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, and other 
African states generally.55 Adding to the initial list of important positions enumerated by 
Mochochoko, Maqungo added that Namibia was the coordinator of African states with 
the Non-Aligned Movement group, and Zambia was a member of the Credentials 
Committee of the conference.56 This account planted the seed to better understand how 
African states intended to shift the balance of the hierarchy of states throughout the 
negotiation process, which was clearly described as intentional.  
Indeed, scholars such as Christopher Rudolph have emphasized that a state’s 
acceptance of its place in the “hierarchy of international society” was a relevant factor for 
understanding national preferences and interests throughout the Rome Statute 
negotiations, since the ICC’s “design had such potentially dramatic implications for 
international order.”57 This assertion is firmly linked to the conclusion made by Gissel 
that “the creation of the ICC was never solely about justice; it was also about sovereign 
inequality and global order.”58 Jalloh and Bantekas similarly opined that “in 
decolonization, the claim of post-colonial governments was not confined merely to the 
establishment of independent states but invoked also the ability to formulate rules of 
international law, whether or regional or universal value, as well as to partake in global 
decision-making; the same is true today in respect of African states in their power 
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struggle with Western superpowers.”59 In this sense, the literature has situated the ICC 
negotiations (and the resultant Court) within the broader political context that shaped 
African diplomacy towards the establishment of the ICC in the 1990s and beyond.  
In seeking to explain why SADC states had not yet ratified the Statute, Maqungo 
highlighted the most contentious elements and their compatibility with the SADC 
principles. Based on this account, the biggest compromises for SADC states were about 
the ICC’s jurisdiction (SADC states preferred universal jurisdiction) and the role of the 
Security Council (SADC states preferred that the only role for the Security Council was 
to refer matters to the prosecutor–deferral capabilities were thus a compromise position). 
It was explained that “the draft Statute was not the best result that SADC would have 
hoped for,” but nevertheless, SADC states accepted it at the end of the conference as a 
package deal.60 The way SADC states worked to convince other African states to accept 
the package deal was further explained by Maqungo in a subsequent article.61 Indeed, the 
decision to accept the final version of the statute is compatible with the account provided 
by Kirsch, since he explained that no state or groups of states were wholly satisfied with 
the final text, yet most accepted it anyway. However, Maqungo’s account of SADC’s 
regional mobilization to accept the final package enriches the explanation as to why 
states did ultimately accept the final text, especially African states. 
In looking to explain why SADC states did not readily ratify the Rome Statute, 
Maqungo opined that SADC states had not yet done so in 2000 because they took the 
obligation to implement and enforce the treaty seriously and needed to continue to 
formulate a strategy to this end. This was supported by the fact that SADC held a one-
week conference in July 1999 to develop a model for how to implement the Rome Statute 
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into domestic law.62 In a related vein, Max du Plessis described that SADC state South 
Africa was the first African state to implement the Rome Statute into domestic legislation 
and sought to provide a regional model to this end.63 Taken together, this history provides 
a more holistic view as to why South Africa took a leading role in this regard.     
 
3.2.1 African Commitment to the Rome Statute 
There is a growing literature that seeks to answer why states choose to become 
States Parties to the Rome Statute/ICC, since doing so imposes tremendous 
sovereignty costs onto states.64 This bears particular relevance in the African 
context, since African states comprise the largest regional bloc of members to the 
Court. As du Plessis has pointed out, the ICC is “a court which counts amongst its 
members such a significant coterie of African nations that Africa today is the 
largest regional bloc represented at the ICC. After the statute was completed, in 
February 1999 Senegal become [sic] the first state party to ratify the Rome 
Statute. Steadily following suit were a host of African states parties so that today 
the court enjoys–at least on paper–significant support in the region.”65 Similar to 
the literature on the Rome Statute negotiations, many works acknowledge the 
comparatively high levels of commitment to the Rome Statute among African 
states, but few substantively analyze or else seek to explain this commitment.66  
 
62 Maqungo, “The establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC’s participation in the 
negotiations,” 42. 
63 Max du Plessis, “South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute: An African Example,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 5.2 (2007): 460-479. See also Max du Plessis, “South Africa’s International 
Criminal Court Act: Countering genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity,” Institute for Security 
Studies Paper 172 (November 2008). See also Max du Plessis and Jolyon Ford, Unable or unwilling? Case 
studies on domestic implementation of the ICC Statute in selected African countries (Institute for Security 
Studies Monograph Series, No. 141, March 2008).  
64 See Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal 
Court,” International Organization 64.2 (2010): 225-256. See also Terrence L. Chapman and Stephen 
Chaudoin, “Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court,” International Studies Quarterly 
57.2 (2013): 400-409. For an example from the human rights literature, see Oona A. Hathaway, “Why Do 
Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51.4 (2007): 558-621. See 
also Richard A. Nielsen and Beth A. Simmons, “Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the 
International Human Rights Regime?” International Studies Quarterly 59.2 (2015): 197-208. 
65 du Plessis, “The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants,” 21. 
66 See for example Tim Murithi, “Between Political Justice and Judicial Politics: Charting a Way Forward 
for the African Union and the International Criminal Court,” in Africa and the International Criminal 
Court, eds. Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, and Moritz Vormbaum (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 
40 
 
Scholars such as Vilmer claim that African commitment to the Rome 
Statute “can be traced to the end of the Cold War, when newly independent 
African countries sought to demonstrate a commitment to good governance and 
membership of the ‘new world order’ by signing international treaties.”67 While 
this offers some explanatory value, it fails to adequately interrogate why newly 
independent states might be willing to give up any amount of sovereignty. 
Referring to the explanation provided by Mochochoko, it might be for reasons of 
self-interest; that is, to promote socioeconomic development and regional 
stability.68 Other reasons might include an aim to achieve “the goal of ridding the 
continent of its deserved reputation as a collage of despots, crackpots and hotspots 
where impunity for too long has followed serious human rights violations.”69 Yet, 
it is important to consider the hypothesis presented by Maqungo that “[i]t is 
expected that SADC states, due to the contribution they made in the process to 
establish the ICC, will be among the first sixty states to ratify the Statute of the 
Court.”70 This explanation links political and normative commitment–at least on 
the part of SADC states–to explain the potential reason(s) for ratification. 
Relying on the human rights literature, scholars such as Goldsmith and 
Posner have argued that most states ratify multilateral treaties because of a 
‘coincidence of interest’–in other words, ratifying human rights treaties “often 
requires many of the parties to do nothing different from what they have done in 
the past.”71  Oona Hathaway has posited that treaty ratification can best be 
explained by considering the domestic constraints it places on states. She argued 
that “states with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to commit to 
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human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records because there is little 
prospect that the treaties will be enforced. Conversely, states with more 
democratic institutions will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties if 
they have poor human rights records–precisely because treaties are likely to lead 
to changes in behavior.”72 
Others point out that the ICC operates under the principle of 
complementarity: i.e. that it is complementary to national justice systems and can 
only intervene if a state is unwilling or unable to prosecute international crimes. 
Therefore, the intent is to bolster national criminal justice responses, ultimately 
reducing overall sovereignty costs. As John Holmes has explained, “ironically, 
the provisions of the Rome Statute itself contemplate an institution that may never 
be employed.”73 In a similar vein, Anne-Marie Slaughter said that:  
One of the most powerful arguments for the ICC is not that it will be a 
global instrument of justice itself–arresting and trying tyrants and torturers 
worldwide–but that it will be a backstop and trigger domestic forces for 
justice and democracy. By posing a choice–either a nation tries its own or 
they will be tried in The Hague–it strengthens the hand of domestic parties 
seeking such trials, allowing them to wrap themselves in a nationalist 
mantle.74  
Former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo similarly explained that “as a 
consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should 
not measure its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, 
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as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a 
major success.”75 On this basis, the literature on complementarity mitigates 
sovereignty concerns to a sizable degree.  
However, in the context of the Rome Statute and African states, there 
were/are reasonable concerns about the capacity of national legal institutions to 
adequately respond to international criminal law violations and ratification often 
required/requires significant change in behavior. It is perhaps even more 
important to note, as scholars have, that domestic institutional failure/collapse 
would actually increase the chances of the treaty being enforced–that is, for the 
ICC to intervene due to the national states’ inability to respond to violations of 
international criminal law therefore increasing the associated sovereignty costs.76 
Some have proposed that weak states ratified the Rome Statute to increase 
development aid and/or assistance because “[p]oorer states might have seen the 
Rome Statute as a key to unlock greater flows of official development assistance 
(ODA), even while intellectuals and government advisers in the Global South 
might have seen the ICC’s mandate as an extension of the West’s neocolonial 
projects.”77  
Such claims have been discredited in the human rights literature, which 
could have analogous application in the international criminal law discourse.78 
This is supported by Mochochoko who explained that:  
Contrary to the view that the ICC was shoved through the throats of 
unwilling Africans who were dragged screaming and shouting to Rome 
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and who had no alternative but to follow their Western Masters under the 
threat of withholding of economic aid if they did not follow, the historical 
developments leading up to the establishment of the Court portray an 
international will of which Africa was a part, to enforce humanitarian 
norms and to bring to justice those responsible for the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community.79 
On this basis, it becomes clear that the Africans who participated and published 
about their experience in the establishment of the ICC (i.e. Mochochoko and 
Maqungo) emphasize the authenticity of African involvement in the enterprise 
and the normative valuation of the project that undergirds and helps to explain the 
comparatively high levels of commitment on the part of ‘Africa.’ However, both 
of these accounts emanate from experience within SADC (Mochochoko 
represented Lesotho; Maqungo, South Africa) and this could be viewed as 
problematic for the formation of a regional explanatory account. Indeed, there is 
no monolithic ‘African’ experience or position and the lack of literature from 
outside of SADC can be reasonably framed as a significant gap that is at least 
worth pointing out.    
Other scholars have provided more ‘generalizable’ theories about why 
states (including African states) ratify the Rome Statute. For example, Simmons 
and Danner have explained Rome Statute ratification in terms of “credible 
commitments theory.” The authors argued that states that are the most and least 
likely to experience ICC intervention have most readily committed to the Court. 
Conversely, states with credible means to conduct international criminal law trials 
have not. The authors argue that “ratification of the ICC is associated with 
tentative steps towards violence reduction and peace in those countries precisely 
least likely to be able to commit credibly to foreswear atrocities.”80  
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Chapman and Chaudoin reach a different conclusion and argue that 
“countries for whom compliance is likely to be easiest–democracies with little 
internal violence–are the most likely countries to join the ICC. On the other hand, 
countries with the most to fear from ICC prosecution, nondemocracies with weak 
legal systems and a history of domestic political violence, tend to avoid 
ratification.”81 This argument falls in line with the coincidence of interest 
argument promoted by Goldsmith and Posner, but does not do a sufficient job of 
explaining why African states comprise the largest regional bloc of States Parties 
to the Rome Statute. The authors acknowledge and accept this theoretical 
incompatibility and term it the “Sub-Saharan Africa Exception.”82 What Chapman 
and Chaudoin do provide, however, is a theoretical explanation for this exception 
through an examination of domestic political factors or motivations for Rome 
Statute ratification in African contexts. The authors raise the important point that 
African leaders may commit to the Rome Statute for their own political interests 
and purposes, that is that they “are trying to make a strong commitment to 
prosecute, without necessarily committing to being prosecuted.”83 This has 
particular application in African states that have instrumentalized the ICC to 
prosecute rebels or warlords while simultaneously insulating the sitting 
government. Indeed, the political instrumentalization of the ICC by African 
leaders has started to occupy an important space in the literature that seeks to 
explain ongoing African commitment to the Rome Statute, despite widespread 
criticism and opposition from the African Union (AU) and some African states.84    
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3.3 The Decline of the Africa-ICC Relationship: head of 
 state immunity, selectivity, bias, and double-standards  
A proliferation of literature on the relationship between Africa and the ICC started to 
emerge following the ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and the 
African Union’s direct opposition to those indictments. Al-Bashir was a sitting head of 
state of a non-States Party (Sudan) at the time that the arrest warrant was issued by way 
of referral by the United Nations Security Council. The African Union strongly opposed 
the ICC’s indictment of a sitting head of state for legal reasons, claiming that it is a 
violation of customary international law, and also for political reasons, claiming that the 
decision to indict al-Bashir disrupted sensitive peace processes that were underway in 
Darfur.85 Thus, the AU adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the ICC for the arrest 
and surrender of al-Bashir and obliged its member states to allow indicted leaders onto 
their territory in order to facilitate regional peace and security goals. The literature can be 
largely parsed into works that consider the following issues: (a) the legality of ICC 
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Sara Kendall, “‘UhuRuto’ and Other Leviathans: The International Criminal Court and the Kenyan 
Political Order,” African Journal of Legal Studies 7.3 (2014): 399-427; Phil Clark, Distant Justice: The 
Impact of the International Criminal Court on African Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018). 
85 See for example Ilias Bantekas, “Sequencing Peace and Justice in Post-Conflict Africa,” in The 
International Criminal Court and Africa, eds. Charles Chernor Jalloh and Ilias Bantekas (Oxford: Oxford 
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indictments against sitting heads of state;86 (b) evaluations of the political 
appropriateness of such indictments as they relate to peace and justice objectives;87 (c) 
normative evaluations about the AU’s response to such indictments with respect to claims 
of selectivity, bias, and double-standards;88 (d) analyses seeking to explain why some 
African states chose to prioritize their obligations to the AU over the ICC by refusing to 
arrest and surrender indicted suspects (particularly Omar al-Bashir, former President of 
Sudan) to the Court and the related nexus of competing obligations and duties.89    
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Jessica Needham, “Protection or Prosecution for Omar Al Bashir? Changing State of Immunity in 
International Criminal Law,” Auckland University Law Review 17 (2011): 219-248; Sophie Papillon, “Has 
the United Nations Security Council Implicitly Removed Al-Bashir’s Immunity?” International Criminal 
Law Review 10.2 (2010): 275-288. 
87 See generally Allard Duursma and Tanja R Müller, “The ICC indictment against Al-Bashir and its 
repercussions for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Darfur,” Third World Quarterly 40.5 
(2019): 890-907. The authors argue that the ICC indictment against Al-Bashir can not only be detrimental 
to peace efforts but also “negatively affect everyday practices of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers.”  
88 See generally Dire Tladi, “Of Heroes and Villains, Angels and Demons: The ICC-AU Tension 
Revisited,” German Yearbook of International Law 60 (2017): 43-68; Max du Plessis, Charles Chernor 
Jalloh, and Dapo Akande, “Assessing the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court,” African Journal of Legal Studies 4.1 (2011): 5-50; Christa-Gaye Kerr, 
“Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC: Legitimacy Undermined,” Michigan Journal of International 
Law 41.1 (2020): 195-225; Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “The International Criminal Court and the Warrant of 
Arrest for Sudan’s President Al-Bashir: A Crucial Step Towards Challenging Impunity or a Political 
Decision?” Nordic Journal of International Law 78.3 (2009): 397-431; Simon M Weldehaimanot, 
“Arresting Al-Bashir: The African Union’s Opposition and the Legalities,” African Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 19.2 (2011): 208-235. 
89 See generally Franziska Boehme, “‘We Chose Africa’: South Africa and the Regional Politics of 
Cooperation with the International Criminal Court,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 11.1 
(2017): 50-70; Crystal Mokoena Untalimile and Ademola Oluborode Jegede, “Politics or Law: Reflections 
on the aftermath of the Omar Al-Bashir saga and South Africa’s intended withdrawal from the ICC,” 
47 
 
 Others have focused on explaining the reasons why the relationship between the 
AU, some African states, and the ICC began to decline.90 In making sense of African 
discontent towards the ICC, scholars have identified the significance of “Africa’s tortured 
place in geopolitics.”91 It has been pointed out that “[e]qually important is the need for 
sensitivity to the history of Africa’s troubled relationship with international law and how 
the impact of the power structure of the international system on the ICC shapes how the 
ICC is perceived in Africa.”92 In this vein, Mutua argued that “[i]n my view, the ICC will 
not be able to blunt the charges of a racist agenda if it cannot produce indictments of 
senior officials from continents other than Africa.”93 Such a view is not wholly 
sympathetic with the AU position, but also acknowledges the reality of the ICC’s 
behaviour that validates regional criticisms and tugs at historical and emotional 
sensitivities in many respects.  
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Aside from these more political considerations, it is also worth noting that some 
scholars have agreed with the AU position regarding al-Bashir’s immunity under 
customary international law,94 while others have provided legal pathways intended to 
strip al-Bashir’s alleged immunity. For example, some have argued that the Security 
Council referral made Sudan a de facto States Party to the ICC.95 Others say that under 
customary international law, immunities do not apply to core international crimes such as 
those covered by the Rome Statute, regardless of jurisdiction.96 A survey of the literature 
indicates that the immunities issue has been vexing, contentious, and variously 
understood by international legal experts and the ICC as an institution, which has 
exacerbated tensions with the AU and some African states. The formulation of a modality 
to resolve the immunities issue remains a vital priority for the legitimacy of the Court and 
international law (including criminal and customary legal standards).      
 
3.4 The African Union (AU) and the Malabo Protocol: 
 ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ 
There is a growing literature that evaluates the African Union’s steps to 
regionalize international criminal law in Africa through the expansion of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) vis-à-vis the adoption of the 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
 
94 See Gaeta, “Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?”; Gaeta and Labuda, “Trying Sitting 
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Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol). The proposed Malabo Protocol 
grants the regional court jurisdiction over international crimes, including those 
covered in the Rome Statute. This institutional overlap has led some to frame the 
Malabo Protocol in the context of regime complexes, that is, “the way in which 
two or more institutions intersect in terms of their scope and purpose.”97 Scholars 
such as Sirleaf have explained that the ICC’s “institutional crisis created a space 
for regional innovation.”98 Others including Jackson say that the likelihood of the 
creation of regional tribunals with overlapping subject matter jurisdiction with the 
ICC should be expected over time whether regional, multilateral, or bilateral.99  
Some scholars have attempted to explain why the AU would want to regionalize 
international criminal justice in the first place. For example, Tim Murithi opined that “the 
key issue is that the continental body views its relationship with the International 
Criminal Court as having deteriorated to such a point that it is exploring actively how to 
make the Court’s presence in Africa an irrelevancy in the future.”100 In a similar vein, 
Gaeta and Labuda couched the Malabo Protocol as reactive to the Court and more 
particularly as “[o]ne of the surprising consequences of the AU’s conflict with the 
ICC.”101 Few scholars have considered potentiality for the coexistence of the ICC and the 
AU Court.102 Rather, most works have focused on the merits and acceptability of the 
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proposal without considering how regional courts such as the ACJHR could fit within the 
Rome Statute System under the auspices of the complementarity principle.    
To illustrate this point, some scholars have challenged the Malabo Protocol on the 
grounds that it is merely a response to the ICC’s prosecution of African presidents and is 
an attempt to insulate African leaders, since the Malabo Protocol provides immunity for 
sitting heads of state, which is not afforded under the Rome Statute.103 For example, Fred 
Aja Agwu opined that “the African leaders’ decision to imbue the African Court with a 
criminal jurisdiction and ensure a soft landing for those of them that committed heinous 
crimes against their populations raises a red flag for Africa on the standards of 
complementarity in the international criminal justice system, especially as anticipated by 
the Rome Statute that created the ICC.”104 Other scholars have argued that the Malabo 
Protocol’s immunity clause is ‘self-defeating’ because “[i]t calls into question seemingly 
settled norms of customary international law… Moreover, the immunities clause 
contravenes the law of some African countries… which have adapted their internal 
legislation to the Rome Statute. Most seriously, giving immunity to African leaders 
undercuts the AU’s criticisms of the ICC’s system of ‘selective justice’ and suggests that 
the proposed African Court is little more than a thinly veiled attempt to challenge the 
ICC’s authority over high-ranking African politicians.”105 Thus, there is a real concern 
raised in the literature about the intent of the Malabo Protocol and how it relates to 
political insulation for African leaders. 
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On the other hand, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder argued that, “[i]n 
response to opponents of the AU’s initiative to endow the African Court with criminal 
jurisdiction, we argue that the concerns that have been voiced about the intentions of 
African leaders and about possible jurisdictional battles with the ICC are exaggerated… 
the Protocol has express value… even if the Protocol will not enter into force… its 
adoption matters, because it articulates a regional vision on the future of international 
criminal justice.”106 This is consistent with the ‘official AU position,’ which is that “the 
African Court’s wider jurisdictional mandate is not a challenge to the ICC’s authority but 
rather an ‘African solution to African problems.’”107 Kamari Maxine Clarke also drew 
attention to the importance of the Pan-Africanism that undergirds the Malabo Protocol. 
Her study explained “how the drafters of the Malabo Protocol for the ACJHR sought to 
gain authority over the sequencing of peace and justice interventions by discursively 
recalling the deep inequalities in Africa’s histories and infrastructures, while innovating 
new ways for political actors to navigate judicial contexts.”108 As such, Clarke uses the 
immunity provision in Malabo to spin the argument of political insulation on its head by 
emphasizing that such an approach allows for the prioritization of justice responses 
outside of retributive or court-based mechanisms, while simultaneously addressing the 
crimes that are a direct biproduct of the structural inequality that stems from colonialism. 
Thus, scholars have acknowledged that “the postcolonial condition is the one in which 
the globally disenfranchised navigate the international justice system, which still 
consecrates the West as incapable of committing criminal acts.”109 This 
acknowledgement is part of the discourse that surrounds calls for African solutions to 
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African problems and recontextualizes African discontent with the behaviour of the ICC 
and the desire to pursue Afro-centric alternatives.         
3.5 Part II. Theoretical Approach 
As determined from the summary of the literature above, much of the discourse 
surrounding the Rome Statute negotiations is descriptive as opposed to theoretical and/or 
explanatory. In the context of the Africa-ICC relationship, the theoretical literatures tend 
to focus on African criticisms of the Court as such, with little consideration of their 
origins. On this pattern, analyses that consider similar questions to those of the 
dissertation tend to focus on the years after the ICC’s establishment, rather than the pre-
Rome or Rome Conference time period. When works do consider the pre-Rome time 
period, they have failed to consider African positions at the Rome Conference itself, or 
else fail to consider how African conceptualizations of an ideal ICC can be used to 
explain the origins of the criticisms towards the resultant Court. As such, consideration of 
African engagement in the Rome Statute negotiation processes increases the explanatory 
depth and facilitates a better understanding of the criticisms expressed by some African 
states and the African Union towards the Court. It also fosters a greater appreciation of 
the empirical significance of the normative commitment that African states have towards 
the ICC, which at times has superseded rational self-interest and directly informed 
African state behaviour and policy preferences with respect to sustained commitment to 
the Rome Statute.  
It is argued here that the behaviour of African states in relation to the ICC can only 
be sufficiently explained through the use of a constructivist theoretical approach. The 
remainder of this section will unpack why constructivism is the preferred lens though 
which to answer each of the four guiding research questions of the dissertation, over and 
above other less suitable theories of international relations, which have narrowed to 
include realism/rational choice; postcolonialism; and liberal institutionalism/institutional 
design. It is argued that constructivism offers a theoretical basis to both predict and 
explain the behaviour of African states in relation to the ICC based on its inclusion of the 
empirical value of rational, normative, and ideational factors. To frame the remainder of 
the chapter, each of the theoretical approaches that were considered for the purposes of 
the dissertation are outlined below, followed by an explanation as to why constructivism 
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provides a preferable theoretical framework through which to answer the research 
questions herein.  
3.5.1 Liberal Institutionalism  
Liberal institutionalists posit that the international political world is ordered by rules and 
is less anarchic and chaotic than realists suggest. Within international relations theory, 
liberal institutionalists such as Alexrod and Keohane assert that institutions can strongly 
influence cooperation between states.110 International institutions are defined as 
“recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge.”111 While other 
definitions may be possible, the common theme is that institutions determine expectations 
of behaviour. As such, institutions “facilitate significant amounts of cooperation for a 
period of time” and can change the incentives for countries, as well as the strategic 
choices available to states in their own self-interest.112 Quite plainly, liberal 
institutionalism has deep roots in game theory–i.e. the measure of strategic opportunities 
and constraints in decision making. Similar to realists, liberal institutionalists are 
concerned with states as unitary actors. For liberal institutionalists, states make strategic 
choices based on self-interest in terms of material security and/or wealth as a primary 
goal. Thus, liberal institutionalism is closely associated with neoliberal, rational-choice 
models.  
The relationship between liberal institutionalism and international law rests on the 
fact that “fully legalized institutions bind states through law: their behavior is subject to 
scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law and, 
often, domestic law.”113 Thus, if a state is willing to make a legal commitment, it is 
because it coalesces with its national self-interest even when levied against the relative 
sovereignty costs associated with doing so. International institutions, it is argued, reduce 
transaction costs. As such, the ICC would be beneficial because creating a permanent 
court would eliminate the need to establish ad hoc tribunals in the future. On this basis, 
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scholars such as Goldsmith and Posner staunchly assert that states only obey international 
law when it is in the self-interest of the state to do so.114 They further argue that when 
international law is instrumentalized in this way, it does not indicate that it is an effective 
legal system.    
In this vein, law and institutions such as the ICC are designed, created, and 
maintained for reasons of strategic self-interest. Liberal institutionalism provides a 
theoretical framework to understand why states choose to legalize arrangements, and to 
better understand the spectrum of soft and hard law approaches to solving collective 
problems. The process of legalization, as defined by Abbott et al., is a “particular form of 
institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and 
delegation.”115 Institutions may or may not possess each of these characteristics; they 
each operate independently of the other and can exist at different levels along a 
continuum. The greatest utility of liberal institutionalism for the purposes of this study is 
its ability to provide a theoretical lens through which to explain elements of the ICC’s 
institutional design. However, while liberal institutionalism provides a lens to theorize 
about how and why the ICC was established through the course of its negotiation process, 
it also provides a more general theoretical framework to analyze why states choose to 
commit to it.116  
 
3.5.2 Institutional Design 
This dissertation engages with works concerning the ICC’s institutional design, that is the 
“specific provisions in the Rome Statute governing the ICC’s operation.”117 As 
Christopher Rudolph has explained, “[w]here a state stands regarding joining the court is 
a direct function of its process of institutional design, for that determines what exactly it 
is supporting or opposing. Thus, theorizing interests regarding the court must begin by 
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considering them in the context of preferences in institutional design.”118 Rudolph also 
importantly points out that “beneath the surface of the Rome Statute negotiations, a battle 
was also waged between states seeking to maintain their relative position in the global 
hierarchy and those who sought to restructure that hierarchy in part by creating a specific 
type of international criminal court.”119 This point is linked back to the Court’s 
relationship to the United Nations Security Council as the ‘crucial political fault line’ in 
the institutional design of the court.120 Rudolph identifies three ‘phases of the process of 
institutional design’: (1) Preparatory Committee meetings (1996-1998); (2) the Rome 
Conference (1998); and (3) the Kampala Review Conference (2010).121 Relying on these 
phases of the ICC’s institutional design offers a lens to better theorize about the kind of 
Court that African states ‘wanted’ and how that might explain state support or opposition 
to the Rome Statute. Similarly, theorizing in terms of the ICC’s institutional design 
allows for an integration of the effects of power politics within the architecture of the 
Rome Statute. The following section will examine how various theoretical approaches 
might answer the research questions and will explain why constructivism provides the 
greatest overall explanatory and predictive value for the purposes of the dissertation.  
 
3.5.3 Rational Choice 
Duncan Snidal defines rational choice as a “methodological approach that explains both 
individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under 
constraints.”122 Thus, rational choice says that explanation can be found by determining 
the “relevant actors, the goals they seek, and their ability to do so. The approach also 
requires some specification of constraints–which may be technological, institutional, or 
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arise from interdependencies among actors’ choices.”123 It is important to note that the 
goals under consideration could include material interests but also “normative or 
ideational ‘goals.’”124  
Rational choice, at least in the context of this dissertation, can be closely 
associated with realist principles that suggest that states are the primary actors, have 
sufficient information, and have the capability to make rational calculations in order to 
maximize power and self-interest. It is important to acknowledge that any explanation of 
state behaviour ought to consider that states typically engage in international politics both 
strategically and rationally. Under a rational choice model, goal seeking is its primary 
explanatory factor. In the context of the Rome Statute negotiations, rational choice 
provides a theoretical model to consider why states chose to design the ICC the way that 
they did, but it substantively fails to explain what kind of Court states ought to have 
designed. Therefore, rational choice tends to generally overlook broader normative 
concerns. Snidal says that “by showing that good institutional design must be consistent 
with interests to be effective, rational choice can help normative analysis avoid 
foundering on naïve idealism.”125 Yet, such an approach does not account for the 
inequality of interests in international politics. In other words, the interests of dominant 
states tend to overshadow those of traditionally weak or less powerful states, particularly 
in the context of multilateral negotiations pertaining to questions of institutional design. 
Thus, rational choice is limited in that it takes for granted who the key actors are 
(identity); what their interests are; and how that affects the creation of international 
institutions, all of which are fundamentally important for the purposes of this dissertation. 
Moreover, it fails to consider how interests or preferences can change. Thus, rational 
choice explanations are partially helpful, but need to be combined with other 








Postcolonialism emphasizes the importance of power relations stemming from 
decolonization and anticolonial struggles. It looks not only at the formal end of 
colonialism following the Second World War, but also the imperial and colonial 
experiences that continue to affect contemporary politics. This suggests that there are 
lingering consequences to colonialism that persist, based on the relations between ‘the 
West’ – i.e. the dominant political powers in international relations, and the ‘other’–i.e. 
the ‘Third World,’ developing world, or ‘Global South.’ For postcolonial theorists, the 
starting place is one which assumes that ‘Western’ power and influence before and 
during decolonization still exists and informs political strategies that seek to retain that 
power and influence, at the subjugation of developing states, including those in Africa. 
The utility of employing a postcolonial lens is in its ability to think critically about an 
often ‘taken for granted’ Eurocentric and/or North American point of view and to begin 
to deconstruct the ways in which the global order is both shaped and maintained by 
dominant and subjugated states.126  
Scholars such as Epstein argue that postcolonialism provides a different lens through 
which to consider the nature of norms in the context of international relations. She says 
that “the postcolonial perspective is thus deeply… genealogical, in its dual concerns with, 
first, the genesis of norms, or the processes by which particular behaviours come to be 
taken to be ‘normal.’ Second, it is centrally concerned with the power relations 
implicated in the (re)drawing of boundaries between the normal and the strange or the 
unacceptable.”127 In this light, postcolonialism offers a lens through which to reframe 
norms as a mechanism or process of control and/or domination created by the existing 
power relations in international politics. It also provides a means to consider ‘alternate’ 
behaviours as potentially legitimate, or least of all, it provides a theoretical method to 
situate difference within the overarching power structures that shape and are shaped by 
dominant powers in the global order.     
 
126 See generally Sanjay Seth, “Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40.1 (2011): 167-183. 
127 Charlotte Epstein, “The postcolonial perspective: an introduction,” International Studies Perspectives 
2.13 (2012): 294. 
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In the context of the research questions that guide this dissertation, postcolonialism 
can help to theoretically reposition and partially explain all four. Since postcolonialism is 
not a grand theory of international relations, but rather a situational lens through which to 
view phenomena, it offers an alternative standpoint from which to examine each of the 
research questions employed throughout the dissertation, but it can neither fully explain 
nor predict. It does, however, provide a means to deconstruct the Eurocentric 
undercurrents of international law, human rights, and liberal cosmopolitism rooted in the 
United Nations System that greatly influenced the Rome Statute negotiations and the 
establishment of the ICC. Postcolonialism has often been used as a theoretical approach 
to explain the operationalization of the ICC, especially with respect to its hyper-focus in 
African situations and contexts, which is highly important for the purposes of the 
dissertation.128    
 
3.5.5 Constructivism 
Constructivism provides the means to examine the identities and interests of relevant 
actors within the international system, but also allows for rational considerations, such as 
the strategic pursuit of interests. As Reus-Smit explained, constructivism “is 
characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material 
structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually 
constitute relationship between agents and structures.”129 Early constructivists such as 
Wendt and Ruggie challenged the epistemological foundations of dominant rationalist 
theories of international relations (i.e. realism and liberalism) by emphasizing the 
importance of ideational and identity factors in generating understandings and 
explanations of global phenomena.130 Constructivism is fundamentally what Wendt et al. 
 
128 See for example Lea Schneider, “The International Criminal Court (ICC)–A Postcolonial Tool for 
Western States to Control Africa?” Journal of International Criminal Law 1 (2020): 90-109. 
129 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism” in Theories of International Relations, eds. Scott Burchill and 
Andrew Linklater (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 217. 
130 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International 
Organization 43.3 (1987): 335-370; John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47.1 (1993): 139-174.   
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described as a “social theory of international politics.”131 Indeed, the foundation of 
constructivism rests on the notion that the international system is ‘socially constructed’ 
and reflects the identity and practices of actors, as opposed to a fixed approach to 
identities and interests, as is the case with rational approaches stemming from realist and 
liberal schools. Constructivists do not deny that the international political system is 
largely anarchical but instead challenge the significance anarchy.  
According to Wendt, “anarchy is what states make of it.”132 In the case of the 
ICC, states have elected to create an institution to preserve order, based on a collective 
and intersubjective understanding of appropriate behaviour, i.e. norms. As such, 
constructivism makes sense of international relations by understanding it as inherently 
social. Constructivists argue that states create–and are created by–shared norms and 
values. Thus, some scholars argue that the guiding theoretical objective for international 
relations constructivists is to establish that norms matter.133 In this respect, constructivism 
is an inherently useful theoretical framework for this study because it allows 
consideration for how the international criminal justice norm as exemplified by the 
creation and enmeshment of the International Criminal Court is related to identity and 
interests. Such an approach can be used to help explain commitment, avoidance, or 
reversion to the ICC at various junctures of its lifecycle.  
From an ontological perspective, constructivism allows for consideration of social 
facts, that is facts that “depend on human agreement that they exist and typically require 
human institutions for their existence.”134 On this basis, constructivism is influenced by 
critical international theory in its broad ontology but differs with respect to its emphasis 
on empirical analysis. According to Adler, constructivism “occupies the middle ground 
between rationalist approaches (whether realist or liberal) and interpretive approaches 
(mainly postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical), and creates new areas for theoretic 
 
131Alexander E. Wendt, Michael N. Barnett, and Raymond Duvall, eds., Social Theory of International 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
132 Alexander E. Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,” 
International Organization 46.2 (1991): 391-425. 
133 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 396.  
134 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52.4 (1993): 856. 
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and empirical investigation.”135 Since the Rome Statute and the ICC only exist because a 
group of states collectively decided that they ought to, constructivism is a particularly 
well-suited lens through which to view both the Statute and the Court’s normative and 
institutional evolution.  
Foundationally, constructivism gained traction in the 1990s as an alternative 
theory to explain international relations, since rationalist theories failed to predict the end 
of the Cold War. Allowing scholars of international relations to consider ideational 
factors in their analyses provided an opportunity for an increased and richer 
understanding of global politics. The depth afforded by a constructivist approach is 
preferable for the purposes of this study, since its intent is to generate deeper and richer 
understanding of the evolution of international criminal justice, the ICC, and its 
relationship to African states. While realist accounts can more readily explain the 
preferences of powerful states, especially members of the permanent five of the United 
Nations Security Council in opposing the Court, the behaviour and interest formation of 
the coalition of middle and weak power states (i.e. the Like-Minded Group) that pushed 
for the success of the Rome Statute and the Court cannot be explained by similar 
theoretical approaches. Thus, Nicole Deitelhoff argued that the ICC was created because 
of persuasion and discourse within the negotiations, in other words, “a shift in states’ 
interests.”136 This, she argued, was heavily influenced by the ability of weak states and 
non-governmental actors to influence the normative and institutional settings of the Rome 
Statute negotiations altogether, which contributed to persuasion and discourse.137 
The compatibility of constructivism with the study of international law has been 
established in the literature. For example, Brunnée and Toope suggest that constructivism 
is compatible with the study of international law because of the attention it gives to the 
role of norms in international politics, which is ‘stock-in-trade’ for international law 
 
135 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of 
International Relations 3.3 (1997): 319-363. 
136 Nicole Dietelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting the Island of Persuasion in the ICC 




scholars.138 Brunnée and Toope further explain that it is “norm creation, evolution, and 
destruction that has proven to be the strongest bridging point between some IL theorists 
and the constructivists.”139 Slaughter et al. pointed out that international relations 
constructivists and international law scholars start with the same proposition that “actors, 
identities, interests and social structures are culturally and historically contingent 
products of interaction on the basis of shared norms.”140 Slaughter had previously written 
that constructivist international relations theories expanded the prospects for 
interdisciplinary collaboration because of its emphasis on international legal norms in 
shaping state behaviour; institutions have the capacity to transform the identity of actors, 
and thus reshape calculations of interests.141 Similarly, Anthony Arend said that 
constructivism is useful to the study of international law because international legal rules 
contribute to the creation of state identity and interest.142 In a similar vein, Harold Koh 
posited that states obey international law because interpreting global norms and 
internalizing them into domestic law leads to the “reconstruction of national interests and 
eventually national identities.”143 On this basis, constructivism departs from realism by 
broadening the spectrum of factors that might shape and inform conceptions of a states’ 
self-interest. Interdisciplinarity in the fields of international relations and international 
law has been a focal advocacy point for scholars on both sides of the disciplinary divide, 
with constructivism featuring strongly on the international relations side of the 
discussion.  
 
138 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, “Constructivism and International Law,” in Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 119. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stepan Wood, “International Law and International 
Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,” The American Journal of 
International Law 92.3 (1998): 384. 
141 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,” 
The American Journal of International Law 87.2 (1993): 222. 
142 Anthony Arend, “Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics,” Virginia 
Journal of International Law 38.10 (1997-1998): 107-154. 




3.5.6  Norm Theory 
A key component of constructivism depends on the emergence and valuation of norms in 
the formation of a states’ identity and interests. Norms are defined as a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.144 The constructivist undercurrent 
of norm theory stresses the significance of socialization by both international institutions 
and norms, which inform identity and interests. However, liberal institutionalist scholars 
have argued that norms are not causally linked to behaviour or phenomena. As Ruggie 
explained: 
Norms may ‘guide’ behavior, they may ‘inspire’ behavior, they may ‘rationalize’ 
or ‘justify’ behavior, they may express ‘mutual expectations’ about behavior, or 
they may be ignored. But they do not effect cause in the sense that a bullet 
through the heart causes death… The impact of norms within international 
regimes is not a passive process… because state behavior within regimes is 
interpreted by other states, the rationales and justifications for behavior that are 
proffered, together with pleas for understanding or admissions of guilt, as well as 
the responsiveness of such reasoning on the part of other states, all are absolutely 
critical component parts of any explanation involving the efficacy of norms.145 
On this basis, it is important to measure the efficacy of the international criminal justice 
norm not in terms of its causal effect on ‘compliance,’ ‘deterrence’ or similar behaviours 
in the narrow sense. Alternatively, the discourse among states offers a better opportunity 
to take stock of the norm’s overall significance in international relations. 
Other scholars such as Risse and Ropp have considered how international human 
rights norms influence domestic politics and the behaviour of states.146 Karen Engle 
mapped the evolution of the anti-impunity norm and its synonymity with international 
criminal law as a response to human rights violations, including the relevant history that 
 
144 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52.4 (1998): 891. 
145 John Gerard Ruggie, “Epistemology, ontology, and the study of international regimes,” in Constructing 
the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (London: Routledge, 
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146 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International 
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paved the way for the establishment of the ICC.147 Theorizing about how norms diffuse 
and the contexts in which they influence international politics encompasses a wide 
research agenda with particular applicability to the study of the diffusion of the 
international criminal justice norm.    
The theory of norm diffusion was laid out most cohesively by Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink in their article, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change.148 Employing a largely constructivist international relations theoretical 
framework (with consideration to rational strategic factors), Finnemore and Sikkink 
explained how new norms are created and diffuse, which may take the form of law over 
time. Indeed, in the context of the ICC, international criminal justice and accountability 
for grave violations of human rights serve as bedrock norms that undergird the entire 
institutional enterprise of the Court. It is therefore impossible to make sense of how and 
why the ICC came to be without tracing the evolution of the international criminal justice 
norm in international political and legal life. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms 
evolve in a patterned three-step ‘life cycle:’ (1) ‘norm emergence,’ which occurs as a 
result of persuasion by norm entrepreneurs who convince states to embrace new norms; if 
a critical mass of states support the norm it reaches a ‘tipping point,’ leading to; (2) broad 
norm acceptance, otherwise referred to as a ‘norm cascade’ where states attempt to 
‘socialize’ other states to follow the norm; (3) internalization, where norms assume a 
‘taken-for-granted quality.’149  
In the context of the ICC, some scholars point out that the academic debate is 
saturated with normative discussions, which largely pivot around empirical findings 
about the Court’s effectiveness at holding perpetrators accountable, and its corresponding 
deterrent capabilities.150 Indeed, scholars such as Sikkink have posited that the ICC does 
 
147 Karen Engle, “Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights,” Cornell Law Review 
100.5 (2015): 1070-1128. 
148 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 887-
917. 
149 Ibid., 895. 
150 Caroline Fehl, “Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist and 
Constructivist Approaches,” European Journal of International Relations 10.3 (2004), 358; See for 
example Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?” American Journal of International Law 95.1 (2001): 7-31; James F. Alexander, “The 
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have a deterrent effect, largely expanding upon her work regarding the deterrent effect of 
human rights trials.151 Jo and Simmons reach a similar conclusion based on their 
systematic assessment of the ICC’s deterrent effects for state and nonstate actors.152 
Catherine Gegout reaches the opposite conclusion, that ICC intervention has not 
prevented the emergence of new conflicts, but argues that it could have a deterrent effect, 
though this is not guaranteed.153 Nevertheless, this approach to the study of international 
law falls under what Shaffer and Ginsburg have referred to as “a new empirical turn in 
international legal scholarship.”154 The authors contend that “[t]he theoretical debate over 
whether international law matters is a stale one. What matters now is the study of the 
conditions under which international law is formed and has effects.” While speaking 
from an international legal theoretical perspective, the same applies for the study of 
international legal institutions within the study of international relations. The 
interdisciplinary nature of international courts and institutions is inherent and ought to be 
incorporated into any empirical inquiry. 
On this basis, other literatures have focused on measures of normative 
commitment and/or compliance in the context of the ICC as a modicum for norm 
efficacy. However, as Howse and Teitel point out, “the concept of compliance (especially 
viewed as rule observance) is inadequate for understanding how international law has 
normative effects.”155 This is especially because a strict interpretation of state compliance 
or noncompliance, which is common in international law scholarship, ignores the broader 
effects that international legal norms might have at multiple levels of political 
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engagement. This theoretical framework offers a means to evaluate norm diffusion at the 
domestic, regional, and/or international level(s), which is a primary objective of this 
dissertation.  
In addition to norm evolution and diffusion, scholars have also focused on norm 
contestation and erosion.156  Falling somewhere in the middle of those discourses, 
scholars have similarly considered the role of norm contestation as it relates to concepts 
of political backlash.157 For example, Dietelhoff examined the impact of norm 
contestation in the context of Africa and the ICC and determined that “the spread and 
intensification of this contestation, or backlash movement, has weakened the court and 
the norm it embodies: Non-compliance with the court has increased on the African 
continent… Hence, contestation even was consequential.”158 On the other hand, 
Dietelhoff also acknowledged that ICC activity in some African states sparked efforts to 
bolster domestic legal institutions so as to avoid Court intervention, and the African 
Union has made efforts to regionalize international criminal justice as a response.159 This 
is especially important to acknowledge, since not all forms of norm contestation are de 
facto regressive. This provides a framework to consider the unintended normative 
consequences for African states engaged in pushback or backlash towards the ICC.  
 
3.5.7 Hybrid Theoretical Approaches 
In the context of the ICC, scholars have attempted to explain the successful negotiation of 
the Rome Statute in both rationalist and constructivist terms. For example, David 
Whippman has explained that the Rome Statute negotiations can best be understood by 
considering three factors: (1) the ‘reasons for action’ of the actors involved–i.e. states and 
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non-governmental organizations; (2) how actors’ interests and identities produced 
positions on particular elements of the statute; and (3) the context of the negotiations, 
since actors were required to situate their positions in the framework of a legal 
institution.160  The overall conclusion made by Whippman is that “politics is driven by 
normative as well as material concerns, and that law is both a product of– and constituted 
of– this multifaceted politics. In the context of the ICC, the arguments of both supporters 
and critics of the proposed new court evidenced a combination of normative, material, 
and identity-based concerns.”161 While this study situates the negotiation of the ICC in 
terms of United States opposition to the Rome Statute and the Court, questions about 
interest formation on the part of weak states can be interrogated through similar 
frameworks. Thus, the positions of African delegations can also be understood in light of 
material and normative factors that influenced identity and interests which were 
ultimately reflected in support or opposition to the ICC. 
Relying on the work of Abbott and Snidal, both rationalist and constructivist 
international relations analyses can be combined with international law in order to 
explain particular phenomena and make sense of legal institutional design. It is argued 
that “law and legalization involve values and interests; they operate through instrumental 
and normative channels; they involve power as well as rational design; they are shaped 
by and shape the behavior of private actors as well as states.”162 Finnemore and Sikkink 
similarly posit that “rationality cannot be separated from any politically significant 
episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative context 
conditions any episode of rational choice.”163 This bears particular relevance to the ICC, 
since as Nicole Deitelhoff has explained, “the ICC entails enormous sovereignty costs for 
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states but only uncertain benefits.”164 Political scientist Judith Kelley similarly concluded 
that “[i]t is not very clear what concrete gains any one state can anticipate from 
supporting the ICC.”165 Thus, there is a basis to employ both constructivist and rationalist 
approaches together to better understand questions of why the ICC was created why 
states choose to commit to it. 
 
3.6 Conclusions  
This chapter has reviewed the most salient themes in the Africa-ICC discourse and has 
surveyed works that evaluate aspects of the ICC’s institutional design as reflected by the 
Rome Statute negotiations in particular. In doing so, this chapter provided a framework to 
theoretically ground the design and architecture of the resultant ICC and evaluate the 
compromises reached in Rome from an African perspective. This chapter provided a 
sketch of the literatures on the Rome Statute negotiations and the Africa-ICC relationship 
to illuminate the compromises that African States made in and after Rome when signing, 
ratifying, and implementing the Rome Statute into domestic legislation. This framing also 
emphasized the most prevalent debates concerning the problems with the ICC’s 
operationalization in African contexts and African responses to those problems. In short, 
the literatures of the Rome Statute negotiations, African commitment to the Rome 
Statute/ICC, African problems with the ICC, and African responses to the problems with 
the ICC have each provided a theoretical lens through which to situate this dissertation’s 
contribution to the literature. This chapter also provided an overview of the theoretical 
approaches with the greatest utility throughout the dissertation and has explained why 
constructivism/norm theory has been selected as its theoretical lens. It is important to 
note that the point is not that the existing literatures are inherently flawed or wrong. 
Rather, this dissertation seeks to complement the existing literature by providing another 
layer of nuance and analysis. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Historical Background 
It is necessary to situate African support and activism for an International Criminal Court 
(ICC or ‘Court’) within its broader historical context. The ICC initiative began at the 
United Nations (UN), and more particularly within the UN General Assembly’s Sixth 
Committee after the Second World War. This chapter maps African interest and 
involvement in the ICC project, and considers how this interest translated into direct 
participation and influence throughout the pre-Rome Conference period. The process of 
establishing the ICC in its broad sense has been well-documented by scholars of 
international relations and international law.1 Tangible developments began in 1994 when 
the International Law Commission (ILC) presented the first draft statute for an ICC to the 
United Nations General Assembly. This draft was the necessary springboard for the work 
that followed, which was completed within four negotiation forums set up by the UN 
Secretariat: the Ad Hoc Committee (1995); the Preparatory Committee or ‘PrepCom’ 
(1996-1998); the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1998); and the Preparatory Commission 
(1999-2004) under the Sixth Committee’s agenda item, ‘The Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court.’  
This chapter focuses on the specific role of Africa and Africans in the formation 
and establishment of the ICC within and outside of UN processes from 1993 to the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference in 1998, i.e. at the Ad Hoc Committee, the Preparatory 
Committee, in regional meetings, and through engagement with civil society most 
particularly the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC), Human Rights 
Watch, and No Peace Without Justice. These contributions were the culmination of (in 
many cases) years of negotiation and diplomacy at the local, regional, and international 
level(s).  
 
1 See generally Fanny Benedetti, Karine Boneau, and John L. Washburn, Negotiating the International 
Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014); Fanny 
Benedetti and John L. Washburn, “Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome 
and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference,” Global Governance 5 (1999): 1-37; William 
Schabas, Oxford Commentaries on International Law: The International Criminal Court, A Commentary 
on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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The aim of this chapter is to systematically map African engagement in the 
development of the Rome Statute from its earliest stages in order to dispel the myth that 
Africans were coerced into joining the ICC by Western states (and other neocolonial 
assertions about the Africa-ICC relationship). This is historical analysis is based on 
research findings which effectively demonstrate high levels of (organic) participation, 
agency, and influence in the creation and use of the Court through diplomatic, political, 
and legal channels leading up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference. The primary 
conclusion is that (neo)colonial arguments are not only inaccurate but deny an important 
historical moment for Africa and the Africans who worked tirelessly to establish the ICC. 
Mutually constituted skepticism on the part of ‘Africa’ and ‘the West’ reinforce ideas of 
mistrust. This is a mistake; if couched differently, the insights generated from the ICC’s 
disproportionate involvement in African situations could provide a reasonable basis to 
consider avenues for constructive reform, used to strengthen the institution and 
international criminal law, more generally. This will require a genuine dialectical process 
rooted in equality and respect, which is imperative given Africa’s disproportionate and 
long-lasting support for the Court and the normative and tangible development of 
international criminal law, more broadly. Alternatively, acknowledging the longstanding 
African commitment to the development of the international criminal justice norm 
provides the space to meaningfully consider the merits of establishing regional 
mechanisms to address similar crimes. 
 
4.1 Drafting the Rome Statute: Tracing UN Processes 
The idea of establishing an ICC originated within the General Assembly of the United 
Nations and the International Law Commission, as early as 1948. See Table 4-1 for a 
timeline of the early stages and legwork involved in establishing an ICC. Table 4-2 
details the processes from the establishment of the ad hoc committee to Rome. Note that 
relevant African contributions or roles are referenced throughout Tables 4-1 and 4-2. 
Several key political events reinforced the notion that a permanent court was needed to 
address the most heinous violations of human rights. Yet it is essential to highlight the 
political factors that both hindered and facilitated the establishment of an ICC from its 
earliest moments to the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.  
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For example, the Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials following the Second World War 
established the idea of holding individuals criminally responsible for atrocity crimes. 
Without dwelling on the overwhelming criticism surrounding these trials and the 
associated complaints of ‘victors justice’–the idea of criminalizing international crimes 
was born as a result of these trials.2 While the General Assembly had asked the 
International Law Commission to examine the establishment of an ICC and a draft statute 
was presented, the effective prioritization of human rights was not a strong or primary 
focus during the Cold War. However, the conflicts in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and subsequent ad hoc tribunals established by the United Nations Security 
Council, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, reiterated the need for a permanent judicial 
institution to respond to mass atrocity crimes. Historical events, coupled with changing 
political trends in the 1990s (which focused less on the primacy of sovereignty and more 
so on ideas of human security and human rights), presented an opportune political 
environment in which to establish an ICC. 
  
 
2 See generally Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971); Guénaël Mettraux, ed., Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A 
Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The 
Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); William 
Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals (Oxford: 
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Table 4-1: Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty, Key United Nations 
General Assembly and International Law Commission Efforts (1948-1994) 
 
1948 
General Assembly Resolution 260 invited the International Law Commission (ILC), 
“to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ 
for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction 
will be conferred.” 
Note: This was a response to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials (1945-1948), which established a system 
of international criminal justice based upon holding individuals criminally responsible for the most 
serious international crimes: war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity by (fair) 
trial.  
1951 
ILC presented a draft statute to the General Assembly to be submitted to governments 
for comment and observation titled, ‘Code of Offences against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind.’  
Discussion about the possibility and desirability of defining ‘aggression’ was 
undertaken.  
1954 
The ILC prepared a revised draft based on the observations received from 
governments.  
The General Assembly postponed considering the draft until aggression was defined.  
(Note: The Cold War limited the progress of the ICC project during this time period. Political will was 
insufficient to push the ICC initiative forward.) 
1989 
Trinidad and Tobago asked the General Assembly to create an international criminal 
court with jurisdiction over drug trafficking. 
The General Assembly asked the ILC to revive the ICC project and work on a new 
draft statute.  
1991 
9 December: ILC completes provisional draft articles on the draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 
1992 
25 November: ILC requested to continue its work on a draft statute for an ICC as a 
matter of priority. The report of the Working Group, views expressed during debate in 
the Sixth Committee, and written comments from states were to be considered. 
1993 
9 December: ILC asked to continue its work as a matter of priority with the goal to 
establish a draft statute by the forty-sixth session in 1994. 
The ILC decided that the draft articles proposed by the Working Group on a draft 
statute for an ICC be transmitted to governments to formulate observations and submit 
comments to the Secretary-General. 
(Note: the conflict and ad hoc tribunal set up by the UN Security Council on 25 May for the former 
Yugoslavia put pressure on the UN to create a more permanent solution.)  
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South African Development Community (SADC) countries Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, and South Africa begin to meet and discuss the ICC project with the aim to 
meaningfully participate in its establishment. 
African membership in the ILC Working Group on the ICC: Sierra Leone (chair), 
Madagascar, Senegal (Special Rapporteur). 
1994 
ILC forty-sixth session: ILC completed a draft statute based on government feedback 
and recommended that the General Assembly convene an international conference of 
plenipotentiaries to adopt a treaty on the establishment of an ICC. 
9 December: General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee to consider 
the  
substantive and administrative issues in the draft statute and consider arrangements for 
convening an international conference of plenipotentiaries.  
(Note: The ad hoc tribunal set up by the UN Security Council on 8 November for Rwanda put continued 
pressure on the UN to create a more permanent solution.) 
(Note also: In South Africa, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated signaling a definitive transition from 
apartheid. This created additional momentum in international politics to prioritize norms such as 
international human rights and post-conflict/violence reconciliation. ) 
The ILC appointed Senegalese lawyer and former Minister Doudou Thiam as Special 
Rapporteur on the Draft Code of ‘Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Humanity’ from 





Table 4-2: The Ad Hoc Committee, Preparatory Committee, and Rome Conference 
1995 
The ad hoc committee meets twice and submits a report to the General Assembly. 
The General Assembly creates the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) to prepare the 
draft text for submission to a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries.  
African membership in the ad hoc committee 3-13 April: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt 
(Vice-Chairman), Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe. 
African membership in the ad hoc committee 14-25 August: Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Sudan, Tunisia. 
1996 
25 March – 12 April: First session of the PrepCom takes place. 
12 August – 30 August: Second session of the PrepCom takes place. 
17 December: General Assembly adopts a resolution and sets the dates for subsequent 
PrepCom sessions.  
Italy offers to host the treaty conference in 1998. 
(Note: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended the PrepComs, particularly under the 
‘Coalition for the International Criminal Court’ (CICC) umbrella.) 
7 August: South Africa and Lesotho submit a working paper on international cooperation and 
judicial [mutual] assistance. 
1997 
10 February – 21 February: Third session of the PrepCom takes place. 
4 August – 15 August: Fourth session of the PrepCom takes place. 
1 December – 12 December: Fifth session of the PrepCom takes place. 
14 September: SADC states meet and establish ‘ten basic principles’ for negotiating an 
independent and effective ICC. 
1998 
16 March – 3 April: Sixth session of the PrepCom takes place. 
15 June – 17 July: United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court takes place in Rome, Italy. 
5 February – 6 February: twenty-five African governments meet in Dakar, Senegal and adopt 
the ‘Dakar Declaration,’ calling for an independent and effective ICC. 
February 1998: Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers adopts the Dakar 
Declaration 
June 1998: Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity 
adopts the Dakar Declaration  
31 October 1998: Organization of African Unity adopts ‘Resolution on the Ratification of the 





4.2 African Support within the General Assembly Processes 
4.2.1  The Ad Hoc Committee 
Africans and African governments took a particularly keen interest in the development of 
the throughout its trajectory through the UN system. Former South African diplomat 
Pieter Kruger, who participated in the discussions that led to the establishment of the Ad 
Hoc Committee in 1994, explained that his own personal position, in consultation with 
the (then) Foreign Affairs and Legal Section, “at the time was cautious support for the 
ICC, but no input had yet been received from other Departments such as Justice, Police, 
and Defence.”3 Kruger explained that he was the only representative of South Africa who 
attended the Ad Hoc Committee meetings in 1995 and “had a general mandate to take a 
positive position to the establishment of an ICC.”4 At least for South Africa, he 
explained, the aftermath of the Cold War made the idea of an ICC viable and possible, 
although it needed a lot of negotiation.5 Referring to Table 4-2, it is apparent that several 
African governments were involved at this stage of the Court’s development and 
contributed to its evolution. 
 Kruger explained that during the second week of the Ad Hoc Committee 
meetings, he was invited by the representatives of Australia and New Zealand to 
participate in an early meeting, which he said was the beginnings of the ‘Like-Minded 
Group’ (LMG). The LMG was a formidable negotiating bloc for the remainder of the 
process, including at the Rome Diplomatic Conference. According to Kruger, African 
membership in the LMG grew to include “at least Lesotho, Botswana, and Malawi.”6 
Also highly influential, Egyptian Cherif Bassiouni assembled interim workshops to work 
on ICC issues at the Siracusa Institute in Sicily. This is particularly important to 
highlight, since Cherif Bassiouni was able to fundamentally influence the development of 
the ICC project and take a leading role in its success, even though his government did not 
fully support the idea (Egypt has neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute at the time 
 







of writing).7 Once the Ad Hoc Committee had done all it could, the Preparatory 
Committee for the Establishment of the ICC was established, in order to work out the 
more complex issues surrounding the text of the draft statute.  
 
4.2.2  The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) Meetings 
With respect to the Preparatory Committee, Pieter Kruger described that in the context of 
South Africa, Foreign Affairs could not take a position on any issue without the 
participation of the Justice Department. As such, he campaigned to put a Justice official 
on the delegation. It is incredibly interesting to note that South Africa’s Department of 
Justice was not initially eager to participate in the Rome Statute negotiation process. 
Kruger explained that “the main reason for the initial recalcitrance was a concern that the 
ICC could have retrospective jurisdiction, which could be problematic during South 
Africa’s ongoing transition period. Once informed that the Statute would not provide for 
retrospective jurisdiction, Justice considered my request.”8 This is significant because it 
demonstrates that South Africa was thinking about the consequences of establishing an 
ICC and its potential effects in domestic contexts. This is a high level of engagement, and 
one that is worth pointing out. 
South Africa took a leading role at the PrepCom meetings. Kruger explained that 
after the first PrepCom that he “started to seriously engage SADC representatives to get 
them to participate actively in the ICC process.”9 This is important to note, since SADC 
had been engaging in its own meetings and establishing its own principles in this respect 
for some time. He explained that Phakiso Mochochoko from Lesotho, who was then part 
of Lesotho’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations, was the only other participant 
 
7 Note: Cherif Bassiouni has been called the ‘Father of International Criminal Law’ for the leading role he 
took in the development of the International Criminal Court. See Mohamed Helal, “In Celebratus: M. 
Cherif Bassiouni (1937-2017)” OpinioJuris (26 September 2017) available at 
https://opiniojuris.org/2017/09/26/in-celebratus-m-cherif-bassiouni-1937-2017/; accessed 1 January 2021: 
“He is essentially the father of International Criminal Law as we know it today; he is the authority on 
extradition law and practice; he has made immense contributions to international human rights law; he has 
written widely on Islamic law and Middle East politics; and he is one of the authors of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.” 





who took an active interest in the ICC and was soon brought into the LMG meetings.10 
This provided the foundation for Kruger and Mochochoko to work on issues together, 
particularly the working paper that they co-authored on International Cooperation and 
Judicial Assistance.11 This demonstrates a degree of regional cooperation and 
coalescence on the most important issues for the development of the ICC project at its 
critical stages of development at the UN.  
 
4.2.3 The Second PrepCom Meeting and Increased African   
Participation 
The second PrepCom meeting saw the expansion of the South African delegation to 
include two Justice officials and Sivu Maqungo from Foreign Affairs; Kruger served as 
the Head of Delegation at this meeting. At this meeting, Kruger explained that the co-
authored paper with Mochochoko served as the basis for the working group discussion on 
international cooperation and judicial assistance. This similarly demonstrates the high 
level of engagement that African governments and Africans exercised throughout the 
development of the ICC through the UN process. Other African participation “remained 
very low key due to limited resources and expertise. At least the representative of Malawi 
was there, and more visible as a result of his participation in earlier workshops.”12 Kruger 
recalled having numerous discussions with non-governmental organizations about ways 
to increase African participation in the process, since “it was not apathy, but a genuine 
lack of resources at that stage.”13 Thus, while South Africa was in a position to take a 
leading role in the process, other avenues were required and pursued for a great deal of 
the region. Kruger said that “most African representatives that I spoke to during that time 
were pretty much in favour of the ICC. They were all aware of the Rwanda tribunal and 
viewed it in a positive light. At that stage there was no real talk of this being imposed on 
Africa by the West, and that the ICC would only exercise its jurisdiction in Africa–those 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 United Nations General Assembly, International Cooperation and Judicial (Mutual) Assistance, working 





arguments only came later.”14 In this respect, African engagement at the earliest stages 
was genuine, as was support for the ICC initiative. This is important because it makes 
clear that such support did not come from a place of manipulation or coercion either 
directly or indirectly on the part of the ‘West.’ 
 
4.2.4  The Third Preparatory Committee Meeting 
Kruger explained that he had left the Civil Service at the end of September 1997. 
However, Chairman of the PrepCom Meetings, Adrian Bos of the Netherlands requested 
that South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Department include him on the South African 
delegation so that he could chair the Working Group on International Cooperation and 
Judicial Assistance again.15 The government of South Africa did not compensate him 
financially for his attendance, instead Cherif Bassiouni facilitated the sponsorship of his 
participation and he chaired the meeting. This is important because it demonstrates the 
lengths that individual Africans were willing to go to ensure that the ICC project ended in 
a successful outcome, above and beyond what the dominant historical narrative might 
suggest. 
 Following Kruger’s departure from the South African delegation, he explained 
that he was replaced by Professor Medard Rwelamira who “was aware of the efforts to 
involve SADC states and other African states.”16 Other members of the delegation 
included John Makhubele, Gen De Klerk, and Sivu Maqungo. With respect to the 
Working Group at the final PrepCom and the Rome Conference on International 
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, Phakiso Mochochoko took over that role, further 
demonstrating regional collaboration and engagement in the process. Kruger explained 
that the LMG began to expand its membership, which he said made it “a little less 
effective because the interests were becoming a bit more diverse the close it came to the 
Rome Conference.”17 This is an important point, since it offers some explanation as to 








of the LMG. It raises questions about how close interests need to be in order to provide 
an effective negotiation strategy for blocs of states. South African participation in the 
final PrepCom meeting remained high, with positive and active participation by Medard 
Rwelamira and Sivu Maqungo. This was the final meeting heading into the Rome 
Conference. 
 
4.3 Outside of the United Nations: SADC’s early interest in 
 the establishment of an ICC 
African support for the idea of an international criminal court began as early as 1993 
through the work of the South African Development Community (SADC), which 
spearheaded coordinated regional activism. Sivu Maqungo, the former Principal State 
Law Advisor to South Africa, explained that “Delegations from Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, Tanzania and South Africa had participated in the effort to establish the ICC 
as early as 1993 when the International Law Commission (ILC) presented a draft statute 
to the General Assembly Sixth Committee for consideration.”18 This cursory involvement 
evolved into a robust consultative approach by SADC, “with the view to develop a 
strategy aimed at making a meaningful impact on the negotiations on the establishment of 
the ICC.”19 This is significant inasmuch as it illustrates that African states not only 
supported the idea of an ICC, but sought to impact its institutional design from the 
earliest stages. African interest in establishing a permanent ICC was directly related to 
the regional experience with widespread and systematic grave human rights abuses, 
particularly apartheid in South Africa and genocide in Rwanda.20   
To this end, according to Maqungo, delegates of fourteen African states,21 “had 
met for the first time on the topic of an International Criminal Court on the 11 to 14 
 
18 Sivu Maqungo, “The establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC’s participation in the 
negotiations,” African Security Review 9 (2000), 42; United Nations, “Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its forty-fifth session,” Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
II (1993), Part Two, 21-100. 
19 Maqungo, “The establishment of the International Criminal Court,” 42. 
20 Sivu Maqungo, former South African diplomat, interview by author, 22 February 2019, Pretoria.  
21 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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September 1994 and discussed a joint uniform approach to negotiating the draft Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.”22 The SADC-led discussions aimed to establish a 
unified position, which was a strategic approach to make a meaningful impact on the 
multilateral negotiations as the ICC initiative continued to move forward. In the 
intervening years, African states worked together in close consultation to shape and 
support the ICC project locally, regionally, and internationally, particularly within the 
United Nations.    
In this vein, legal experts from SADC states met in Pretoria, South Africa on 14 
September 1997, “and adopted principles of consensus which were transmitted for review 
to SADC ministers of Justice and attorneys-general.”23 These principles of consensus 
provided the basis for the issuance of a Common Statement, “which became the 
instruction manual for SADC’s negotiations.”24 This streamlined approach provided a 
strong basis for African activism and involvement in negotiating the ICC from the outset. 
The 14 September 1997 meeting and subsequent principles of consensus are 
referred to as ‘SADC’s ten negotiating principles for the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court.’ The ten negotiating principles were enumerated as follows:  
(1) Support for an early Establishment of an International Criminal Court; 
(2) The ICC should be effective, independent and impartial and operating within 
the highest standards of international criminal justice; 
(3) The ICC should decide whether it has jurisdiction in circumstances where the 
national judicial system is not available, fails to prosecute or investigate or is 
ineffective; 
(4) The ICC should be complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases 
where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective; 
(5) The ICC should be responsive and give consideration to plights of victims 
especially women and children; 
 
22 Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo, “The African Contribution Towards the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court”, in African Yearbook of International Law, ed. A.A. Yusuf (African Association of 
International Law, 2001), 333-350; United Nations, “Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,” 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, II (1994), Part Two, pg. 23-209. 




(6) The ICC should be unfettered by veto of the Security Council; 
(7) Independence of the Prosecutor should be guaranteed and he/she must have ex 
officio powers to initiate investigations; 
(8) The ICC should enjoy maximum cooperation of States; 
(9) The ICC ought to have inherent jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, serious violations of the principles applicable in armed 
conflicts and if consensus is reached in respect of the crime of aggression it 
should also fall under inherent jurisdiction of the ICC. Opt in or prior consent 
should be in respect of treaty-based crimes; 
10 Human Rights must be respected in all aspects of the ICC Statute, especially 
rights of the accused to a fair trial.25     
 
These negotiating principles reflect an Afro-centric vision of what would be required to 
establish an effective ICC. Interestingly, these principles reflect a desire for a much 
stronger statute than the one that was ultimately negotiated in 1998, especially regarding 
the role of the Security Council, for example. The efforts on the part of SADC triggered 
other regional dialogue about the want and need for the ICC Statute to succeed and the 
importance of establishing an effective negotiation strategy to this end.  
 
4.4 The Dakar Declaration  
On 5-6 February 1998, the government of Senegal hosted an ‘African Conference on the 
International Criminal Court’ (African Conference). Twenty-five states attended this 
conference and the ‘Dakar Declaration on the Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court’ (Dakar Declaration) was adopted.26 The attendees of the African Conference were 
aware of the upcoming diplomatic conference for the adoption of the ICC treaty, which 
was only four months away in Rome, Italy. African interest in the ICC project had been 
well-established and the Dakar Declaration may be framed as reactionary to SADC’s 
 
25 Maqungo, “The African contribution towards the establishment of an International Criminal Court,” 335. 
26 Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (6 February 1998), 
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DakarDeclarationFeb98Eng.pdf. 
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vigilance, best expressed by the ten negotiating principles for the establishment of an 
ICC. Of importance, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union 
(AU), adopted the Dakar Declaration at the 67th ordinary session of the OAU Council of 
Ministers in Addis Ababa (February 1998) and at the 34th Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the OAU in Ouagadougou (June 1998). Since all African nations are 
members of the African Union (which was then the OAU), this demonstrates strong 
regional support for an ICC.          
 The Dakar Declaration makes several similar affirmations to those in the SADC 
principles. For example, the Dakar Declaration affirms “that the Court shall be 
independent, permanent, impartial, just and effective.”27 Other parallel components 
include the affirmation that the ICC statute be adopted at the diplomatic conference, in 
other words, there was a shared regional commitment to the early establishment of an 
ICC. An important affirmation that “the International Criminal Court shall operate 
without being prejudiced by actions of the Security Council”28 demonstrates a uniform 
regional importance placed on this particular point. Both SADC and the Dakar 
Declaration identify the importance of complementarity between the ICC and national 
tribunals. Other similar points address the importance of state cooperation, respect for 
human rights in all phases of the procedure, the independence of the Prosecutor, and a 
financing scheme that does not impede the ICC’s independence and impartiality.29 
Additionally, both documents say that the ICC can determine its own jurisdiction when 
national systems fail to punish those most responsible for committing genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.    
 The Dakar Declaration largely mirrored SADC’s ten negotiating principles, with 
some interesting points of departure. For example, while SADC only references national 
justice systems in its conception of complementarity, the Dakar Declaration says, “That a 
complementarity exists between the International Court and national and regional 





30 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
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approach signals a focus on (more) local forms of justice, and further entrenches the 
notion of complementarity by framing the ICC as a court of last resort. The second key 
difference is with respect to the question of providing compensation for victims. The 
Dakar Declaration says “that the Statute of the Court must ensure respect for Human 
Rights in all phases of the procedure, namely the rights of the suspects, the accused, the 
victims and the witnesses, and consequently that the Preparatory Committee should 
intensify its efforts to establish a consensus on the question of victim compensation.”31 
These differences may be a reflection of the expansion of states involved in the process, 
which represent different legal systems and/or valuations of particular aspects or ideas of 
justice, i.e. compensation.     
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined African participation in the establishment an ICC, particularly 
from 1993 to 1998. It is clear that African governments and individuals engaged in very 
high levels of engagement with the issues both inside and outside of the United Nations 
processes. The role of civil society to increase broader regional involvement in the 
development of the ICC project is especially important to note. Ultimately, however, this 
chapter has outlined that African delegations were invested in the successful negotiation 
of the Rome Statute, and many governments had established positions and preferences on 
what kind of Court the ICC ought to be. This engagement offers a basis to seriously 
consider the interventions of African governments throughout the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference to better understand how the region conceptualized international criminal 





Chapter 5  
5 African Participation at the Rome Diplomatic Conference 
This chapter deconstructs the preferences of African states at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference with respect to the role of the Security Council, the trigger mechanism for the 
Court’s jurisdiction, and the power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu. While there is no one monolith, there are some general regional consistencies in the 
construction of preferences on these three provisions. This chapter synthesizes the 
positions of African governments with respect to these issues, based upon the plenary 
meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference.  
Generally, the states that preferred to construct the Court in the ways reflected in the 
final text displayed a strong commitment to the Statute in the form of treaty ratification. It 
is important to note that these trends are general, since not every African state spoke to 
every issue. However, the information provided by the summary records of the plenary 
meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole indicates that there is a general 
correlation between how much of the final text of the Statute reflected the preferences of 
various African delegations and that states’ willingness to be bound by it.  
 
5.1 Key Issues 
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court (The Rome Diplomatic Conference, Rome Conference or 
Conference) took place from 15 June to 17 July 1998 in Rome, Italy. From an 
organizational (United Nations) perspective, it was the culmination of years of work on 
the part of the International Law Commission (ILC), the Ad Hoc Committee (which was 
tasked with reviewing the draft statute provided by the ILC in 1995),1 and the Preparatory 
Committee (PrepCom), which continued to iron out the contentious components of the 
 
1 See United Nations, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Fifteenth Session (New York, 1995), Supplement No. 22 (A/20/22). 
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draft statute leading up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998.2 These efforts were 
supplemented by the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, 
intergovernmental (regional) organizations, and committed delegates and activists. The 
draft statute contained 13 parts and 116 articles.  
Heading into the diplomatic conference in Rome, the successful negotiation of the 
treaty to establish an International Criminal Court (ICC) was uncertain. Conference 
Chairman Philippe Kirsch and his colleague, Canadian delegate John Holmes, explained, 
“[d]espite the work accomplished by the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), the draft 
statute that ultimately emerged from the PrepCom was riddled with some fourteen 
hundred square brackets, i.e. points of disagreement, surrounding partial and complete 
provisions, with any number of alternative texts.”3 This resulted in the need to organize 
the Conference strategically. Coordinators were appointed to a specific area of 
responsibility: “the chairman requested all coordinators at the outset to take the lead in 
drafting provisions in their area of responsibility and to refer only unbracketed texts to 
the CW [Committee of the Whole] so as to avoid miring it in negotiations on the 
multitude of square brackets.”4 This division of labour was a managerial choice to 
maximize time and consolidate the text.  
 On this basis, it is important to highlight the most controversial or contentious 
parts of the treaty– that is, those aspects that could have resulted in the failure of the 
Conference. Heading into Rome, according to the UN Press Release of 8 June 1998:  
Most of the draft’s unresolved issues, however, are political in nature. Key issues 
still outstanding include whether or not State consent would apply within inherent 
jurisdiction of the court; whether the prosecutor would be able to initiate criminal 
 
2 See United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court (14 April 1998), A/CONF.183/2/Add.1. 
3 Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process,” The American Journal of International Law, 93.1 (January 1999), 3. Note that 
Philippe Kirsch was the Canadian Chairman of the Conference and John T. Holmes was the Counsellor for 
the Delegation of Canada, which gives their account of the negotiations special weight. 
4 Ibid. See note 5: “In general, issues once debated in the CW were referred to working groups or 
coordinators. The latter then reported the results of their work to the CW, and texts accepted by the CW 
were referred to the Drafting Committee. Texts refined by the committee had again to be approved by the 




action independently of the Security Council or the complaint of any State; 
whether the Security Council could stop the course of investigation or prosecution 
if it considered it a matter of international peace and security; the definition of 
war crimes; and whether or not to include the crime of aggression under the 
jurisdiction of the court.5 
Naturally, as the Conference evolved, the questions of contention became more 
concentrated. Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn broke the issues into two ‘sets of 
questions.’ The first concerned questions “about the exact categories of crimes the Court 
would try, and the second would be directed at the Court’s jurisdiction, how to determine 
a case’s admissibility, and the type of law the Court would apply… The meeting and 
Conference as a whole recognized that these questions of jurisdiction and admissibility 
were the intensely political issues that could no longer be postponed.”6 A key example of 
this was the crime of aggression and its fundamental ties to the United Nations Security 
Council (Security Council or UNSC). While a definition of aggression was not 
established in the context of the ICC by the PrepCom before the Rome Conference, the 
basic and general understanding was that aggressive acts breached the peace.7 Such 
breaches are fundamentally linked to the Security Council, the primary responsibility of 
which is to maintain international peace and security, under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.8 The nature of the relationship between the proposed Court and the Security 
Council was unclear leading up to and at the Rome Conference, especially when handling 
the same situation(s). Questions about institutional sequencing and concurrent 
involvement remained largely unanswered leading up to and during the negotiations. 
 
5 Press Release L/2867, “UN Diplomatic Conference to Establish International Criminal Court to Convene 
in Rome, 15 June-17 July,” (8 June 1998), available at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980608.l2867.html; accessed 28 February 2020 [emphasis added]. 
6 Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 
1994-1998 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014), 126. 
7 Note that the General Assembly had dealt with the difficult issue of defining aggression since 1945, 
referring the issue to the International Law Commission in 1950. In 1967, a Special Committee on the 
Question of Defining Aggression was established. In 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3314 
(XXIX), without a vote. See United Nations Resolution (XXIX), (14 December 1974), available at 
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/3314(XXIX); accessed 9 March 2020. 
8 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V: The Security Council, Article 24.1 (26 June 1945). 
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Nevertheless, Kirsch and Holmes explained that “the most controversial elements 
of the statute–those that could make or break the conference–were largely contained in 
Part 2, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law, which includes the list and 
definition of crimes. For that reason… the negotiating efforts of the chairman and the 
Bureau of the Committee of the Whole were mainly directed at resolving problems in 
part 2.”9 Kirsch and Holmes highlighted some key areas of contention: the role of the 
Security Council in respect of the Court; the inclusion of aggression among the core 
crimes covered by the statute; how the jurisdiction of the Court could be triggered 
(automatic jurisdiction upon ratification, case-by-case consent, universal jurisdiction); the 
power of the Prosecutor to initiate proceedings proprio motu; the inclusion of terrorism 
and regional drug trafficking; and the inclusion of nuclear weapons among the list of 
weapons prohibited by the statute.10 The jurisdiction question was the most problematic: 
“It is on this issue that the differences proved irreconcilable and consensus eventually 
broke down, leading to a vote at the end of the conference.”11 Indeed, the Rome Statute 
was not borne out of consensus. Instead, the final text was a reflection of measured 
compromise, designed to generate broad acceptance in the form of a ‘final package’ that 
states would be forced to accept in its entirety, or not at all, by an unrecorded yes-or-no 
vote. This was an effective strategy: 120 countries voted in favour of the Statute; seven 
countries, China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the United States, and Yemen, voted against 
it; 21 countries abstained.     
Within that framework, this chapter focuses on the positions of African 
delegations on the controversial elements contained in Part 2 in an effort to better 
understand the African ‘vision’ of the Statute and has been broken into two parts. The 
first considers African positions on the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the Security 
Council, ‘trigger mechanisms,’ and the powers of the Prosecutor to initiate an 
investigation on his or her own volition (i.e. proprio motu). The second part considers 
African positions on key issues with respect to crimes. This includes the inclusion of 
 






internal armed conflicts, the prohibition of terrorism and drug trafficking, and the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. For clarity, the inclusion of aggression as a core crime is 
fundamentally interlinked with the role of the Security Council and is considered as such, 
in part one.  
This builds on the work of others by further enriching understandings of African 
activism and support for the establishment of an ICC by putting a special analytical focus 
on the Rome Diplomatic Conference negotiations.12 This content analysis primarily relies 
upon the summary records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole, the main working body of the Conference. Unpacking Afro-specific 
contributions at the Rome Conference provides important insight into the ‘African vision’ 
of the ICC in its key ideational moment. A review of the contributions in Rome is used to 
better understand what kind of Court African states and coalitions of states wanted and 
whether or not such preferences ultimately affected treaty ratification in the region. 
Understanding these preferences provides a basis to better understand the areas of 
compromise which were required to ensure the success of the Conference and the 
establishment of the Court. It is argued that these compromises in many respects troubled 
the Court’s institutional design as a corollary of political posturing. This has permeated 
its operationalization, most focally in African situations.  
 
5.2 Regional and Other Group Affiliations  
African preferences in Rome were formed by states, and in many cases, within coalitions 
of states. Such coalitions took the form of intergovernmental negotiation blocs or 
regional organizations, namely: the South African Development Community (SADC), the 
 
12 See Line Engbo Gissel, “A Different Kind of Court: Africa’s Support for the International Criminal 
Court, 1993-2003,” The European Journal of International Law 29.3 (2018): 725-748; Max du Plessis and 
Christopher Gevers, “The Sum of Four Fears: African States and the International Criminal Court in 
Retrospect – Part I,” OpinioJuris (blog), August 7, 2019, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/08/the-
sum-of-four-fears-african-states-and-the-international-criminal-court-in-retrospect-part-i/; accessed 5 April 
2020; and Max du Plessis and Christopher Gevers, “The Sum of Four Fears: African States and the 
International Criminal Court in Retrospect – Part II,” OpinioJuris (blog), August 7, 2019, available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/08/the-sum-of-four-fears-african-states-and-the-international-criminal-court-
in-retrospect-part-ii/?relatedposts_hit=1&relatedposts_origin=35701&relatedposts_position=0; accessed 5 
April 2020.   
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Group of Arab States, the Group of African States, the Like-Minded Group (LMG), 
and/or the Nonaligned Movement (NAM); intersectional membership was commonplace 
for many African delegations, as shown in Table 5-1. It is also important to acknowledge 
the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in supporting and driving 
commitment to the establishment of an ICC, most notably through the work of the 
umbrella NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC).  
 
Table 5-1: African Coalition Membership at the Rome Diplomatic Conference 
(1998) 
Negotiating Bloc African Member States 
SADC Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Group of Arab States 
 
Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia. 
 
Group of African States 
 
Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-




Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, 
Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra  
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia. 
 
Nonaligned Movement  
 
Algeria, Ghana, Egypt, Mozambique, Sudan. 
 
It is important to understand that many African delegations had multiple affiliations at the 
Rome Conference, which often shaped the preferences of individual states throughout the 
negotiations. This frames a conceptualization of African diplomacy in Rome as complex 
and interdependent in many respects. The decision to join a negotiation bloc or coalition 
is a strategic choice for less powerful states to wield greater influence over the outcome 
of the negotiations.13 For context, it is important to note that SADC took a leading role 
 
13 See Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo, “The African Contribution Towards the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court,” in African Yearbook of International Law, ed. A.A. Yusef (African Association of 
International Law: 2001), 333-350; Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott, “Beyond soft balancing: small 
states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations,” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 25.3 (2012): 345-366. 
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regionally. As South African delegate Sivu Maqungo explained, “SADC also sought to 
maintain control of the regional groups, particularly the African group. To this end a 
successful concerted lobby effort was undertaken by SADC to have Lesotho co-ordinate, 
on a permanent basis, the Africa group’s effort within the process to establish an ICC.”14 
It is also important to highlight that “The Arab States formed one of the most active 
informal groups; they met frequently and adopted common positions that were not 
necessarily supportive of the ICC, although some states (such as Egypt and Jordan) were 
part of the ‘like-minded states.’”15 This is indicative of the difficulty stemming from 
membership in multiple groups. Nevertheless, while regional or group affiliations may 
explain preferential patterns among some African states, the analytical starting point is at 
the level of the state. More specifically, 48 African states attended the Rome Statute 
negotiations and expressed a range of national preferences.16 On this basis, African 
positions on the most controversial elements and key issues relating to elements of the 












14 Manqungo, “The African Contribution Towards the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” 
339. 
15 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 32.3, Article 3 (1999): 449, note 25. 
16 These states included Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, 




Table 5-2: African Positions on Controversial Elements and Key Issues on 
Jurisdiction at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 1998 
Controversial element and/or 
key issue 
 Number of African 
states that expressed 
a preference for the 
stated element/issue 
The role of the Security  
Council 
No role for UNSC 
 
No veto to block cases 
 


























































5.3 The role of the Security Council 
Many African delegations engaged in dialogue surrounding the proposed relationship 
between the ICC and the Security Council. The range of positions on this issue was 
broad. Five delegations expressly felt that the Council should have no involvement in the 
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operation or function of the Court.17 Others took a softer position, suggesting that the 
Council and the Court would need to have clearly defined roles and boundaries in order 
for both to work effectively– a cooperative arrangement.18 It is helpful to evaluate the 
positions of African delegations in further detail on this point, to better understand the 
imagined working relationship between the Council and the proposed Court.  
 
5.3.1  The Security Council and the crime of aggression 
Many states understood that the Security Council was bound to the crime of aggression, 
however defined, given its responsibility to maintain international peace and security 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Some African states wanted to give the Council 
inherent power in this respect. Cameroon, for one, was particularly involved in this 
discussion and submitted a proposal on the crime of aggression and the relationship 
between the Security Council and the Court. The most relevant points of the 
Cameroonian proposal are contained in its proposed Article 10: Relationship between the 
Security Council and the Court, which stated: 
1. The Security Council shall determine the existence of aggression in 
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 
before any proceedings take place in the Court in regard to a crime of 
aggression. 
 
2. The Security Council may determine the existence of aggression in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of this article: 
(a) On its own initiative; 
(b) At the request of a State which considers itself the victim of aggression; 
(c) At the request of the Court when a complaint relating to a crime of 
aggression has been submitted to it.19 
 
17 These states included Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia. 
18 These states included Cameroon, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique.  
19 Proposal Submitted by Cameroon to the Committee of the Whole, United Nations Diplomatic 




This approach suggests that the Security Council would have primary and sole authority 
to determine whether the crime of aggression had been committed.  
 Other African delegations strongly disagreed with this idea. For example, the 
Nigerian delegate stated that: 
He had a reservation about the proposed role of the Security Council. While there 
should be a relationship between the United Nations and the Court under an 
agreement, he was opposed to conferring on the Council the exclusive right to 
determine when aggression was committed and to refer such cases to the Court. 
The Court should not be encumbered at the outset by avoidable political 
influences. The power of the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations should not extend to the Court.20 
These concerns were further highlighted when he asked, “Moreover, how could 
aggression on the part of one of the permanent members of the Security Council be 
referred to the Court if that member could veto such a referral?”21 These sentiments were 
echoed by the Kenyan delegate who said that “he shared the view concerning the 
potential for conflict of jurisdiction, given the pre-existing powers of the Security 
Council. Its competence to determine the existence of acts of aggression could seriously 
affect the integrity of the Court as an independent body free from political influence.”22 
The delegate from Libya provided an experience-based opinion and posited that:  
 
20 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 7th plenary meeting (18 
June 1998) A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 and Corr.1, 111, para. 87. See also 8th plenary meeting (18 June 1998) 
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 and Cor. 1, 118, para. 69: This opinion was mirrored by the Ugandan delegate who 
said, “The role of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should not 
be allowed to influence the acceptability and independence of the Court.” 31st meeting (9 July 1998) 
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 and Corr. 1, 314, para. 6: The Tunisian delegate took a balanced position and said, 
“The Court should not be prevented by the Security Council from exercising jurisdiction over situations 
involving the crime of aggression. Nevertheless, due weight must be accorded to the Council’s role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”  
21 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June 1998) 
A/CONF./183/Add.1 and Corr.1, 209, para. 83. 
22 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 7th meeting (19 June 1998) 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.7, 181, para. 15. See also the statement of the delegate from Ghana: “The Court 
should have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but not, at the current 
juncture, over aggression, as that would inevitably cause conflict with the Security Council.” Summary 
records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 26th meeting (8 July 1998) A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53, 
278, para.61.  
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She did not consider that the Security Council should refer cases. The Security 
Council had failed to deal with many cases of flagrant aggression–for instance, 
the attack on her country in 1986… The Security Council and its decisions were 
influenced by the interests and positions of certain permanent members, so that its 
resolutions were selective and followed a double standard. Her delegation would 
object to the Court’s being paralysed if the Security Council could not decide 
whether or not there was aggression.23 
These examples demonstrate the range of opinion about the Security Council’s power to 
determine acts of aggression among various African delegations. Importantly, the 
politicization of the Council was acknowledged by several states that were less than 
enthusiastic about incorporating an unchecked United Nations Security Council into the 
framework of the ICC to solely determine acts of aggression. 
It is important to note that there was a high level of consensus among African 
delegations in Rome to include the crime of aggression in the Statute (65 per cent of the 
total number of African delegations in Rome).24 Only four states posited that aggression 
should not be included in the Statute, namely Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and Rwanda. Ghana 
appeared to change its position as the Conference evolved.25 Despite the overall 
 
23 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 6th meeting (18 June 1998), 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.6, 174, paras. 79-80. 
24 These included Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Tunisia. 
25 See Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 25th meeting (8 July 1998), 278, 
para. 61. Ghana had said that “The Court should have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, but not, at the current juncture, over aggression, as that would inevitably cause conflict 
with the Security Council.” Later, at the 33rd meeting (13 July 1998), 325, para. 63, the delegate from 
Ghana, “said that aggression was the mother of war crimes and it was absolutely essential that the Statute 
should reflect that fact.” At the 6th plenary meeting (17 June 1998), 103, para. 106, Morocco “agreed that 
the Court’s jurisdiction should be confined to war crimes, crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
To include the crime of aggression would be premature.” Ibid., at 174, para. 53: “Given the difficulty of 
finding a precise definition of the crime of aggression and the role of the Security Council, he thought that 
aggression should be excluded from the list of crimes falling within the competence of the Court. At the 
29th meeting (9 July 1998), 298, para. 53, Morocco said, “Aggression was political in nature and had not 
been clearly defined. It should therefore be excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction, and the same applied to 
other crimes which were not of the same gravity.” At the 26th meeting (8 July 1998), 278, para. 65, Mali 
said, “Aggression should not be included at that stage because it was an act for which no generally 
acceptable definition had yet been found.” Rwanda’s preference to exclude aggression is derived from its 
statement at the 6th plenary meeting, 103, para. 11: “His delegation believed that the crimes falling within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court should be confined to genocide, war crimes and crimes 
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consensus that aggression ought to be included in the Statute, opinion diverged on two 
distinct and important points: (1) its definition and (2) whether the Security Council 
would be necessarily and/or solely responsible for determining whether aggression had 
occurred as a precursor to Court intervention. This divergence is important because it 
hints at the willingness of African governments to accept the status quo–that is, the 
integration of the power of the Security Council within the Court’s institutional 
architecture. To this point, there was some disagreement as to whether or not the Court 
would be able to make its own determination about acts of aggression independent of the 
Security Council, or if there might be a role for the United Nations General Assembly in 
determining aggressive acts. Nevertheless, enumerating aggression within the Rome 
Statute required an acknowledged degree of coalescence between the Court and the 
Security Council, given the Security Council’s primary duty to maintain international 
peace and security; at the most basic level, acts of aggression disrupt international order. 
However, embedding realpolitik within the structure of an international judicial 
institution vis-à-vis the Security Council raised concerns for many African states in (and 
before) the negotiations at Rome. Since consensus broke down on this issue, aggression 
was included as an undefined core crime in the Statute in 1998. However, it did not come 
into force until it was: (a) defined in 2010 at a review conference in Kampala; (b) 
activated through the adoption of a resolution on 15 December 2017; and (c) entered into 
force on 17 July 2018.26 It is also important to note that the ICC only has jurisdiction over 
aggression with respect to States Parties which have ratified the Rome Statute and the 
 
against humanity, to the exclusion of other crimes already covered by national, regional or international 
conventions.” While aggression may be conceptualized as a war crime, it was generally compartmentalized 
as a separate and distinct ‘core crime’ alongside those cited by the Rwandan delegate and it is inferred that 
aggression was deliberately omitted from its preferred list of crimes. Note, also: the Angolan delegate took 
a mixed position, first supporting the inclusion of aggression at the 8th plenary meeting (18 June 1998), 
118, para. 56: “He supported the inclusion of aggression within the Court’s jurisdiction.” This was 
reinforced at the 9th meeting (19 June 1998),180, para. 8: “aggression was a very serious crime which 
caused a great deal of suffering and damage to the victim State. It must therefore be covered in the Statute.” 
Later at the 27th meeting (8 July 1998), 285, para. 42, the delegate stated that “he was not yet decided 
whether aggression should be included. A clear definition was needed so as to take account of General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) and, particularly, the role of the Security Council.” 
26 See generally “The Crime of Aggression,” Coalition for the International Criminal Court, (no date), 




amendments on the crime of aggression (unless referred to the ICC by the Security 
Council, which has no jurisdictional limits). 
 
5.3.2  Veto Powers 
Before the Rome Conference, SADC states had considered the role of the Security 
Council and the Court. Specifically, the SADC Principles enumerate that “The ICC 
should be unfettered by the veto of the Security Council.”27 More general language was 
expressed by African states in the Dakar Declaration, which states “that the International 
Criminal Court shall operate without being prejudiced by actions of the Security 
Council.”28 While SADC’s position focused squarely on the use of the UNSC veto, the 
Dakar Declaration reads more generally, with reference to ‘actions’ of the Security 
Council, which may include referral and deferral powers, for example. The consistency 
between the two expressions is in an overall emphasis on the Court’s independence from 
the Security Council, which was the primary point articulated by African delegates in the 
plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole. 
It is significant that 33 per cent of African states that attended the Rome 
Conference expressed general statements about the importance of the Court’s 
independence from the Security Council. For example, the Tanzanian delegate said that 
“The International Criminal Court had to be truly independent, effective, impartial and 
permanent. It must not become a tool for the political convenience of states.”29 Similar 
claims were made by Senegal, which noted that “referring to the role of the Security 
Council in respect of the International Criminal Court… no political structure should 
hamper the Court’s action. The Court should be independent of the Council and any other 
political body.”30 General expressions about the Court’s independence from political 
bodies, and particularly the Security Council permeate the summary records and 
 
27 SADC Negotiating Principles for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (11-14 September 
1997, Pretoria, South Africa). 
28 Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (6 February 1998, 
Dakar, Senegal). 
29 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 3rd plenary meeting (16 
June 1998), 74, para. 29. 




thematically characterize an African vision of a depoliticized Court rooted in the ideals of 
judicial independence. These two examples are relatively unsurprising, since Tanzania 
belongs to SADC and the Dakar Declaration took place in Senegal and both states had 
advocated the need for an independent ICC well before the Conference. Nevertheless, it 
is constructive to evaluate how the SADC Principles and Dakar Declaration shaped state 
positions at the Rome Conference with respect to the role of the Security Council in 
greater detail.   
Preference for the Court’s independence from the use of the Security Council veto 
was clearly reflected in the positions of seven African delegations in Rome.31 To 
highlight this point, the Gabonese delegate stated that: 
His delegation also considered that the Council should be given the possibility of 
bringing certain cases before the Court. It was, however, opposed to the principle 
that the Court could not prosecute persons who had committed crimes in a 
situation being taken up by the Council by virtue of its powers under the Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, unless the Council explicitly authorized 
it to do so. The exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction must therefore not depend on 
prior decisions by the Council, a highly politicized body. Any machinery that 
might allow the permanent members of the Council to use their veto to protect 
potential accused persons when the interests of their countries were at stake 
would severely damage the independence and credibility of the Court.32 
Gabon was a member of the Like-Minded Group (LMG), of which many African 
countries were also a part.33 This may explain why the Gabonese delegate took a strong 
position on this particular issue. Most important, it illustrates that the delegate had 
meaningfully considered the significance of the relationship between the Security 
 
31 These were Angola, Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Senegal, Sierra Leone. 
32 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 6th plenary meeting (17 
June 1998), 102-103, para. 96 [emphasis added]. 
33 The Like-Minded Group consisted of 55 states. African countries included: Algeria, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia. See Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling, Song Tianying and Yi Ping, 
eds.Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 4, (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, 2015), 732, note 8.  
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Council and the Court and chose to emphasize judicial independence to enhance 
institutional credibility.  
This might be compared to the contributions of the Botswanan delegate (and 
SADC member), who said, “some questions remained, for instance, regarding the role of 
the Security Council. The Council was the first port of call in international crises and 
should be allowed to refer cases to the Court. Any State or member of the Council should 
also be able to refer cases before it to the Court, and the veto should not be applicable.”34 
Comparing the statements of these two delegations indicates diversity with respect to the 
overall willingness to involve the Security Council within the structure and function of 
the Court. Both Botswana and Gabon reach the same conclusion (i.e. that the UNSC can 
refer cases to the Court, but the veto should not be used), yet the language indicates a 
greater willingness on the part of Botswana to work within the existing political structure 
by incorporating and trusting the Security Council to fulfill its mandate and the mandate 
of the Court. These are important distinctions which demonstrate that consensus is often 
reached with complex and principled difference(s), even in cases of surface-level 
(general) agreement.   
A different concern regarding the role of the Security Council and the use of the 
veto with respect to the Court was raised by the Libyan delegate, who said that “the Court 
should not be prevented from exercising its jurisdiction in the event of a Security Council 
veto.”35 This was reinforced when she said that “her delegation could not agree to any 
role for the Security Council. The Court would be paralysed if the Council could impede 
its investigations because of the veto power of individual States.”36 This position 
demonstrates a strong aversion to the Security Council altogether. Curiously, this 
indicates a desire for a strong and independent Court, but only if the case was not referred 
by the Security Council. Such a position is consistent with placing an ideological 
superiority on state sovereignty and ultimately reflects a desire to establish new power 
 
34 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 8th plenary meeting (18 
June 1998), 118, para. 66. 
35 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998), 293-294, 
para 102. 




structures in international politics concerning the design of international criminal law and 
its judicial institutions.37 This illustrates that there was not one monolithic ‘African’ 
position with respect to the ICC and its intended relationship with international political 
structures such as the Security Council. Nevertheless, similar fears were identified by 
Gabon and Libya with respect to the possibility of the Council abusing its power by using 
the veto and obfuscating the independence of the Court. Despite nuanced differences, 
expressions of Court independence remained generally consistent among African states in 
Rome.  
In contrast, Cameroon took a unique approach to constructing the relationship 
between the Court and the Council based on ideas of ‘cooperation and complementarity.’ 
Specifically, the Cameroonian delegate said that “the relationship between the Security 
Council and the Court should be a matter of cooperation and complementarity. The 
Council needed the Court to help maintain global peace and the Court needed the 
Council, in particular, to help enforce its decisions.”38 This suggests that Cameroon’s 
vision of the Court was based more so on including it within the existing political 
landscape, rather than seeking complete independence from it. This also indicates a belief 
that the Council and the Court could work together to achieve mutually shared goals. 
Similar themes were addressed by Mozambique when it outlined the importance of 
establishing a coordinated and cooperative relationship between the Security Council and 
the Court. In a similar vein, the Central African Republic emphasized the need for 
harmonization, not obstruction between the Court and the Security Council.  
Perhaps the most significant underlying concern raised by Cameroon and others 
was the idea that the Court would need assistance with enforcement, based on complex 
political realities, which the Security Council could help facilitate. To elaborate, 
Madagascar suggested that the Security Council would be needed to compel States 
Parties to enforce the Court’s sentences. However, underlying these advances of 
 
37 See generally 28th meeting, 294, para. 104 when the delegate from Libya said that “she was ready to 
consider guarantees that would secure the integrity and sovereignty of States;” see, also: 6th plenary 
meeting (17 June 1998), 102, para. 81: Libya similarly said that “It was essential to respect the sovereignty, 
equality and independence of States and to prevent political organs from controlling international life.” 




institutional cooperation is the assumption that the Council would place the moral 
imperatives or normative ideologies of the Court above the political interests of Council 
members, either individually or collectively. Although relatively unpopular with other 
African delegations, this position presents a degree of pragmatism with respect to 
enforcement challenges that could not go unacknowledged. This is important because it 
demonstrates the high level of engagement exercised by African delegates, who engaged 
with the difficult and contentious issues directly relating to power politics and the 
limitations of realpolitik.  
Nevertheless, a different understanding was described by the delegate from 
Lesotho, who said that “the relationship between the Security Council and the Court 
raised difficult questions. Although, in theory, no conflict should exist, the Council’s 
maintenance of peace and security might either complement or frustrate the work of the 
Court in bringing war criminals to justice and advancing the international rule of law. He 
opposed any political interference by the Council or States in the affairs of the Court.”39 
Lesotho took a leading role within the SADC on the ICC issue and was heavily involved 
in the negotiations leading up to Rome. This statement suggests a fundamental concern 
with trusting the Security Council to strengthen, rather than weaken, the Court. This 
appears to be a chance that Lesotho was unwilling to take, opting instead for an 
independent and depoliticized ICC, much like the majority of African delegations that 
spoke to this issue in plenary. This is important because it demonstrates that the majority 
of African states viewed the ICC as an institution that ought to reflect a new world order, 
or at least not integrate the existing power structures within its institutional design.    
 
5.3.3  Referral powers 
Other expressions of Security Council powers outside of the veto include its capacity to 
refer situations to the Court and to defer proceedings in the interest of maintaining 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The majority of 
African delegations that addressed the powers of the Security Council in the plenary 
 
39 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 2nd plenary meeting (15 
June 1998), 69, para. 72. 
100 
 
meetings were willing to grant referral powers with relatively little contestation. This 
willingness may be linked to thematic ideals of universality and the desire to establish a 
Court with broad jurisdictional reach.40 Further, the Security Council has historical ties to 
international criminal justice, since it established the ad hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. Granting the Security Council referral powers would supplant the need to 
establish ad hoc tribunals, should the need arise in future contexts. 
Nonetheless, there was variation in opinion on how to establish Security Council 
referral powers in the context of an ICC during the negotiations. Specifically, 15 African 
states expressly agreed to give the Security Council referral powers. This represented the 
position of 31 per cent of the African delegations in attendance in Rome and more 
pointedly, 75 per cent of African delegations that addressed this particular issue in the 
plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole.41 Ethiopia, Morocco, and 
Zimbabwe preferred that the referral powers of the Security Council be limited only to 
acts of aggression. Nigeria and Libya were expressly opposed to giving referral powers in 
any capacity.42 To demonstrate this point, the Nigerian delegate said that the Council 
should have “no role whatsoever with regard to referral of matters to the Court.”43  
Generally, this indicates broad(er) regional support for granting the Security 
Council referral powers, though 28 African states did not address this issue in the plenary 
meetings. Tacit approval and/or consent may be inferred by the states that did not speak 
to this issue but either signed, or more demonstrably, signed and ratified the final version 
of the Statute.44 Of the 18 African delegations that preferred to grant the UNSC referral 
 
40 See generally Line Engbo Gissel, “A Different Kind of Court: Africa’s Support for the International 
Criminal Court, 1993-2003,” The European Journal of International Law 29.3 (2018), 735. 
41 This included the following states: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. 
42 See generally Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June 
1998), 209, para. 77. Libya said that “To give the Security Council, which was a political body, the right to 
trigger action would destroy confidence in the impartiality and independence of the Court, and thus detract 
from its credibility.”  
43 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 198, para. 
76. See 28th meeting, 293-294, para. 102: Libya expressed a similar position when its delegate said that “the 
right of members of the Council to refer cases to the Court was an entrenchment of domination.” 
44 Note that Angola, Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sudan did not speak 
to UNSC referrals and ultimately signed the Rome Statute but did not ratify it. States that did not speak to 
the issue of Security Council referral powers but signed and ratified the Rome Statute include: Cape Verde, 
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, 
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powers (limited or general), 13 went on to ratify the Statute, constituting the majority of 
the group with this shared preference.45 Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Zimbabwe signed 
the Rome Statute, but did not ratify it, which demonstrates a degree of low-level 
commitment. Ethiopia neither signed nor ratified the Statute.       
 Indeed, the final text of the Statute grants the Security Council referral powers 
under Article 13 (b)– Exercise of jurisdiction: 
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if… 
b. A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.46 
Providing referral powers for the Security Council is generally in line with the 
predominant ‘African’ vision of the Court. Only two African states specifically expressed 
a preference for no referral powers: Nigeria and Libya. Nigeria eventually signed and 
ratified the Rome Statute. Libya neither signed nor ratified. The significance of the 
Security Council’s referral power is that it can expand the Court’s jurisdiction to 
situations involving non-State Parties. This is a privilege not afforded to the Prosecutor or 
to States Parties when triggering the Court’s jurisdiction and can be used in lieu of the 
establishment of ad hoc tribunals.     
 
5.3.4  Deferral powers 
All the African states that accepted conferring deferral powers on the UNSC opposed 
prolonged involvement or interference with the Court and sought to limit this power as a 
result.  This is consistent with the regional thematic aspiration of Court independence 
from political bodies, especially the Security Council. Specifically, 17 African 
delegations accepted giving the Security Council the ability to defer proceedings at the 
 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia. The states that did 
not speak to the issue of Security Council referral powers and did not sign or ratify the Rome Statute 
include Mauritania, Rwanda, and Swaziland.  
45This included the following states: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone.  
46 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) A/CONF.183/9. 
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Court, though with varying levels of overall approval and endorsement.47 African 
delegations sought to restrict UNSC deferral powers in two primary ways: (1) temporal 
restrictions with respect to the duration of the deferral and the duration and number of 
possible renewal(s); (2) the caveat that evidence and witnesses be protected during the 
deferment process.48 To be sure, these restrictions were important for many African 
states. Consider that Congo and Senegal preferred not to give the UNSC deferral powers 
but were willing to compromise if limits were placed on those powers. It is instructive to 
evaluate the positions of various African delegations to better understand the ideological 
spectrum on this particular issue. 
 First, Libya recommended giving no deferral powers to the Security Council. The 
Libyan delegate said, “[t]he Security Council should not have powers over the Court or 
be able to suspend proceedings for 12 months. Both article 10 [Security Council deferral] 
and article 6(b) [Exercise of jurisdiction: Security Council referral] should be deleted.”49 
This position is consistent with Libya’s view of a depoliticized Court, particularly 
regarding its quintessential independence from the Security Council. Speaking from a 
similar perspective, the delegate from Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed that 
“the Court should be able to function without interference from any other organ, 
especially the Security Council.”50 However, it is necessary to identify that the majority 
of African states that addressed this issue expressed a desire to limit the deferral powers 
of the Security Council, rather than deny this power altogether.  
 In this frame, the majority of African states that considered this issue took a 
(more) moderate position on UNSC deferral powers in Rome. Delegations such as Congo 
submitted that its preference was not to grant the Security Council deferral powers. 
 
47 These included Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and 
Sudan.  
48 Note that the states that preferred placing limits on the duration of the deferral included Angola, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Sudan. States that preferred to incorporate 
protections for witnesses and evidence included Benin, Burundi, Congo, Gabon, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. 
49 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 307, para. 
35. 
50 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 7th plenary meeting (18 
June 1998), 112, para. 93. 
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However, “it could, as a compromise, agree to a suspension for a maximum, non-
renewable period of six months.”51 The Burundian delegation also took a compromise 
position, expressing that “it would have liked the suspension period to be shorter, but 
could accept the provision… provided that the need for preservation of evidence was 
addressed.”52 This position indicates an acceptance of limited deferral powers, so long as 
evidence is preserved while proceedings are suspended. In other words, the deferral 
cannot prejudice any future investigations or proceedings.  
The preservation of evidence and the protection of witnesses in the event of a deferral 
was a priority for Benin, Burundi, Congo, Gabon, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Like 
Burundi, each of these delegations also preferred to place temporal restrictions on the 
duration of the deferral and/or the possibility for renewal. To illustrate this point, the 
Senegalese delegate presented a compromise position by placing temporal and 
evidentiary restrictions on UNSC deferrals when he said “the Security Council should be 
able to refer matters to the Court, but it would be preferable for it not to have the power 
to suspend proceedings. However, he would be prepared to accept option 2 for article 10, 
paragraph 2, [Security Council deferral] if the period involved did not exceed three or 
perhaps six months and if the suspension was not renewable. Strong provisions should be 
included for the protection of witnesses and the preservation of evidence.”53 This position 
reflects a preference for the Council not to have deferral powers, but a willingness to 
compromise if powers were limited in terms of duration and if protections were afforded 
to the evidence and associated witnesses/victims. Other states made more general 
assertions. For example, the delegate from Gabon said that “the Council should not have 
the power to defer consideration of a case by the Court for more than six months.”54 
African delegations had competing ideas about the appropriate length of time that the 
 
51 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 315, para. 
17. 
52 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), 336, 
para. 21. 
53 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 307, para. 
29. 
54 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 29th meeting (9 July 1998), 300, para. 
103. In a similar vein, Ethiopia supported the view that deferral powers should not exceed six months and 
could not be renewed for more than six months, see 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 315, para. 29.  
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UNSC could defer a situation from the Court. This provides additional evidence with 
respect to how African governments viewed the UNSC, and more specifically, the 
relative willingness of particular African governments to provide the UNSC with more or 
less integrative powers within the institutional framework of the Court.  
 Some African states had less hesitation about incorporating Security Council 
deferral powers within the Statute, albeit with similar temporal limits. Egypt, for 
example, submitted that while the Security Council “should have the right to deal initially 
with some matters, it should be empowered to prevent the Court from dealing with them 
only for a limited, non-renewable period.”55 Similarly, but more specifically, Kenya 
acknowledged the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international 
peace and security, yet suggested that a twelve-month deferral period should be reduced 
to six, with the possibility of one six-month extension.56 Mozambique dealt specifically 
with the question of renewal and was willing to accept UNSC deferral powers “on the 
understanding that the request of the Security Council could be renewed for no longer 
than six months, and once only.”57 Notably, some African delegations were concerned 
with the possibility that the Security Council could defer a situation indefinitely. For 
example, the delegate from Central African Republic said that “granting the Council 
power to suspend proceedings reflected a commendable desire to harmonize the actions 
of those two bodies; however, harmonization did not mean obstruction…  his delegation 
felt that… the Council’s right of suspension could not be renewed indefinitely.”58 Such 
positions acknowledge that the Security Council may have a need to defer Court action in 
the interest of maintaining international peace and security, but only temporarily.  
 
 
55 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June 1998), 209, 
para. 89. 
56 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 317, para. 
33. 
57 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), 341, 
para. 71.  




5.4 The final text  
The final version of the Statute under Article 16 that deals with the deferral of 
investigation or prosecution says: 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that 
effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.59 
Ultimately, the negotiated Statute does not reflect the ‘African vision’ of Security 
Council deferral powers. Indeed, all of the African states that addressed this issue in the 
plenary meetings preferred to grant limited deferral powers to the Council in terms of 
duration and/or evidence and witness protections. This required compromise on the part 
of Senegal and Congo, as both countries ideally preferred to grant no deferral powers to 
the Council.60 However, since deferrals are enacted by Security Council Resolution, it 
requires a relatively unified Council decision-making process; abstention rather than the 
use of the veto may suggest disapproval without impacting the outcome of the resolution. 
However, the use of the veto on a deferral resolution could be used. Nonetheless, the 
Rome Statute does not reflect the ideal ‘African vision’ of Security Council deferral 
powers as described at the Rome Conference. It is important to note that non-States 
Parties of the ICC which are permanent members of the Security Council have built-in 
insulation from the Court (i.e. Russia, China, United States) as a consequence of its 
collective deferral (and referral) powers. Of the 17 African states that were willing to 
grant the UNSC deferral powers, 11 went on to ratify the Statute, constituting 65 per cent 
of this group of states.61 Angola, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sudan signed 
the Rome Statute, but did not ratify it, demonstrating a minimal level of approval and 
commitment. Ethiopia neither signed nor ratified.  
 
 
59 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 16. 
60 It could be viewed as problematic that the final text does not enumerate the need to protect evidence or 
witnesses in the event of a deferral. It similarly places no restriction on renewals, meaning that the Security 
Council could infinitely defer situations from Court action. 
61 These states included: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. 
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5.5 Implications of key positions on the role of the Security 
 Council  
The broad spectrum of African positions ranged from rejection, cautious acceptance, tacit 
approval, and overall acceptance of the UNSC as it relates to, and operates alongside, the 
ICC. This highlights the difficulty in constructing an institution from scratch and 
incorporating it within an existing global structure (and order), which has been designed 
to deal with similar and related issues in international political life. Nevertheless, it is 
fundamentally important to acknowledge that the diffusion of politics and law is in 
keeping with the most basic rule-of-law principles–embedding an imbalanced and 
hierarchical political body within the foundation and structure of a (purportedly 
objective) judicial institution is perplexing at the very least. This is even more so the case 
because the use of the Security Council veto presents the opportunity to insulate the 
national interest(s) of states, even with respect to the most serious crimes. In a similar 
vein, relying solely on the Security Council to determine acts of aggression presents 
another opportunity for politicized lawlessness.  
Given that African states stressed the importance of the Court’s independence 
from the ICC in Rome, the final Statute reflects a compromise outcome–one that iterates 
the fears expressly stated by African states that saw Security Council involvement as an 
opportunity for the enmeshment of power politics in international law. Many delegates in 
Rome had the foresight to predict that the Council would interject in the Court’s 
proceedings in subjective and unfair (i.e. political) ways. Since then, the Security Council 
can and has used the veto to block referrals to the Court, particularly as it relates to 
jurisdictional matters concerning non-states parties (e.g. the resolution on the referral of 
the situation in Syria to the ICC, which was blocked by China and Russia) even with 
respect to the most serious international crimes.62 On the other hand, it can and has 
 
62 United Nations, Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, “Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court 
Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution,” (22 May 2014) 
SC/11407, available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm; accessed 11 March 2020. Note 
that even the representative of the United States supported the draft resolution and said it “was about 
accountability for crimes so extensive and deadly that they had few equals in modern history. It was also 
about accountability on the [Security] Council’s part. Recalling that the International Criminal Court had 
been able to act when extraordinary crimes had been committed in the past, she asked why the Syrian 
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referred situations to the ICC, even with respect to non-states parties (e.g. the resolution 
referring the situation in [Darfur] Sudan–a non-states party, to the ICC and the 
subsequent referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC, also a non-states party).63 This 
uneven application of the Court’s only mechanism of ‘universal’ jurisdiction damages not 
only the ICC’s institutional reputation, but perhaps more importantly, international 
criminal justice norms altogether.  
The fact that the UNSC referred the African situations but not others of equal 
gravity is less significant than the point that African delegates were very aware of this 
possibility, well before the Rome Statute entered into force and the ICC came to be. In 
other words, this was a known risk associated with signing and ratifying the treaty. While 
Sudan and Libya did not become States Parties, the majority of African nations that did, 
did so with an awareness that this type of politicization was not only possible, but likely. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is relatively uncontroversial to contend that the powers 
given to the Security Council constituted the biggest compromise of the Conference. This 
is iterated by reference to Security Council referrals as a ‘poisoned chalice.’64 This is not 
just because such referrals enmesh justice and politics, but also because UNSC referrals 
have had no substantive political support or backing and completely debilitate the Court 
as a result. In this view, the ideal construction of the relationship between the UNSC and 
the Court by the majority of African delegations in Rome was not reflected in the final 
text of the Rome Statute. Problematically, the Court is not solely independent nor is it 
coalescent with the Security Council in many respects, which troubles the effective 
political and legal operationalization of both. 
 
 
people did not equally deserve justice.” The French representative also said that the resolution “appealed to 
the human conscience and was not a political gesture… stressing that failure to adopt it was an insult to 
humanity.” Note also: justice was extremely slow for the Rohingya in Myanmar – mass violence began in 
2017 during a military campaign and has continued since. The Prosecutor of the ICC was only authorized 
to open an investigation by the Pre-Trial Chamber in November 2019 based on neighbouring Bangladesh’s 
membership. It is argued that the UNSC could and should have referred this situation to the ICC much 
earlier.   
63 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), S/RES/1593; United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1970 (2011), S/RES/1970. 
64 Mark Kersten, “The UN Security Council and the ICC: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” Justice in 
Conflict (6 May 2011), blogpost available online at https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/05/06/the-un-security-
council-and-the-icc-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/; accessed 7 April 2020.  
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5.6 Jurisdiction: ‘Trigger mechanism’ 
Establishing the trigger mechanism for the Court’s jurisdiction was a particularly high 
priority at the Rome Diplomatic Conference and is a key institutional feature of the 
Court. Consensus broke down on this issue and African delegations were similarly 
divided. Importantly, 77 per cent of African delegates in attendance in Rome took an 
express position on the Court’s jurisdiction regime, providing ample insight into regional 
preference(s) on this issue. Specifically, modes of jurisdiction were broken down and 
compartmentalized within three ideological frames: automatic, universal, and case-by-
case consent/opt-in. Automatic jurisdiction upon ratification of the Statute was the most 
widely shared preference for the Court’s jurisdiction regime by African delegations in 
Rome, which compromised the majority and 63 per cent of the total number of African 
delegations in attendance at the Conference; 81 per cent of African delegations that spoke 
to the jurisdiction regime issue during the negotiations.65 Universal jurisdiction was 
supported by 10 African delegations, which constituted 21 per cent of total African 
delegations and 28 per cent of the African delegations that spoke to the jurisdiction 
regime issue. Importantly, all of the African delegations that wanted universal 
jurisdiction were willing to compromise and settle for automatic jurisdiction. For this 
reason, these states are identified and dually listed in both universal and automatic 
jurisdiction categories for the purpose of this analysis. Case-by-case consent was 
endorsed by eight African delegations, which compromised 17 per cent of the total 
African delegations in attendance at the Conference and 22 per cent of African 
delegations that spoke to the jurisdiction regime issue in the plenary meetings and 
 
65 These states included Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, 
Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note that Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe preferred universal jurisdiction, but accepted automatic jurisdiction as a 
compromise. Note also: Tunisia preferred the Court have automatic jurisdiction over some crimes, while 
others would require explicit consent. Consider also that delegations such as Ghana explicitly opposed a 
consent-based system but did not expressly take a position on automatic or universal jurisdiction. Such 
ambiguous positions have been omitted from this analysis. For context, the Republic of Korea proposed 
‘automatic jurisdiction’ at the outset of the Conference. Under this framework, jurisdiction would be 
triggered when any of the states involved (territorial, national [of accused or victims], or custodial) had 
consented to the Court’s jurisdiction either by ratifying the Rome Statute or ad hoc and this position was 
supported by the majority of African states in the negotiations. 
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meetings of the Committee of the Whole.66 These positions will be considered in greater 
detail in order to generate a more nuanced understanding of the ‘African vision’ of the 
ICC as it was negotiated in Rome. The jurisdiction issue might be understood on an 
ideational spectrum of desired institutional strength/robustness, illustrated by Figure 5-1. 
This is significant because this spectrum reflects the relative willingness of states to be 
subject to infringement on sovereignty, evidenced by preferences in the ICC’s 
institutional design, particularly with respect to its jurisdiction regime.      
 
Figure 5-1: Institutional robustness based on jurisdiction regime or ‘trigger 
mechanism’
 
5.6.1  Case-by-case Consent/Opt-in Jurisdiction 
Case-by-case or opt-in approaches to the jurisdiction of the Court would require the 
explicit agreement on the part of states over and above ratification of the Statute to 
trigger Court action. This conception of the Court’s jurisdiction is strongly rooted in 
 
66These states included Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Tunisia. Note that 
Algeria, Rwanda, and Sudan preferred for states to be able to issue reservations. Tunisia preferred mixed 
jurisdiction: automatic for some crimes and opt-in for others. It is cross-listed on both automatic and 
consent-based preferences.  
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traditional understandings of state sovereignty and the primacy of states in international 
law.67 The interjection of international law in domestic contexts is only permissible if the 
state allows it. This was an especially common understanding of international law in the 
mid to late 1990s, which explains why consent was advocated or presumed as an 
essential feature of the Court’s jurisdiction regime by some African states. 
Specifically, Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Nigeria 
expressly endorsed a case-by-case consent jurisdiction in Rome. Algeria took the position 
that “State consent was fundamental. The consent of at least two States should be 
required: the State of nationality [of the suspect/accused] and the State of custody [of the 
suspect/accused].68 The Algerian delegate clarified his position in later meetings and said 
that his country, “was not in favour of automatic jurisdiction of the Court over all the 
crimes covered by the Statute. When ratifying the Statute, States should indicate the 
crimes for which they accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. For the exercise of jurisdiction, 
the consent of the following States would be necessary: the State of which the victim was 
a national, the State where the act had been committed and the State of which the accused 
was a national.”69 This raises fundamental questions about the nature of consent and 
which States might be required to agree to Court action and whether a lack of consensus 
could render the Court ineffective. This particular interpretation of state consent is 
exhaustive and presents the greatest likelihood of restricting the Court’s jurisdictional 
reach.  
In a similar vein, the Nigerian delegate highlighted the importance of the 
relationship between sovereignty and state consent. In particular, the Nigerian delegate 
said that he “reiterated his full support for the collective African position set out in the 
declaration on the establishment of an international criminal court adopted by the 
Organization of African Unity at Ouagadougou in June 1998. That declaration stressed, 
 
67 See generally Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 6th Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 4: “the general consent of states creates general rules of application;” Louis 
Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Brill Academic Publishers, 1994), 28: “No treaty, old or 
new, whatever its character or subject, is binding on a state unless it has consented to it.”   
68 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 197, para. 
58. 




inter alia, that the cardinal principle of the sovereignty of States should be preserved in 
the Statute of the Court and that the Court should be complementary to national criminal 
justice systems and be based on the consent of the States concerned.”70 Similarly, the 
Libyan delegate opined “that the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction should be based on 
State consent” and moreover that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court could not be split in the 
sense of having an inherent jurisdiction for some crimes such as genocide and an optional 
jurisdiction for other crimes. Her delegation supported the principle of acceptance of 
jurisdiction, rather than that of inherent jurisdiction.”71 This position similarly places an 
emphasis on state sovereignty and consent. With respect to ‘split jurisdiction,’ Tunisia 
proposed a mixed approach–some crimes should have automatic jurisdiction and others 
should require the consent of States. In rejecting this approach, it is clear that Libya 
endorsed consent-based jurisdiction, emphasizing the primacy of state sovereignty and 
the principle of non-interference with respect to internal (domestic) matters.   
In this vein, Algeria, Rwanda, Sudan, and, to some degree, Egypt posited that 
states should be able to issue reservations on particular aspects of the Statute, thus 
reflecting a degree of opt-in jurisdiction, since it would allow States to choose the laws it 
is subject to on an ad hoc or piecemeal basis. According to the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties, Article 2(1)(a): 
“reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, 
made by a State, when ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of 
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.72 
In the context of the Rome Conference, it was well-established that Rwanda preferred the 
inclusion of the death penalty. At the negotiations, the Rwandan delegate expressed that 
“the exclusion of the death penalty could not affect the right of sovereign States to apply 
 
70 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 7th plenary meeting (18 
June 1998), 111, para. 89 [emphasis added]. 
71 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 197, para. 
74. 
72 United Nations, Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) see Articles 19-23 inclusive. 
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it in aggravated circumstances, particularly in situations involving great loss of life.”73 
This may explain why Rwanda took the position that states should be able to express 
reservations. Particularly, its delegate said, “Rwanda supported the right of a State to 
express reservations with respect to certain provisions of the Statute. It hoped that the 
establishment of an international criminal court would allow prosecution of the planners 
of genocide who had sought refuge in other States.”74 This position is interesting 
inasmuch as on one hand, it promotes the ‘right’ of a State to express reservations while 
advocating for the extrajudicial prosecution for perpetrators of genocide on the other. 
This appears to combine a consent-based regime with universal jurisdiction.  
Sudan also expressed a preference for reservations in Rome, but couched its 
justification in the idea of universality. Specifically, the Sudanese delegate, speaking on 
behalf of the Group of Arab States, said that, “[w]hile the Arab States would not stand in 
the way of the adoption of the Statute of the Court, he felt bound to place on record that 
they were not convinced by what had been agreed upon… The right to express 
reservations should also have been granted. The removal of that right by article 109 
would be an obstacle to accession.”75 Egypt also touched on this point when its delegate 
said that “he attached great importance to the universality of the Convention to be 
adopted. The possibility of entering reservations might encourage many countries to 
accede to the Convention.”76 Indeed, the final version of the Rome Statute does not allow 
reservations of any kind.77 As such, States Parties must accept the treaty in its entirety. It 
appears as though Sudan and Egypt (and the Group of Arab States, by extension) were 
willing to construct a weaker Statute in exchange for increased ratification (i.e. 
 
73 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 41st meeting (16 July 1998), 357, para. 
10. Note that other African states endorsed the use of the death penalty, including Ethiopia at the 41st 
meeting (16 July 1998), 356-357, para. 7: “Crimes like genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
called for penalties commensurate with their gravity. Exclusion of the death penalty for such crimes was 
unacceptable.” 
74 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 6th plenary meeting (17 
June 1998), 103, para. 114. 
75 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 9th plenary meeting (17 
July 1998), 126-127, paras. 74-78.  
76 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 1st plenary meeting (15 
June 1998), 69, para. 80. 
77 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 120: Reservations: “no reservations may be made 
to this Statute.” 
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universality). This is important because it demarcates a division in regional preferences 
and priorities. Indeed, a trade-off in the interest of universality was not prioritized by the 
majority of African delegations at the Conference, but it provides interesting insight as to 
how African states conceptualized or ranked features of institutional effectiveness. 
A related concern was raised about the potential for conflict between domestic 
law and the proposed Rome Statute with respect to the surrender of nationals under the 
International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance heading. In three African cases, the 
extradition of nationals was an express contradiction with domestic law. It was explained 
by the Sudanese delegate that “the constitutions of a number of countries, including his 
own, prohibited the surrender of nationals. His delegation hoped that the International 
Criminal Court, once established, would take that difficulty into account.”78 The delegate 
from Libya similarly identified this competing obligation. She explained that “the 
prohibition of the surrender of nationals was one of the most important provisions in her 
country’s legislation.”79 Likewise, the delegate from Algeria said that “[h]is country’s 
Constitution and legislation prohibited the extradition of nationals. Algeria therefore 
wished to record its reservation… pending a final decision as to the issue of reservations 
in general.”80 Libya and Sudan made clear the incompatibility between domestic law and 
the proposed Rome Statute on the issue of extradition. This may offer explanation 
regarding the preference for reservations in the negotiation process, emphasized by 
Algeria. This is particularly insightful when coupled with national preference for the use 
of the death penalty, as expressed by states like Rwanda and Ethiopia. Such a position 
suggests that a ‘weaker’ Court would be more agreeable to a greater number of states; 
this would result in increased membership and work towards the broadly stated goal of 
universality. This reflects a view that institutional and normative weakness is generally 
more acceptable to states and the Court’s relative effectiveness would be correlated with 
its number of States Parties.  
 
78 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 38th meeting (15 July 1998), 351, 
para. 19. 
79 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 38th meeting (15 July 1998), 352, 
para. 22. 
80 Ibid., at para. 23. 
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It is worth noting that Sudan also expressed other reasons for opposing automatic 
jurisdiction for Court. Specifically, the Sudanese delegate said, “to give the Court 
inherent [automatic] jurisdiction would favour a State that was not a party to the Statute, 
because in their case the consent of the custodial State or the territorial State or both 
would be required before the Court could exercise its jurisdiction, whereas in the case of 
States parties the Court would automatically exercise jurisdiction. That would discourage 
accession to the Statute.”81 
This demonstrates an emphasis on protective measures–that States should be 
insulated from the Court’s jurisdiction. This position privileges consent and principles of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention. In this respect, an emphasis on the principle of 
complementarity is relevant since the Court can only intervene as a last resort when 
domestic institutions manifestly fail to act. This bedrock principle is fundamentally 
important when conceptualizing the role and function of the Court in domestic contexts 
and responding to concerns like those expressed by Sudan. Ultimately, a normative 
commitment to international criminal justice demands that states surrender some amount 
of sovereignty. 
This isolationist approach was countered by several African delegations, most 
strongly by Botswana. Specifically, the delegate from Botswana “rejected the opt-in/opt-
out approach: in his delegation’s view, States ratifying the Statute must accept the 
Court’s automatic jurisdiction in respect of all the core crimes. That did not mean he did 
not want to see a universally accepted court. However, the ideal of universality should 
not be achieved at the expense of effectiveness.”82 This demonstrates broad ideological 
diversity with respect to the Court’s jurisdiction regime or trigger mechanism. It is clear 
that there was not one monolithic ‘African’ position, though the majority of delegates that 
addressed the options for triggering the Court’s jurisdiction in the plenaries and the 
Committee of the Whole preferred to establish an effective Court that could operate 
beyond the limits of state consent. The strongest articulation of this position came from 
 
81 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 198, para. 
68 [emphasis added]. 
82 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 313, para. 
3 [emphasis added]. 
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the states that pushed for a Court with universal jurisdiction over the core crimes–that is, 
a view that the Statute should apply to every relevant situation regardless of consent or 
accession by the national, territorial, or custodial state(s) involved.83 
5.6.2  Universal Jurisdiction 
Ten African delegations at the Rome Conference supported a universal approach to the 
Court’s jurisdiction: Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Mali, Senegal,84 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Universal jurisdiction would have expanded the 
Court’s reach, making it more effective and a comparatively stronger institution than the 
other jurisdiction regimes allow. In normative terms, universal jurisdiction offers an 
opportunity to expand the salience of international criminal justice, regardless of a state’s 
willingness to submit to it. The reality of international relations is such that the 
willingness on the part of states to realize the ideals of international criminal law is not 
uniform; compromise positions are not only necessary, they were (and are) required. This 
offers explanation as to why all of the African delegations that preferred universal 
jurisdiction were willing to accept automatic jurisdiction as a compromise. Yet it is useful 
to evaluate the statements made on behalf of the African states that were willing to grant 
the Court universal jurisdiction, mitigating state sovereignty and maximizing institutional 
power and scope. 
 In this respect, Tanzania’s contributions were particularly instructive. 
Specifically, early in the Conference, the Tanzanian delegate said that “[t]he regime of 
human rights derived its legitimacy from the universality of those rights, and the same 
would apply to the Court. Some aspects of the idea of sovereignty were a potential bar to 
 
83 See generally Sharon A. Williams, “The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court – Universal 
Jurisdiction or State Consent – To Make or Break the Package Deal,” International Law Studies 75 (2000): 
544; Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer, “The International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction: A 
Close Encounter?” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 56.1 (2007): 49-68. The German 
delegation proposed the strongest concept of universal jurisdiction in Rome. The United States was 
particularly disapproving of this approach and the proposal was ultimately dropped. As a compromise 
response, South Korea proposed a form of so-called automatic jurisdiction by expanding jurisdiction to the 
ICC if any of the following states were States Parties to the Rome Statute: territorial, nationality or passive 
personality, or custodial. See Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th 
meeting (9 July 1998), 302, para. 130: Guinea said, “As to acceptance of jurisdiction, his delegation 
regretted that the German proposal on universal jurisdiction seemed to have been withdrawn.”  
84 Note that Senegal preferred automatic jurisdiction for States Parties and universal jurisdiction over the 
core crimes for non-States Parties. 
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the common will to punish heinous crimes, but the Court must ensure that State 
sovereignty became a concept of responsibility and international cooperation rather than 
an obstacle to the enjoyment of universal human rights.”85 
Such an approach is rooted in ideas of human rights, human security, and the 
interrelated consequence of placing conditional limits on sovereignty if gross human 
rights violations are largely ignored by the state in which they occur.86 Tanzania framed 
sovereignty in a very different way than the states that promoted a consent-based 
jurisdiction regime. This demonstrates a significant difference in ideological perspective. 
With specific attention to jurisdiction, the Tanzanian delegate stated that “her delegation 
supported universal jurisdiction for all the core crimes but as a compromise could accept 
automatic jurisdiction. It considered that an opt-in/opt-out regime would undermine the 
Court’s effectiveness.”87 Similar statements were made by other states, such as Congo. 
For example, the Congolese delegate explained that 
the Statute should provide for automatic jurisdiction of the Court over genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. His delegation 
was in favour of universal jurisdiction, and thus regretted the omission of the 
proposal by Germany … It would reluctantly accept option 1 [automatic 
jurisdiction]… as a compromise. However, it was opposed to jurisdiction of the 
Court being subjected to a regime of acceptance by States, which should not be 
allowed the possibility of protecting those responsible for the most odious 
crimes.88 
In a similar vein, the delegate from Cameroon “said that he would have much preferred 
universal jurisdiction with respect to all the core crimes, but would settle for automatic 
jurisdiction. The opt-in regime would run counter to the fundamental concept of the 
 
85 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 3rd plenary meeting (16 
June 1998), 74, para. 30. 
86See generally M.V. Naidu, “Security, sovereignty, and intervention: concepts and case studies,” Peace 
Research 34.1 (May 2002): 33-58. 
87 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 29th meeting (9 July 
1998), 303, para. 175 [emphasis added]. 
88 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 315, para. 
16 [emphasis added].  
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Statute.”89 These contributions demonstrate a preference for universal jurisdiction, but a 
willingness to compromise in the interest of moving the Conference and international 
criminal justice forward. It is interesting to note that many African delegations expressly 
disapproved of any jurisdiction regime based solely on state consent or opt-in measures. 
This reflects a commitment to international norms and a desire to establish a tangible 
institution with effective enforcement capabilities. Yet the progressive commitments by 
various African delegations faced weighty opposition, which demanded a significant 
amount of compromise. 
 
5.6.3  Automatic Jurisdiction 
Automatic jurisdiction was the primary preference of African delegations in Rome when 
designing the ICC’s jurisdiction regime or ‘trigger mechanism.’ Automatic jurisdiction 
means that states that ratify the Rome Statute automatically accept the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the core crimes covered in Article 5 (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
aggression). This decision, it is argued, “represents a major advance in international law 
because in the past, the acceptance of jurisdiction has, in most cases, been subject to 
additional State consent.”90 To provide some context, the International Law 
Commission’s draft statute presented a form of jurisdiction it referred to as ‘inherent 
jurisdiction.’ Under this framework, genocide was inherently within the Court’s 
jurisdiction (if a State Party issued a complaint). Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn 
explain, “[t]he Court could exercise its jurisdiction over other crimes once the state with 
custody of the suspect and the state on whose territory the crimes were committed 
 
89 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 309, para. 
79. Note also: Ibid., at 298, para. 60, Sierra Leone similarly said that “It regretted that universal jurisdiction 
had been eliminated from the choices;” Ibid., at 311, para. 110, the delegate from Djibouti said that 
“although he would have preferred the German concept of universal jurisdiction, he would accept option 1 
in article 7, [automatic jurisdiction] for the reasons put forward by many delegations; Ibid., at 307, para. 36, 
the Burundian delegate said that “He would have liked the Statute to confirm the principle of universal 
jurisdiction for core crimes, but could accept the proposal providing for automatic jurisdiction for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.” 
90 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Questions and Answers, question 12: “When 
will the Court have jurisdiction over crimes?” available at https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm; 
accessed 20 March 2020.  
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accepted the jurisdiction through ratification and specific declaration.”91 This type of 
inherent jurisdiction regime is etched in a state-based, sovereign frame, relying on 
traditional consent-based applications of international law. A significant amount of 
discussion regarding the options for the Court’s jurisdiction took place in 1998, with 
states such as Germany and the United Kingdom taking a keen interest. It is worth noting 
that it was the Republic of Korea that presented a proposal for ‘automatic jurisdiction’ at 
the opening of the Conference, “in which the Court could exercise its jurisdiction when 
any four possible states involved (the territorial state, the states of nationality of the 
accused and the victims, or the custodial state) had consented to the ICC jurisdiction over 
the case by ratification or acceptance on an ad hoc basis.”92 Benedetti, Bonneau, and 
Washburn go on to explain that, “African states and like-minded states supported the 
automatic jurisdiction of the Korean proposal.”93 Curiously, however, automatic 
jurisdiction was a compromise for the ten African states that actually preferred an even 
stronger Court and enmeshment of norms couched in a universal jurisdiction regime. This 
is important because this compromise suggested that states could choose whether or not 
to be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, integrating and protecting sovereign principles 
within the framework of the Court. The justifications for African support of automatic 
jurisdiction are worth exploring in greater detail.   
Based on the summary records of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, automatic 
jurisdiction was the primary choice for 20 African delegations, representing a general 
regional preference and key negotiating position. Egypt, for example, stated that it 
“supported automatic jurisdiction over the core crimes, which should include aggression. 
States not parties to the Statute should not be subject to the Court by virtue of universal 
jurisdiction, because that would run counter to international law.”94 This is particularly 
interesting, since it has been argued that automatic jurisdiction extended traditional 
 
91 Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 
1994-1998, 162. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 163. 
94 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting, (9 July 1998), 310, para. 
87. See also 29th meeting (9 July 1998), 300, para. 103, where Gabon made a similar point: “the Court’s 
jurisdiction for all crimes under article 5 should be automatic for States parties. The possibility of allowing 
States parties to take measures affecting non-parties might run counter to the law of treaties.”. 
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approaches to jurisdiction in international law by moving away from additional opt-in 
(consent) by states. This suggests that the moderate approach embodied by automatic 
jurisdiction was more agreeable than a universal jurisdiction regime when moving away 
from strict, consent-based trigger mechanisms for the Court.  
Other states such as Morocco reached the same conclusion, though for different 
reasons. To this point, the Moroccan delegate said “that Court action should be triggered 
by a State party. If the Court was to be as universal as possible, States should be allowed 
to decide whether or not they accepted its jurisdiction, at least during the initial phase 
following its establishment.”95 This perspective has some important implications, namely, 
that the Court may need to be less effective in its infancy to generate broad(er) 
acceptance by States. This seems to suggest that universality and institutional strength are 
inversely related. In other words, in order to achieve universal membership, the 
institution ought to preserve state sovereignty over and above evolving international 
criminal law norms. In its rejection of universal jurisdiction, this interpretation also 
suggests that States Parties have consented to potential Court action by virtue of ratifying 
the Statute.  
More general understandings of automatic jurisdiction were expressed by others. 
For example, the delegate from Côte d’Ivoire said that “in ratifying the Statute, States 
should accept the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the four categories of core crimes, 
including aggression.”96 This implies that ratification constitutes more than a symbolic 
act, it enacts a tangible acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction over the core crimes. In 
many respects, such an approach ensures that the states that sign and ratify the treaty 
intend to strengthen the Court by conceding to its jurisdiction if any of the core crimes 
are committed and domestic courts fail to investigate or prosecute them. This safeguard 
mitigates concerns that States Parties will unduly block Court action, or else stagnate its 
institutional strength and utility. Such a pragmatic approach abandons traditional consent-
based conceptions of jurisdiction in international law, while accepting that the universal 
 
95 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 196, para. 
38. 




application of the Statute would most likely result in the failure of the Conference. 
Problematically, while automatic jurisdiction sufficiently addresses how Court action 
might be triggered in situations involving States Parties, it inadequately addresses how 
the Court might effectively respond to atrocity crimes involving non-States Parties.  
 While consensus broke down on the jurisdiction issue somewhat in the African 
context, and more so generally, the final compromise largely reflects a narrow conception 
of automatic jurisdiction, with mixed features for dealing with non-States Parties. 
Specifically, the Rome Statute provides jurisdiction to the ICC over the core crimes if the 
national and/or territorial state is a States Party. According to Article 12, the 
Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction: 
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of 
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5. 
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: 
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the 
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of 
that vessel or aircraft; 
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The 
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in 
accordance with Part 9.97 
 This explains that ratification of the Rome Statute is the usual mechanism by which 
jurisdiction is triggered. Notwithstanding this, the final text of the Statute restricts the 
States Parties that trigger jurisdiction when compared to the Korean proposal, since it 
eliminates both the state of nationality of the victims and the custodial state from the list 
of states that could trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. Further, while not universal, this 
 
97 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 12: Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction. 
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approach allows jurisdiction to be based on the ratification of the Statute by the national 
and/or territorial State of which the alleged crime(s) occurred, which is loosely consistent 
with what African delegations envisioned in Rome, albeit considerably more restricted. 
Regarding non-States Parties, the Rome Statute provides that jurisdiction may be 
triggered if the state expressly accepts it (i.e. consent regime). The exception to this is if a 
situation is referred to the Court by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter under Article 13(b). Interestingly, the Council can refer any situation to the 
Court, regardless of ratification or consent by the state(s) involved. This particular 
inclusion can be framed optimistically as a form of universal jurisdiction, though it 
remains subject to heavy criticism. Relying on the Council to achieve institutional and 
normative consistency and effectiveness has been met with logical suspicion.  
 
5.6.4  Conclusions about the Court’s mixed jurisdiction regime 
Indeed, this power structure raises difficult questions and exposes the Court to criticism, 
since it is foreseeable that some crimes will remain outside of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
particularly situations involving non-States Parties which are also permanent members of 
the Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States, and their allies. Naturally, this 
arrangement highlights the problematic use of the veto as a means to curtail international 
criminal justice norms for politically motivated reasons. Former ICC Judge Hans-Peter 
Kaul identified another related weakness: “In civil wars, the most common form of 
conflict today, the present compromise provision does not allow for any jurisdiction 
unless the state in question is a Party to the Statute.”98 Nevertheless, the automatic 
jurisdiction regime embodied in the Rome Statute reflects an institutional structure that a 
significant majority of African delegations wanted in Rome, though in a limited form. 
The role of the Security Council, while marred with practical difficulties, expands 
the jurisdictional capacity of the Court beyond a strict ratification/implied consent 
approach and encroaches on the idea of universal jurisdiction, albeit in a relatively weak 
way. It is weak in the sense that it reinforces the existing power structure and hierarchy in 
 
98 Hans-Peter Kaul, “Special Note: The Struggle for the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction,” 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 4 (1998), 57. 
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international political life; the Security Council reserves ‘watchdog’ privileges that other 
states simply do not and will not have. Inconsistency in normative commitment and 
institutional trust riddle the Security Council-Court relationship in significant ways and 
severely undermine arguments about the Court’s potential universal jurisdiction capacity 
within its current construction. Referring to the findings with respect to how African 
states conceptualized the Court’s relationship with the Security Council, vesting only the 
Council with the power to apply the Court’s jurisdiction in non-consensual non-States 
Parties was likely approached with a reasonable degree of skepticism, especially from the 
states that pushed for consent-based jurisdiction altogether. It also effectively insulates 
dual Security Council members and non-States Parties from the Court’s reach altogether. 
While imperfect, this mixed jurisdictional regime reflects a modest version of automatic 
jurisdiction that most African delegations preferred, while providing an additional 
element of jurisdictional capacity with respect to some non-States Parties. Given the 
strong opposition to universal jurisdiction on the part of the United States, for example, 
the compromise reflected in the final Statute provides measured jurisdictional capacity 
for the Court, while insulating powerful ‘norm spoilers’ at the same time by virtue of 
political prowess.  
The seven African delegations that supported a consent-based jurisdiction regime 
for the Court at the Conference did not see this vision reflected in the final version of the 
Rome Statute. Of these states, only Nigeria and Tunisia ultimately ratified the Statute. 
Algeria, Morocco, and Sudan signed but did not ratify. Ethiopia and Libya neither signed 
nor ratified. This means that of the African states that preferred a consent-based 
jurisdiction regime, only 25 per cent ultimately ratified the Rome Statute. Since 75 per 
cent of these states chose not to ratify, it might be argued that the compromise on trigger 
mechanisms was a deal breaker for these states. It is interesting to note that Algeria, 
Libya, Morocco, and Sudan are members of the Group of Arab States, which may explain 
the consistency in decision making among this group if those states were negotiating as a 
coalition or bloc. Least of all, the coalescence among this group of states can be 
understood as an expression of a shared experience within Arabic states in Africa. This 
can be couched in a deep ideological commitment to the principles of state sovereignty 
and non-interference, which frame a particular outlook and approach to international 
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relations and institutional design rooted in the primacy of states and the comparative 
weakness of institutions and norms.   
Automatic jurisdiction was agreeable to 30 African states, comprising 81 per cent 
of delegations that spoke to this issue, which represents a clear regional preference. Of 
the 10 delegations that preferred universal jurisdiction but accepted automatic jurisdiction 
as a compromise, only Cameroon signed but did not ultimately ratify the Statute. This 
suggests a correlation between a state’s willingness to establish the strongest possible 
Court with its overall commitment to be subject to it. This correlation similarly holds 
when the analysis is expanded to include all 30 states that accepted an automatic 
jurisdiction regime at the Conference, since 73 per cent of this group of states ratified the 
Rome Statute.99 This demonstrates a general willingness to be subject to the Court, given 
its primary reliance on States Parties to trigger jurisdiction. It is of interest to note that 
Angola, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, and Zimbabwe went on to sign the 
Statute but did not ratify it. Only Swaziland and Togo neither signed nor ratified. While 
the jurisdiction regime issue was among the most contentious at the Rome Conference, 
the majority of African states preferred a version of the approach that is largely reflected 
in the final text of the Rome Statute, which may offer a marginal degree of explanatory 
power with respect to its broad regional acceptance.100     
       
5.7 Prosecutorial Powers 
In an effort to ensure the independence of the Court, most African states preferred giving 
the Prosecutor the power to investigate (alleged) crimes proprio motu. Benedetti, 
Bonneau, and Washburn explained that “[o]pponents defending the sole legitimacy of the 
Security Council to act on behalf of the international community or to qualify serious 
 
99 These included Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, 
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
100 This conclusion is made with the caveat that most African states wanted a Court free from political 
influence, in particular from the Security Council, which troubles the form of ‘politicized universal 
jurisdiction’ that appears in the final text of the Statute. Nevertheless, the Security Council’s ability to refer 




crimes feared the risks of politicization.”101It was argued that a strong, independent 
Prosecutor with the ability to initiate investigations on his/her own volition would be a 
safeguard against political posturing by the Security Council and by States. Many African 
states took an early position on this issue. For example, the SADC States enumerated in 
its sixth principle of consensus that, “[t]he independence of the prosecutor must be 
guaranteed by the Statute and should have the necessary powers to initiate investigations 
and prosecute ex-officials.”102 Additional regional consensus on this issue was articulated 
in the Dakar Declaration, particularly where it states “[t]hat the independence of the 
Prosecutor and his functions must be guaranteed.”103 It is important to note that in Rome, 
delegations used the terms proprio motu and ex officio (i.e. prosecutorial discretion by 
virtue of office) interchangeably.104 For the purposes of this analysis, the terms are 
understood as closely related and are treated synonymously.105 The most significant 
points of contention regarding the independence of the Prosecutor pivoted on issues of 
oversight and information sourcing. Specifically, states were concerned about a 
Prosecutor’s ability to go ‘rogue’ or to act with no effective oversight mechanism. In 
addition, delegates expressed concern about how and where the Prosecutor would gather 
evidence when conducting an investigation. On this basis, it is useful to evaluate how 
African states understood and negotiated prosecutorial powers in Rome.   
 
101 Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 
1994-1998, 164. 
102 SADC Principles for Negotiating an International Criminal Court (Pretoria, South Africa: 11-14 
September 1997), Principle 5. 
103 Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (Dakar, Senegal: 6 
February 1998). 
104 Note that this is the usual analytical approach based on the drafting history of the Statute. See, generally: 
William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 402: “The Preparatory Committee draft said: ‘The Prosecutor 
[may] [shall] initiate investigations [ex officio] [proprio motu] [or] on the basis of information [obtained] 
[he may seek] from any source, in particular from Governments, United Nations organs [and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations].’”  
105 The term ‘ex-officio’ is Latin meaning “from the office.” Thus, in the context of the powers of the 
Prosecutor, ex officio powers would be given by virtue of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), as such. The 
term ‘proprio motu’ is Latin for “by one’s own impulse.” In the context of the powers of the Prosecutor, it 
would mean that the Prosecutor’s instincts could guide the opening of an investigation, as they do in the 
current construct of the ICC. Thus, one source of power comes from the office itself, while the other comes 
from the individual. In either instance, the OTP has the authority to open an investigation without outside 
authority, which was the fundamental goal of governments seeking to establish an independent ICC in 
Rome.   
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Given the strong regional consensus on the issue preceding the Conference, it is 
relatively unsurprising that 28 African states expressly preferred to give the Prosecutor 
proprio motu powers.106 This constitutes 58 per cent of the total African delegations in 
attendance at the Conference and 80 per cent of the African delegates that vocalized a 
clear position on the issue in the plenaries, reflecting a clear ‘majority preference’ of 
African delegations. Of the 13 SADC states in attendance at the negotiations, nine clearly 
stated a preference for conferring proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor.107 The 
remaining SADC states did not indicate a preference on this particular issue.108 This 
suggests a high level of (regional) organizational consensus since there was no explicit 
dissent expressed by any SADC member state(s) in the summary records of the plenary 
meetings or the meetings of the Committee of the Whole.   
This was best illustrated when the delegate from South Africa, speaking on behalf 
of SADC States, took a clear position on this issue early in the Conference. Specifically, 
the South African delegate said that “the SADC States believed that the Prosecutor 
should be independent and have authority to initiate investigations and prosecutions on 
his or her own initiative without interference from States or the Security Council, subject 
to appropriate judicial scrutiny. The independence of the Court must not be prejudiced by 
political considerations.”109 Similarly, Lesotho’s delegate demonstrated SADC’s 
commitment to the adoption of an independent Prosecutor when he said that “[t]he 
Prosecutor’s power to initiate proceedings without awaiting referrals by the Security 
Council or States would help to assure the Court’s independence and ensure that justice 
was served in cases where the Council or States failed to act. There were many 
procedural safeguards against the unlikely eventuality that the Prosecutor would ‘run 
 
106 These states included Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda. 
107 These states included Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, South Africa. 
108 These states included Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Note that Seychelles did not attend the 
Rome Conference and is omitted from the analysis altogether. 
109 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 2nd plenary meeting (15 
June 1998), 65, para. 16. 
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wild.’”110  Lesotho remained committed to its preference for an independent Prosecutor 
throughout the Conference. To demonstrate this commitment, Lesotho subsequently 
submitted that: 
if an independent and effective Court was to be established, it was essential that 
the Prosecutor should have the authority to initiate investigations ex officio. If 
investigations and prosecutions could only be triggered by States and to some 
extent by the Security Council, the functioning of the Court would be dependent 
on the political motivations of those entities and as a result be severely hampered, 
because in practice States and the Security Council would be reluctant, or unable, 
to lodge complaints or refer situations to the Court.111 
This position raises the complex political issues associated with restricting the 
Court’s jurisdiction to the whims of states and the Security Council. Under this 
construction, the independence of the Prosecutor is a mitigating factor in a highly 
politicized state-based institutional model. This presumes the Prosecutor’s ability to act 
outside of the political sphere, or at least not to be directed solely by national or 
collective political interest(s).  
Functional safeguards were an important feature of the Prosecutor’s independence 
and were frequently referred to by many African delegations that promoted this 
institutional feature. For example, the delegate from Lesotho explained that “[t]he 
Prosecutor should be able to initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of 
information obtained from any source. Judicial review of the decision to commence an 
investigation would be the task of the Pre-Trial Chamber.”112 This suggests that these 
states wanted a scenario whereby the Prosecutor would be able to act independently when 
opening an investigation, with the potential for judicial review by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
110 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 2nd plenary meeting (15 
June 1998), 69, para. 71. 
111 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 199, 
para. 84. 
112 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 307, 
para. 40. Note that other African states shared this belief with respect to broad information sourcing. See 
for example Ibid., 309, para. 63: the delegate from Côte d’Ivoire said that “he was in favour of the power of 
the Prosecutor to act proprio motu on the basis of information obtained from States, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations or victims, or indeed from the Security Council.”   
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This was not a vision of unchecked Prosecutorial powers; it advanced a role with built-in 
assurances against rogue behaviour emanating from the institution itself, rather than 
states or the Security Council.  
Similar positions were taken by African states outside of SADC. For example, the 
delegate from Burkina Faso said that “he too, favoured empowering the Prosecutor to 
initiate proceedings… That would enable an independent prosecutor with a purely 
judicial role to act in cases where States or the Security Council might block 
investigations because of the political interests at stake. The Prosecutor’s powers should 
nevertheless be subject to control by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”113 These positions 
demonstrate a broad commitment to adopting an independent Prosecutor, with 
appropriate controls to monitor decision-making processes when opening an investigation 
proprio motu. Of the 28 African delegations that preferred to confer proprio motu powers 
to an independent Prosecutor, almost all qualified their endorsement with reference to the 
role of judicial oversight from the Pre-Trial Chamber, or else made generalized 
statements about the importance of providing adequate safeguards against unchecked 
prosecutorial power.114 
 However, some states did not share the view that the Prosecutor should be subject 
to review by the Pre-Trial Chamber at the early stages of an investigation. The Congolese 
delegate, for example, stated that “[t]he Prosecutor should have ex officio powers to 
initiate proceedings and should not be subject to controls by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which should only intervene once proceedings had commenced, to check abuses.”115 
Later in the Conference, he clarified this position when he said that “[t]he Prosecutor 
must be able to initiate investigations proprio motu… The Pre-Trial Chamber should be 
entitled to act only after the Prosecutor had done so, and the latter must have very broad 
 
113 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June 1998), 206, 
para. 42. 
114 Note that 23 out of the 28 African states that preferred conferring proprio motu on the Prosecutor 
qualified this preference with reference to Pre-Trial Chamber oversight or more generally, adequate 
safeguards. These states included Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. 




powers in order to carry out an effective investigation.”116 While framed differently, 
Congo seemed to share a similar view that the Prosecutor should be independent, yet it 
still details the necessity of Pre-Trial Chamber oversight in the overall functioning of the 
Court. This conceptualization of the powers of the Prosecutor is largely consistent with 
the examples provided from Lesotho and Burkina Faso and reflects the majority position 
taken by many African states in Rome. 
The Moroccan, Libyan, and Egyptian117 delegates indicated a preference for 
giving the Prosecutor limited power to initiate proceedings to mitigate fears associated 
with unchecked power. Each of these delegations expressed the preference to limit the 
sources of information that the Prosecutor could use in opening his or her investigation to 
information obtained only from states and state-based sources. This constituted less than 
one per cent of the African delegations at the Conference and of the African delegations 
that took an express position on the issue during the negotiations.  
To better understand this position, the Moroccan delegate expressed that “[t]he 
Prosecutor should have the right of initiative in cases, but there must be adequate 
safeguards to avoid misuse of his powers and to ensure that the rights of the accused were 
respected.”118 This position was reiterated and expanded upon when the delegate 
expressed “that the Prosecutor should have an independent role and be able to initiate 
investigations ex officio. However, such action should be subject to the agreement of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber. Information should only be obtained from States and organizations in 
the United Nations system.”119 This makes clear that the Moroccan position was that the 
 
116 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 36th meeting (13 July 1998), 345, 
para. 16. 
117 Note that Egypt stated that it preferred that the Prosecutor have limited powers. See 2nd plenary meeting 
(15 June 1998), 69, para. 77: “The Prosecutor should have the power to commence proceedings ex officio, 
although not as an absolute and unrestricted right. There would have to be some form of recourse against 
the Prosecutor’s decisions.” However, this was contradicted at the 9th plenary meeting at 127, para 87: 
“The Prosecutor should not be able to initiate investigations ex officio for practical and legal reasons” 
[emphasis added]. Egypt also said at the 9th meeting at 201, para. 119 that safeguards would be required if 
the Prosecutor were to receive information from any source; the Pre-Trial Chamber would need to “check 
the accuracy of information.” These statements in combination suggest a preference for a limited role for 
the Prosecutor.  
118 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 6th plenary meeting (17 
June 1998), 103, para 107. 
119 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 9th meeting (22 June 1998), 200, 
para. 100 [emphasis added].  
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Prosecutor should be limited by Court oversight and should also be restricted by the 
sources of information he or she could use to initiate the opening of an investigation. This 
would exclude the Prosecutor from initiating Court action on the basis of information 
obtained from important civil society actors such as survivors/victims and key non-
governmental organizations, for example. While Morocco was willing to give the 
Prosecutor a version of proprio motu powers, it also sought to curtail his or her 
independence by restricting sources of information available for initiating an 
investigation and subjecting decision making to institutional oversight from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. As such, it is reasonable to argue that the Moroccan preference was for limited 
proprio motu powers for the Prosecutor–not a purely independent role.  
This sentiment was echoed by the Libyan delegate who said, “the power vested in 
the Prosecutor should be restricted. He or she should be able to commence an 
investigation on the basis of information obtained from a State, but not on the basis of 
information from non-governmental organizations, victims or their representatives.”120 
This position seeks to restrict the type of information that would be available to the 
Prosecutor, and compromises his or her independence to conduct a thorough and 
objective investigation. Information obtained from a state may be censored in significant 
ways; least of all, this approach runs the risk of constructing a narrative based on 
evidence that supports the practical and political national interests of the state(s) 
involved. However, given the primacy of states in the international system, this 
preference is consistent with Libya’s largely realist approach to institutional design and 
norm enforcement, which permeates the summary records of the plenary meetings and 
meetings of the Committee of the Whole in distinct ways. Notwithstanding this, such an 
approach does grant the Prosecutor the power to start an investigation, but effectively 
limits the source of information upon which it might be based. This construction would 
not establish a truly independent Prosecutor and does not express a preference for 
conferring true proprio motu powers to him or her.   
 
120 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 36th meeting (13 July 1998), 344, 
para. 7 [emphasis added]. 
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 Such an approach is consistent among the seven African delegations that 
preferred to give the Prosecutor no power to initiate an investigation.121 This constituted 
10 per cent of the total African delegations present at the Conference and 16 per cent of 
those that articulated a preference in the plenary meetings. This was the position taken by 
Tunisia, which was made clear when its delegate “said that his country had some 
misgivings as to the powers being granted to the Prosecutor in the draft proposed. His 
delegation believed that action should only be initiated on the basis of a complaint 
submitted by a State.”122 Such a position restricts prosecutorial powers by limiting cases 
to those referred to the Court by states. This framework does not allow the Prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation into a situation on his or her own volition and emphasizes the 
priority of state sovereignty in its institutional model. This position was echoed by Kenya 
when its delegate said that, “his delegation saw no reason why the Prosecutor would 
require ex officio powers to trigger Court action. The twin triggers of States and the 
Security Council, subject to appropriate controls, were sufficient to cover all cases which 
would need to go before the Court.”123 This demonstrates an effective trust in States and 
the Security Council and seeks to limit the powers of the Prosecutor as a consequence. 
The Kenyan and Tunisian delegates plainly endorsed the preservation of states’ primacy 
in the international order and sought to mitigate prosecutorial power and intervention in 
domestic affairs to that end.   
 Applying a different rationale, Sudan preferred that the Prosecutor not be given 
proprio motu powers because it feared that the power of the Prosecutor would be too 
great. To this point, the Sudanese delegate opined that “the Statute gave the Prosecutor, 
acting proprio motu, a role beyond the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Prosecutor 
should be under reasonable and logical control, and should not act ex officio.”124 This 
position suggests that institutional oversight by the Pre-Trial Chamber was a necessary 
institutional feature to screen the powers of the Prosecutor. Related concerns were raised 
 
121 These states included Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tunisia. 
122 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 10th meeting (22 June 1998), 205, 
para. 29.   
123 Ibid., at 199, para. 92. 
124 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 9th plenary meeting (17 
July 1998), 126, para. 77. 
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by Egypt, particularly with respect to information received by the Prosecutor as a basis 
for initiating an investigation. Such positions iterate a mistrust in the Prosecutor’s 
discretionary capabilities and suggest that institutional oversight by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber ought to be required to limit the Prosecutor’s independence. Limitations in this 
respect seriously affect the independence of the Prosecutor and his or her ability to 
initiate an independent investigation.  
Some delegations agreed that the Prosecutor should not have proprio motu 
powers because of the pressures it would place on him or her. These pressures, it is 
argued, would compromise his or her independence in the role and negatively impact the 
Court. To this point, the delegate from Algeria said that “he did not support the power of 
the Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu. Such powers might expose him or 
her to all sorts of pressures and prevent him or her from carrying out his or her work 
impartially and independently.”125 It is unclear exactly what sorts of pressures the 
delegate was referring to, although it seems to suggest that the Prosecutor may be subject 
to political posturing from states or other interested parties. Similar concerns were raised 
by the Kenyan delegate when he said that “Kenya continued to doubt the desirability of 
conferring proprio motu powers on the Prosecutor, particularly because of the danger that 
pressure might be exerted on him or her to act or not to act, to the detriment of his or her 
independence. However, it would not stand in the way of consensus on that issue.”126 
This suggests that Kenya shared concerns with Algeria about the pressures the Prosecutor 
might be exposed to and its impact on his or her independence. However, the fact that the 
delegate expressed that this issue was not significant enough to obstruct consensus 
suggests that it was a concern, but not a barrier to Kenya’s particular support of the 
Statute in its entirety. 
 
125 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 30th meeting (9 July 1998), 308, para 
75. 
126 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st meeting (9 July 1998), 317, para 
33. Note that similar concerns were raised by the delegate from Nigeria in the 7th plenary meeting (18 June 
1998), at 111, para. 87, when he said that “He also had a strong reservation to the ex officio powers of the 
Prosecutor under article 12 of the draft Statute. Giving the Prosecutor such power without any safeguards 
might entail the risk of political manipulation, which would not augur well for the independence of the 
Court.” Egypt made similar comments at 35th meeting (13 July 1998), 335, para. 6: “Egypt had serious 
reservations about conferring proprio motu powers on the Prosecutor: to do so might hamper the 




5.7.1 The final text and conclusions 
The final text of the Rome Statute details the powers of the Prosecutor under Article 
15.127 Some key elements of the Statute include the Prosecutor’s ability to initiate 
investigations proprio motu based on information concerning crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.128 The Statute also includes the possibility for consultancy with States, 
organs of the UN, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable 
sources when assessing the information received.129 Article 15(3) enumerates that the 
Prosecutor must submit a request for authorization of an investigation to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber based on the information he or she has collected.130 As such, the final text 
largely reflects the preference of the majority of African delegations in Rome–an 
independent Prosecutor with the ability to initiate investigations proprio motu, 
accompanied with broad sources of consultancy when gathering information and 
appropriate judicial oversight from the Pre-Trial Chamber.  
 The seven African states that did not want to give the Prosecutor proprio motu 
powers did not see this reflected in the final text of the Rome Statute. Libya and Ethiopia 
did not sign or ratify the Rome Statute. Algeria and Sudan both signed it; Kenya, Nigeria, 
and Tunisia all signed and ratified it. However, it would be an omission not to point out 
that Algeria, Libya, and Sudan are each also members of the Group of Arab States, and 
this may explain the cohesion in decision-making among these states, outside of the 
narrow prosecutorial powers issue, based on shared culture and experience. A notable 
outlier is Tunisia, since it is a member of the Group of Arab States, yet preferred not to 
confer proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor, but signed and ratified the Rome Statute 
anyway. Nevertheless, the ability of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu or to base an investigation on information from sources other than State(s) may 
 
127 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 15. 
128 Ibid., Art. 15(1). 
129 Ibid., Art. 15(2). 
130 Ibid., Art. 15(4): The Pre-Trial Chamber can authorize an investigation if there is a reasonable basis to 
do so based on the evidence and the Court’s jurisdiction. Art. 15(5): Denial at the Pre-Trial stage does not 
preclude resubmission at a later stage based on new evidence. Art. 15(6): Similarly, if the Prosecutor 
decides not to initiate an investigation, additional information may be submitted to him or her at a later 
stage.   
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have been decidedly problematic for some, especially African states that are also in the 
Group of Arab States.       
 On the other hand, most African states expressed a preference for the type of 
prosecutorial powers reflected in the final text of the Rome Statute. Of these 28 states, 
only Rwanda, Swaziland, and Togo neither signed nor ratified the Statute. Angola, 
Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, and Mozambique signed the Statute but did 
not ratify it. On this basis, the ratification rate is 68 per cent among the African states that 
vocalized a preference for conferring proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor. This 
suggests that 32 per cent of African states felt strongly enough to enumerate a preference 
for an independent prosecutor in the plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole but were not entirely committed to the Statute and chose not to ratify it. 
Curiously, of the six states that endorsed proprio motu powers and ultimately did not 
ratify the Rome Statute, half belong to SADC: Angola, Mozambique, and Swaziland. The 
final text of the Statute reflects the type of prosecutorial powers that SADC endorsed 
from the earliest stages, which raises questions about the other provisions which might 
explain this defection. It is worth noting that 89 per cent of the African states that 
preferred conferring proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor did sign the Statute, 
reflecting tacit approval among the majority of this group of states.      
   
5.8 Conclusion  
The final text of the Rome Statute enumerates that a situation can be investigated and 
prosecuted at the ICC if referred by a States Party, which reflects an automatic 
jurisdiction regime. Alternatively, the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation proprio 
motu, subject to appropriate judicial oversight in situations involving States Parties. 
Lastly, the Security Council may refer a situation to the Court, even with respect to non-
states parties. The Security Council may also defer a situation at the Court, if it is in the 
interest of maintaining international peace and security to do so. This chapter has 
deconstructed the particular preferences of African states at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference with respect to the role of the Security Council, the trigger mechanism for the 
Court’s jurisdiction, and the power of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu. While there is no one monolith, this chapter has drawn attention to some general 
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patterns and consistencies in the construction of preferences on these provisions among 
African states.  
Generally, the states that preferred to construct the Court in the ways reflected in 
the final text of the Statute displayed a strong commitment in the form of treaty 
ratification. It is important to note that these trends are general, since not every state 
spoke to every issue. However, relying on the information provided by the summary 
records of the plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole indicates 
that there is a general correlation between how much of the final text of the Statute 
reflected the preferences of various African delegations and that states’ commitment to be 
bound by it. This is particularly visible when considering the ways that situations can 
come under the Court’s jurisdiction. The next section analyzes the preferences of African 
states on the provisions concerning crimes, including the inclusion of war crimes 
committed during internal armed conflict, the inclusion of so-called ‘treaty crimes’–
especially terrorism and drug trafficking, and the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the 
prohibited list of weapons used in conflict.   
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Chapter 6  
6 African Positions at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 
continued 
The previous chapter provided insight into African positions on contentious aspects of the 
Rome Statute negotiations with respect to issues concerning the Court’s jurisdiction, 
including the role of the United Nations Security Council and the independence of the 
Prosecutor. In addition to those issues, there was significant contention surrounding some 
of the provisions of the Statute that dealt with the nature of crimes covered by the Statute, 
most notably the inclusion of war crimes committed during internal armed conflict; the 
inclusion of so-called ‘treaty crimes,’ especially terrorism and drug trafficking; and the 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Similar to the jurisdiction provisions, African 
states engaged with the difficult issues with respect to the nature of crimes, demonstrating 
meaningful and affective diplomacy throughout the negotiations. Likewise, African 
delegates expressed a keen interest in designing an ICC that covered the sorts of crimes 
that were most relevant to the region. In many respects, African interventions with 
respect to the provisions dealing with crimes provided further evidence to suggest that 
positions were constructed from an Afro-centric point of view. On this basis, the 
preferences of African states on the controversial parts of the Statute with respect to 




Table 6-1: African Positions on Controversial Elements and Key Issues on crimes 
provisions at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 1998 
Controversial Element and key issues  Number of African 
states that supported 
the stated 
controversial 
elements of the 
Statute 
 
Inclusion of war crimes in internal 































No inclusion of nuclear weapons 
  
1 
6.1 Internal Conflict 
Among the most debated issues was whether war crimes committed during internal 
armed conflict (non-international armed conflicts) should be included and if so, what the 
threshold should be to distinguish these acts from isolated internal disturbances or acts of 
violence.1 52 per cent of the African states in attendance at the Conference expressed a 
preference to include internal conflicts in the Statute, in many cases because of direct 
 
1 See Thomas Graditzky, “War Crime Issues before the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court,” U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 5.2 (1999), 208: 
“One of the most controversial issues relating to war crimes was whether to include a provision covering 
non-international armed conflicts.” 
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experience(s).2 Stephen John Stedman provides a contemporaneous analysis and 
explained that: 
in 1995, there were five ongoing wars (in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
and Sudan), and several countries that were candidates for state collapse or civil 
war (Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire), and a host 
of other countries where low-level ethnic and political conflict remained 
contained, but unresolved (Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda).3     
This suggests that this issue had a geopolitical component, which informed a want 
and need for the establishment of an ICC with jurisdiction over war crimes committed in 
internal conflicts. It is important to highlight the significance and importance of the 
negotiations to countries with firsthand experience (past or present) with widespread 
internal conflict and violence in shaping the institutional design of the proposed Court. 
This is one area of the negotiations that showcases how various African experiences with 
post-colonial violence directly influenced state preferences in the negotiations and 
permeated the summary records of the plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee 
of the Whole. It demonstrates that the African experience was a driving factor that 
directly affected African support for, and engagement in, the drafting of the Rome 
Statute. To reflect this point, the delegate from Benin “said that the adoption of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court was a major step forward for humanity as a 
whole and for Africa in particular. Africa had suffered from the most serious violence for 
decades.”4 This regional component was demonstrated by reference to country-specific 
experience(s) with widespread human rights violations by Burundi, the Democratic 
 
2 These states included Angola, Botswana, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
Note that South Africa expressed its preference to include war crimes committed in internal conflict on 
behalf of the South African Development Community (SADC) States. As such, the SADC states are 
individually listed in this preferential group.   
3 Stephen John Stedman, “Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in The International 
Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael Edward Brown (Harvard University: Center for Science and 
International Affairs, 1996), 237. 




Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, 
and frequent reference to the Rwandan genocide throughout the plenary meetings and 
meetings of the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference.5   
The main issue at the Conference with respect to the inclusion of war crimes 
committed during internal armed conflict surrounded clarifying the defining nature and 
threshold of internal conflict itself. The initial proposal to address this issue presented in 
the Rome Statute negotiations employed the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), which covers non-derogable rights contained in Article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions. More particularly, the initial proposal suggested the use of the 
threshold contained in Article 1, paragraph 2 of Protocol II, which says: “This Protocol 
shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated 
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed 
conflicts.”6 
However, difficulty arose in the negotiations because the Rome Statute deals with 
war crimes outside of those contained in common Article 3. As such, Graditzky 
explained that some delegations argued that the acts not mentioned by Common Article 3 
 
5 For example, see Summary records of the plenary meetings 4th plenary meeting (16 June 1998) 
A/CONF.183/SR.4, 87, para. 56: The delegate from Namibia said, “In view of the atrocities the world had 
witnessed during the previous century and Namibia’s own recent history, his Government supported the 
establishment of an effective and independent international criminal court” [emphasis added]. See also 
Summary records of the plenary meetings, 8th plenary meeting, 118, para. 58: The delegate from Burundi, 
“said that his country had suffered for almost five years from genocide and attacks by bands of terrorists 
against innocent people; he requested that an ad hoc international criminal tribunal be set up for Burundi in 
order to help national reconciliation efforts.” See also Summary records of the meetings of the Committee 
of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998) A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, 292, para. 76: The delegate from 
Guinea-Bissau said that “He attached prime importance to the inclusion of sections C and D, since his 
country continued to suffer from non-international armed conflicts” [emphasis added]. See also Summary 
records of the plenary meetings, 7th plenary meeting (18 June 1998), A/CONF.183/SR.7, 112, para. 91: 
The delegate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that “The international community had 
proved powerless to prevent atrocities or even punish the perpetrators. Indeed, his own country had suffered 
the influx of millions fleeing from the genocide in Rwanda. His delegation therefore believed that the 
creation of an international criminal court was an imperative” [emphasis added]. See also Summary records 
of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, 337, 
para. 23: The delegate from Uganda said, “Whether or not the perpetrators controlled territory was 
immaterial: they might be operating from a neighbouring country, with or without that country’s consent, 
as was currently the case in Uganda” [emphasis added].  
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 1, paragraph 2.  
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should have a higher threshold.7 On this basis, some delegates proposed to “resolve this 
issue by inserting the restrictive threshold of Article 1, paragraph 1 of Additional 
Protocol II before the list of additional acts at issue.”8  
The international humanitarian law framework provided by Article 1 in Protocol 
II espouses a high threshold based on the actors involved and the level of territorial 
control necessary to reach the categorical label of non-international armed conflict.9 The 
specific problem with employing this threshold in the broadly termed ‘African context’ 
is, as it was at the time, its focus on organized armed groups, or else state or dissident 
armed forces, acting under responsible command, exercising control over and operating 
out of a part of the states’ territory. This implies an organizational and territorial aspect, 
which effectively limits its application in many internal conflicts. As Charles Jalloh 
highlights, “keeping in mind the types of non-State actor conflicts that we see in that 
region of Africa today… more conflicts are of an intra-state rather than inter-state nature 
and feature rebel groups and other non-State actors as key perpetrators.”10  
Within the context of the Rome Statute negotiations, Graditzky explained, 
“[o]pposing delegations and other involved actors reacted strongly [to inserting the 
restrictive threshold of Article 1] since many internal conflicts would be excluded.”11 
This is consistent with the view taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
which argued that “[t]he restrictive definition of the material field of application in 
Article 1 will have the effect that Protocol II will be applicable to a smaller range of 
 
7 Graditzky, “War Crime Issues,” 209. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Protocol II Article 1(1): This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all 
armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) 
and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol; Article 1(2): This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts.  
10 Charles Chernor Jalloh, “What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity,” American 
University International Law Review 28.2 (2013): 415. 
11 Graditzky, “War Crime Issues,” 209. 
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internal conflicts than Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”12 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions enumerates human rights that are non-
derogable in character, amounting to peremptory norms of international law or jus 
cogens. It was therefore understood that embedding the framework contained in Article 1 
of Protocol II within the structure of the Court would severely limit its utility in 
addressing war crimes allegedly committed during internal conflicts, particularly if the 
sorts of crimes fell outside of those listed in Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.13 In this frame, the utilization of Article 1 of Protocol II would have been 
limited in terms of the actors and crimes in which it covers. This was especially 
problematic for African states that had dealt with (and continue to deal with) the 
complexities of war crimes committed during internal conflict by rebel groups and other 
non-State actors without satisfying the territorial control threshold.   
To reconcile this issue, Sierra Leone made reference to its own experience with 
internal conflict. The delegate said that he  
had reservations, for example, regarding the chapeau of section D, which referred 
to organized armed groups that exercised ‘control over a part of [a State party’s] 
territory.’ That wording was very restrictive: in his own country, for example, the 
rebel forces did not occupy a territory. Thus, as presently drafted, section D would 
exclude the type of internal conflict presently taking place in Sierra Leone.14  
As a result, Sierra Leone proposed using the language that internal conflict “applies to 
armed conflicts that take place in a territory of a State when there is protracted armed 
 
12 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977,” available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475; accessed 1 April 2020. 
13See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949: Conflicts Not of an International Character. Article 3 provides essential 
human rights and freedom from persecution in the case of non-international armed conflict. Article 3(1) 
specifically enumerates some acts which would constitute a crime: (a) violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and 
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 




conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups.”15 This is an example of an African country using its own experience to lead 
negotiations in an important manner. The practicality and relevance of this proposal to 
the region was demonstrated by the Ugandan delegate when he said that: 
Uganda shared other delegations’ concern about the watering down of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over situations of internal conflict. As currently worded, the second 
sentence of the chapeau of article 5 quarter, section D, severely limited the 
Court’s scope in that regard. Whether or not the perpetrators controlled territory 
was immaterial: they might be operating from a neighbouring country, with or 
without that country’s consent, as was currently the case in Uganda. His 
delegation thus supported the proposal by the representative of Sierra Leone with 
regard to the chapeau of section D.16  
This not only highlights the importance of the proposal made by Sierra Leone, but 
it also demonstrates a need for the provision to cover the sorts of crimes being committed 
in several African states during the Rome Diplomatic Conference. To further illustrate 
this point, the delegate from Guinea-Bissau said that “[h]e attached prime importance to 
the inclusion of sections C and D [on internal conflict], since his country continued to 
suffer from non-international armed conflicts.”17 This is another example of how country-
specific experience guided some African states in the negotiation of particular aspects of 
the ICC, especially with respect to the inclusion of war crimes committed in internal 
conflict. Acknowledging the relevance of particular crimes in domestic contexts 
reinforced the need for an effective system of international criminal justice, which 
influenced national preferences during the negotiations in pointed ways. This is important 
because it directly affected African preferences throughout the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference which are strongly evidenced through a content analysis of the plenary 
meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole.  
 
15U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.62 (13 July 1998). Note that the language proposed by Sierra Leone is 
reflected directly in the final text of the Rome Statute in Article 8 para. 2(f).  
16 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), 337, 
para. 23. 
17 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 28th meeting (8 July 
1998), 292, para. 77. 
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More generally, 32 African states took a clear position on non-international armed 
conflict: 25 expressed a preference to include internal conflicts within the war crimes 
provisions;18 seven expressed a preference not to do so.19 The states that preferred to 
include war crimes committed during internal conflict did so for mixed reasons. Several 
African states emphasized the evolving contemporary reality of internal armed conflicts. 
For example, the delegate from South Africa, speaking on behalf of the South African 
Development Community (SADC) States, said that “most atrocities were now committed 
in the context of internal armed conflicts. The member States of SADC therefore 
supported the inclusion of sections C and D in the Statute [on internal armed conflict].”20 
Similarly, Ethiopia, stated that, “[n]on-international armed conflicts should be included, 
being the main cause of crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court.”21 Mali also said that “[m]ost conflicts were internal in nature, so sections C and D 
[on internal conflict] should be included in the Statute.”22 This rationale emphasizes not 
only the changing nature of conflict but prioritizes the Court’s utility to address the 
crimes which it is designed to respond to, based on the broadly understood ‘African’ 
experience. While traditionally conceptualized as state-on-state aggression, the 1990s 
brought to the fore a new wave of warfare defined by violent internal conflict – including 
in many African countries, which directly influenced state preferences and 
conceptualization of the object and purpose of the ICC.23  
 Other states relied on specific experiences with violent internal conflict even more 
directly when forming a domestic preference. For example, the delegate from Namibia 
said, “[i]n common with several African delegations, he believed that the question of 
internal conflicts must be addressed, since in one case the entire Government had been 
 
18 These states included Angola, Botswana, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
19 Algeria, Burundi, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia. 
20 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 25th meeting (8 July 1998), 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, 267, para. 10. 
21 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998), 288, para. 
4. 
22 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 26th meeting (8 July 1998), 278, para. 
66. 
23 See Michael Edward Brown, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Harvard University: 
Center for Science and International Affairs, 1996).  
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involved in genocide and the judicial system in situ had not been effective.”24 This 
statement reflects a degree of regional consensus on this issue. Further, it makes 
reference to the violent internal conflict that had taken place in Rwanda to highlight the 
need for the ICC Statute to deal with similar situations, should they occur in the future. 
Curiously, one might have expected Rwanda itself to take a position on this issue based 
on first-hand experience, yet it did not.25 The delegate from Rwanda did say “that his 
delegation hoped that the many references made to the genocide that had involved the 
people of his country in 1994 denoted a desire to bring the organizers of that genocide to 
justice… While supporting the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, 
Rwanda believed that its establishment would not obviate the need for ad hoc 
tribunals.”26 It is curious that the Rwandan genocide was a major catalyst for the 
establishment of an ICC and bolstered regional and global commitment to the norms 
undergirding it, yet Rwanda itself demonstrated a degree of apathy at the Rome 
Conference and neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute, which casts doubt as to 
whether or not Rwanda wanted to ensure that future crimes of a similar gravity could not 
go unpunished by committing to a permanent international criminal justice mechanism.27  
Nevertheless, jointly and separately, the African majority position on the 
inclusion of war crimes committed during non-international conflict may explain why the 
delegate from Togo said that “[s]ections C and D on non-international armed conflicts 
must be included in the Statute, as the credibility of the Court depended on it.”28 
Ultimately, the African contributions with respect to the inclusion of war crimes 
committed during non-international armed conflict demonstrate the relevance of 
 
24 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998), 290, para. 
26. 
25 See generally Summary records of the plenary meetings, 6th plenary meeting (17 June 1998), 103-104, 
paras. 110-114: Rwanda’s primary issues were with respect to the continued support of ad hoc tribunals, 
the scope of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, the primacy of national courts, the independence of 
the Prosecutor, the use of the death penalty, victims’ rights, and the right of a State to express reservations 
with respect to certain provisions of the Statute.  
26 Summary records of the plenary meetings, 6th plenary meeting (17 June 1998) A/CONF.183/SR.6, 103, 
para. 110 [emphasis added]. 
27 Note that the ICC can only prosecute crimes committed after July 2002, once it entered into force with 
the necessary sixty ratifications. 
28 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 26th meeting (8 July 1998), 278, para. 
72 [emphasis added]. 
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continental and domestic experience(s) in shaping preferences and negotiating positions. 
This effectively demonstrates that the majority position on the part of African states to 
include war crimes committed in internal conflict was strongly influenced by the regional 
experience with such conflicts. While there is a geopolitical aspect to explaining African 
support for the inclusion of internal conflict in the war crimes provisions, it would be 
negligent to ignore that the International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that 80 
per cent of victims of armed conflicts since 1945 have been victims of non-international 
armed conflicts,29 which highlights the importance of the issue to the overall utility and 
effectiveness of the Court altogether.  
 Notwithstanding this, it is necessary to evaluate the rationale of the seven African 
delegations that preferred not to include internal conflict in the Rome Statute. The 
primary justification for taking this position hinged on traditional concepts of sovereignty 
and non-interference in domestic politics. For example, the delegate from Tunisia, when 
addressing crimes against humanity, said that “his delegation interpreted crimes against 
humanity as taking place only in international armed conflicts; otherwise intervention by 
the Court would amount to interference in internal affairs contrary to the principles of the 
United Nations.”30 Related points were made by the delegate from Algeria, who said that 
“he was somewhat concerned about the inclusion of sections C and D [on internal 
conflict], since that might lead to interference in the internal affairs of countries. It would 
be difficult to draw a line between a genuine armed internal conflict and internal 
disturbances.”31 He reaffirmed these concerns later in the Conference when he said that 
Algeria “continued to oppose inclusion of internal armed conflicts under the Court’s 
jurisdiction, on account of the practical difficulty of distinguishing between true armed 
conflict and policing operations intended to restore public order.”32 Sudan felt similarly 
 
29 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977,” available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475; accessed 1 April 2020.  
30 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 3rd meeting (17 June 1998), 148, para. 
34. 
31 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 27th meeting (8 July 1998), 283, para. 
5. 




hesitant to endorse an inclusion of internal conflicts within the Statute. When speaking on 
behalf of the Group of Arab States, the Sudanese delegate said that “the Arab States were 
afraid that the inclusion of non-international conflicts within the Statute would allow 
interference in the internal affairs of States on flimsy pretexts.”33  
Given that this was the position of the Group of Arab States, it may be inferred 
that it reflects the views of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia–six of 
the seven African states that expressly preferred not to include non-international armed 
conflict in the Statute and belong to the Group of Arab States. The sixth state, Burundi, 
did not provide a justification for taking this position. The delegate simply said that “[t]he 
Court should not have competence with respect to internal conflicts.”34 This may be a 
consequence of Burundi’s own experience with internal conflict, exemplified by the 
military coup in 1993, which started a civil war between the Tutsi armed forces and Hutu 
rebel groups.35 It is logical to infer that delegates negotiating the Rome Statute would 
have considered its impact on their own domestic realities. Those states with questionable 
human rights records, or that were otherwise coping with the sorts of crimes being 
discussed at the negotiations, would likely have had a special interest in seeking to limit 
the Court’s reach in those contexts.     
Nevertheless, defection from the African majority position with respect to internal 
conflicts primarily emanated from the Group of Arab States in Rome. The heart of the 
justification(s) provided by these states thematically rests on realist principles, which 
permeated the negotiations throughout. These included the primacy of state sovereignty 
above all else. This was emphasized by the Libyan delegate when she said that “sections 
C and D [on internal conflicts] should not be included. She was ready to consider 
guarantees that would secure the integrity and sovereignty of States.”36 This demonstrates 
a clear ideological difference from the majority of African states that considered the 
 
33 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 9th plenary meeting (17 
July 1998), 126, para. 75. 
34 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 27th meeting (8 July 1998), 286, para. 
46. 
35 See, for example, Léonce Ndikumana, “Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi,” African 
Studies Review 4.1 (1998): 29-47. 




Court’s role in addressing war crimes committed in internal conflicts as not only 
important, but necessary.  
The minority position articulated in the summary records of the plenary meetings 
and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole seems to rely on three distinct and 
consistent fears: first, that state sovereignty would be compromised; second, that 
governments would be unable to maintain effective order within borders; and third, that 
unsolicited intervention on the part of other states (or the Court, for that matter) will be 
justifiable. Separately or combined, the potential realization of these fears compromises 
the foundation of the nation state and the international state-based system; this forms the 
basis of normative and institutional rejection, least avoidance. As Sivu Maqungo 
explained, “it was always going to be difficult to convince governments, particularly, 
African governments to accept an institution that threatened to lift or even pierce the veil 
of their hard won sovereignty.”37 This challenge explains the polarization in the 
approaches of African states, many being willing to give up some degree of sovereignty 
in exchange for normative commitment, while others were unwavering in their 
ideological ascription to the primacy of state sovereignty and non-intervention for any 
purpose(s) in the post-colonial political landscape.    
 
6.1.1  The final text and conclusions 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC Prosecutor the ability to investigate war 
crimes committed in both international and internal armed conflict.38 The provisions 
concerning internal armed conflict specifically enumerate violations of Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions at Article 8, 2 (c).39 Importantly, Article 8, 2 (e) details 
 
37 Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo, “The African Contribution Towards the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court,” in African Yearbook of International Law, ed. A.A. Yusuf (African Association of 
International Law: 2001), 339. 
38 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8: War Crimes. 
39 Ibid., at Art. 8.2(c): “In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations 
of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts 
committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other 
cause: i. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture; ii. Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
iii. Taking of hostages; iv. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
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other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in internal conflicts and 
enumerates specific war crimes in these contexts.40 Of additional relevance, both Article 
8, paragraph 2 (d) and Article 8, paragraph 2 (f) employ the language and threshold 
provided in Paragraph 2 of Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions: 
Paragraph 2 (c) [or Paragraph 2 (e)] applies to armed conflicts not of an 
international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or 
other acts of a similar nature.41 
This inclusion seeks to clarify the threshold to distinguish ‘regular’ internal violence from 
internal conflict, an attempt to pacify the concern raised by some states (including some 
African states) that the Court could intervene in domestic affairs on weak bases. A key 
distinction between the two paragraphs is the additional text in paragraph 2 (f) that 
follows, and, which says: “It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a 
State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups.”42 
This text is a verbatim application of the proposal made by Sierra Leone in the 
course of the negotiations, referenced above. This proposal effectively mitigated the use 
of the restrictive threshold contained in Paragraph 1 of Protocol II of the Geneva 
Conventions. This is a clear example of African involvement in the institutional design of 
the Court based on domestic experience with the issues involved. 
 It is also important to note that a further attempt was made to assuage the fears of 
the delegations that touted the primacy of sovereignty and non-interference. Specifically, 
Article 8, paragraph 3 of the Rome Statute states that “Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) 
shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-establish law and order 
in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate 
means.”43 
 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are 
generally recognized as indispensable.”  
40 Ibid., Art. 8 paragraph 2(e).  
41 Ibid., Arts. 8, para. 2 (d) and (f). 
42 Ibid., Arts. 8, para. 2(f). 
43 Ibid., Art. 8, para. 3. 
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This inclusion reflects an acknowledgement of the concerns raised by states 
throughout the course of the negotiations, including the African states that preferred not 
to include war crimes allegedly committed in internal conflicts in the Statute because it 
would allow for intervention on weak grounds. This inclusion shifts responsibility back 
to the government to maintain the state, consistent with the object and purpose of the 
bedrock complementarity principle espoused by the Court. That is, the Court is meant to 
be a complement to national institutions and may only intervene if a state is unwilling or 
unable to do so–a last resort.44    
 Notwithstanding this, of the seven African states that preferred not to include 
internal conflict, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan did sign the Rome Statute, but did 
not ratify it. Burundi and Tunisia signed and ratified the Statute. Libya neither signed nor 
ratified. This suggests that the compromise solution or the substance of the Statute was 
great enough to overcome a delegations’ preference on this particular issue, since 86 per 
cent of this group ended up at least signing the Statute. More demonstrably, 29 per cent 
of this group exercised a strong commitment to the Court by ratifying the Statute. The 
other 71 per cent of African states that preferred not to include internal conflict acted 
consistently by not ratifying the Statute, since the final text included internal conflicts 
within the war crimes provisions in Article 8.   
 With respect to the 25 African states that preferred to include war crimes 
committed during internal conflicts, Ethiopia, Swaziland, and Togo neither signed nor 
ratified the Statute; together, these three comprised 12 per cent of this group of states. 
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe demonstrated a low-level of 
commitment to the Rome Statute and signed but did not ratify it. The other 18 States did 
ultimately ratify the Rome Statute; they comprised 72 per cent of the delegations that 
enumerated a preference to include internal conflicts. While 88 per cent of the African 
states that preferred to include war crimes committed in internal conflict within the Rome 
Statute signed it, 28 per cent of the 88 per cent per cent did not ultimately ratify it.  
 
44 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998), A/CONF.183/9, Preamble: 
“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary 
to national criminal jurisdictions;” Art. 1; Art. 17. 
149 
 
It is important to note that the final text of the Rome Statute has been criticized on 
the grounds that some war crimes provisions apply to international conflicts yet are 
excluded from internal ones. The crimes that apply in international conflicts but not 
internal ones include: “launching indiscriminate attacks likely to cause incidental loss of 
life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects; widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the environment; attacking undefended places which are not military 
objectives; improper use of flags and markings; use of human shields; and the use of 
starvation as a method of warfare.”45 Scholars such as Willmott have problematized this, 
arguing that “These acts, committed in the course of non-international armed conflict, 
cannot be prosecuted by the ICC as war crimes.”46 Dörmann explains this asymmetry as 
having two explanations: the first is that some provisions simply do not apply to internal 
conflicts. The second is that “several states took the view that these have not yet reached 
the status of customary international law and should therefore not be included.”47 
The unequal application of crimes in international and internal conflicts may 
explain why 20 per cent of the African states that preferred to include war crimes 
committed in internal conflict in Statute ultimately decided not to ratify the final text, 
notwithstanding their preferred inclusion. Scholars such as Graditzky argue that 
“however disappointing the list of the included crimes might seem, the presence of 
 
45 Deidre Willmott, “Removing the Distinction between International and Non-International Armed 
Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 
5.1 (2004), 196. 
46 Willmott, “Removing the Distinction between International and Non-International Armed Conflict,” 197. 
47 Knut Dörmann, “War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a Special 
Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 7 
(2003): 347. Note that the second reason was directly applicable to the decision not to include the use of 
prohibited weapons in internal armed conflicts. Scholars such as Willmott and Dörmann argue that this was 
a problematic outcome of the negotiations. However, the first amendment to the Rome Statute expanded 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the use of prohibited weapons in international armed conflicts to their use in 
internal conflicts, which happened at the Review Conference on the International Criminal Court in 
Kampala (June 2010). See generally Amal Alamuddin and Philippa Webb, “Expanding Jurisdiction over 
War Crimes under Article 8 of the ICC Statute,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 8.5(2010): 1219-
1243. Similarly, Switzerland proposed to include the intentional starvation of civilians as a war crime in 
internal conflicts in 2019. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Rome, 17 
July 1998, Switzerland: Proposal of Amendment (30 August 2019), C.N.399.2019.TREATIES-XVIII.10 
(Depositary Notification). At the 18th Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, it was 
unanimously agreed to amend the Rome Statute to include starvation as a war crime during internal 
conflict. In combination, these amendments signal the evolving nature of international law covering war 
crimes committed during internal conflicts.  
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provisions relating to non-international armed conflicts is itself one of the greatest 
achievements of the Conference.”48 The inclusion of internal conflicts within the war 
crimes provisions of the Rome Statute was indeed consistent with the majority preference 
of African delegates at the Conference. This is similarly reflected by the strong 
ratification rate among states that expressed this preference in the summary records of the 
plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole.  
 
6.2 Treaty Crimes: Terrorism and Drug Trafficking 
At the Rome Conference there was significant discussion about whether the Court should 
cover so-called ‘treaty crimes’ that is, crimes already defined and established by treaties–
especially terrorism and drug trafficking.49 Kirsch and Robinson explained that “whether 
to include the drug trafficking or terrorist crimes (referred to in the negotiations as the 
‘treaty crimes’) was also hotly debated, as a minority of States pressed keenly for their 
inclusion.”50 With respect to African states, nine preferred to include terrorism in the 
Statute and five supported the inclusion of drug trafficking.51 This reflects a general low-
level of regional preference; 19 per cent of African delegations at the Conference pushed 
for the inclusion of terrorism; 10 per cent for drug trafficking.  
 
48 Graditzky, “War Crimes Issues,”211; Dörmann, “War Crimes under the Rome Statute,” 348: 
“Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the major accomplishment of the Rome Conference with regard 
to war crimes certainly resides in the inclusion of war crimes committed during non-international armed 
conflicts.”  
49 See Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, “Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” in The 
International Criminal Court: the making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, ed. Roy S. 
Lee (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 80: under the ILC Draft Statute, treaty crimes were 
understood to include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional protocol I, apartheid, 
torture and certain acts of terrorism and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. These crimes were considered 
separately from the ‘core crimes’ – genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. It is 
important to note that apartheid was included as a crime against humanity in the final text of the Rome 
Statute.  
50 Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference,” in The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1, eds. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.W.D. 
Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), 78. The authors explain that the states that pushed for drug 
crimes included Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago; India, Sri Lanka, Algeria, and 
Turkey pushed for the inclusion of terrorist crimes (at note 41). Accordingly, Algeria is the most relevant 
state for the purposes of this analysis. 
51 The African states that preferred to include terrorism included Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Comoros, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Tunisia; regarding drug trafficking, Algeria, Botswana, 
Comoros, Kenya, and Madagascar preferred its inclusion. 
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It is also important to highlight that Namibia enumerated an unspecified 
preference to include “some treaty crimes… though definitions were not yet clear 
enough.”52 Through a similar lens, Cameroon and the SADC States took a loose position 
on the inclusion of treaty crimes, generally understood. For example, the Cameroonian 
delegate said that “he had an open mind concerning the other crimes–terrorism, crimes 
against United Nations and associated personnel and the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances.”53 The delegate from South Africa said that “[t]he member 
States of SADC had a flexible attitude with regard to the inclusion of treaty crimes: drug 
crimes and crimes against United Nations personnel represented major challenges that 
might usefully be reflected in the Statute.”54 Congo was similarly vague about the 
inclusion of treaty crimes. Its delegate said, “[h]e was not opposed to the inclusion of 
treaty crimes, since the role of the Court was to ensure legal protection for the 
international community.”55 Since Cameroon, Congo, and South Africa (and by 
extension, SADC States) were ambiguous with their preferences to include treaty crimes, 
these positions are excluded from the analysis on terrorism and drug trafficking. It is 
worth noting that the delegate from Tanzania, Mr. Tuvako Manongi, coordinated 
consultations on treaty crimes throughout the negotiations.56 This is important because it 
demonstrates a high level of engagement within the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the 
part of African delegations and African individuals, thus giving the resultant Statute an 
inherent African identity.    
 Algeria took a leading role in the push to include treaty crimes–particularly 
terrorism. To illustrate this point, the Algerian delegate said in the meetings of the 
Committee of the Whole that: 
 
52 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998), 290, para. 
24. 
53 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 7th meeting (19 June 1998), 181, para. 
23. 
54 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 25th meeting (8 July 1998), 268, para. 
12. 
55 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 27th meeting (8 July 1998), 286, para. 
56. 
56 von Hebel and Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference,” footnote 1.  
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terrorism should be within the Court’s jurisdiction. He agreed with the 
representative from Norway that it was a matter of great concern to the 
international community, as reflected in the large number of international 
instruments that had been prepared in order to deal with the various aspects of the 
phenomenon and in the efforts of States to explore other ways and means of 
strengthening their cooperation in order to end those acts… With regard to illicit 
drug trafficking, the idea of creating the Court had been revived as the result of a 
desire to bring the authors of those crimes to justice. Illicit drug trafficking should 
be included in the competence of the Court.57 
With respect to drug trafficking, the delegate from Algeria referred to the push for the 
establishment of an ICC by Trinidad and Tobago in 1989, which reignited the stagnant 
project and ultimately resulted in the Diplomatic Conference nine years later.58 Regarding 
terrorism, Algeria referenced its preference to include it within the Statute four times in 
the summary records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the 
Whole.59 Algeria advanced the position that terrorism and drug trafficking were 
important and serious crimes that threaten international peace and security. It proposed 
that the Court’s credibility would be strengthened by including treaty crimes and pushed 
for this outcome throughout the course of the negotiations. It is especially important to 
emphasize that Algeria has dealt with terrorism throughout much of its history, but was 
 
57 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 6th meeting (18 June 
1998), 177, paras. 110-111. 
58 See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at 
https://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm; accessed 2 February 2021. Note that the idea of an ICC was 
brought back onto the agenda of the United Nations as a response to a request by Trinidad and Tobago to 
the General Assembly to work on establishing an international criminal court that was able to prosecute 
drug trafficking. The General Assembly requested that the International Law Commission begin to work on 
drafting a statute for such a court. Following the serious conflicts in the 1990s (i.e. in the former 
Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994), even more attention was directed towards the idea of an ICC. 
The International Law Commission finished its draft statute in 1994, which was submitted to the General 
Assembly.  
59 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 27th meeting (8 July 1998), 282-283, 
para. 3: “He favoured the inclusion of treaty crimes, especially terrorism. However, a global and unified 
approach to such crimes was needed.” 3rd plenary meeting (16 June 1998), 73, para. 18: “The Court would 
be more credible and find wider acceptance if its scope was limited. It should therefore focus on the core of 
serious crimes that threatened international peace and security. Terrorism and drug trafficking should be 
included in the list of crimes within its jurisdiction.” 3rd meeting (17 June 1998), 148, para 43: “As far as 




experiencing particularly serious violence in the historical moment leading up to the 
Rome Conference. According to Anneli Botha, 
the period between 1995 and 1998 could probably be described as a black period 
in Algeria’s history, categorized inter alia by collective massacres directed at 
rural and isolated communities. According to eyewitness reports, terrorist 
elements responsible for the massacre in Bentalha (Baraki), south of Algiers, on 
22 and 23 September 1997 had a list of primary targets. This was an action that 
confirmed that these attacks were intended to terrorise and punish the population 
hostile to them, or those who formerly supported them but who had since 
withdrawn their support, or relatives and current supporters of rival armed 
groups.60 
This domestic experience likely contributed to Algeria’s desire to include treaty crimes, 
especially terrorism, within the Court’s mandate. This is another example of how 
domestic experience shaped national preference at the Rome Conference and informed a 
states’ idealized vision of the Court.   
However, low-level regional support for the inclusion of treaty crimes was made 
especially clear since 12 African states expressly preferred not to include treaty crimes, 
either terrorism or drug trafficking, which suggests a split on this issue.61 Some of these 
states took a sympathetic position, while maintaining that treaty crimes should not be 
included. Senegal, for example, “[a]greed that terrorism, crimes against United Nations 
personnel and drug trafficking were important and serious, but thought that they should 
not be within the Court’s jurisdiction.”62 The delegate from Sierra Leone said that “while 
appreciating the seriousness of the treaty crimes and their adverse effect on society, his 
 
60 Anneli Botha, “Terrorism in Algeria,” in Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of 
Domestic Terrorism, Monograph No. 144 (Institute for Security Studies, June 2008), available at 
https://issafrica.org/chapter-2-terrorism-in-algeria; accessed 20 April 2020.  
61 These states included Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Note that Some of these states recommended that treaty crimes be considered 
at a later stage, specifically: Benin, Lesotho, Mali, and Sierra Leone. It is also important to disclose that 
Nigeria initially preferred to include treaty crimes, but later in the Conference recommended that they not 
be included in the Statute. 




delegation thought that those offences should not be included at the current stage.”63 
These positions were a natural consequence of the difficulty in reaching consensus on 
this issue within the time constraints of the Conference. 
The delegate from Nigeria raised a different issue and said that “though he 
sympathized with the desire to include treaty crimes, the list proposed was selective. 
Treaty crimes should be left to national courts.”64 This position highlights the selectivity 
involved with narrowing in on drug trafficking, terrorism, and less frequently, crimes 
against UN personnel, while omitting other serious crimes. The problem with the scope 
of crimes was addressed by the Libyan delegate when he said, 
moreover, it was not acceptable that the Court’s jurisdiction should be confined to 
matters of interest to some States while ignoring different issues of concern to 
others. In addition to so-called aggression and so-called terrorism, the Court 
might deal with drug trafficking, insults to religion, violation of humanitarian 
values, forbidding of religious rites, white slavery, organized crime, involvement 
of children in war, violence and prostitution, economic and financial crimes, 
aggression against the environment and other threats.65 
This supports the inclusion of some crimes while approaching others with a degree of 
condescension. Moreover, it reflects a detailed list of crimes (drug trafficking, insults to 
religion, violation of humanitarian values, forbidding of religious rites, white slavery, 
organized crime, involvement of children in war, violence and prostitution, economic and 
financial crimes, aggression against the environment), some of which were ultimately 
included in the Statute.66 Along the same mixed preference pattern, Côte d’Ivoire 
supported the inclusion of treaty crimes, with the exception of drug trafficking, and 
“urged the inclusion of crimes against United Nations and associated personnel within the 
 
63 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 25th meeting (8 July 1998), 271, para. 
54. 
64 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998), 293, para. 
99. See also 25th meeting (8 July 1998), 273, para. 74, the delegate from Botswana said that “It was in 
favour of including treaty crimes, but since they were all equally important, they must either all be included 
or all excluded.” 
65 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 6th plenary meeting (17 
June 1998), 102, para. 82 [emphasis added]. 
66 Note that the involvement of children in war was included in the Statute, for example. 
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competence of the Court.”67 It is interesting to note that both Burundi and Libya 
expressly posited that economic embargoes should have been included as a crime covered 
by the Statute.68 Madagascar preferred that the Court cover “trafficking in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances, the deposit of toxic or nuclear waste within the territory of a 
State, and the sale of arms or munitions to Governments not recognized by the 
international community or to military leaders, except in cases authorized under 
international law.”69 It is also worth noting that Comoros and Madagascar submitted a 
proposal to include the crime of “mercenarism” in the Statute.70 This demonstrates the 
diversity in preferences with respect to what crimes should be included in the Statute on 
the part of several African states, beyond the focused consideration of terrorism and drug 
trafficking, in many cases based on country-specific and regional experiences.  
 Alternatively, Ghana considered that the inclusion of treaty crimes would 
complicate the relationship between the Court and national judicial institutions. 
Specifically, the delegate from Ghana said that “[t]he inclusion of the treaty crimes, 
particularly terrorism and drug trafficking, would only heighten national sensitivities, and 
would therefore not be conducive to the desired cooperation envisaged for their effective 
prosecution.”71 This position emphasizes the importance of constructing an institution 
with the greatest potential to work cooperatively with domestic courts. This is in keeping 
with the principle of complementarity, which is a cornerstone of the Court’s structure.  
 
67 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 6th meeting (18 June 1998), 174, 
paras. 60-61: “It would be premature to include illicit traffic in narcotics in the Statute at the current stage, 
but the other provisions on treaty crimes could be forwarded to the Drafting Committee.” 
68 See for example Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 27th meeting (8 July 
1998), 285-286, para. 46, the delegate from Burundi said that “Economic embargoes, which subjected the 
vulnerable population to great suffering, should also fall under the jurisdiction of the Court.” See also: 
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 36th meeting (13 July 1998), 344, para: 
6. The delegate from Libya said that “Economic embargoes should be included… as a crime against 
humanity.”  
69 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 7th plenary meeting (18 
June 1998), 107-108, para. 31. 
70 Proposal by Comoros and Madagascar on Article 5 (3 July 1998) A/CONF.183/C.1/L.46 and Corr. 1 (7 
July 1998). See A/CONF.183/C.1/L.12 (22 June 1998): It is also demonstrative that Bangladesh, India, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mexico, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago and Tanzania 
submitted a proposal to include apartheid as an enumerated crime against humanity, which was ultimately 
successful.  




 Further complicating the notion of consensus among African delegations, 
Cameroon and South Africa took a flexible approach to the inclusion of treaty crimes. 
While these States were not against including them, they did not indicate any meaningful 
degree of support or focus on this issue. Lesotho was also sympathetic and proposed that 
treaty crimes could be included in the Statute at a later stage. The delegate explained that 
this position was a result of “the controversy that still surrounded questions of definition 
and scope, as well as time constraints.”72 These concerns were further addressed by the 
delegate from Mali, who said that “it would be premature to include treaty crimes in the 
Statute, which should be referred to a review conference.”73 Similarly, Benin said that 
“the consideration of the other treaty crimes should continue in the Preparatory 
Commission, with a view to their inclusion at a later stage.”74 Ultimately, the majority of 
African states that took a position on the inclusion of treaty crimes within the Statute 
either preferred not to include them in the Statute, or else had no substantive preference 
either way.  
The final text of the Rome Statute does not include treaty crimes. Kirsch and 
Robinson explained that “the majority regarded these crimes as crimes of a 
fundamentally different character than the ‘core crimes,’ and feared that they might 
overburden the Court.”75 However, the Final Act of the Conference recommended that a 
future review conference reopen the idea of adding terrorism and drug trafficking to the 
Statute. Specifically, Annex I(E) states: 
Having adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Recognizing that terrorist acts, by whomever and wherever perpetrated and 
whatever their forms, methods or motives, are serious crimes of concern to the 
international community, 
 
72 Ibid., 281, para. 117. 
73 Ibid., 278, para. 66. 
74 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 27th meeting (8 July 1998), 286, para. 
58. 
75 Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference,” 78. 
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Recognizing that the international trafficking of illicit drugs is a very serious 
crime, sometimes destabilizing the political and social and economic order in 
States, 
Regretting that no generally acceptable definition of the crimes of terrorism and 
drug crimes could be agreed upon for the inclusion, within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, 
Affirming that the Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for a 
review mechanism, which allows for an expansion in future of the jurisdiction of 
the Court, 
Recommends that a Review Conference pursuant to article 123 of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court consider the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes 
with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition in their inclusion in the list of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.76 
This suggests that the importance of treaty crimes to some states was significant 
enough for the Final Act to recommend reconsideration at a later date, even if the 
majority of states (including most in Africa) did not approach this issue with the highest 
priority. There is a certain irony in the fact that the ICC project was reinvigorated by a 
State that wanted to address drug trafficking, yet the resultant Court does not address 
such crimes. This speaks to the evolution of international criminal law, which was 
informed by the mass and widespread atrocities in the Second World War, the former 
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. These modalities of crime overshadow acts such as drug 
trafficking, which have a traditional conceptualization as occurring during times of war 
and peace and fall under the jurisdiction of domestic courts.77 The threshold of the Rome 
Statute requires the Court have “jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to 
 
76 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Done at Rome on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10. 
77 Another reason why states viewed treaty crimes differently than the core crimes is because genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes are considered international crimes, while drug and human 
trafficking is considered a transnational crime. Therefore, some states considered treaty crimes to fall on 
different planes of action under international law, and it would confuse the Rome Statute to include both 
types of crime equitably. See Robert J Currie and Dr Joseph Rikhof, International and Transnational 
Criminal Law, Third Edition (Irwin Law Inc, 2020). 
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the international community as a whole.”78 Although seemingly peculiar to compare acts 
of genocide to drug trafficking, for example, it is important to consider that the latter may 
severely complicate international and domestic relations in some situations. In addition, 
such acts may undergird an organized criminal network which facilitates the perpetration 
of the core crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. The 
effective prosecution of such crimes may have a deterrent or preventative effect on the 
perpetration of the core crimes. 
Nine African states wanted to include acts of terrorism in the Rome Statute: 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Tunisia. 
Six African states wanted to see drug trafficking within the Court’s jurisdiction, namely: 
Algeria, Botswana, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, and Tunisia. Namibia suggested that 
some treaty crimes should be included in the Statute, without specificity. Thus, the 
preferences of these states were not reflected in the Statute on this issue. Of the African 
states that preferred the inclusion of treaty crimes, four did not ratify the Rome Statute: 
Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya. This suggests that 67 per cent of the African states 
that preferred to include treaty crimes (either terrorism, drug trafficking, or both) 
ultimately went on to ratify the Statute even though this was not included the final text. 
This may be explained by the recommendation in the Final Act of the Conference to 
consider the inclusion of these crimes at a later date. The implication of this is that the 
inclusion of treaty crimes did not fundamentally influence accession to the Statute in the 
African context, since most of the states that wanted them to be included went on to ratify 
the Statute anyway. 
 Of the 14 African states that took a flexible position or expressly rejected the 
inclusion of treaty crimes, 10 went on to ratify the Rome Statute.79 Cameroon, Libya, 
Morocco, and Togo did not accede to the Statute, although Cameroon and Morocco did 
sign it. Nevertheless, diplomatic negotiation efforts the part of many African states with 
respect to the inclusion of treaty crimes within the Statute demonstrate how national 
experience shaped preferences. This is most strongly demonstrated by states that 
 
78 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble [emphasis added].  
79 These states included Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and South Africa. 
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preferred to include crimes which were not even “on the table” such as Comoros and 
Madagascar, with the joint proposal to include so-called “mercenarism.” Similarly, 
Algeria’s preference to include terrorism within the list of crimes covered by the Statute 
can be directly tied to its own experience with such crimes. These two examples 
demonstrate that domestic experience shaped the preferences of some African states at 
the Rome Conference with respect to the crimes included in the Statute. 
 
6.3 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
Falling under the war crimes heading, provisions relating to the prohibition of weapons 
were highly contested at the Conference. According to von Hebel and Robinson, 
“particularly controversial was the inclusion or non-inclusion of nuclear weapons… The 
inclusion of nuclear weapons was strongly supported by Arab countries, India, Pakistan 
and countries in the Pacific region, and also had support from several African, Asian and 
Latin American countries.”80 Kirsch and Robinson explain the division on this issue as 
related to the fact that some delegations felt it was unreasonable to omit nuclear weapons 
while at the same time including lesser weapons on a prohibited list. Others, however, 
“argued that including nuclear weapons would be creating new law, since fifty years of 
negotiations had produced neither a conventional nor a customary prohibition on the use 
of nuclear weapons. Moreover, these delegations believed that to use the Statute to 
attempt to achieve a ban, where fifty years of disarmament negotiations had not, would 
be fatal for the creation of the Court.”81 It is useful to understand African support and/or 
opinion on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Rome Statute, to better grasp the 
conceptualization of the Court by African delegations in Rome.  
 To this end, based on the summary records of the plenary meetings and meetings 
of the Committee of the Whole, 18 African states, comprising 38 per cent of the African 
delegates in attendance at the Conference spoke to the issue of including nuclear weapons 
on a prohibited list. Of them, 17 states preferred to expressly criminalize the use of 
 
80 Herman Von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, “Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” 115. 
81 Kirsch and Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference,” 79-80. 
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nuclear weapons; seven belonged to the SADC and four were Arab States.82 Only one 
African state, Guinea, opined that nuclear weapons should not be included on the list of 
prohibited weapons.  
In line with the explanation provided by Kirsch and Robinson, the delegate from 
Guinea said that “it would be premature to include nuclear weapons… as there was no 
treaty banning them.”83 In light of this explanation, it can be inferred that the delegate 
from Guinea acknowledged that this particular issue had been and remained legally and 
politically challenging. This position highlights the direct impact(s) that a nuclear weapon 
prohibition could have not only on the success of the Conference, but the Court’s efficacy 
if it were to be included in the Statute and the Court came to be. Since nuclear weapons 
were ultimately not included in the final text of the Rome Statute, Guinea was the only 
African state that had its preferred outcome reflected in the Statute. It is worth noting that 
Guinea did ultimately ratify the Rome Statute.    
 It is worth noting that the other 17 African states that addressed the question of 
nuclear weapons supported their inclusion on the prohibited list of weapons; these 
comprised the majority African position on this issue. In keeping with the explanation 
provided by Kirsch and Robinson, the delegate from Libya said that “his delegation also 
found it contradictory to regard the use of certain types of weapons as a crime but not the 
use of the most destructive and dangerous weapons of all.”84 This suggests that a list of 
prohibited weapons ought to include the most serious types, most of all nuclear weapons.  
Other African states believed that the drafting of the Rome Statute provided an 
opportunity to develop law on nuclear weapons, rather than avoid the issue. For example, 
Namibia said the inclusion of nuclear weapons, “would allow the addition of weapons as 
 
82 These states included Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe. Note: Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, and Sudan belong to the Group of Arab States. Note also that Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe belong to the SADC. 
83 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 28th meeting (8 July 1998), 290, para. 
37. 
84 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 42nd meeting (17 July 
1998), 362, para. 33. 
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yet undeveloped.”85 This sentiment was echoed by the delegate from Benin when he said 
that “nuclear weapons should have been outlawed once and for all. He had not gained 
satisfaction on these points, but nevertheless welcomed the considerable progress 
achieved.”86 While Benin supported the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the prohibited 
list, it can be inferred that the overall contribution of the Statute outweighed this 
particular disappointment. In this sense, it is clear that several African states saw the 
Conference and the Court as an opportunity to develop the law on nuclear weapons and 
contribute to the resolution of a complex international political debate muddied by the 
interdependent relationship between hard power and global ordering principles. This was 
extremely important for those African governments that viewed the ICC and the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference as an opportunity to restructure the political hierarchy, or at least 
begin to level the political playing field between and among states. 
SADC States Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Zimbabwe each expressly endorsed the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the 
prohibited list. The SADC Negotiating Principles did not specifically address this issue, 
though it can be inferred from the summary records of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole that this was a uniform position and negotiation strategy. The South African 
delegate addressed this point when he “drew attention to matters of concern to his 
delegation and to some extent to the Southern African Development Community… 
Nuclear weapons and other weapons causing indiscriminate injury or suffering should be 
included.”87 As such, it is understood that the SADC States preferred to include nuclear 
weapons on the prohibited list.  
The Rome Statute does not reflect this vision and failed to satisfy the majority of 
African states on this issue. For example, Ghana was particularly disappointed with the 
exclusion of nuclear weapons from the prohibited list. This was made clear when its 
 
85 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 28th meeting (8 July 
1998), 289, para. 25. 
86 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 9th plenary meeting (17 
July 1998), 128, para. 109.    




delegate said, “as for nuclear weapons, their exclusion from the list of prohibited 
weapons rendered that list well-nigh meaningless.”88 Ghana was not alone in its 
dissatisfaction. Egypt was also especially displeased with the exclusion of nuclear 
weapons from the prohibited list. This was made clear when its delegate said, 
with regard to section B, subparagraph (o) [on prohibited weapons], he was 
disappointed to note that the Bureau proposal offered only one option, which was 
supported by nuclear States but which was totally unacceptable to his delegation 
because it made no reference to nuclear weapons. If the International Criminal 
Court was to be an international rather than a European body, a text acceptable to 
all must be found.89 
These comments demonstrate the depth of disapproval felt by Egypt with respect to the 
absence of nuclear weapons on the prohibited list at the end stages of the Conference. 
This interjection suggests there was a racial, if not colonial, realpolitik explanation for 
the negotiation outcome on this issue, which was strongly opposed by Egypt and others.  
To be sure, at the end of the Conference, the issue of nuclear weapons remained 
focal. In response to the final package presented by the Bureau of the Committee of the 
Whole, India interjected and proposed two amendments (one dealing with war crimes and 
one dealing with the role of the Security Council). With respect to the relevant 
amendment on war crimes, the delegate from India 
drew attention to document A/CONF.183/C.1/L.94, which contained amendments 
proposed by his delegation to article 8 concerning war crimes… The effect of 
these amendments would be to include weapons of mass destruction, i.e. 
nuclear… among the weapons whose use would constitute a war crime. The 
 
88 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 33rd meeting (13 July 1998), 325, 
para. 63.  
89 Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 35th meeting (13 July 1998), 335, 
para. 3. Egypt’s preference to include nuclear weapons on the prohibited list of weapons was made clear 
throughout the Conference. See also Summary records of the plenary meetings, 9th meeting (17 July 1998), 
127, para. 85: “Nuclear weapons should have been included. He agreed with the statements made by the 
representatives of the Group of Arab States, and of Lesotho on behalf of the Group of African States… any 
future lists of prohibited arms annexed to the text should include weapons of mass destruction, particularly 
nuclear weapons.” This demonstrates Egypt’s co-membership in the Group of Arab States and the Group of 
African States but also effectively points to the fact that both groups endorsed the inclusion of nuclear 
weapons within the Statute. 
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absence of any mention of such weapons in the draft represented a retrograde 
step.90  
However, the delegate from Norway proposed a motion that no action be taken on the 
proposals submitted by India. This was recommended since the final text reflected  
a compromise formula designed to achieve broad support and reflecting as far as 
possible a consensus approach. A package, almost by definition, would contain 
elements which displeased some delegations. It was essential to maintain the 
integrity of the package offered in order to avoid destroying the balance achieved 
with such difficulty and making it impossible to achieve the ultimate goal of an 
independent, effective and credible international court.91 
It is interesting to note that Malawi and the majority of SADC states supported the 
Norwegian proposal. The Malawian delegate said that, “while he appreciated the 
rationale behind the Indian proposals, he considered that the issues they raised had 
already been fully discussed, and therefore supported the Norwegian proposal. The 
delegations of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe associated themselves with his delegation’s view.”92 This 
suggests that Namibia and Tanzania were the only SADC States that expressly preferred 
to include nuclear weapons in the Statute, and did not clearly endorse the rejection of 
India’s proposal to prohibit them at the final moment of the Conference. Lesotho, 
Swaziland, and Zambia did not take an express position on this particular issue in the 
plenary meetings or meetings of the Committee of the Whole. Nevertheless, this implies 
a degree of acceptance of the decision to exclude nuclear weapons from the final text of 
the Statute on behalf of these African states. Ultimately, of the 17 African States that 
expressly preferred to prohibit nuclear weapons, 53 per cent went on to ratify the Rome 
Statute. This constitutes a slim majority, particularly when compared to the other 
 
90 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 42nd meeting (17 July 
1998), 360, para. 7.  
91 Ibid., at para. 9. 
92 Ibid., 361, para. 12. 
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provisions considered in this analysis.93 This suggests that this issue was important and 
the decision not to prohibit nuclear weapons could indeed explain accession depression 
among this group of states.94 Least of all, it is important to acknowledge that the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons only applies to states that have nuclear weapons. This 
issue is and was fundamentally political and interlinked with conceptions of hard power, 
which subsequently reinforce(d) the existing global order.  
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks about African Diplomacy at the 
 Rome Conference 
It is apparent that African delegations contributed meaningfully at the Rome Conference, 
as states and as part of coalitions and regional blocs. On balance, African states took part 
in the negotiations with the view to push back against traditionally powerful states. To 
illustrate this point, the delegate from Malawi “appealed to delegations to make an effort 
to achieve compromises. It was unhelpful for powerful countries to attempt to force their 
point of view on the rest by threatening not to sign the Statute.”95 It is clear that many 
African delegations approached the Rome Conference with the attitude that compromises 
would be required in order to ensure success, which was a better alternative than outright 
failure. Balancing the interests of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council 
with those of low and middle power states demanded strategic compromise. The salience 
of the need for compromise was most apparent with respect to the Court’s relationship to 
the Security Council and the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the prohibited list–i.e. the 
elements of the Statute that directly impact traditionally powerful states. Notwithstanding 
this, as Otto Triffterer pointedly explained,  
 
93 These states included Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanzania. 
94 See Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 9th meeting (17 July 
1998), 127, paras. 84-85: The delegate from Egypt said that “his country had been among the first to call 
for the establishment of the International Criminal Court… While he supported the text in general, there 
were some matters that the Statute did not deal with satisfactorily. Nuclear weapons should have been 
included.” 
95 Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 30th meeting (9 July 
1998), 310, para. 91. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.30 
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the only alternative to the establishment of a permanent ICC by the Rome Statute 
would have been the failure of the Conference, in spite of decades of 
comprehensive preparations, endeavours and various proposals. A compromise, 
therefore, was required in many cases … Closing the Conference without the 
adoption of a Statute for the ICC would have delayed the whole idea for decades, 
if not destroyed it altogether.96  
African states compromised during the Rome Conference and afterward, by committing 
to the Rome Statute by signing and/or ratifying it, illustrated by Figure 6-1.  
 
 
96 Otto Triffterer, Part 1. Establishment of the Court, Preliminary Remarks: The Permanent International 
Criminal Court – Ideal and Reality in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 





Figure 6-1 illustrates general trends about the African states that wanted a different kind 
of Court, feature by feature. It is apparent that for the most part, compromise was 
achieved, and African states were willing to commit to the Rome Statute, even to the 
strongest degree in the form of ratification. In three instances the majority of African 
states that wanted a different kind of Court did not end up ratifying the Rome Statute: 
those that preferred consent-based jurisdiction, those that preferred that the United 
Nations Security Council be able to refer only acts of aggression to the Court, and those 
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cases, the same states preferred a different kind of Court– on the balance, the cumulative 
compromise may have been too great.97  
 In the end, African states compromised to ensure the success of the Rome 
Conference and committed to the Rome Statute by signing and ratifying it more than 
states from any other region. No African state was completely satisfied by the final text 
of the Statute. To reconcile this problem, some delegations viewed the Statute as 
evolutionary, which could be improved upon by future generations. To illustrate this 
point, the delegate from Botswana said that  
although imperfect, the Statute of the International Criminal Court clearly 
expressed common values of justice, governing how the human race wanted to 
live in the future. He had supported the adoption of the Statute because it reflected 
the consensus of humanity as represented at the Conference. Generations to come 
should be able to perfect the Statute, and he urged those who felt that the 
document fell short of their expectations to reflect further and resolve to improve 
it during the review process.98 
General statements were offered at the end of the Conference by several African states: 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Egypt, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. It is important to identify that 
Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan are members of the Group of Arab States, and Sudan’s 
comments were made on its behalf. General themes of disappointment emerged 
throughout the statements of Egypt and Sudan, namely: the inclusion of aggression 
without definition or substance; the absence of nuclear weapons from the list of 
prohibited weapons enumerated in the Statute; disappointment with the ability of the 
 
97 For example, Ethiopia preferred that the UNSC only be able to refer acts of aggression, and it preferred a 
consent-based jurisdiction regime. Ethiopia neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute. Libya preferred a 
consent-based jurisdiction regime and that war crimes committed during internal armed conflict not be 
included. Libya neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute. This may also explain why some African 
states signed but did not ratify the Rome Statute. For example, Morocco preferred that the UNSC only be 
able to refer acts of aggression, it preferred a consent-based jurisdiction regime, and it preferred that war 
crimes committed during internal armed conflict not be included in the Statute. Morocco signed, but did not 
ratify the Rome Statute. Similarly, Algeria and Sudan preferred a consent-based jurisdiction regime and 
that war crimes committed during internal armed conflict not be included. Algeria and Sudan signed but did 
not ratify the Rome Statute. Zimbabwe preferred that the UNSC only be able to refer acts of aggression. It 
signed but did not ratify the Rome Statute. Egypt preferred that war crimes committed during internal 
armed conflict not be included. Egypt signed but did not ratify the Rome Statute. 
98 Summary records of the plenary meetings, 9th plenary meeting (17 July 1998), 127, para. 89. 
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Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio motu; the inability of states to issue 
reservations; and a role for the General Assembly over and above the Security Council.99 
Algeria’s comments were far more general and convey a degree of disappointment 
balanced with positivity. Specifically, it said that “Algeria [had] always longed for such a 
Court, and had always been committed to its achievement. Algeria had given a great deal 
without achieving all that it had wanted. It had some fears and regrets. It hoped the 
signing of the text would augur well for the future.”100 This statement made clear that 
Algeria compromised a great deal and was not fully satisfied by the final text. 
Nevertheless, it preserved optimism about the long-term success of the Court and its 
commitment to the same.    
 In the African context, the division between the Group of Arab States and the rest 
of Africa is quite apparent when approaching the difficult components of the Statute 
issue-by-issue, or when viewing the Statute in its entirety. It also apparent when 
considering a state’s overall attitude towards the Court. For example, Sierra Leone 
expressed that it was pleased that the Court preserved jurisdiction over internal armed 
conflict– a logical satisfaction based on its country-specific involvement on that 
particular issue. It was also pleased that the Prosecutor was given proprio motu 
powers.101 Botswana reiterated the point that the Statute was an important historical 
 
99 UN Press Release L/2889 (20 July 1998), available at 
https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2889.html; accessed 1 May 2020. See, more specifically, 
Sudan (on behalf of the Group of Arab States): “The Arab States came to the Conference with great hope of 
achieving a great document, the signing of which will be a great moment for humankind. The Court must 
try every criminal that commits a crime against humanity. The Arab States are not happy with the 
document. It was regrettable that just reference to aggression was included, as aggression is ‘the mother of 
all crimes.’ Also, nuclear weapons should also have been included. Any future list of weapons of mass 
destruction must include those weapons. The Prosecutor should also be under reasonable and logical 
control and not be ex-officio only. The Statute might even increase the power of the Security Council, and 
for that reason the Arab States have tried to have a role for the General Assembly under the Statute, but 
those hopes had been destroyed. Reservations should also have been allowed.” See also Egypt, “Egypt was 
among the first States which called for the establishment of the Court, and had participated in the 
preparatory work. The Arab world had need for such a Court, as acts of the perpetrator went unpunished. 
Egypt accepted the text in toto as a package, although some provisions had not been dealt with 
satisfactorily. It had stated time and again the need for inclusion of the use of weapons of mass destruction 
such as nuclear weapons. It had hoped for a definition of aggression which should conform to that of the 
General Assembly. The Prosecutor should not be able to initiate investigations ex officio. With regard to 
reservations, a general declaration should be adopted in the future.” 




landmark and that future generations could improve upon it.102 Benin identified some 
pointed concerns. More specifically, it identified the importance of the Statute to Africa 
in general, while highlighting that “[t]he text adopted was not a perfect one. Benin was 
not entirely satisfied with the provisions on war crimes. It was also concerned about the 
role given to the Security Council under the Statute” and questioned whether it was fair 
“that the Council should be able to block investigations of the Court. Benin would have 
preferred that nuclear weapons were formally banned by its inclusion in war crimes 
provisions of the Statute. Benin hoped all would work together for the effective 
implementation of the Statute.”103 This statement fused the concerns raised by some of 
the Arab States with general concerns about balancing its interests with those of nuclear 
or else P5 states in a multilateral negotiation process. However, Benin erred on the side 
of positivity, stressing the importance of cooperation in order to effectively implement 
the Statute.  
 The outcome of the Conference from an African perspective was explained by 
Sivu Maqungo, delegate for South Africa and Rome Statute Drafting Committee 
member:  
as expected, reservations from some African States on the fact that the crime of 
aggression was not included to their satisfaction were voiced, the absence of 
nuclear weapons in the list of weapons whose use in armed conflict is prohibited 
was also vented as a major concern. Moreover, the issue of inclusion of internal 
armed conflict within the Statute was a point of dissatisfaction from other African 
States. However, after much deliberation and due to the overwhelming vociferous 
support for the package deal by, notably, Francophone and Anglophone African 
States the retractors yielded to the wishes of the majority and thus Africa decided 









This pitted African-Arab States against the rest of ‘Africa’ to some degree. It also 
suggests that the majority African position was one of support for the final package and 
for the establishment of the ICC. On the whole, African States accepted the final text of 
the Statute and were willing to commit to it– Senegal being the first State to ratify the 
Rome Statute on 2 February 1999. Nevertheless, general trends suggest that Arab-African 
States were less likely to ratify the Statute, since 67 per cent of the African members of 
the Group of Arab States still had not ratified the Rome Statute at the time of writing. 
Notwithstanding this, Comoros, Djibouti, and Tunisia are Arab-African States that had 
ratified the Rome Statute. The majority of this Group had signed, but not ratified the 
Statute, including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan, demonstrating a loose level of 
commitment to it. Libya and Mauritania had neither signed nor ratified the Statute. In 
many respects, the compromises reached in the final text of the Rome Statute can be 
understood as too great to satisfy the preferences of Arab-African States and others 
throughout the region, more generally.
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Chapter 7  
7 African Commitment to the Rome Statute1 
The aims and normative goals of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) can 
only be achieved by the adoption of the Rome Statute of  
the International Criminal Court.2 In order to be truly effective, states must sign, ratify, 
and implement the Statute. As an international institution, the ICC cannot oblige states to 
commit to the Rome Statute. It necessarily relies on state cooperation and consent in the 
form of accession to be effective, which requires a mitigation of sovereignty. States must 
meaningfully contribute to the evolution of the international criminal justice norm by 
committing to its tangible application and establishing binding principles of international 
law. Importantly, the Rome Statute requires that States Parties implement its contents into 
domestic legislation, under the auspice of complementarity–i.e. the ICC is to be 
complementary to national jurisdictions and can only intervene when a state is unwilling 
or unable to do so.3 Commitment to the goals of the ICC and its normative 
underpinnings, generally framed, can be positioned on an ideational spectrum ranging 
from none (no signature or ratification), weak (signature only), strong (signature and 
ratification), and strongest (signature, ratification, and implementation in domestic 
legislation). 
The willingness of states to establish binding principles of international criminal 
law with reference to the Rome Statute has been mixed. This uneven landscape troubles 
the predictability of the ICC and has contributed to substantive criticism in its nascency.  
In this frame, African states have ratified the Rome Statute more than any other region. 
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Sarah Nimigan, “Africa and the International Criminal 
Court: (Re)constructing the Narrative,” International Criminal Law Review 21.2 (2021): 203-241. 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (17 July 1998), A/CONF.183/9 (hereafter Rome Statute 
or Statute). 
3 It is acknowledged that whether states are legally obligated to implement the contents of the Rome Statute 
into domestic law is the subject of ongoing debate. Some scholars contend that states are not legally 
required to implement the Rome Statute into domestic law, particularly because the contents of the Rome 
Statute are already covered by universal jurisdiction and customary law. See, for example, Xavier Philippe, 
“The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the two principles intermesh?” 
International Review of the Red Cross 88.862 (June 2006): 375-398   
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At the time of writing, 33 African states were States Parties to the Statute.4 This might be 
compared to other geographic regions as categorized by the Assembly of States Parties to 
the Rome Statute: 19 States Parties come from Asia-Pacific States; 18 from Eastern 
Europe; 28 from Latin America and Caribbean States; and 25 from Western European 
and Other States.5 It is also important to acknowledge that South Africa was the first 
African State to develop implementation legislation in the form of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court Act, 2002, which served as a regional example for 
African States domesticating the Rome Statute.6 An overview of African commitment to 
the Rome Statute is illustrated in Table 7-1.  
 
Table 7-1: African Commitment to the Rome Statute 






Algeria X   
Angola X   
Benin X X X 
Botswana X X Draft Law 
Burkina Faso X X X 
Burundi    
Cabo/Cape Verde X X  
Cameroon X   
Central African 
Republic 
X X X 
Chad X X Draft Law 
Comoros X X X 
Congo X X X 
Côte d’Ivoire X X X 
Djibouti X X  
 
4 This includes the following states (listed in order of ratification): Senegal; Ghana; Mali; Lesotho; 
Botswana; Sierra Leone; Gabon; South Africa; Nigeria; Central African Republic; Benin; Mauritius; 
Democratic Republic of the Congo; Niger; Uganda; Namibia; Gambia; Tanzania; Malawi; Djibouti; 
Zambia; Guinea; Burkina Faso; Congo; Liberia; Kenya; Comoros; Chad; Madagascar; Seychelles; Tunisia; 
Cabo Verde; Côte d’Ivoire. 
5 Assembly of States Parties, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, available at asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.as
px, accessed 5 May 2020. 
6 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC Act 27 of 2002, 16 August 2002. See also Max du 
Plessis, “South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute: An African Example,” Journal of International 




Republic of the 
Congo 
X X X 
Egypt X   
Equatorial Guinea    
Eritrea X   
Ethiopia    
Gabon X X Draft Law 
Gambia X X  
Ghana X X Draft Law 
Guinea X X X 
Guinea-Bissau X   
Kenya X X X 
Lesotho X X X 
Liberia X X Draft Law 
Libya    
Madagascar  X X  
Malawi X X Draft Law 
Mali X X X 
Mauritania    
Mauritius X X X 
Morocco X   
Mozambique X   
Namibia X X  
Niger X X X 
Nigeria X X Draft Law 
Rwanda    
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
X   
Senegal X X X 
Seychelles X X  
Sierra Leone X X Draft Law 
Somalia    
South Africa X X X 
Sudan X   
Swaziland    
Tanzania X X Draft Law 
Togo    
Tunisia X X  
Uganda X X X 
Zambia X X  
Zimbabwe X   
 
The importance of Table 7-1 is that 47 per cent of all African States have signed, 
ratified, and taken steps to implement the Rome Statute domestically and 62 per cent 
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have signed and ratified it. The decision to ratify the Rome Statute by the majority of 
African States is especially important, since a disproportionate amount of violence and 
widespread human rights violations plague the continent and the likelihood of ICC 
intervention in African contexts was (and remains) comparatively high. The behaviour 
and decision-making of African states in deciding to ratify the Statute and be bound to 
the institutional canon of the ICC can best be explained using two international relations 
(IR) theories: rational choice and constructivism. This work analyzes patterns of 
behaviour related to Rome Statute commitment in Africa, against the backdrop of the 
overall regional commitment to international criminal justice norms that undergird it.  
The choice of states to join the ICC is far more than symbolic; it carries 
obligations that affect the domestic, regional, and international political and legal 
landscape to varying but interrelated degrees. The overall conclusion is that using a 
rational choice lens provides an incomplete view as to why African states have 
committed to the Rome Statute. Similarly, norms shape national preferences to varying 
degrees, but the dynamization of interests collectively and individually must be 
accounted for, beyond a valuation of moral imperative. Thus, the influence of 
international criminal justice norms in shaping African preferences, coupled with 
complex and dynamic domestic political factors yields the most holistic explanatory 
approach. This rationalist-constructivist approach provides a strong foundation for 
explaining state behaviour in this context.7     
 
7 This work employs the approach advocated by Abbott and Snidal to the multidisciplinary study of IR-IL. 
See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the Next 
Generation of IR-IL Scholars,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International 
Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33-
56, at 52: “It is likewise essential to draw on the range of theoretical perspectives within each discipline, 
both for explanatory analysis and for international legal design. Law and legalization involve values and 
interests; they operate through instrumental and normative channels; they involve power as well as rational 
design; they are shaped by and shape the behavior of private acts as well as states.” See also Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization 52.4 (1998): 888. The authors say that “Rationality cannot be separated from any politically 
significant episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative context conditions 
any episode of rational choice.”   
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7.1 General Remarks About Rome Statute Ratification 
 Processes 
The Rome Statute was open for signature following the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(Rome Conference) on 17 July 1998. It entered into force four years later, in July 2002, 
once it was ratified by 60 States. Formally, a state must issue a deposit of its instrument 
of ratification of the Rome Statute to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order 
to become a States Party.8 Fourteen African states were among the first sixty to ratify the 
Statute, as illustrated in Table 7-2. It is worth noting that Senegal was the first state to 
ratify. These African States contributed substantially to the necessary ratifications 
required for the Rome Statute to enter into force and the ICC to become a reality by 
effectively committing to the Court’s overall utility and normative value by legalizing the 
Statute.9  
 
Table 7-2: African States Among the First Sixty Rome Statute Ratifications 
Date of Ratification State 
02 February 1999 Senegal 
20 December 1999 Ghana 
16 August 2000 Mali 
06 September 2000 Lesotho 
08 September 2000 Botswana 
15 September 2000 Sierra Leone 
20 September 2000 Gabon 
27 November 2000 South Africa 
27 September 2001 Nigeria 
03 October 2001 Central African Republic 
22 January 2002 Benin 
05 March 2002 Mauritius 
11 April 2002 Democratic Republic of the Congo 
11 April 2002 Niger 
 
8 The Rome Statute, Art. 125. 
9 See Table 1. Note that Burundi was the 26th African State to ratify the Rome Statute on 1 December 2004. 
It issued a deposit of withdrawal to the United Nations Secretary General on 27 October 2016 and the 
withdrawal took effect one year later on 27 October 2017, in accordance with Art. 127(1) of the Rome 





7.2 Explaining African commitment to the ICC using 
 international relations theory  
A robust literature seeks to explain state behaviour with respect to commitment to 
international institutions, including courts and tribunals, and even the ICC, largely with a 
specific focus on powerful states.10 The aim of this analysis is to build upon this work 
and expand the theoretical application of major international relations theories to explain 
the behaviour of weak states, particularly African states, and the pronounced regional 
commitment to the Rome Statute in the form of ratification and implementation. 
 
7.3 Rational Choice  
A rational choice theoretical approach presumes that a state will act rationally to 
maximize its interests, which is situated within the broader prism of the interests of other 
states and the distribution of power in the international system.11 While it is true that 
individuals negotiated the Rome Statute, its obligations are placed upon states and thus, 
 
10 See John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19.3 
(1994): 5-49; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). See also David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a 
World of Power Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For a neoliberal account, see Kenneth 
W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42.1 (1998): 3-32. The sum of these parts is the basic presumption that powerful states 
preserve control over international institutions, since they are merely a reflection of existing power 
structures and realities. For a general theoretical understanding of legalization and world politics, See 
Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, 
“The Concept of Legalization,” International Organization 54.3 (2000): 401-419. Note that the use of 
rational choice methodologies makes good sense when explaining the actions of powerful states. For 
example, the United States made clear that the costs of ratifying the Rome Statute outweighed the benefits. 
Since the United States disproportionately intervenes in international conflict(s), the risks of soldiers being 
exposed to Court prosecution was not acceptable to the Bush administration, or any administration 
thereafter. US hostility towards the ICC was made especially clear by the Trump administration, and more 
particularly by John Bolton, who openly discredited and opposed the ICC in the context of a possible 
investigation into grave crimes committed in Afghanistan. Bolton threatened sanctions against the ICC and 
its staff and said, “We will not cooperate with the ICC… for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already 
dead to us.” See “John Bolton threatens ICC with US sanctions,” BBC News, 11 September 2018, available 
at www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45474864; accessed 10 May 2020. 
11 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, 3. 
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the state remains focal point of analysis under a rational choice model. In other words, 
the state is a unitary, rational actor, that follows a rationalist ‘logic of consequences.’ 
According to Goldsmith and Posner, “a state… can make coherent decisions based upon 
identifiable preferences, or interests, and it is natural and common to explain state action 
on the international plane in terms of the primary goal or goals the state seeks to 
achieve.”12 In this vein, it can be presumed that African delegations at the Diplomatic 
Conference negotiating the establishment of an ICC constructed preferences either in 
advance of the Conference, or throughout, based on domestic and/or regional goals. This 
is particularly likely given the strong regional commitment to the ICC project– most 
notably by the South African Development Community (SADC) and more generally at 
the African Conference in Dakar leading up to the negotiations in Rome.13 It is also 
important to note that African civil society organizations were heavily involved in the 
creation of the ICC and several joined the Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
(CICC), putting exogenous pressure on states to commit to the Rome Statute.14 From an 
intergovernmental standpoint, the African Union (Organization of African Unity at the 
time) supported the establishment of the ICC and encouraged its members to join the 
Rome Statute.15     
 
12 Ibid., 6. 
13 Note that SADC states met as early as 1994 to discuss the ICC project and to coordinate a regional 
negotiation strategy for its establishment. The Dakar Declaration was the result of the African Conference, 
which provided a general regional position heading into the negotiations in 1998.  
14 Phakiso Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” in African Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice, eds. Evelyn A. Ankumah and Edward K. Kwakwa (Accra: Africa Legal 
Aid, 2005), 248. Note that non-governmental organizations based in Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, 
Rwanda, and Ethiopia (among others) joined the CICC and lobbied for the establishment of an ICC.  
15 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Official Records, Summary of the plenary meetings, 6th plenary meeting, 17 June 1998 
(A/CONF.183/SR.6), 104, para. 116. At the Rome Diplomatic Conference (1998), the observer for the 
Organization of African Unity said that “Africa had a particular interest in the establishment of the Court, 
since its peoples had been the victims of large-scale violations of human rights over the centuries: slavery, 
wars of colonial conquest and continued acts of war and violence, even in the post-colonial era. The recent 
genocide in Rwanda was a tragic reminder that such atrocities were not yet over, but had strengthened 
OAU’s determination to support the creation of a permanent, independent court to punish the perpetrators 
of such acts.” See also Hassan Jallow and Fatou Bensouda, “International criminal law in an African 
context,” in African Guide to International Criminal Justice, ed. Max du Plessis (Institute for Security 
Studies, 2008), 42. The authors said that “At a meeting on 27 February 1998, the council of ministers of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union) took note of the Dakar declaration and called 
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Analogously, using a rational choice model, Goldsmith and Posner posit that most 
states ratify multilateral human rights treaties due to a ‘coincidence of interest.’ Namely, 
the authors argue that human rights treaties “often requires many of the parties to do 
nothing different from what they have done in the past.”16 In the context of the ICC, this 
rationale has a particular relevance to democracies with robust judicial institutions, since 
the ICC cannot intervene if a national system has initiated genuine proceedings.17  
On the other hand, this is often untrue in African contexts. It is relatively 
uncontroversial to contend that extensive human rights abuses amounting to the threshold 
of the crimes contained in the Rome Statute still occur throughout the African continent 
and this was similarly true during the period of African Rome Statute ratification (1999-
2013). In this respect, ratification of the Rome Statute would in many cases contradict the 
coincidence of interest argument, especially with respect to African states experiencing 
ongoing conflict and/or widespread and systematic human rights abuses. From a rational 
choice perspective, it seems plausible and quite likely that many African delegates in 
attendance at the Rome Conference considered that the Court they were negotiating had 
potential domestic relevance, or else direct application. This is especially true in states 
run by dictators, despots, autocrats, or other oppressive or corrupt leadership models. To 
cede sovereignty by signing and ratifying the Statute would risk the possibility of 
bringing ICC prosecutions into the domestic fold. As Deitelhoff argues, “[p]lagued by 
military uprisings and failing state structures, these [developing] countries could 
realistically expect their heads of state to be summoned before the court, so they had to 
 
on all OAU member states to support the creation of the ICC. This resolution was later adopted by the 
OAU summit of heads of state and government in Burkina Faso in June 1998.” 
16 Ibid., 89. See also Oona A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 51.4 (2007): 588-621. The overall argument made by Hathaway is that treaty 
ratification can best be explained by considering the domestic constraints it places on states. The less the 
obligation on states, the more likely the probability of ratification. See Hathaway, “Why Do Countries 
Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” 588: “states with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to 
commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records because there is little prospect that 
the treaties will be enforced. Conversely, states with more democratic institutions will be less likely to 
commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records – precisely because treaties are 
likely to lead to changes in behavior.”  
17 The Rome Statute, Art. 17. 
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expect the highest costs.”18 This is relevant to African states with ostensibly weak 
domestic judicial systems, which trouble the complementarity principle since such states 
would most often be unwilling and/or unable to investigate and prosecute the most 
serious international crimes.          
Some potential benefits of committing to the Rome Statute are considered in the 
literature. For example, it may be the case that “Poorer states might have seen the Rome 
Statute as a key to unlock greater flows of official development assistance (ODA), even 
while intellectuals and governmental advisers in the Global South might have seen the 
ICC’s mandate as an extension of the West’s neocolonial projects.”19 This assumption 
has been empirically challenged in the context of human rights treaty ratification. 
Specifically, Nielsen and Simmons concluded that there is “practically no support for the 
idea that treaty ratification produces significant increases in aid.”20 Thus, relying on the 
human rights experience, it is unlikely that African states assumed Rome Statute 
ratification would result in increased aid, since similar actions have not yielded this result 
in the past. At the very least, there would be no guarantee that ratification of the Rome 
Statute would have a direct correlation to increases in development assistance or aid. This 
uncertainty would tip the scales in any rational cost-benefit analysis, since accession to 
the Rome Statute carries significant sovereignty costs.  
Nevertheless, some behaviour might indicate a form of ‘soft coercion’ on the part 
of the European Union (EU) to increase ratification of the Rome Statute in African States 
in exchange for development aid. Specifically, the EU highlighted the importance of 
ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement on 
development assistance. The agreement regulates cooperation between the EU and 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific states on political, commercial, cooperation and 
 
18 Nicole Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC 
Case,” International Organization 63.1 (2009): 42. 
19 Sandeep Prasanna, “Did some African states ratify the Rome Statute to marginalize political 
competitors?” ICC Forum available at iccforum.com/forum/permalink/91/1198; accessed 10 May 2020.   
20 Richard A. Nielsen and Beth A. Simmons, “Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the 
International Human Rights Regime?” International Studies Quarterly 59.2 (2015): 205. 
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development issues. The EU can impose sanctions or freeze aid to problem states, and 
human rights feature strongly in its framework for development and cooperation.21   
In this vein, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement includes the Rome Statute under 
the umbrella of ‘promoting the strengthening of peace and international justice.’ More 
specifically, Article 11 (on peacebuilding policies, conflict prevention and resolution, and 
response to situations of fragility) states: 
In promoting the strengthening of peace and international justice, the Parties 
reaffirm their determination to:       
-share experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for the 
ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court; and 
-fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due 
regard to the Rome Statute. 
The Parties shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and implementing the Rome 
Statute and related instruments.22 
The Cotonou Agreement also states in the Preamble that, “the establishment and effective 
functioning of the International Criminal Court constitute an important development for 
peace and international justice.”23 Thus, it appears that the European Union has framed 
the ICC as a key component to development, both domestically and internationally. 
Although it seems somewhat peculiar (and raises neocolonial sensitivities) to push 
African states to ratify the Statute, it does not seem to tie any development aid to 
ratification directly. Nevertheless, this use of soft power has the potential to shape and 
 
21 Sanctions have been imposed on Zimbabwe (2002), Central African Republic (2003), Guinea-Bissau 
(2004, 2011), Togo (2004), Burundi (2015), and Madagascar (2020) for widespread human rights 
violations or other political violence. It is interesting that three of these six are States Parties to the Rome 
Statute, and Burundi was a States Party until 2017, meaning it was in 2015 at the time the sanctions were 
authorized for election violence. The link between Rome Statute ratification and behaviour change in this 
frame remains unestablished.    
22 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of 
the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States of the Other Part, Ouagadougou, 22 
June 2010, available at eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/namibia/documents/eu_namibia/cotonou-




influence developing states that might feel pressure to conform to European ideals, 
particularly in the interest of securing development assistance.24  
However, there are 45 African contracting Parties to the Cotonou Agreement.25 
Of them, 12 have failed to ratify the Rome Statute, comprising 27 per cent of the group of 
African contracting Parties to the Cotonou Agreement.26 The high number of non-States 
Parties to the Rome Statute that are contracting members to the Cotonou Agreement 
weakens the argument that the European Union is using treaty ratification to spike 
development aid in African states. While it is important to acknowledge the possible 
influence that such an approach may have on weak states, including the contracting 
African states Parties to the Cotonou Agreement, the reality is such that ratification rates 
are high, but not as high as they should be if tangible development incentives are directly 
correlated. More importantly, many African states that are contracting Parties to the 
Cotonou Agreement worked tirelessly to establish the ICC.  It is disingenuous in many 
respects to reduce African commitment to the Rome Statute to aid incentives or other 
forms of coercion. Phakiso Mochochoko, head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation division of the ICC and delegate for Lesotho during the Rome Statute 
negotiations crystallized this point when he explained that  
contrary to the view that the ICC was shoved through the throats of 
unwilling Africans who were dragged screaming and shouting to Rome 
and who had no alternative but to follow their Western Masters under 
threat of withholding of economic aid if they did not follow, the historical 
 
24 For an example of such an argument, see Stephen R. Hurt, “Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou 
Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention,” Third 
World Quarterly 24.1 (2003): 161-176. Hurt argues at 161 that “the new EU-ACP agreement has 
significantly shifted the relationship further from one of co-operation to one of coercion. The new approach 
taken by the EU can be understood within the context of the hegemonic dominance of neoliberalism within 
political elites.”  
25 These States include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
26 More specifically, the following states have not ratified the Rome Statute: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Swaziland, Togo, and Zimbabwe. 
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developments leading up to the establishment of the Court portray an 
international will of which Africa was a part.27 
The significance of this point cannot be understated. The involvement, activism, and 
agency that African states had over the development and establishment of the ICC was 
and remains extraordinarily high. This is further compounded by the fact that a strategic 
partnership agreement was signed at the EU-Africa summit in 2007 saying that,  
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide should not go 
unpunished and their prosecution should be ensured by measures at both 
domestic and international levels. In this context, the partners agree that 
the establishment and effective functioning of the International Criminal 
Court constitute an important development for peace and international 
justice.28  
This suggests that the goals underpinning the Rome Statute and the ICC were mutually 
constructed on the part of ‘Africa’ and the EU.29 Thus, the utility of employing a 
reductionist calculus to explain African ratification of the Rome Statute in exchange for 
increased development aid is questionable at best and provides minimal (or else 
incomplete) explanatory value.  
Instead, a different explanation for high ratification rates relies on ‘credible 
commitments’ theory. More specifically, Simmons and Danner contend that  
the states that are both the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility 
of an ICC case affecting their citizens have committed most readily to the 
ICC, while potentially vulnerable states with credible alternative means to 
hold leaders accountable do not. Similarly, ratification of the ICC is 
associated with tentative steps towards violence reduction and peace in 
 
27 Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” 243. 
28 The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 12 August 2007, 8, para. 30, available 
at <africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en_0.pdf>.  
29 Jallow and Bensouda, “International criminal law in an African context,” 43.  
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those countries precisely least likely to be able to commit credibly to 
foreswear atrocities.30  
In the African context, the overall application of this argument is that states use the ICC 
as a springboard to peace, signalling commitments to justice–i.e. ratification is a nod to 
the international community, used to signal a states’ credible commitment to the aims and 
goals of the ICC: peace, stability, and justice in respect of accountability. This is 
particularly relevant in states that self-identify as having progressive human rights 
agendas (e.g. Botswana, Senegal, South Africa), or else having a particularly legitimate 
legal tradition (e.g. Ghana).   
On the other hand, this theory has been subject to criticism, most notably from 
Chapman and Chaudoin who argue that “countries for whom compliance is likely to be 
easiest–democracies with little internal violence–are the most likely countries to join the 
ICC. On the other hand, countries with the most to fear from ICC prosecution, 
nondemocracies with weak legal systems and a history of domestic political violence, 
tend to avoid ratification.”31 Prima facie, Chapman and Chaudoin’s approach does not 
explain the widespread ratification rates in African contexts, which the authors 
acknowledge as the ‘Sub-Saharan Africa Exception.’32 In opening up the ‘black box’ of 
the state to consider domestic political factors or motivations, the authors address the 
important point that the ICC’s involvement in Central African Republic (CAR), 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Uganda focused on the prosecution of 
rebels and not heads of state or other senior government officials. The same is also true in 
Mali and the second situation opened in CAR (otherwise referred to as CAR II). It is also 
important to note that all of these situations were brought to the ICC by self-referral. 
Quoting legal scholar Tom Ginsburg, the authors raise the point that some countries “are 
‘trying to make a strong commitment to prosecute, without necessarily committing to 
 
30 Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court,” 
International Organization 64.2 (2010): 225. 
31 Terrence L. Chapman and Stephen Chaudoin, “Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal 
Court,” International Studies Quarterly 57.2 (2013): 400. 
32 Ibid., 404. 
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being prosecuted.’”33 This point, which is of particular relevance in the African context, 
casts doubt about the merits of employing a generalizable credible commitments theory 
advanced by Simmons and Danner in all African States. Yet, while it might be true that 
leaders commit to the ICC for the purpose of self-preservation, it is also true that there is 
no absolute guarantee that once a state accedes to the Rome Statute that government 
leaders or other senior officials will not find themselves in the crosshairs of the Court, as 
was the case in Kenya, for example.34 Any rational state engaging in a cost-benefit 
analysis must account for this possibility and include it in its calculus.  
Thus, scholars have suggested that “some states engaged in a simpler rational 
choice analysis regarding ratification: whether ratification would marginalize domestic 
political competitors and benefit the sitting government. Internal politics, just as much as 
international power dynamics, provide an important framework for understanding 
whether and why a state ratified the Rome Statute.”35 The traditional view that states 
have fixed foreign policy interests no matter the leadership is questionable at best, 
particularly with respect to accountability for serious human rights violations such as the 
crimes covered by the Rome Statute (that is, genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, aggression). Domestic political considerations matter when attempting to make 
sense of African commitment to the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, employing such an 
approach largely fails to account for the analytical value of international criminal justice 
norms as independent conject variables, which may also inform state behaviour and 
shape state preferences. This is especially the case because ratifying the Rome Statute is 
always a gamble for any rational decision-maker–once the Rome Statute has been 
ratified, the ICC, and particularly the Prosecutor, has the ability to act autonomously and 
perhaps even unpredictably. Contributing to the significance of this point, a state may 
 
33 Ibid., 405. See also Kenneth A. Rodman and Petie Booth, “Manipulated Commitments: The International 
Criminal Court in Uganda,” Human Rights Quarterly 35.2 (2013): 271-303. 
34 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11. Kenyatta was the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance at the time of summons and won the Presidential election in 2013 during 
the course of his indictment by the ICC. The charges were eventually withdrawn due to insufficient 
evidence and widespread non-cooperation with the ICC investigation.  
35 Prasanna, “Did some African states ratify the Rome Statute to marginalize political competitors?” See 
also Simmons and Danner, “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court.” 
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withdraw from the Rome Statute after ratification, but this only comes into effect one 
year after the deposit of withdrawal to the United Nations Secretary-General. Further, the 
ICC retains jurisdiction over that state during the time in which it was a States Party. On 
this basis, ratification cannot only be explained as a politicized opt-in/opt-out process 
used to maximize domestic leadership interests because the long-term costs are simply far 
too uncertain and therefore, too high.  
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Burundi is the only African 
state that quit the Court when it acted incompatibly with domestic political interests. 
While South Africa and The Gambia filed notices of withdrawal, both ultimately reversed 
those decisions and remained States Parties to the Rome Statute.36 Some African States 
Parties such as Kenya, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia threatened to withdraw, but never 
formally did so.37 From a Pan-African perspective, the African Union (AU) adopted a 
 
36 The Gambia reversed its formal withdrawal almost immediately after the election of President Adama 
Barrow in 2017. The Gambia’s previous President, Yahya Jammeh, had a troubling human rights record. It 
is likely that Jammeh wanted to withdraw from the ICC to avoid accountability for crimes committed by 
him or else under his leadership, akin to Burundi. On the other hand, Jammeh was the leader of the Gambia 
for 22 years and it is unclear why he would ratify the Rome Statute in the first place. With respect to South 
Africa, see Robbie Gramer, “South African Court Tells Government It Can’t Withdraw From the ICC,” 
Foreign Policy, 22 February 2017, available at <foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/22/south-african-court-tells-
government-it-cant-withdraw-from-the-icc/>,; accessed 5 February 2021. The South African High Court 
ruled that the decision to withdraw from the Court was unconstitutional and therefore invalid because the 
Executive decision was not dually authorized by Parliament, maintaining South Africa’s status as States 
Party to the Rome Statute. This example demonstrates that in an operational democracy, unilateral decision 
making is likely impossible, troubling the ability of a leader to act solely in his or her own personal 
(political) interest. See also Anton du Plessis and Simon Allison, “ICC Withdrawal: a new low in Zuma’s 
rule,” Institute for Security Studies, 25 October 2016, available at <issafrica.org/iss-today/icc-withdrawal-a-
new-low-in-zumas-rule>,; accessed 5 February 2021: “There is little doubt among independent journalists 
and civil society activists in South Africa that the motivation for the proposed withdrawal is political rather 
than legal, and that it is inextricably linked to the president’s own domestic issues.” For an official 
justification for the Zuma government’s decision to withdraw from the ICC, see ‘SA formally withdrawing 
from ICC’, South African Government News, 21 October 2016, available at www.sanews.gov.za/south-
africa/sa-formally-withdrawing-icc; accessed 5 February 2021. The reasons cited included selectivity in 
ICC case selection; the Court’s hinderance of the peaceful resolution of conflicts; and competing 
obligations that the Rome Statute imposed with respect to immunities for sitting heads of state that would 
ordinarily be afforded under customary international law, which hinder South Africa’s ability to host peace 
talks with leaders indicted by the ICC.     
37 See Duncan E Omondi Gumba, “Will other African countries follow Burundi out of the ICC?” Institute 
for Security Studies, 16 November 2017, available at issafrica.org/iss-today/will-other-african-countries-
follow-burundi-out-of-the-icc,; accessed 5 February 2021. Note that African States Parties including 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania expressly 
opposed the idea of withdrawing from the ICC. 
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non-binding decision for a continent-wide mass withdrawal strategy from the ICC.38 
However, this never materialized and African States Parties have collectively remained 
committed to the Rome Statute, save for Burundi. Instead, many African States Parties 
have prioritized the need to amend the Rome Statute, or else engage in genuine processes 
to begin to mend the points of contention that have troubled the Africa-ICC 
relationship.39 As such, there must be ‘something else’ that contributes to the explanation 
of African states’ disproportionate commitment to the Rome Statute beyond material self-
interest.           
 
7.4 Constructivism and African Rome Statute ratification  
The ICC operates at the nexus of international relations (IR) and international law (IL). 
Scholars have attempted to bridge the gap between the two disciplines, in order to 
generate an enriched understanding and increase explanatory or predictive capabilities. 
International law inherently considers the evolutionary nature and significance of norms, 
since it is the product of shared ideas, values, and beliefs, translated by states into law. 
This reality makes the study of international law highly compatible with constructivist 
accounts of international relations. Norms are generally defined as a “standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”40 Early constructivists such as 
Wendt and Ruggie offered an alternative theoretical lens to study global politics and 
explained international relations as a social construct, placing a special analytical focus 
 
38African Union, Draft 2: Withdrawal Strategy Document (Version 12.01.2017), available at 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf, accessed 12 
May 2020), 7, para. (E)26.  
39 See Ed Cropley, “Reform the ICC from within, pleads Botswana’s Foreign Minister Venson-Moitoi,” 
Business Live, 26 October 2016, available at www.businesslive.co.za/news/africa/2016-10-26-reform-the-
icc-from-within-pleads-botswanas-foreign-minister-venson-moitoi/,; accessed 5 February 2021. Botswana 
was a regional leader in the advocacy for this position. During the peak of AU efforts to encourage mass 
withdrawal from the ICC in 2016, Botswana’s then Foreign Minister Pelomoni Venson-Moitoi encouraged 
AU-ICC member states to continue to support the Court from within saying, “I don’t see why we should be 
pulling out… The good thing is that a few more members now, within the AU, agree that pulling out is not 
the solution. We should be working towards fixing.” 
40 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 891. 
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on ideations and identity factors in analyzing global phenomena.41 By emphasizing the 
significance of norms and identity in international relations as factors that shape state 
behaviour, constructivism offers a useful lens through which to study the evolution of 
international law, and more particularly, international criminal law. The enmeshment of 
international criminal justice norms in the Rome Statute and through the work of the ICC 
constructs the ‘logic of appropriateness’–the expected behaviour of states operating the 
international system. Constructivist accounts “understand legal norms as social norms, 
and so as constituted and powered primarily by social practices.”42 This provides an 
analytical framework to consider the Rome Statute itself as a social construct and not 
epiphenomenal.  
It is also important to note that “Constructivism has made important contributions 
to understanding the operation of international law by showing how norms may constitute 
or even trump interests.”43 This is particularly useful for explaining African ratification 
of the Rome Statute. By requiring states to cede sovereignty, the Rome Statute directly 
opposes conventional understandings of material interests. The evolution of the 
international criminal justice norm has been remarkable and has direct explanatory value 
for understanding the behaviour of African states with respect to Rome Statute 
ratification and overall commitment. As Risse and Ropp observe, “we witness the gradual 
emergence of a new model of criminal accountability used by states acting collectively 
through the International Criminal Court (ICC) to hold individuals responsible for human 
rights violations.”44 Since African states continue to contribute immensely to this model, 
a constructivist account as to why is worthwhile. 
 
41 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International 
Organization 41.3 (1987): 335-370. See also John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47.1 (1993): 139-174. 
42 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, “Constructivism and International Law,” in Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, eds. Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 129. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp, “Introduction and overview,” in The Persistent Power of Human 
Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, eds. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3. 
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 General comments about what Finnemore and Sikkink call the ‘life cycle’ of the 
international criminal justice norm can be made in the African context.45 The idea of 
international criminal justice for atrocity crimes began with the Nuremberg Tribunal and 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East following the Second World War. 
However, in the African context, the regional experience with genocide in Rwanda 
illuminated the reality that serious widespread and systematic human rights crises were a 
problem on the continent.46 This experience prompted the pursuit of accountability, 
which was complemented by the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) by the United Nations Security Council in 1994. More generally, the use 
of ad hoc tribunals to address post-conflict violence was gaining salience in the 1990s 
(e.g. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the ICTR). The 
idea of an ICC reappeared at the United Nations in 1994, when the need for a permanent 
international criminal justice institution became apparent.  
The push for a permanent institution to assure accountability for atrocity crimes 
was undergirded by several ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ constituting a strong civil society 
network, operating under the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) 
umbrella headed by William Pace. Over ninety African nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) joined the CICC.47 Pace recruited Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to do for the ICC Statute what he had done for landmines.48 As a result, 
Canada mobilized a key negotiation coalition called the ‘Like-Minded Group’ during the 
1995 Ad Hoc Committee Meetings for the establishment of an ICC at the United Nations, 
 
45 This analysis relies on the ‘life cycle’ of norms as described by Kathryn Sikkink. See Kathryn Sikkink, 
The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2011).  
46 Sivu Maqungo, former South African diplomat, Department of Foreign Affairs, interview by author, 
Pretoria, South Africa, 22 February 2019. It is important to note that this is relevant not only in the regional 
context, but also more generally. For example, reference to the Rwandan genocide was made 66 times 
throughout the course of the Rome Diplomatic Conference.   
47 Mochochoko, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” 248. 
48 Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (Canada), interview by author, London, Ontario, 11 
March 2019. Pace was referring to Axworthy’s mobilization of like-minded states interested in banning 
anti-personnel landmines in 1996, which resulted in the fast-track negotiation that established the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction.  
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of which several African states became a part.49 Even without the support of the most 
powerful states, the merger of civil society and weak and middle power government 
coalitions created a strong push for the establishment of the Court, causing the 
international criminal justice norm to ‘cascade’ by the time of the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference in 1998.50 
From a regional perspective, the states from the South African Development 
Community (SADC) took a particularly keen interest in establishing an ICC. Justice 
Ministers and Attorneys General from SADC states began meeting as early as 1994 to 
discuss the issue and to take a uniform negotiation strategy.51 In 1997, SADC states 
established ten principles of consensus for negotiating an ICC, otherwise referred to as 
the ‘SADC Principles.’52 This meeting was jointly organized by the NGO South African 
Lawyers for Human Rights and the Justice Ministry of South Africa. Richard Dicker of 
Human Rights Watch also attended this meeting. According to Dicker, he was invited to 
the SADC meeting in Pretoria to ensure that the negotiating principles used the strongest 
human rights language possible.53 Dicker emphasized that African commitment to the 
establishment of the ICC was an organic regional effort and was not directly informed or 
influenced by Western NGOs or actors.54 Human Rights Watch played a supportive role 
 
49 Jennifer Schense, “The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations,” in The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol 1, eds. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. 
Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 113. For example, In December 1997, African members of 
the Like-Minded Group included Egypt, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, and South Africa. It is also interesting to 
note that Egyptian Cherif Bassiouni established an institute after the first Ad Hoc Committee session in 
Siracusa, Sicily to work on ICC issues in 1994. A second workshop took place at this institute after the first 
Preparatory Committee meeting in 1996. This demonstrates the involvement of Africans throughout the 
process of establishing the ICC, even at the earliest stages and the most formalized processes. For example, 
South Africa and Lesotho produced a joint working paper to the Preparatory Committee on International 
Cooperation and Judicial (Mutual) Assistance, 12-30 August 1996 (A/AC.249/L.5). The delegate from 
Lesotho that co-authored this paper, Phakiso Mochochoko is now the head of the Jurisdiction, 
Complementarity and Cooperation Division of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC. This reflects a 
longstanding commitment and dedication to the ICC project from its origination to present.   
50 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 895. 
51 Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo, “The African contribution towards the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court,” African Yearbook of International Law 8.1 (2000): 334. 
52 Ibid., 335. 
53 Richard Dicker, Director of Human Rights Watch International Justice Program, interview by author, 7 




for SADC States in formulating an ICC negotiation strategy. The initiative and leadership 
role taken by SADC states on the ICC issue provided a basis for norm diffusion 
throughout the rest of the continent. SADC States have been strong supporters of the ICC 
and 75 per cent of its members have ratified the Rome Statute to date.  
A similar regional conference took place in Dakar, Senegal in 1998 as a response 
to the SADC principles.55 The so-called ‘African Conference on the International 
Criminal Court’ was attended by twenty-five African states and resulted in the Dakar 
Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998.56 In the 
Dakar Declaration, “African States affirmed their commitment to the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court and underlined the importance that the accomplishment of 
such a court implies for Africa and the world community as a whole.”57 This regional 
conference was organized by the NGO No Peace Without Justice and was convened by 
the government of Senegal. According to Niccolò Figà-Talamanca of No Peace Without 
Justice, this conference solidified the Pan-African movement that brought African 
support to the idea of an ICC.58  
 At the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998, African states continued to engage 
meaningfully in the negotiations, taking on leadership roles and actively participating in 
the process, including the drafting committee that produced the final draft of the statute. 
The only African state that voted against the Statute in Rome was Libya. According to 
former South African diplomat Pieter Kruger, “African states had mostly voted yes. 
There may have been one or two abstentions, but Africa as a whole was supportive of the 
ICC at that stage–and it was without coercion.”59 On this basis, African commitment to 
the Rome Statute needs to be situated within its broad and deep-seated normative context. 
The instinct to view the ICC project as ‘Western’ or Eurocentric is simply inaccurate.    
 
55 Sivu Maqungo, interview by author, 22 February 2019. 
56 Maqungo, “The African contribution towards the establishment of an International Criminal Court,”. 
335. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Niccolò Figà-Talamanca, Secretary General of No Peace Without Justice, interview by author, 5 July 
2018, by phone. 
59 Pieter Kruger, former South African diplomat, Department of Foreign Affairs, interview by author, 12 
December 2018, by telephone [emphasis added]. 
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Against this backdrop, the internalization of the international criminal justice 
norm in the African context is apparent and important. According to Niccolò Figà-
Talamanca, the idea of an ICC gained African support because it was an anti-colonial 
movement.60 The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
vehemently opposed a strong, independent ICC and sought to establish a court that would 
pivot around the authority of the Security Council. At the same time, small or weak states 
like those in Africa saw the Rome Statute negotiations as an opportunity to achieve an 
important result for humanity, in “which they were the drivers and not the followers of 
the great powers’ priorities.”61 As such, the Rome Statute itself is an expression of a new 
institutional approach, since coalitions or blocs of small and/or weak states mitigated the 
interests of powerful states in the international political system to achieve an outcome 
that reflected their values and beliefs. Thus, the Rome Statute not only expresses norms 
about international criminal justice, it also signifies a commitment to a new global order, 
of which ‘Africa’ is an integral part. While regional and domestic power dynamics are 
important, so too are the manifold normative bases for ratifying the Rome Statute and 
remaining committed to it for the many African states that were active drivers of the ICC 
project from the earliest stages of its ideation and establishment.  
 
7.5 Anti-ICC Rhetoric, Two-level Games, and Sustained 
 Rome Statute Commitment  
Though African support for the ICC was extraordinarily high during the early stages of 
its development, the Africa-ICC relationship has been turbulent throughout the course of 
its existence. Explanations for the fallout of the Africa/AU-ICC relationship are perhaps 
the most salient in the literature.62 The point of this section is not to reproduce those 
 
60 Niccolò Figà-Talamanca, Secretary General of No Peace Without Justice, interview by author, 5 July 
2018, by phone. 
61 Ibid. 
62 For example, see Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus, and Eefje de Volder, eds., Africa and the ICC: 
Perceptions of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Charles Chernor Jalloh and Ilias 
Bantekas, eds., The International Criminal Court and Africa (Oxford University Press, New York, 2017); 
Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, and Moritz Vormbaum, eds., Africa and the International Criminal 
Court, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014); Phil Clark, Distant Justice: The Impact of the International 
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explanations, but rather to consider how domestic and international politics via two-level 
game theory might explain sustained African commitment to the Rome Statute, using 
Kenya as its analytical lens.63 
7.6 Background 
For the purpose of context, at the time of writing, the Security Council had referred two 
situations involving non-states parties to the ICC Prosecutor: Darfur, Sudan in 2005 and 
Libya in 2011. The ICC issued arrest warrants for the sitting heads of state in both 
situations, namely Omar al-Bashir in 2009 and 2010, and Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. 
This was perceived by the African Union and some African states as a derogation of the 
principle of state sovereignty and the Court was purported to be a politicized tool of 
powerful states used to directly influence African politics and governance.64 These 
sentiments were exacerbated when the Prosecutor opened a case in Kenya proprio motu 
and indicted Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2012 for post-election violence 
 
Criminal Court on African Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Kamari Maxine 
Clarke, Affective Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Pan-Africanist Pushback (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2019); Evelyn A. Ankumah, ed., The International Criminal Court and Africa: One 
Decade On (Intersentia, 2016). 
63 Traditionally, approaches to international relations that integrate domestic factors into a systemic theory 
are blanketed under liberalism. See Kenneth W. Abbott, “International Relations Theory, International 
Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,” American Journal of International Law 
93.2 (1999): 361-379. Generally, liberalism holds that state preferences are informed by domestic politics 
as opposed to material factors (i.e. state power). However, the two-level games approach is particularly 
useful for this analysis. See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic 
Theories of International Bargaining,’ in Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and 
Domestic Politics, eds. Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 15-17: Two-level game theory is useful because it places the political leader as the 
central strategic actor, and “begins by assuming that statesmen are typically trying to do two things at once; 
that is, they seek to manipulate domestic and international politics simultaneously.” Two-level games seek 
to explain the strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas that exist when leaders balance domestic and 
international demands. Similarly, two-level games allow for the consideration of Waltz’s ‘first-image’ 
explanations, i.e. that leaders are seeking to realize personal goals which are contingent on individual 
psychology and political skill. Leaders seek to ‘simultaneously exploit both levels’ – that is, domestic and 
international. Two-level game theory effectively combines liberalism with rational-choice models of 
analysis. See also Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of ‘Two-Level Games,’” 
International Organization 42.3 (1988): 427-460. 
64 See for example Dire Tladi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The battle for the 
soul of international law,” South African Yearbook of International Law 34.1 (2019): 58. Tladi says, “yet 
the vision [of international law predicated on respect for human rights and concern for the plight of 
humanity] continues to be questioned as imperialistic, colonialist, and even racist. Thus it may be argued 
that… the ICC is seen as a Western imperial master exercising imperial power over African subjects.”  
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perpetrated in 2007.65 Within the AU and some African states, the ICC’s pursuit of 
African heads of state mobilized feelings of distrust towards the Court and fostered a 
sense of fear that the ICC could be a very real threat to African leaders.66 The postulation 
that the Court was pursuing accountability as an objective and universal imperative was 
called into question and rhetoric of neocolonial politicization was instrumentalized in AU 
and (sometimes) domestic politics, largely from the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.67 It is significant that four out of these six 
states are non-states parties to the Rome Statute and the two States Parties to the Rome 
Statute had both been subjects of ICC intervention (i.e. proprio motu in Kenya; self-
referral in Uganda). 
The use of anti-ICC rhetoric from leaders of non-states parties is logical, since it 
justifies defection from the accountability and international criminal justice norms 
typified by the ICC. It is instructive to highlight that the non-states parties that engaged in 
anti-ICC rhetoric never supported the idea of an international criminal court, particularly 
at its liberal cosmopolitan maxim. This is tangentially evidenced by statements of 
delegations at the Rome Diplomatic Conference and more consequentially confirmed by 
subsequent unwillingness to be bound by the Rome Statute System.68 As such, anti-ICC 
rhetoric from this group of states is expected, since its normative and ideological 
 
65 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11. 
66 Jean-Baptise Jeangène Vilmer, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court,” International 
Affairs 92.6 (2016): 1321. Vilmer explained that “when Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir was indicted for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in 2009 and for genocide in 2010, the protests started to spread. 
Fuelled by other leaders’ fear and Bashir’s desire to embody ‘a liberation movement against this new 
colonization,’ a post-colonial, pan-African anti-ICC rhetoric emerged” [emphasis added]. 
67 See Mark Kersten, “South Africa and Burundi Withdrawals Expose Faults and Fault-Lines in ICC 
Opposition,” Justice in Conflict, 11 November 2016, available at justiceinconflict.org/2016/11/11/south-
africa-and-burundi-withdrawals-expose-faults-and-fault-lines-in-icc-opposition/; accessed 6 February 2021. 
See also “Countering the anti-ICC agenda in Africa,” Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 3 
September 2015, available at coalitionfortheicc.org/fr/node/178; accessed 10 February 2021. Note that this 
work identifies other African states that also engaged in the use of anti-ICC rhetoric, including Burundi, 
Libya, and The Gambia. See Vilmer, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court,” 1321: 
Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi said that the ICC was an “attempt [by the West] to recolonize 
their former colonies… a practice of First World terrorism.”  
68 See Table 1. See also, for example, Summary records of the plenary meetings, 9th plenary meeting, 17 
July 1998, (A/CONF.183/SR.9), 126, paras. 74-78: the delegate from Sudan, speaking on behalf of the 
Group of Arab States said, “While the Arab States would not stand in the way of the adoption of the Statute 
of the Court, he felt bound to place on record that they were not convinced by what had been agreed upon.”  
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foundation was/is fundamentally incompatible with domestic interests, even from its 
earliest stages of development.  
 
7.7 Kenya: Anti-ICC Rhetoric and Domestic Political Strategy 
However, the President of Kenya similarly made use of anti-ICC rhetoric to further 
domestic political interests. More specifically, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta 
described the ICC as a “tool of global power politics and not the justice it was built to 
dispense.”69 It is important to note that all African leaders who chose to speak out against 
the ICC framed their opposition in anticolonial rhetoric and stereotypical tropes in an 
attempt to diminish the Court’s institutional credibility, legitimacy, and overall normative 
value under the auspice of Pan-African solidarity.  
Kenyatta won the 2013 Kenyan Presidential election running on anti-ICC 
campaign, which united formerly divided ethnic groups against a common enemy: the 
interventionist, neocolonial, ‘Western’ ICC.70 It is important to note that Kenyatta’s 
running mate was William Ruto and both were accused of bearing responsibility for the 
2007 post-election violence at the ICC. Together they formed the Jubilee Alliance, which 
united former rival ethnic groups the Kikuyu and Kalenjin in an unlikely strategic 
 
69 Franck Kuwonu, “ICC: Beyond the threats of withdrawal: African countries in dilemma over whether to 
leave or support the International Criminal Court,” Africa Renewal, May-July 2017, available at 
www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-july-2017/icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal; accessed 9 May 2020. 
This article also highlights the warnings of Rwandan President Paul Kagame who said that “the court was 
never about ‘justice but politics disguised as international justice.’”  
70 Laurence R. Helfer and Anne E. Showalter, “Opposing International Justice: Kenya’s Integrated 
Backlash Strategy against the ICC,” International Criminal Law Review 17.1 (2017): 8. Simultaneous two-
level game play is made clear by the observation that “promises to cooperate with the ICC were a pillar of 
the defendants’ [Kenyatta and his Deputy President, Ruto’s] campaign… The dual strategy–pledging 
cooperation while raising objections to the prosecution based on Kenya’s sovereignty–allowed the 
defendants to avoid the appearance of shirking accountability while increasing public support for their anti-
colonial narrative against the ICC.” See also Gabrielle Lynch, Performances of Injustice: The Politics of 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 57. Lynch 
explained that Kenyatta and his Deputy President used the involvement of the ICC to win the election in 
2013, “following a campaign that had placed ‘their struggle’ against the ICC centre stage; and the process 
had revealed how the rich and powerful could undermine the ICC and strengthened opposition to the Court 
around the world.” See also Kamari M. Clarke, “International Justice and Politics of Sentimentality,” in 
Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice, eds. Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 81: “After discussing the ‘brutality’ that their 
‘independence heroes’ endured, Kenyatta linked his judicial indictment by the ICC to his father’s 
indictment by the British colonial administration in Kenya, thereby connecting the brutality of the colonial 
past to contemporary international law.”  
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partnership. Since Kenyatta and Ruto were both suspects at the ICC at the time that they 
were elected President and Deputy President, institutional delegitimization was important 
to maintain and gather domestic political support. Using the ICC to achieve domestic 
political ends worked. When William and Ruto were elected in 2013, it was explained 
that “[t]he ICC was definitely a factor in this election… It got people out. People were 
saying, ‘They’re our boys, they’re our sons, we need to protect them.’”71 This suggests 
that Kenyatta was able to strategically mobilize domestic support in direct opposition to 
the ICC.  
While initially cooperative with the Court, after Kenyatta won the election, he 
wielded his Presidential power to stifle the ICC’s investigation process.72 This forced the 
Prosecutor to drop the charges against him due to a lack of evidence. Since Kenyatta ran 
on an anti-ICC campaign, it was logical to calculate that the costs of noncompliance with 
the Court would be inconsequential among domestic constituents. Strangely, however, 
Kenya has remained a States Party to the Rome Statute after Kenyatta’s election, even 
though the government actively sabotaged the Court’s effective operationalization in the 
country. It is also significant that the government of Kenya has actively attempted to 
reform the Rome Statute from within the Court’s institutional channels.73 This suggests a 
 
71 See Thomas P. Wolf, “The Electoral Consequences of Kenya’s ICC Cases,” in Africa and the ICC: 
Perceptions of Justice, eds. Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 249. 
72 See Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the withdrawal 
of charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5 December 2014, available at www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2; accessed 12 February 2021. The Prosecutor 
raised issues of witness tampering, noncooperation on the part of the Kenyan government, and an overall 
lack of evidence as reasons for withdrawing the charges against Kenyatta. It is worth noting that in 2016, 
the ICC Judges referred Kenya to the Assembly of States Parties (the Court’s oversight and legislative 
body), for its non-cooperation with the Prosecutor’s investigation and allegations of witness tampering. 
Some observers have argued that Kenya strategically used the threat of withdrawal as a way to temper the 
outcome of the procedures. See Thomas Obel Hansen, “Will Kenya Withdraw from the ICC?” Justiceinfo, 
12 December 2016, available at www.justiceinfo.net/en/31056-kenya.html; accessed 10 February 2021. 
73 See Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties, Informal compilation of proposals to amend the Rome 
Statute, 23 January 2015, 9, para. VI., available at asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Publications/WGA-Inf-
Comp-RS-amendments-ENG.pdf; accessed 12 February 2021. Kenya has proposed to amend various 
articles of the Rome Statute: Art. 63 to allow a trial in absentia by video or representation of Counsel; Art. 
27 to provide immunity for sitting heads of state or government; Art. 70 to include offences against the 
administration of justice committed by court officials (i.e. the Prosecutor); Art. 112 to establish an 
independent oversight mechanism to evaluate the performance of the Prosecutor; and the proposal to 
include regional mechanisms under the Court’s vision of complementarity; and Art. 68 regarding the 
inadmissibility of pre-recorded evidence.  
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sustained commitment to the Statute, whether for Kenyatta’s own strategic interest or 
otherwise. 
The behaviour of the government of Kenya demonstrates that the undercurrent of 
support for the international criminal justice norm is usually stronger than domestic 
political maneuvering, but not for depoliticized reasons. Kenyatta played a two-level 
game in order to distract constituents from domestic political problems by blaming an 
international institution, i.e. the ICC, while remaining a member. Aside from using the 
Court to unite domestic constituents against a common enemy during his campaign, once 
he was elected President, Kenyatta blamed the Court for his leadership struggles. For 
example, he said, “we’ve had to contend with the ICC pursuing weak, politicized cases. 
This has become a huge distraction from our duty to serve our people and this continent 
fully. That is not what Kenya signed up for when we joined the ICC.”74 Berating the 
Court provided Kenyatta with a strategic opportunity to achieve his political goals by 
fostering an anti-ICC stance among his domestic constituents from the earliest stages of 
his Presidency.  
 
7.7.1 Strategic Opportunities and Constraints at the International Level 
Kenyatta calculated that the ICC could be exploited to bolster domestic political support 
without damaging relations with the African Union and several other African states. 
Important in this calculus was the fact that the AU had already taken an ‘anti-ICC’ 
position on immunities for sitting heads of state, stemming from the indictment of al-
Bashir,75 and was actively trying to fast-track the establishment of its regional court to 
prosecute international and transnational crimes, including those covered by the Rome 
Statute.76 This position correlatively informed the foreign policy positions of some AU 
 
74 Ed Cropley, “ICC’s toughest trial: Africa vs. ‘Infamous Caucasian Court,” Reuters, 28 October 2016, 
available at www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc/iccs-toughest-trial-africa-vs-infamous-caucasian-court-
idUSKCN12S1U3; accessed 10 February 2021. Note that this statement was in reference to global security 
concerns, essentially blaming the ICC for Kenya’s inability to fight armed groups, including those who 
attacked Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in 2013.  
75 See African Union Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African States to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), AU Doc.Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII), 3 July 2009, para. 10. 
76 See African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, 27 June 2014 (hereafter ‘Malabo Protocol’). For a more in-depth discussion of 
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member states with respect to the ICC, shown in Table 7-3.77 States are placed into 
particular categories based on commitment to the Rome Statute and relative levels of 
cooperation with the ICC. It is necessary to note that these positions can be fluid, 
depending on the ideological approach of particular statesmen and their governments–e.g. 
The Gambia reversing its withdrawal immediately following the election of President 
Adama Barrow. Nevertheless, pre-existing regional opposition to the ICC created a 
strategic opportunity for Kenyatta to manipulate the Court to his benefit and rally AU 
support for his opposition position. 
 
Table 7-3: African Foreign Policy Positions on the ICC 
Country Liberal Protectionist Swing 
Algeria  X  
Angola  X  
Benin X   
Botswana X   
Burkina Faso X   
Burundi  X  
Cabo/Cape Verde X   
Cameroon  X  
Central African 
Republic 
X   
Chad   X 
Comoros X   
Congo X   
Côte d’Ivoire X   
Djibouti   X 
DRC   X 
Egypt  X  
Equatorial Guinea  X  
Eritrea  X  
 
the Malabo Protocol, see Jutta F. Bertram-Nothnagel, “A Seed for World Peace Growing in Africa: The 
Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression and the Monsoon of Malabo,” in The International 
Criminal Court and Africa: One Decade On, ed. Evelyn A. Ankumah (Intersentia, 2016), 347-400. See also 
Charles C. Jalloh, Kamari M. Clarke and Vincent O. Nmehielle, eds., The African Court of Justice and 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in Context: Development and Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2019). 
77 Table 3 relies on the positions of delegations at African Union meetings on the issue of the ICC. It also 
considers state cooperation with the Court–i.e. the arrest and surrender of indicted suspects while on the 




Ethiopia  X  
Gabon X   
Gambia   X 
Ghana X   
Guinea X   
Guinea-Bissau  X  
Kenya   X 
Lesotho X   
Liberia X   
Libya  X  
Madagascar  X   
Malawi   X 
Mali X   
Mauritania  X  
Mauritius X   
Morocco  X  
Mozambique   X 
Namibia   X 
Niger X   
Nigeria X   
Rwanda  X  
Sahrawi Republic   X  
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
 X  
Senegal X   
Seychelles X   
Sierra Leone X   
Somalia  X  
South Africa   X 
South Sudan  X  
Sudan  X  
Swaziland  X  
Tanzania X   
Togo  X  
Tunisia X   
Uganda   X 
Zambia   X 
Zimbabwe  X  
 
Indeed, the African Union supported Kenyatta, most expressly by changing its 
previous legal stance on immunities for sitting heads of state to include even those in 
199 
 
States Parties to the Rome Statute.78 However, the majority of African states have 
continued to approach the Court from a liberal foreign policy position (43 per cent). This 
can be compared to the 37 per cent of African states that approach the ICC from a 
protectionist position and 20 per cent that swing. This regional dynamic may help to 
explain why Kenya remains committed to the Rome Statute, since most African states 
continued to take a liberal foreign policy position with respect to the Court, regardless of 
the protectionist stance advanced by the AU. This is supported by the fact that at the time 
of writing, African states boasted the highest number of regional ratifications of the 
Rome Statute, but no state had ratified the Malabo Protocol to regionalize international 
criminal justice at the AU Court of Justice and Human Rights.79 Nevertheless, the 
substantial amount of protectionist and swing states signalled to Kenyatta that the use of 
anti-ICC rhetoric and efforts to withdraw from the Statute would not be a significant 
problem for Kenya’s relations on the continent.80 Even so, it was important for Kenyatta 
to situate the potential consequences of withdrawal in its broader context–i.e. how it 
might affect relations with those from Western Europe and Other States that vehemently 
support the ICC and the international criminal justice norm that undergirds it. 
 
78 Dire Tladi, “Of Heroes and Villains, Angels and Demons: The ICC-AU Tension Revisited,” German 
Yearbook of International Law 60 (2017): 59. Tladi explained that “the position of the AU… which 
emerges in light of the Kenyatta prosecutions, seems to be that heads of State cannot be prosecuted at all, 
even by international courts.” 
79 At the time of writing, fifteen African states had signed the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol), including: Benin, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, Mauritania, Togo, 
and Uganda. No states had ratified the Malabo Protocol at the time of writing. The Malabo Protocol 
requires ratification by fifteen states to enter into force. 
80 This is further supported by that fact that Kenya belongs to the East African Community (EAC) with 
other member states Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The fact that Tanzania is the 
only member state of the EAC that takes a liberal foreign policy position towards the ICC is a further 
indicator that regional costs would be inconsequential for Kenyatta taking an anti-ICC position. On the 
other hand, it is worth noting that in 2013 the European Union was Kenya’s greatest export partner, 
accounting for 20.6 per cent of Kenya’s total exports. See Trade between the EU and Kenya, Information 
on the EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, April 2015, available at 
eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/kenya/documents/press_corner/trade_between_the_eu_and_kenya_210
5.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021. This relationship might have tacitly influenced Kenya’s decision to 
remain a States Party to the Rome Statute. See also Obel Hansen, “Will Kenya Withdraw from the ICC?” 
Thomas Obel Hansen explained the role of European diplomacy and soft power on Kenya’s decision to 
remain a States Party: “Undoubtedly, European diplomats are now urging Kenya to stay with the ICC. 
Even if it is unlikely that ‘hard sanctions’ will be associated with a withdrawal, it would surely frustrate 
some European capitals if Kenya proceeds to withdraw.” 
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In this vein, since the charges against Kenyatta were dropped, he had no substantive 
reason to push for Kenya’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute. He had already ‘beaten’ 
the ICC and is at no risk of being prosecuted by the Court again, unless he commits other 
atrocity crimes or more evidence against him with respect to the 2007 post-election 
violence becomes available.81 Therefore, there was/is no reason for Kenya to incur the 
potential reputational or material costs associated with pulling out of the Rome Statute. 
Kenyatta strategically calculated the potential reputational costs of leaving the Court, 
evidenced by the fact that the Kenyan Parliament passed two resolutions to withdraw 
from the ICC: one in 2010 and one in 2013 but neither resolution materialized. In 2016, 
government spokesman Manoah Esipisu explained that the Cabinet was still deciding 
whether or not to proceed with withdrawal, depending on the reputational costs that 
South Africa incurred for doing so.82 Indeed, South Africa’s post-apartheid reputation as 
a leader in human rights was severely damaged when it attempt to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute, which provided the Kenyan government with important information to 
assess the costs and benefits of remaining a States Party.83 Therefore, international 
 
81 Scholars have argued that the ICC had a deterrent effect in Kenya, since the 2013 election was 
comparatively peaceful. The explanation for this is twofold: (1) Kenyatta had a rational self-interest to 
make sure the 2013 election was peaceful to avoid future intervention by the ICC and (2) ethnic tensions 
had been eased as a result of the Jubilee Alliance. See Claudio Corradetti, “The Priority of Conflict 
Deterrence and the Role of the International Criminal Court in Kenya’s Post-Electoral Violence in 2007-8 
and 2013,” Human Rights Review 16.3 (2015): 257-272. 
82 ‘ICC debate: Africa vs ‘infamous Caucasian court’?’ IPP Media, 2 November 2016, available at 
www.ippmedia.com/en/news/icc-debate-africa-vs-infamous-caucasian-court; accessed 10 February 2021. 
See also Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘What’s at stake as Kenya weighs withdrawal from the ICC’, The 
Conversation, 9 November 2016, available at theconversation.com/whats-at-stake-as-kenya-weighs-
withdrawal-from-the-icc-68353; accessed 12 February 2021: “Shortly before making the announcement 
that it was withdrawing, South African President Jacob Zuma met Kenyan leaders in Nairobi, suggesting 
some form of coordination may have taken place.” See also anonymous employee of South Africa 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), interview by author, Pretoria, 20 
February 2019: it was confirmed that Kenya indeed waited to see what happened to South Africa after its 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute to decide if it would follow suit. The reputational costs for South Africa 
were severe both domestically and internationally, which informed Kenya’s decision to remain a States 
Party to some degree.  
83 See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “State Withdrawals from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
South Africa, Burundi, and The Gambia,” in The International Criminal Court and Africa, eds. Charles 
Chernor Jalloh and Ilias Bantekas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 238-239: “withdrawal from the 
ICC is costly for poorer developing states in terms of its impact on a state’s (perceived or real) commitment 
to international criminal justice and may lead to retaliatory measures (such as cutbacks in EU or US 
international assistance/development aid).” See also “South Africa: Decision to leave International 
Criminal Court a ‘deep betrayal of millions of victims worldwide’” Amnesty International, 21 October 
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normative pressures acted as a constraint on Kenyatta that influenced his decision to 
remain committed to the Rome Statute. 
From a regional perspective, while many African states have openly criticized the 
Court, all of the African States Parties that initially ratified the Rome Statute have 
remained committed to it, except for Burundi. Kenya would be considered an outlier if it 
abandoned the Statute, which was/is counterintuitive for the achievement of domestic, 
regional, and/or international political goals. The effective strategizing by Kenyatta 
allowed him to exploit the ICC for his own ends at both domestic and international levels 
of political engagement, which required tactful manipulation of the opportunities and 
constraints presented at both levels.  
It is argued that domestic political dynamics matter and continue to inform 
commitment to the Rome Statute in Kenya. Unlike the African states that never ratified 
the Rome Statute, Kenya expressed a strong commitment to the normative foundation of 
the ICC at its earliest stages.84 It is apparent that support for the norms that undergird the 
international criminal justice project informed state support throughout the negotiation of 
the Rome Statute, and continue to shape the willingness of Kenya to remain subject to it. 
This is supported by the statement of the Kenyan Ambassador at the 16th Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute in 2017 when he said, 
In our belief in the noble objectives of the Statute and its potential 
capacity to end impunity, Kenya played a key role in championing for the 
establishment of the Court and firmly remains a steadfast ally in the fight 
against impunity. As a firm adherent to the rule of law, Kenya actively 
 
2016, available at www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/south-africa-decision-to-leave-international-
criminal-court-a-deep-betrayal-of-millions-of-victims-worldwide/; accessed 12 February 2021.  
84 See, for example, Rome Diplomatic Conference, Summary records of the plenary meetings, 3rd plenary 
meeting, 16 June 1998, (A/CONF.183/SR.3), 77, paras. 63-68. The Kenyan delegate “reaffirmed Kenya’s 
commitment to the establishment of an effective, impartial, credible and independent international criminal 
court… There must therefore be a strong political will on the part of the States parties that would sign and 
ratify the Statute… His delegation would support all efforts to that end.” See also Wolf, “The Electoral 
Consequences of Kenya’s ICC Cases,” 253. Wolf notes that the fact that the “morally impaired political 
elite… had (almost unanimously) supported Kenya’s ICC membership without imagining that any Kenyan 
would ever ‘visit’ The Hague.” This problematizes the notion that entering the Rome Statute System was a 
rational choice by the Kenyan government and suggests that other factors influenced Kenya’s decision to 
join the ICC in the first place.   
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supports the international criminal justice system. Even as we 
constructively criticize the Court, it remains our aspiration that the highest 
standards of justice, human rights and the rule of law, are achieved as 
envisioned by the Rome Statute.85 
In this respect, anti-ICC rhetoric in Kenya can be framed as a form of pushback politics, 
i.e. using jargon and logic to contest the rules and authority of the Court within the 
existing structure.86 Kenyatta was displeased with how the ICC was operating, but was 
not compelled to abandon the Rome Statute System for a myriad of strategic reasons. 
What is perhaps most surprising is that even with extreme anti-ICC rhetoric, Kenyatta 
did not reduce the costs of non-compliance to the point where withdrawal was a logical 
or strategic choice to appeal to domestic constituents or other states in Africa or 
elsewhere.87 In this respect, the normative strength of the accountability and international 
criminal justice norm in domestic and international contexts is a constraint on Kenyatta 
that helps to explain sustained commitment to the Rome Statute. The ICC’s involvement 
in Kenya demonstrates the complexity of competing interests. Ultimately, however, anti-
ICC rhetoric and threats of withdrawal were used to achieve strategic political ends at the 
domestic and international levels but had no substantive impact on Kenya’s overall 
commitment to the Rome Statute for rational and normative reasons. 
 
85 Statement by H.E. Amb. Koki Muli Grignon, Charge d’Affaires, A.I., of the Republic of Kenya to the 
United Nations, General Debate of the Assembly of States Parties during the 16th Session of the Assembly 
of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 7 December 2017, available at asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-KEN.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021 [emphasis added]. 
86 Mikael Rask Madsen, “Two-level politics and the backlash against international courts: Evidence from 
the politicisation of the European court of human rights,” British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 22.4 (2020): 728-738. 
87 See Rorisang Lekalake and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, “Support for the International Criminal Court in 
Africa: Evidence from Kenya,” Policy Paper No. 23 Afrobarometer (August 2015), available at 
afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno23_kenya_anti_co
rruption.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021. This large N-studies quantitative study concluded that “a majority 
of Kenyans believe that the ICC is an important tool in the fight against impunity, see it as an impartial 
institution, and reject the notion of withdrawal from the court.” It is also important to acknowledge the 
nuance within this conclusion that “Further analysis reveals that opinions are sharply divided along ethnic 
lines, reflecting the deep discord between the country’s notoriously factious ethnic groups.” See Geoff 
Dancy, Yvonne Marie Dutton, Tessa Alleblas, and Eamon Aloyo, “What Determines Perceptions of Bias 
towards the International Criminal Court? Evidence from Kenya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64.7-8 
(2020): 1443-1469. Note also the role of civil society as a driver of the international criminal justice norm, 




7.8 The Curious Case of Côte d’Ivoire 
The paradox surrounding African ratification of the Rome Statute is typified by the fact 
that Côte d’Ivoire consented to the Court’s involvement and ratified the Statute only after 
the ICC initiated an investigation into alleged crimes committed by its nationals.88 In 
order to explain this behaviour, the expected benefits of Rome Statute ratification to Côte 
d’Ivoire must be understood.  This is an especially peculiar case, since the ICC targeted 
former Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo; his wife, Simone Gbagbo; and the leader of 
the pro-Gbagbo militia, Charles Blé Goudé as bearing the most responsibility for crimes 
against humanity perpetrated in the context of post-election violence in 2010-2011.89 In 
2003, former President Gbagbo authorized the Prosecutor to open an investigation 
proprio motu in response to widespread and violent internal conflict in Côte d’Ivoire–a 
non-states party at that time. As such, the government leader that initially consented to 
the Court’s jurisdiction as a non-States Party in 2003 was subsequently targeted by the 
Prosecutor for investigation and prosecution.90 The incoming President, Alassane 
Ouattara surrendered Laurent Gbagbo and Blé Goudé to the ICC and transferred them to 
 
88 It is important to note that Côte d’Ivoire formally consented to the Prosecutor’s investigation in 2003, 
which was initiated proprio motu. It reaffirmed its consent to the Court’s jurisdiction formally in 2010 and 
2011. The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC authorized the Prosecutor’s investigation on 3 October 2011 with 
respect to post-election violence. Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute much later in 2013. Côte d’Ivoire 
also implemented domestic legislation to amend its penal code to integrate the Rome Statute in March 
2015. See LOI nº 2015-133 du 9 mars 2015 modifiant et complétant la loi nº 60-366 du 14 novembre 1960 
portant institution d’un Code de Procédure pénale, Art. 139, available at 
www.gouv.ci/doc/accords/1512502230CODE-PENAL-2015-134.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021. It is 
worth noting that the case against the former President of Côte d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo and his aide 
Charles Blé Goudé resulted in an acquittal for alleged crimes against humanity in January 2019. For 
context, Gbagbo was transferred to the Hague after he was captured by opposition forces, backed by the 
French military and United Nations peacekeeping forces in November 2011. Laurent Gbagbo’s wife 
Simone Gbagbo remains at large, with a warrant out for her arrest. Côte d’Ivoire has challenged the Court’s 
jurisdiction, arguing that domestic Ivorian courts have prosecuted her for similar crimes, including 
genocide and other crimes. President Ouattara granted her amnesty in 2018. The Court urges the surrender 
of Simone Gbagbo to The Hague. See Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11. 
89 Human Rights Watch, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Events of 2018,’ available at www.hrw.org/world-
report/2019/country-chapters/cote-divoire; accessed 10 May 2020. Note that it is estimated that at least 
3,000 people were killed, and more than 150 women were raped in the 2010-11 post-election crisis. 
Gbagbo lost the election and refused to leave office, sparking widespread and systematic violence and 
human rights abuse. 
90 Gbagbo initially consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC in 2003 as a response to widespread internal 
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.  
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the Hague in November 2011. Simone Gbagbo was never transferred to the ICC and 
remains at large. Notwithstanding this overall sentiment of cooperation, Ouattara did not 
ultimately ratify the Rome Statute until two years later in 2013.  
In order to explain this behaviour, it is important to acknowledge that the 2010-
2011 post-election violence emanated from both sides: from Gbagbo and Ouattara, and 
from their respective supporters. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been particularly 
vocal on this point. In the 2013 World Report, HRW argued that, “Eighteen months after 
the end of the 2010-2011 post-election crisis, justice for the grave crimes committed 
remained disturbingly one-sided. Ivorian authorities and the International Criminal Court 
have yet to arrest and prosecute any member of President Alassane Ouattara’s camp for 
post-election crimes, reinforcing dangerous communal divisions.”91 This point frames 
two important political realities. First, Ouattara and his supporters were exposed as a 
potential target of the ICC. Second, the decision to cooperate with the Court was likely 
informed by two interdependent goals: (1) an attempt to mitigate his own personal 
exposure by becoming a ‘friend of the Court’ and bolstering the perceived legitimacy of 
the new political regime and (2) the effective removal of Gbagbo from the Ivorian 
political landscape. However, the cost of ratifying the Statute without sufficient 
guarantees that he and his supporters would not be directly targeted by the Court would 
be sufficient to stall ratification.92 The use of rational choice in this context makes their 
actions particularly telling, since Ouattara’s behaviour can be readily explained utilizing a 
political calculus shaped by individual power and interests. As William Schabas cautions, 
“when a State is actively engaged in initiation of the process, there is a potential for 
manipulation. In effect, the State quite predictably uses the international institution to 
 
91 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire, Events of 2012,” available at 
www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-divoire#; accessed 10 May 2020.  
92 The point that Ouattara was using the ICC as a political tool to remove Gbagbo from the Ivorian political 
landscape is further supported by the fact that he sent a letter to the ICC after taking office to reaffirm Côte 
d’Ivoire’s consent to the Court’s jurisdiction originally granted by Gbagbo. See Office of the Prosecutor, 
Letter Reconfirming the Acceptance of the ICC Jurisdiction (14 December 2011). Ouattara reaffirmed Côte 
d’Ivoire’s willingness “to fully cooperate and without delay with the ICC, especially regarding all the 
crimes and abuses perpetrated since 2004.” Given that Gbagbo was the President of Côte d’Ivoire from 26 
October 2000 to 11 April 2011, the time period emphasized by Ouattara would directly implicate Gbagbo 
and his supporters.  
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pursue its enemies.”93 Through this lens, the ICC is just as exposed to political 
instrumentalization as a result of self-referrals by States Parties as it is by referrals from 
the UNSC.94 Yet, the AU and many African States Parties have been seemingly 
accepting of politicizing the ICC when it emanates from the power of African leaders, but 
less so when it stems from the power of the Security Council.   
Notwithstanding this, it is still unclear why Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome 
Statute in 2013. This decision was a risk, since the Prosecutor could open new 
investigations on all sides of the conflict with little jurisdictional difficulty. It is 
impossible to know whether or not a deal was made by the OTP and Ouattara, or whether 
future Prosecutors would be obligated to uphold such a deal. However, the 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Africa Legal Aid explained that “ratification of the 
Rome Statute was delayed because it was determined to be unconstitutional by Côte 
d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Court. Civil society organisations, both national and 
international, set up conferences, advocated and conducted trainings and with the help of 
some supportive members of Parliament, they made sure the Constitution was properly 
amended so that ratification became possible.”95  Thus, the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in Ivory 
Coast directly facilitated ratification in this case. If the aim is to appear legitimate, there 
are few good reasons to oppose commitment to the Rome Statute, particularly in a post-
conflict society.  
 
93 William A. Schabas, “Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts,” 20th 
Anniversary Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law (Vancouver, 23 June 
2007), available at www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2010_02017.PDF; accessed 10 May 2020, 12. 
94 Catherine Gegout, “The International Criminal Court: limits, potential and conditions for the promotion 
of justice and peace,” Third World Quarterly 34.5 (2013): 800-818. Gegout argues that, “State leaders who 
ask the ICC to act against rebels in order to reinforce their own regime and authority are effectively seeking 
to turn the ICC into their political instrument. They are also contributing to the creation of an unjust 
international legal system, as they want the Court to focus on one side of a conflict. This was the case with 
Joseph Kabila in the DRC in 2004, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda in 2004, François Bozizé in the Central 
African Republic in 2005, and with the government of Mali in 2012.” See also Phil Clark, Distant Justice.  
95 Africa Legal Aid, ‘Côte d’Ivoire has ratified the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),’ 4 
April 2013, available online at www.africalegalaid.com/cote-divoire-has-ratified-the-statute-of-the-
international-criminal-court-icc/; accessed 11 May 2020. See also Statement by the Ivorian Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court at the 10th Assembly of States Parties to the ICC (New York: UN 
Headquarters, 12-21 December 2011), available at asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ICC-ASP10-GenDeba-CICC-IvoryCoast-ENG.pdf; accessed 
11 May 2020. 
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To further support this conclusion, President Ouattara stated in a 2011 letter to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC that  
For reasons you are aware of, the transfer of power following the 
presidential election of 31 October and 28 November 2010 could not 
occur in the peaceful manner I wished for. A serious crisis has ensued, 
during which it is unfortunately reasonable to believe that crimes falling 
under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court have been 
committed. These crimes are of such gravity that I call for your assistance 
to make sure that the main perpetrators will not remain unpunished, hence 
contributing to restoring the rule of law in Côte d’Ivoire.96 
President Ouattara made clear that Ivorian judicial mechanisms were insufficient to deal 
with the types of crimes committed in the post-election conflict. According to the 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the letter also made a promise of 
cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor and confirmed Côte d’Ivoire’s intent to 
become a State Party to the Rome Statute “with the shortest possible delay.”97 The 
significance of this behaviour is that while the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is technically a 
proprio motu referral stemming from Gbagbo’s initial consent in 2003, the reality is such 
that the Prosecutor’s investigation into the 2010 post-election violence in Ivory Coast was 
actually a self-referral by Ouattara, reaffirming the new governments’ consent to ICC 
involvement. This reality complicates the objectivity of prosecutorial decision making 
and raises questions about the malleability of case selection.  
Indeed, Ouattara publicly acknowledged the need to bring all of those involved in 
the perpetration of atrocious crimes to justice– “regardless of political affiliation or 
military rank.”98 Notwithstanding this, in 2016, one week after Prosecutor Bensouda 
 
96 Président de la République de Côte d’Ivoire, Lettre du 3 Mai 2011, cited by Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire: Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 
15 (23 June 2011), ICC-02/11; [OTP translation]. 
97Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Côte d’Ivoire: President Ouattara wants ICC 
Investigation; OTP to Seek Pre-Trial Authorization,” available at 
iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=4476; accessed 11 May 2020. 
98 Human Rights Watch, “Turning Rhetoric into Reality: Accountability for Serious International Crimes in 
Côte d’Ivoire,” 3 April 2013, available at www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/03/turning-rhetoric-
reality/accountability-serious-international-crimes-cote-divoire; accessed 10 February 2021.   
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announced that she would be investigating alleged crimes committed by pro-Ouattara 
members, Ouattara publicly stated that no more Ivorians would go before the ICC. He 
explained that domestic justice systems were operational and capable of prosecuting 
atrocity crimes, eliminating the need for ICC intervention in Ivory Coast.99 In 2018, it 
was made clear that President Ouattara’s ethos surrounding international criminal justice 
and accountability shifted when he announced an amnesty for over 800 people involved 
in the perpetration of serious crimes committed in the context of the post-election internal 
conflict–including Simone Gbagbo, whose arrest warrant at the ICC is still outstanding. 
As Amnesty International highlights, “Ouattara listed Simone Gbagbo, who is serving a 
20-year sentence for other offenses related to the post-election crisis, as one of the people 
who would benefit from an amnesty, casting doubt on the willingness of the Ivorian 
justice system to try her for her alleged role in crimes against humanity or war 
crimes.”100 Against this backdrop, an ideological shift has taken place in Ivory Coast.  
What remains consistent is an undercurrent of protectionism and the 
instrumentalization of the Court to fulfill a myriad of political goals in Ivory Coast. 
Immediately following his election, Ouattara had an interest in appealing to the ICC for 
help as a demonstration of leadership through his commitment to justice for victims. 
Using the ICC to further entrench an anti-Gbagbo narrative through its selectivity in 
cases, which was directly influenced by Côte d’Ivoire’s approach to cooperation with the 
OTP and its influence over evidence gathering and investigative processes, offered a 
direct benefit to Ouattara. Least of all, managing a conflict-ridden country is 
cumbersome. The promise of a better life by committing to accountability and the 
international criminal justice norm vis-à-vis the ICC signalled domestically and to other 
states that atrocity crimes would not be tolerated under the new leadership. Prosecutorial 
 
99 Statement of President Alassane Ouattara, 4 February 2016, Elysee Presidential Palace, Paris: Ouattara 
said that “The ICC played the role it had to. After the electoral crisis, we had no justice system, the country 
was in tatters… Now we have a justice system that is operational and that has begun to judge everyone 
without exception. These trials will begin very shortly and I hope they will move faster than the ICC.” It is 
worth noting that Prosecutor Bensouda had announced that the OTP was looking into crimes committed by 
pro-Ouattara members one week before this statement was made.  
100 Amnesty International, “Côte d’Ivoire: No Amnesty for Serious Crimes of 2010-11 Crisis,” 7 August 
2018, available at www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/cote-ivoire-no-amnesty-for-serious-crimes-of-
crisis/; accessed 11 May 2020. 
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discretion on the part of the OTP largely obfuscates Ouattara’s responsibility for how 
justice is dispensed by the Court. However, the fact that justice has been so one-sided in 
Côte d’Ivoire raises genuine concern about the authenticity of the President’s 
commitment to justice and his strategic involvement with the Court. This was 
compounded by his shift in international criminal justice related policy, which must be 
situated in its broader context.  
In 2016, African hostility toward the ICC was mounting. At the same time, the 
Ivorian experience had left many victims disenchanted due to the selectivity of the 
Court’s cases and the inefficiency of the process altogether.101 In combination, the 
necessity to remain committed to the ICC to secure legitimacy domestically and 
regionally was rapidly declining. Thus, the mitigation of sovereignty to the Court in the 
current climate likely incurs more costs than benefits for Ouattara. Côte d’Ivoire’s 
ratification of the Rome Statute can reasonably be explained by domestic political 
interests, which have shifted over time. Notwithstanding this, while other African states 
were considering leaving the Court in 2016, Ouattara reaffirmed his commitment to it.102 
It is worth noting that Gbagbo and Blé Goudé remained in ICC custody until 2019, which 
may explain why Ouattara remained committed to the Court, since it was actively 
targeting his enemies.  
While Côte d’Ivoire remains committed to the Rome Statute and the ICC, it 
would appear that it would now prefer to dispense justice locally. The framing of this 
reality, i.e. that Ivory Coast is now capable of prosecuting international crimes 
domestically, acknowledges the value of the accountability norm, while keeping the ICC 
at a comfortable distance under the auspice of complementarity. This may be a 
consequence of the fear that the Prosecutor will move on to consider pro-Ouattara 
 
101 See Netton Prince Tawa and Alexandra Engelsdorfer, “Acceptance of the International Criminal Court 
in Côte d’Ivoire: Between the Hope for Justice and the Concern of ‘Victor’s Justice,” in After Nuremberg. 
Exploring Multiple Dimensions of the Acceptance of International Criminal Justice, eds. Susanne Buckley-
Zistel, Friederike Mieth and Marjana Papa (International Nuremberg Principles Academy, 2017), available 
at www.nurembergacademy.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Cote_d_Ivoire.pdf; accessed 10 February 2021. 
102 Freddy Mulongo, “La Côte d’ivoire n’envisage pas de quitter le CPI répond Alasane Ouattara à Réveil 
FM,” Mediapart, 19 May 2020, available at blogs.mediapart.fr/freddy-mulongo/blog/011116/la-cote-
divoire-nenvisage-pas-de-quitter-le-cpi-repond-alasane-ouattara-reveil-fm; accessed 10 May 2020. 
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suspects in the aftermath of the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé trials. Nevertheless, this example 
provides a useful illustration of the interplay between domestic politics and the 
overarching influence of the international criminal justice norm to explain commitment to 
the Rome Statute in an African context.    
7.9 Conclusion 
This analysis provided a lens through which to view the interrelationship between 
African commitment to the ICC and the diffusion of the international criminal justice 
norm on the continent more broadly. While the ICC has been criticized on neocolonial 
bases, it is important to reconstruct the narrative to more accurately reflect African 
agency and ownership over the international criminal justice project and the ICC in 
particular. African states committed to the ICC as a counter to impunity for the 
perpetration of international crimes through the establishment of the Court. The 
significance of the fact that 62 per cent of all African states have ratified the Rome 
Statute cannot be understated. This is especially pertinent due to the propensity of 
violence on the continent reaching the threshold of the crimes contained in the Rome 
Statute, which logically increases the probability of ICC intervention in domestic political 
and legal matters.   
 The mobilization of the Rome Statute and therefore, the ICC, to restructure or 
equalize the global order is similarly important. Since powerful states opposed the 
creation of a strong, independent Court in exchange for one under the strict control of the 
Security Council, African states approached the ICC project as fundamentally 
anticolonial. This perspective reflects a desire to restructure global politics. In many 
ways, the establishment of the ICC demonstrated the emergence of a new multilateral 
diplomacy model which could achieve results even without the support of powerful 
states. In concert, the shared idea that accountability for atrocity crimes is important, 
coupled with the desire to achieve an outcome that would benefit humanity with or 
without powerful states, typify the Africa-ICC relationship from 1994 to present-day to 
varying degrees.    
 Activism and agency in the establishment of the ICC by SADC states, the 
government of Senegal, and others, along with strong support from NGOs and the 
African Union, created a strong normative backbone for the establishment of an ICC in 
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Africa from the earliest stages. This important historical experience continues to 
influence state behaviour and commitment to the ICC throughout most of Africa. This is 
supported by the willingness of most African states to remain a part of the Rome Statute 
System, even when domestic or regional political dynamics present a logical or strategic 
opportunity to defect. It is important not to underestimate the ability of African 
governments to instrumentalize the ICC for domestic political ends, while also 
acknowledging that ongoing commitment to the ICC in the form of treaty ratification and 
implementation contributes to the value of the Rome Statute System, whether intended or 
not.     
 Using the example of Côte d’Ivoire, it is apparent that domestic politics are 
important considerations for understanding why a state might ratify the Rome Statute or 
else make use of the ICC. While it is possible and indeed likely that the ICC was used for 
strategic political interests in that case, the reality remains that once Ivory Coast became 
a States Party to the Rome Statute in 2013, ICC intervention on any side of the conflict 
became possible with little jurisdictional difficulty. On this basis, it is fundamentally 
important to consider both rational and normative explanations for Rome Statute 
ratifications in Africa and the interplay between the two as valuable tools of analysis. 
Similarly, Kenya’s sustained commitment to the Rome Statute is best explained by 
considering both domestic and international political factors, with a particular focus on 
Kenyatta as the central strategic actor. While Kenyatta approached the ICC negatively for 
his own objectives, the fact that Kenya remains a States Party to the Rome Statute 
suggests that the normative value surrounding the Court is a relevant constraint on 
governments, which informs sustained commitment to the Statute regardless of 
contradictory domestic political interests. 
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Chapter 8  
8 Head of State Immunity 
The previous chapters have helped to establish an understanding of what kind of 
International Criminal Court (ICC or ‘Court’) African states wanted before and during 
the Rome Diplomatic Conference. The ICC entered into force in 2002 and began its work 
almost exclusively in African situations. The first case brought to the Prosecutor was a 
self-referral by Uganda in 2003. The first investigation opened by the Prosecutor proprio 
motu was in Kenya in 2007. And the first case involving a non-States Party that was 
referred to the Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was the 
situation in Darfur (Sudan) in 2005. The UNSC’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the 
ICC has been widely understood as the impetus for the breakdown of the relationship 
between the African Union (AU), some African states, and the Court. Some reasons for 
this can be linked back to the concerns of politicization raised by African governments at 
the Rome Diplomatic Conference, since the UNSC was yielding its power to interfere in 
the sovereign activities of a non-States Party, while others are linked to the Prosecutor’s 
targeting of a sitting head of state and the severity of the consequences for such a 
decision, since the ICC indicted then-President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir in 2009.1 What 
is perhaps most important for the purposes of this dissertation is to establish the link 
between what African states vocalized in Rome as legitimate concerns with embedding 
the authority of the UNSC within the Court’s structure, which provided the necessary 
foreshadowing for the ICC’s controversial involvement in Sudan. It is nevertheless 
important to recall that the AU is not a States Party to the Rome Statute, and therefore its 
antagonism towards the Court has mattered inasmuch as it affected or influenced the 
 
1 See for example Awa Adamu, “Lack of Objectivity in Security Council Referrals and its Effects on 
International Criminal Court’s Prosecution,” International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts 9.1 
(2021): 2120-2134. See also Bethel Aregawi, “The Politicisation of the International Criminal Court by 
United Nations Security Council Referrals,” Accord (2017), available at 
https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/politicisation-international-criminal-court-united-nations-
security-council-referrals/; (accessed 1 February 2021). See also Christa-Gaye Kerr, “Sovereign Immunity, 
the AU, and the ICC: Legitimacy Undermined,” Michigan Journal of International Law 41.1 (2020): 195-
225. See also Manisuili Ssenyonjo, “The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International 
Criminal Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders,” International Criminal Law Review 
13 (2013): 385-391. 
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behaviour and policy choices of States Parties to the Rome Statute, which will be 
evaluated herein. Ultimately, the aim of this chapter is to outline the most serious point of 
contention in the ‘Africa-ICC’ relationship, i.e. head of state immunity, situate it within 
its broader historical context, and consider the compatibility of the ICC’s approach to 
international criminal justice within the African context with respect to the indictment of 
sitting heads of state. 
 
8.1 Framing the relationship between the AU and the ICC 
The relationship between the African Union (AU) and the International Criminal Court 
has been tumultuous. Focal in the discourse surrounding the AU-ICC relationship is the 
issue of head of state immunity: the AU takes the position that sitting heads of state and 
senior government officials enjoy immunity during their tenure of office, while the ICC’s 
establishing treaty, the Rome Statute, specifically waives immunity for heads of state and 
senior officials who are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. The crystallization of the 
AU position emanated from the ICC’s indictment of former Sudanese leader, Omar al-
Bashir in 2009 via United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1593, and 
relatedly, the indictments of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2011.2 The Court’s pursuit of al-Bashir is particularly 
contentious from the perspective of the AU since Sudan has never ratified the Rome 
Statute and therefore, has not consented to the involvement of the ICC in its domestic 
political and legal affairs.   
However, the UNSC has a special jurisdictional role under the Rome Statute. 
Article 13(b) grants the Security Council the power to refer situations to the ICC 
 
2 Note that the ICC also indicted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi via Security Council Resolution 1970 
for alleged crimes against humanity, particularly the murder and persecution of civilians who opposed his 
political leadership. See “ICC issues Gaddafi arrest warrant: Libya has dismissed the move by the ICC, 
rejecting the authority of the tribunal,” Reuters (28 June 2011), available at 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/6/28/icc-issues-gaddafi-arrest-warrant; (accessed 1 January 2021): 
Gaddafi opposed the ICC intervention on the basis that it was a “crusade against his country and an attempt 
by the West to recolonize Libya.” The justice minister of Libya at the time, Mohammed al-Qamoodi, stated 
that “Libya… does not accept the decisions of the ICC which is a tool of the Western world to prosecute 




Prosecutor where crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court are alleged to have taken 
place.3 This includes situations involving non-States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
providing the Court with a form of universal jurisdiction. Relatedly, Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute allows the UNSC to defer an investigation or prosecution for a renewable 
one-year period. Both powers were given to the UNSC for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.4  
Against this backdrop, this chapter considers the international criminal justice 
norm, typified by the ICC, and its compatibility with the AU on the issue of head of state 
immunity by using the Court’s indictment of Omar al-Bashir as its analytical lens. It 
argues that the AU does endorse and support the international criminal justice norm, 
albeit from a different position than the ICC with respect to immunity for sittings heads 
of state, primarily for protectionist reasons. Nevertheless, the AU has attempted to use the 
mechanisms available within the Rome Statute System to mediate its disagreements 
regarding the al-Bashir case including at the UNSC, the Assembly of States Parties, and 
the Court itself. The AU and the ICC have identified the same goal with respect to 
international criminal justice: long-term peace and stability.  The point of departure, 
however, is on how best to achieve this goal.  The ICC prioritizes ending impunity, 
emphasizing criminal accountability and claims that justice is a ‘key prerequisite’ for 
lasting peace.5  On the other hand, the AU has placed an emphasis on containing peace 
and stability on the continent, which it argues can be eroded by arresting sitting heads of 
state.6 This is evidenced by the AU’s tacit support of ICC indictments against rebels and 
 
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, Art. 13(b): Exercise of 
jurisdiction. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears 
to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 16: Deferral of investigation or prosecution. No 
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 
months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions. 
5 International Criminal Court, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/about.  
6 African Union, Observations of the African Union on the Scope and Application of the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction, presented to at the United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Seventy-
fifth session (15 December 2020) available at 
https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/universal_jurisdiction/au_e.pdf; accessed 5 January 2021, 4: “However, 
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warlords, and its direct opposition to the Court, i.e. when it requested its members not to 
cooperate with the ICC by arresting and/or surrendering sitting heads of state, especially 
al-Bashir. The AU has also asserted that reconciliation is primordial in post-conflict or 
transitional societies, over and above the retributive approach typified by the ICC. On 
this basis, the AU and the ICC have fundamentally disagreed about the primacy of 
arresting and surrendering al-Bashir while he was President of Sudan to the Court in 
order to achieve the mutually constituted objective of long-term peace and stability in 
Darfur. Considering that al-Bashir was never arrested, even when traveling to African 
States Parties of the Rome Statute, suggests that the predictive and expected behaviour of 
African states was not to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the ICC. On this basis, the 
AU’s interpretation and understanding of the international criminal justice norm was 
prioritized over and above that of the ICC in some African states. 
It is important to note that the AU and relevant African states provided complex 
legal justifications using both the Rome Statute and customary international law to 
uphold the immunity of al-Bashir while he was a sitting head of state. The ICC failed to 
adequately respond to these arguments in a cogent manner, which has created a serious 
institutional legitimacy and credibility crisis for the Court. The instrumentalization of 
head of state immunity by both the AU and the ICC in the al-Bashir case is a clear 
demonstration of the deep politicization that undergirds the operationalization of the 
Court at the domestic, regional, and international level(s). Neither the AU nor the ICC 
approached the issue of al-Bashir’s immunity from a depoliticized position, yet neither 
abandoned the international criminal justice norm in formulating justifications for the 
immunity (or lack thereof) of al-Bashir during his tenure as President of Sudan. This 
suggests a mutual respect and acknowledgement of the norm, but exposes its potential for 
political instrumentalization, since it has not yet reached its conceptual maxim.7  
 
whilst affirming universal jurisdiction, the AU has also taken cognizance of the political use and abuse of 
the principle by some States against African leaders in particular. Essentially, African States have 
consistently echoed concerns with the selective and political manner in which universal jurisdiction is 
exercised by non-African foreign States against African State Officials, and which has the potential to 
undermine the peace efforts and stability on the Continent as well as other existing international law 
principles such as the principle of sovereign equality of State.” 
7 See generally Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change,” International Organization 52.4 (1998): 887-917: It is argued here that many African states and 
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8.2 Resolution 1593 and beyond 
The situation in Darfur, Sudan was referred to the ICC Prosecutor by UNSC Resolution 
1593, which was made possible by Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.8 To be sure, UNSC 
referrals are the only possible avenue to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction in non-states 
parties to the Rome Statute where genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and/or 
aggression are alleged to have taken place. The UNSC based its decision to refer the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor on a proposal by the International Commission 
of Inquiry, which enumerated reasons to refer the situation to the Court.9 At the time of 
writing, the UNSC has referred only two situations involving non-States Parties to the 
ICC: Darfur (Sudan) in 2005 and Libya in 2011. It is important to acknowledge that ICC 
 
African individuals were in fact the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ that helped to establish the Rome Statute and 
thus, the ICC. In this vein, it would be unwise for the AU to reject the presence of the norm altogether. 
Similarly, the fact that so many African States have ratified the Rome Statute and integrated into domestic 
law further suggests an African commitment to the ‘norm cascade.’ Nevertheless, the operationalization of 
the ICC has raised practical and political difficulties with the implementation of the norm and has stagnated 
its ‘life cycle’ thus, not reaching the point of ‘norm internalization.’ See also Jutta Brunnée, “International 
Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law of State Responsibility,” Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 36 (2005): 3-38. See also Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, “Interactional 
international law: an introduction,” International Theory 3.2 (2011): 307-318. 
8 UN Doc. S/Res/1593 (2005); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 
A/CONF.183/9, Art. 13(b): “Exercise of jurisdiction. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect 
to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (b) A situation in 
which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;” Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005. 
9 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005: the reasons 
for the proposed UNSC referral included that the crimes being committed were a threat to peace and 
security; the investigation and prosecution of crimes would “be conducive, or contribute to, peace and 
stability in Darfur, by removing serious obstacles to national reconciliation and the restoration of peaceful 
relations” and that investigation and prosecution in Sudan of those with authority and prestige was 
impossible at the local level. Therefore, having trials “away from the community over which those persons 
still wield authority and where their followers live, might ensure a neutral atmosphere and prevent the trials 
from stirring up political, ideological or other passions;” the UNSC and ICC’s authority “might compel 
both leading personalities in the Sudanese Government and the heads of rebels to submit to investigation 
and possibly criminal proceedings;” the ICC would facilitate a “veritably fair trial;” the ICC could start its 
work immediately as opposed to ad hoc tribunals or other internationalized courts or alternative 
mechanisms of justice; and the ICC proceedings “would not necessarily involve a significant financial 
burden for the international community [emphasis added].”  
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intervention has not manifestly contributed to the proliferation of ‘justice’ in the form of 
criminal accountability in either instance.10  
In many respects, the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC was an 
important test case used to measure the institutional effectiveness of the ICC in the 
context of non-States Parties and ultimately, the malleability of the concept of universal 
jurisdiction advanced by the Rome Statute. It is clear that this approach was an overreach 
both normatively and conceptually: it has done more damage to the international criminal 
justice regime and the institutional credibility of the ICC than it has helped to end 
impunity, deter atrocity crimes, or contribute to peace and security. It is for this reason 
that Phakiso Mochochoko, Head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation 
Division of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, has referred to UNSC referrals as a 
“poisoned chalice,” and has advanced the idea that the ICC would be far better off 
without any involvement from the UNSC in the future.11 This stemmed largely from the 
fact that the UNSC does not oblige cooperation from states (other than the states 
involved–i.e. Libya and Sudan). Cooperation from other states is voluntary, which has 
revealed an ostensive lack of political will to uphold and/or strengthen the accountability 
norm in the international political sphere. The UNSC has, as a matter of practice, referred 
situations to the Court without providing any of the necessary support to ensure its 
institutional effectiveness.12 The only value of a UNSC referral appears to be symbolic, 
which has had severe reputational consequences for the ICC, and the international 
criminal justice regime altogether. 
 
10 See Security Council Meetings Coverage, “We Have Failed Darfur’s Victims, International Criminal 
Court Prosecutor Tells Security Council, Noting Continuing ‘Total Impunity,’” SC/11441 (17 June 2014): 
ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda told the UNSC that “systematic and wide-spread crimes continued to be 
committed with total impunity in Darfur nearly ten years since the situation was referred to the 
International Criminal Court.” 
11 Sarah Nimigan, “Carrots, Sticks, and the ICC: Prospects for Cooperation? Part 1,” IntLawGrrls, (9 
December 2018), blogpost available at https://ilg2.org/2018/12/09/carrots-sticks-and-the-icc-prospects-for-
cooperation-part-1/; accessed 3 January 2021. 
12 “In Hindsight: The Security Council and the International Criminal Court,” Security Council Report (31 
July 2018) available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-
08/in_hindsight_the_security_council_and_the_international_criminal_court.php; accessed 4 January 2021: 
“The Council has also been relatively indifferent towards states’ non-cooperation with the ICC on existing 
referrals, refraining from taking action on the 13 decisions of the court regarding the non-compliance of 
UN member states.” 
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In effect, allowing the UNSC to refer non-States Parties to the Court provides the 
ICC with a politicized and weak form of universal jurisdiction over atrocity crimes. 
Indeed, the involvement of the UNSC in the situations in Darfur and Libya have been 
explained as a manifestation of a global order whereby powerful states can act in an 
interventionist way and make determinations about the standards of appropriateness in 
weak(er) states, subject to political interests.13 This has readily been interpreted by the 
AU and African leaders as a violation of state sovereignty and an imposition of ‘Western’ 
values.14 From the perspective of the AU, this realization triggered colonial sensitivities 
and reiterated that the ICC operates squarely within the realm of power politics rather 
than an objective and/or neutral legal space. This point has only been strengthened by the 
UNSC’s willingness to get the ICC involved in African situations, but not others of equal 
gravity, based solely on political factors.15  
This manifestation of overt politicization is precisely why the relationship 
between the ICC and the UNSC was so contentious during the negotiation of the Rome 
Statute in 1998. As Williams and Schabas have explained, “[t]hose delegations that had 
opposed any Security Council involvement had argued that it would politicize the ICC 
 
13 See for example Mary Kimani, “Pursuit of justice or Western plot? International indictments stir angry 
debate in Africa,” Africa Renewal (October 2009) available at 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2009/pursuit-justice-or-western-plot; accessed 4 
January 2021. See in particular, the comments of AU Commission President Jean Ping to a French radio 
network RFI that the “ICC always targets… Africans. Does it mean that you have nothing on Gaza? Does it 
mean you have nothing [on the] Caucasus? Does it mean that you have nothing on the militants in 
Colombia? There is nothing on Iraq? We are raising this type of question because we don’t want a double 
standard.” 
14 See for example “Uganda’s Museveni calls on African nations to quit the ICC,” Reuters (12 December 
2014), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc-idUSKBN0JQ1DO20141212; accessed 3 
January 2021: “I supported the court at first because I like discipline. I don’t want people to err without 
accountability… But they have turned it into a vessel for oppressing Africa again so I’m done with that 
court. I won’t work with them again.” Museveni advised that “I want all of us to get out of that court of the 
West. Let them (Westerners) stay with their court.” See also Siobhán O’Grady, “Gambia: The ICC Should 
be Called the International Caucasian Court,” Foreign Policy (26 October 2016), available at 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/26/gambia-the-icc-should-be-called-the-international-caucasian-court/; 
accessed 3 January 2021: Gambian Information Minister Sheriff Bojang said that “the ICC, despite being 
called International Criminal Court, is in fact an International Caucasian Court for the persecution and 
humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans.” 
15 Key examples of similar gravity which were not referred to the ICC by the UNSC include, but are not 
limited to: Iraq, North Korea, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Ukraine. Note that the investigation in 
Afghanistan was initiated by the prosecutor proprio motu and similarly not by UNSC referral (for obvious 
reasons). It is interesting to note that the Pre-Trial Chamber denied Bensouda’s request to open the 
investigation at first, solely for political reasons. This decision was reversed unanimously on appeal. 
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and undermine its credibility. As before Rome the arguments of inequality based on the 
role of the P5 [that is, the permanent five members of the UNSC: China, France, Russia, 
United Kingdom, United States] was presented and that the veto would be used to stop 
referrals involving these States or their more indirect interests.”16 It is relevant to note 
that African states were particularly opposed to the use of the UNSC veto in the function 
of the Court. For example, the South African Development Community had established 
negotiating principles for the establishment of the ICC in 1997, which clearly enumerated 
that “[t]he ICC should be unfettered by the veto of the Security Council.”17 Further 
African negotiation coordination efforts were undertaken in Senegal in 1998 with the 
signing of the Dakar Declaration which stated more broadly, “that the International 
Criminal Court shall operate without being prejudiced by actions of the Security 
Council.”18 It is apparent that African states were generally concerned about the role of 
the UNSC and its potential influence on the ICC’s politicization and judicial 
independence. In the course of the Court’s history, it is apparent that such concerns were 
both appropriate and well-conceived. The complication of the United States, Russia, and 
China not ratifying the Rome Statute has further inflamed perceptions of inequality and 
has posed serious credibility challenges for the Court, particularly from the perspective of 
the AU and its member states that have been subject to UNSC intervention that triggers 
the Court’s jurisdiction over the alleged behaviour of non-States Parties.19 The UNSC has 
manifestly failed to apply the same standard in all situations in need of ICC intervention, 
 
16 Sharon A. Williams and William A. Schabas, “Part 2. Jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law: 
Exercise of jurisdiction,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (Portland: C.H Beck, Hart, Nomos, 
2008), 568. 
17 SADC Negotiating Principles for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (11-14 September 
1997, Pretoria, South Africa). 
18 Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (6 February 1998, 
Dakar, Senegal). 
19 Note that there have also been concerns raised by the relationship between the UNSC and the ICC from 
scholars and observers. See for example Louise Arbour, “The Relationship Between the ICC and the UN 
Security Council,” Global Governance 20.2 (2014), 196: “Yet for all the good that Security Council 
referrals do in expanding accountability and combating impunity, there is a danger they could, and already 
do, undermine the wider aims of international criminal justice. Such referrals not only could erode the legal 
principles at the heart of this project, not least the fundamental tenets of the rule of law, but also on a more 
practical level could provoke a backlash against the ICC over the perceived use of international justice as a 
bargaining chip or tool to gain political powers [emphasis added].” 
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which has devalued the institution’s legitimacy and credibility and contributed to 
backlash from the AU and some African states.  
The point is not to dispute that horrific violations of international criminal law 
amounting to the crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute were being committed in both 
Darfur and Libya. Rather, the bigger concern is twofold: (1) the UNSC has demonstrated 
a willingness to refer situations in Africa to the ICC, but not in other situations of 
comparable gravity; this behaviour has knowingly compromised perceptions of 
institutional fairness, objectivity, and neutrality–all of which are quintessential features of 
a legal institution such as the ICC; (2) the UNSC has failed to ensure that existing 
referrals to the ICC are effectively enforced and knowingly degraded the effectiveness, 
legitimacy, and credibility of the ICC and risked its long-term institutional sustainability. 
It is important to couch the AU’s problems with the ICC in its broader political context, 
which can be perspicuously linked to the significant compromise reached during the 
Rome Statute negotiations to provide the UNSC with referral and deferral powers under 
the Court’s jurisdiction regime–an outcome that African states did not want. This 
particular compromise was an attempt to assuage the fears of powerful states by 
reinstituting their power within the apparatus of the ICC, which has had a 
disproportionate impact on the AU and many African states and has insulated the 
permanent five members of the UNSC and their interests and/or allies all at the same 
time. AU opposition to this type of political posturing can be viewed as a counter to the 
dominant global order, which the ICC was intended to operate independently from. 
 
8.3 Peace v. Justice and Head of State Immunity 
The majority of African states (and the AU, formally the Organization of African Unity) 
were historically strong supporters of the ICC from the earliest stages of its 
development.20 However, in 2008, the AU’s Peace and Security Council issued a press 
 
20 See for example The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 24th Ordinary Session (22-31 
October 1998), Banjul, The Gambia, 27 Resolution on the Ratification of the Treaty on the International 
Criminal Court, ACHPR/Res.27(XXIV) 98: “Calls on all States Parties to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights to carry out all the appropriate constitutional procedures to sign and ratify the Rome 
treaty on the International Criminal Court.” 
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release identifying concern over the indictment of al-Bashir, citing the problems it posed 
for the pursuit of peace and reconciliation, which were inherently prioritized over ‘strict’ 
legal justice.21  This is thematic; a resurrection of the ‘peace versus justice’ debate 
saturates the AU’s opposition calls towards ICC decision-making and operationalization 
processes, particularly those led by the Prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno Ocampo. On 
a practical level, the AU postulates that indicting sitting heads of state has the ability to 
further compromise peace and security efforts. Instead, healing and reconciliation are 
prioritized above criminal accountability in delicate post-conflict or transitional societies, 
such as Darfur. Moreover, the argument that restorative or alternative transitional justice 
approaches have a greater suitability in African contexts is not an uncommon position, 
which the AU has expressly integrated in its opposition to al-Bashir’s indictment by the 
Court.22 It is relevant to point out that as a response to the arrest warrant, the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Council called for the establishment of an AU High-Level 
Panel on Darfur (AUPD), led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki (‘The 
Mbeki Panel’). The AUPD issued an in-depth report, enumerating how to achieve the 
 
21 African Union Peace and Security Council, Comminiqué of 142nd meeting, 21 July 2008, 
PSC/MIN/2(CLI); see also African Union Peace and Security Council, Comminiqué of the 175th meeting, 
5 March 2009, PSC/PR/Comm(CLXXV): “Council expresses deep concern over the decision taken by Pre-
Trial Chamber I of the ICC on 4 March 2009, to issue an arrest warrant against the President of the 
Republic of the Sudan, Mr. Omar Hassan Al Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the 
far reaching consequences of this decision. Council notes with regret that this decision comes at a critical 
juncture in the process to promote lasting peace, reconciliation and democratic governance in the Sudan, 
and underlines that the search for justice should be pursued in a way that does not impede or jeopardize the 
promotion of peace.” Note that genocide was added to al-Bashir’s arrest warrant in 2010. 
22 See generally Julena Jumbe Gabagambi, “A Comparative Analysis of Restorative Justice Practices in 
Africa,” Globalex (October 2018), available at 
https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Restorative_Justice_Africa.html; accessed 4 January 2021: “The 
paper argues that restorative justice is a paradigm that was in use in Africa prior to the coming of 
colonialists and should be revived by African countries because it promotes healing and restores 
relationships between offenders, victims, and community much better than the western adversarial 
system… restorative justice can work much better in the 21st century in Africa than the court proceedings;” 
Fainos Mangena, “Restorative justice’s deep roots in Africa,” South African Journal of Philosophy 34.1 
(2015): 1-12; Brian Kagoro, “The paradox of alien knowledge, narrative and praxis: transitional justice and 
the politics of agenda setting in Africa,” in Where Law Meets Reality, eds. Moses Chrispus Okello, Chris 
Dolan, Undine Whande, Nokukhanya Mncwabe, Levis Onegi and Stephen Oola (Cape Town: Pambazuka 
Press, 2012), 8: “It is fair to surmise that African victims of crimes against humanity, gross human rights 
violations, war crimes and genocide are trapped between inadequate local remedies and expensive, highly 
politicised, ineffective, remote and relatively low-impact international criminal justice options… local 
activists vest their hopes in an international system whose ethos has historically been imbued with self-
interest and bigotry, heavy handedness and short-term objectives.”  
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interrelated goals of “accountability and fighting impunity, on the one hand, and 
reconciliation and healing, on the other” in Darfur.23 The report proposed that an 
integrated justice and reconciliation process would be the best pathway to address the 
conflict in Darfur. It called for national criminal justice processes; a hybrid criminal 
tribunal to address those bearing the most responsibility for atrocity crimes in Darfur; 
reconciliation and truth-telling mechanisms; traditional justice mechanisms to deal with 
appropriate crimes; and compensation programs for victims.24 It is interesting to note that 
AUPD determined that “Criminal justice will be a significant, though not sufficient, pillar 
in the justice and reconciliation framework for Darfur.”25 The recommendation to employ 
national and hybrid court systems effectively limits the potential role of the ICC, and 
places an emphasis on local capacity building efforts. The establishment of the Mbeki 
Panel iterates AU commitment to achieving peace and stability in Darfur from an Afro-
centric point of view, with a broad(er) lens than strict mechanisms of international 
criminal justice– but not to their exclusion. 
Indeed, the UNSC was similarly aware of the need to approach justice in Darfur 
holistically and not rely solely on the ICC. To this point, Security Council Resolution 
1593 expressly stated that: 
The Security Council, 
Taking note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60), 
Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or 
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal 
Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect… 
5. Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and 
encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of 
Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to 
 
23 African Union Peace and Security Council, 207th Meeting at the Level of the Heads of State and 
Government, Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD)The Quest for Peace, 
Justice and Reconciliation (20 October 2009), PSC/AHG/2(CCVII). 
24 Ibid., 86-87. 
25 Ibid., 87. 
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complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the effects to restore long-
lasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary.26  
It is on this basis that the AU requested the UNSC to use its deferral powers under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend ICC proceedings against then President Omar 
al-Bashir, due to the ongoing peace process in Sudan.27 Even though the preamble of 
Resolution 1593 makes explicit mention of this deferral power, the UNSC ignored the 
AU’s request, which further damaged AU-ICC relations and perceptions of institutional 
credibility. Demonstrating this point, Ghana’s Foreign Minister at the time, Alhaji 
Muhammad Mumuni explained, “the AU actually addressed a resolution to the Security 
Council asking… to defer the warrant [against al-Bashir] for one year, and it was 
virtually ignored. That we thought was a slap. We thought that as Africans, and having a 
clear understanding and clear interest in the interest of peace in the Sudan and in Darfur, 
we thought that was a matter (where) the Security Council should have listened to Africa, 
at the very minimum.”28 The AU was not alone in its concern over the potentially 
destabilizing effects of indicting al-Bashir. It has been explained that “US diplomats in 
the Hague described the prosecutor’s coming move against Bashir as ‘a high stakes 
gamble– not only for the ICC but for global politics.’”29 Furthermore, “Chinese and 
Russian diplomats warned that the prosecutor’s move could threaten the fragile progress 
 
26 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005), UN Doc. S/RES/1593 available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/85febd1a-29f8-4ec4-9566-48edf55cc587/283244/n0529273.pdf; 
accessed 10 January 2021. 
27 Note that the UNSC reserves referral and deferral powers with respect to the ICC under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute for a renewable period of twelve months. The UNSC has used its deferral powers to prevent 
the ICC from starting an investigation or prosecution regarding UN peacekeeping personnel in Bosnia but 
has never responded to the requests of the African Union to defer ICC proceedings in either Sudan or 
Kenya. See specifically African Union Assembly, 12th Ordinary Session, Decision on the Application by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of 
The Sudan, AU Assembly Doc. Dec.22(XII), 1-2 February 2009, 3. Note also that the United Nations and 
the African Union worked to help facilitate peace processes and diplomatic solutions to the conflict in 
Darfur. The processes involved al-Bashir and senior officials in Khartoum, and leaders of the numerous 
rebel groups, which took a significant amount of detailed coordination to achieve, see generally United 
States Institute of Peace, USIPeace Briefing “Negotiating Peace in Darfur,” (January 2008), available at 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2008/01/negotiating-peace-darfur; accessed 3 January 2021.  
28 “AU votes against cooperating with ICC arrest warrant for Bashir,” France 24 (7 March 2009), available 
at https://www.france24.com/en/20090703-au-votes-against-cooperating-with-icc-arrest-warrant-bashir-; 
accessed 5 January 2021. 
29 David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 144. 
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in Darfur… they argued that the prosecutor was interfering recklessly with the diplomatic 
process.”30 Thus, the far-reaching consequences of prosecuting the sitting head of state in 
Sudan was a concern for many in Africa and elsewhere. The United States, China, and/or 
Russia did not utilize UNSC powers to stop the indictment of al-Bashir through an ICC 
deferral. Consequentially, the prosecutorial strategy to indict al-Bashir and the related 
political inaction on the part of the UNSC to stop it singlehandedly led to the fallout of 
the relationship between the AU and the ICC.  
However, since he was overthrown by military coup on 11 April 2019, the 
possibility of al-Bashir being prosecuted at the ICC has been revived. He is accused of 
committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Darfur from 2003 to 
2008. However, the ability of the Prosecutor to build a strong enough case to secure a 
conviction (particularly for the genocide charge) has been called into question.31 This 
raises doubts about the appropriateness of the initial indictment, particularly if the 
evidence was weak and/or insufficient to substantiate the charges brought against him. 
This concern is substantiated by the fact that former Chief Prosecutor Ocampo had to 
appeal the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to omit the genocide charge saying that the 
standard applied was too high.32 The Appeals Chamber allowed the inclusion of the 
genocide charge on al-Bashir’s arrest warrant, though concerns about its viability at trial 
based on the evidence remain high.33 While it is undeniable that horrific violations of 
international criminal law occurred in Darfur, the necessary question is whether or not al-
Bashir can be held criminally responsible for those crimes and/or whether it would have 
 
30 Ibid., 145. 
31 Alex de Waal, “Omar al-Bashir: Will genocide charge against Sudan’s ex-president stick,” BBC News 
(14 February 2020), available at https://www.bbc.com/news/51489802; accessed 2 January 2021. With 
respect to the initial charges filed by former Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, it was said that “some 
Sudanese wryly comment that Mr. Ocampo had charged Bashir with the only crime he had not actually 
committed [genocide].” It is also argued that “The current prosecutor… will need substantially to improve 
on her predecessor’s performance if the charges, especially on genocide, are to go forward…A few years 
ago it put its Darfur investigations on ice, expecting no progress. The ICC is not ready for Bashir yet.”  
32 See ICC Press Release, “Pre-Trial Chamber I issues a second warrant of arrest against Omar Al Bashir 
for counts of genocide,” (12 July 2010), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr557; 
accessed 5 January 2021. 
33 “Judges allow genocide charge against Sudanese leader,” CNN (3 February 2010), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/02/03/sudan.bashir.genocide/index.html; accessed 2 January 
2021: “Even if genocide is added to the arrest warrant, Moreno-Ocampo still faces a challenge in proving 
the charges at trial, said Mark Ellis, the executive director of the International Bar Association.” 
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been appropriate to remove him from office to stand trial at the ICC when the Prosecutor 
had limited evidence to substantiate the charges brought against him.34 
In the aftermath of the acquittal of former Vice-President of the Central African 
Republic, Jean-Pierre Bemba by the ICC Appeals Chamber, and the acquittal of former 
President of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo by the Trial Chamber, it is clear that the 
standard of proof at the ICC is high for former government leaders, as it should be for all 
defendants. In this vein, it would be devastating for the ICC and the victims in Sudan 
seeking criminal accountability to finally get al-Bashir in custody, only to see him be 
acquitted due to a lack of evidence. This example also illuminates that the incoming 
Prosecutor is at the behest of the strategy taken by Ocampo with respect to the charges 
against al-Bashir and will similarly be dependent on the investigation materials obtained 
by Ocampo and Bensouda in building the most high-stakes case in the history of the 
Court. These difficulties should be taken very seriously; ICC prosecution of al-Bashir 
should be compartmentalized as but one remedial approach to justice for the victims in 
Darfur–not the only one. This point was emphasized by the UNSC in its initial referral, 
and by the AU throughout the Court’s involvement in the situation in Darfur, for good 
and important reasons.  
Notwithstanding this, the al-Bashir example effectively demonstrates that in a 
protectionist fashion, African political leaders and the African Union as a collective are 
largely opposed to the indictment of sitting heads of state, and that once a leader is 
removed from power, justice becomes reprioritized. Indeed, since being overthrown, al-
Bashir has become ‘available’ for justice: the Sudanese government has tacitly agreed to 
his transfer to the ICC, or least of all to accept assistance from the ICC to prosecute him 
in a national or hybrid court.35 States in Africa and elsewhere no longer have to choose 
 
34 Phil Clark, Distant Justice, 273: “the ICC’s investigations in Darfur highlight that, even when the 
Security Council refers a situation, the Court depends heavily on cooperation by the state in which crimes 
were allegedly committed. From the outset, Bashir’s government barred ICC investigators from gathering 
on-the-ground evidence and refused any form of cooperation with the Court.” 
35 Omar al-Bashir: Sudan agrees ex-president must face ICC, BBC News (11 February 2020), available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51462613; accessed 1 January 2021; Mark Kersten, “The ICC 
Inches Closer to Bashir Prosecution as Sudan and Israel Normalize Relations,” Justice in Conflict (28 
October 2020) blogpost available at https://justiceinconflict.org/2020/10/28/the-icc-inches-closer-to-bashir-
prosecution-as-sudan-and-israel-normalize-relations/; accessed 1 January 2021.  
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whether to prioritize justice above regional political obligations and interests, including 
the inevitably destabilizing consequences of inciting regime change (or least of all, a 
power vacuum) by arresting a sitting head of state.36 In the case of al-Bashir, Sudanese 
civilian protests led to the military coup that removed him from power–not the ICC, 
UNSC, or any other state.  
While this demonstrates the ICC’s utter dependence on the voluntary cooperation 
of states to operate effectively, it also raises questions about the significance of local 
agency when triggering justice processes altogether, and perhaps more importantly, its 
longer-term impact(s) on peace and stability in post-conflict and transitional societies 
such as Sudan.37 Importantly, criminal accountability at the ICC has been emphasized as 
a priority by the military junta governing Sudan. More specifically, Mohammed Hassan 
al-Taishi, member of the ruling Sovereign Council said that “the ICC would be among 
the four mechanisms for transitional justice in Darfur, which will also include a special 
criminal court and truth and reconciliation in Sudan… everyone who had arrest warrants 
issued against them will appear before the ICC.”38 This indicates that the form of justice 
championed by the ICC still matters, thereby strengthening the international criminal 
justice regime and the accountability norm, more broadly. Karen Allen from the Institute 
of Security Studies has described the potential indictment of al-Bashir as a “delicate 
balancing act between politics and the law” while reiterating that there is in fact a “global 
appetite for individual responsibility.”39 The legal maxim ‘justice delayed is justice 
denied’ is relevant in the al-Bashir case, though it is also important to acknowledge that 
‘something is better than nothing;’ it seems that the remedy, either symbolic or material, 
provided by a potential ICC conviction against al-Bashir is still significant over a decade 
 
36 The Libyan example serves well to demonstrate the complexities of removing a leader without 
demonstrative plans to rebuild society. This raises deeper, fundamental questions about the role of the ICC 
in the conflict/post-conflict and/or transitional contexts in which it operates. 
37 See generally Phil Clark, Distant Justice. 
38 “Sudan Opens Door for ICC Prosecutions: Ex-President Bashir May Finally Face Trial for Alleged 
Darfur Crimes,” Human Rights Watch (12 February 2020), available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/sudan-opens-door-icc-prosecutions#; accessed 2 January 2021. 
39 Karen Allen, “Will Omar al-Bashir and the ICC meet at last?” ISS Today (21 February 2020), available at 
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-omar-al-bashir-and-the-icc-meet-at-last; accessed 4 January 2021. Note 
that political reasons for the new transitional government’s willingness to engage with the ICC include its 




after the initial arrest warrants against him were issued. The transitional military 
government will necessarily seek justification from the international community, the AU, 
and other African states for pushing al-Bashir out of power. In this sense, the ICC is 
exposed to instrumentalization for political purposes, which will nevertheless 
concurrently strengthen the international criminal justice norm as a result.  
 
8.4 Framing the fallout of AU-ICC relations vis-à-vis al-
 Bashir 
When the UNSC referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC, eleven states on the Security 
Council voted in favour, none voted against, and four states, Algeria, Brazil, China, and 
the United States, abstained.40 It is perhaps relevant to note that aside from Algeria, 
African non-permanent members of the UNSC at the time included Benin and Tanzania, 
both of which voted in favour of the referral. Consequently, the Prosecutor began 
investigating the situation in Darfur. The Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately issued arrest 
warrants for seven suspects, including al- Bashir, beginning in 2007. Al-Bashir was 
indicted first in 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and second in 2010 for 
genocide. The genocide charge was included once Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo was able 
provide the necessary evidence to charge al-Bashir with genocide, which was denied at 
the initial indictment by the Pre-Trial Chamber due to a lack of evidence.  
On this basis, tensions between the AU and the ICC can be traced back to 2008 
when it became clear that the ICC Prosecutor intended to indict al-Bashir.  At that time, 
the AU’s Peace and Security Council identified a ‘double standard’ with respect to 
international justice and emphasized the “AU’s concern with the misuse of indictments 
against African leaders.”41 The centrality of Africa in the operationalization of the ICC in 
every situation at that time led to assertions by some African politicians of selectivity, 
neo-colonialism, ‘white justice,’ and reference to the ICC as the ‘African Criminal 
 
40 Security Council, 5158th Meeting, UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005), SC/8531, 31 March 2005. 




Court.’42 This anti-ICC rhetoric has had a significant impact on African states and the 
AU’s identity, interests, and behaviour, which have shaped interactions with the Court to 
varying degrees ever since. The ICC and the UNSC’s flippant attitude towards the 
concerns raised by the AU and avenues for remedy further escalated feelings of mistrust 
throughout much of the Court’s operational history. 
Further compounding criticisms of institutional selectivity, the ICC did not extend 
its reach into situations outside of Africa until 2016. At the time of writing, the Court’s 
hyper-focus on ‘Africa’ was still visible: ten out of thirteen situations under investigation 
at the ICC involved African states.43 This reality has been matched with an institutional 
unwillingness to consider the AU’s position on key issues (i.e. head of state immunity 
and UNSC capability to refer and defer cases in sensitive and complex conflict and post-
conflict contexts). Resultantly, the Court, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), and the 
UNSC manifestly failed to mitigate the escalation of AU concerns, which fostered a 
culture and policy of non-cooperation with the ICC on the part of the AU for the arrest 
and surrender of al-Bashir to the Court.44 Specifically, at the 13th AU Summit it was 
decided that, “in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been 
acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate… for the arrest and surrender of 
President Omar El [sic] Bashir of The Sudan.”45 It is interesting to note that Chad issued 
 
42 Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: counteracting the 
crisis,” International Affairs 92.6 (2016), 1319-1320. 
43 The situations under investigation in Africa included Burundi, Central African Republic, Central African 
Republic II, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Uganda. The situations 
under investigation by the ICC outside of Africa included Afghanistan, Bangladesh/Myanmar, and Georgia. 
44 Note that the Assembly of States Parties in the management and legislative body of the ICC. Regarding 
institutional failure to mitigate AU concerns, see for example Charles Chernor Jalloh, Dapo Akande, and 
Max du Plessis, “Assessing the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court,” African Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2011), 5: “The UNSC’s failure to accede 
to the AU request [to defer the case against President Omar al-Bashir] led African States to formally 
withhold cooperation from the ICC in respect to the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese leader.” See, also: 
Adil Ahmad Haque, “Head of State Immunity is Too Important for the International Court of Justice,” Just 
Security (24 February 2020) blogpost available at https://www.justsecurity.org/68801/head-of-state-
immunity-is-too-important-for-the-international-court-of-justice/; accessed 1 January 2021: the author 
observes that the legal inconsistencies regarding head of state immunity could have been resolved by the 
International Law Commission, the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Security 
Council, and/or the Assembly of States Parties, but was not.  
45 African Union Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), 1-3 July 2009, Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), July 3, para. 10. 
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a formal reservation to this decision, demonstrating that it was adopted with some level 
of opposition from AU-ICC member states. 
Nevertheless, all of the African States Parties to the Rome Statute are also 
members of the AU, which effectively created a political climate of conflicting and 
overlapping mandates and obligations. African States Parties to the Rome Statute had to 
choose whether to uphold obligations to the AU or to the ICC regarding the arrest and 
surrender of Omar al-Bashir. This dualism ultimately led to increased AU pushback 
against the Court, first as a response to the Kenyan suggestion that African states should 
collectively withdraw from the ICC in 2013, and again in the form of its ‘ICC withdrawal 
strategy’ document in 2017.46  
Ultimately, Kenya, Namibia, and Uganda, threatened to withdraw, but never 
did.47 Burundi, The Gambia, and South Africa filed written notices of withdrawal from 
the Rome Statute, though The Gambia and South Africa withdrew their notifications and 
remained States Parties. Burundi did leave the Court, though this behaviour is readily 
explained by the fact that the prosecutor opened an investigation proprio motu in 
response to alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated in the context of political 
(election) violence, and withdrawal from the ICC has been understood as an attempt to 
skirt accountability for those crimes.48 Indeed, collective African withdrawal from the 
Court did not happen, though AU frustrations with the operationalization of the ICC in its 
pursuit of al-Bashir (and other African sitting heads of state) remained visible.  
 
46 African Union, “Withdrawal Strategy Document: Draft 2,” (2017) available at 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf; 
accessed 3 January 2021. 
47 Philomena Apiko and Faten Aggad, “The International Criminal Court, Africa and the African Union: 
What way forward?” European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper 201 
(November 2016), 1. 
48 See generally Refik Hodzic, “Burundi’s Vote to Leave ICC is Ill-Conceived and Sets Dangerous 
Precedent, Says ICTJ,” ICTJ (13 October 2016), available at https://www.ictj.org/news/burundi-icc-leave; 
accessed 5 January 2021: “The Burundi government has done a great disservice to its citizens, especially 
victims, by adopting this decision which uses false accusations of the court’s ‘anti-African’ bias to avoid 
the possibility of justice being done.” See also Benjamin Duerr, “Burundi’s ICC Withdrawal a Major Blow 
for Accountability,” Global Observatory (12 October 2016) available at 
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/10/burundi-icc-rome-statute-nkurunziza/; accessed 5 January 2021: 
“Nkurunziza’s government has a clear intention of avoiding accountability for its actions.” 
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Within the AU, those initially opposed to the ICC largely came from East African 
states (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda). However, AU Assembly 
Chairperson Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn stated in 2013 that “it 
should be underscored that our goal is not and should not be a crusade against the ICC, 
but a solemn call for the organization to take Africa’s concerns seriously.”49 This 
underscores the divisions within the AU with respect to the ICC–not all African states 
support the idea that they ought to abandon the ICC altogether and the real objective is to 
achieve genuine dialogue and constructive reform.  
Desalegn also claimed that the ICC was “degenerat[ing] into some kind of race 
hunting.”50 This type of rhetoric has infiltrated the backdrop upon which AU-ICC 
relations operate.  This also reflects the competing identities and norms at play on the 
continent. There is a desire not to completely reject the ICC, while at the same time 
reiterating strategically charged political rhetoric stemming from influential states within 
the AU. This is compounded by the lack of meaningful dialogue between the ICC and the 
AU, and the inherent distrust of the AU in general. These biases are significant because 
their internalization had the dual impact of shaping state (and regional) identity and 
perpetuated constructions of an ‘us versus them’ approach to ICC-AU relations at both 
the organizational and institutional levels. The AU has engaged in a two-level game 
whereby it has openly criticized the ICC while simultaneously seeking avenues for 
mediation. In many respects, South Africa’s withdrawal was a useful experiment for the 
rest of the continent to evaluate the reputational consequences that would stem from 
leaving the Court. Indeed, South Africa faced significant reputational costs associated 
with its decision to withdraw, which offers some explanatory value as to why other 
African countries decided to remain States Parties.51 
 
49 Voice of America, “AU Requests Kenyatta ICC Trial Delay,” available online 
https://www.voanews.com/africa/au-requests-kenyatta-icc-trial-delay (accessed 10 April 2021). 
50 Manuel J. Ventura and Amelia J. Bleeker, “Universal Jurisdiction, African Perceptions of the 
International Criminal Court and the New AU Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,” in The International Criminal Court and Africa: One 
Decade On, ed. Evelyn A. Ankumah (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2016), 442. 
51See for example: Saul Musker, “Why South Africa is wrong to leave the international criminal court,” 
The Guardian (14 October 2015) available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/14/why-south-
africa-is-wrong-to-leave-the-international-criminal-court; accessed 10 January 2021: “Should the country 
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Notwithstanding this, calls for the ICC to take African concerns seriously 
permeate the AU discourse. Moreover, attempts by the AU to facilitate communicative 
diplomacy through the UNSC with respect to ICC cases concerning sitting heads of state, 
particularly in the case of al- Bashir is worth noting in this respect. Morally charged 
judgments aside, the AU had clearly formulated objections to the ICC’s conduct on the 
continent and the failure to engage in meaningful dialogue with respect to these points 
allowed the AU to take a step away from the institution and provide its membership with 
politically instrumental insulation and solidarity. Pitted against the idea that there needs 
to be ‘African solutions to African problems’ coupled with constructions of identity that 
reinforce an ‘us versus the West’ power structure within the AU, isolationist movements 
by African states may be better understood. It is also necessary to acknowledge the 
longstanding tradition of brotherhood and protectionism afforded to African leaders by 
the AU and the related reluctance to censure a sitting head of state, no matter how 
untoward their domestic politics may be.52 This reality similarly informs constructions of 
identity, both inside and outside of the AU.    
It is clear that African states chose to uphold regional political obligations over 
international ones, since al-Bashir was never arrested, even when he travelled to ICC 
member states throughout the continent, including Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, South 
Africa, and Uganda. African interests and the AU legacy of brotherhood among 
government leaders prevented the effective operationalization of the Rome Statute and al-
Bashir’s arrest at various junctures between the years 2009-2019. However, despite the 
 
withdraw, a mass exodus of African states will likely follow and the foundations of the court will crumble. 
Not only will this set back the pursuit of meaningful international justice by decades, it will seriously 
tarnish South Africa’s global reputation as a proponent of human rights and a moral authority in the world, 
significantly reducing its political capital. The country’s prominence in a variety of international 
institutions relies on this reputation, as does its bid for permanent status at the UN security council.”    
52 Note that key examples of this tradition include the Organization of African Unity making Idi Amin 
Chair in the 1970s, despite knowledge that he was perpetrating atrocious crimes against his own citizens. 
Similarly, when Mugabe was under Western sanctions for election-based crimes he became the Chair of the 
AU. Other AU chairs include Muammar Gadaffi from February 2009-Janaury 2010, which demonstrates 
that domestic human rights issues do not factor into the legacy of the AU power structure. See Elizabeth 
Ohene, “Letter from Africa: Has the African Union grown some teeth?” BBC (23 December 2015), 
available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35162455; accessed 5 January 2021: “I gritted my 
teeth through sessions chaired by the Ugandan leader Idi Amin… I covered the OAU when the principle of 
non-interference in international affairs was sacrosanct and members would not condemn ‘Brother 
Presidents,’ no matter how badly they behaved towards their own citizens.” 
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widespread regional culture of non-cooperation with the Court, dual AU-ICC member 
states chose to remain States Parties to the Rome Statute. 
As a result, the AU began to soften its approach towards the Court in 2018, by 
seeking remedial strategies to resolve tensions and confusions, most notably through its 
request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the issue of 
immunities for sitting heads of state, and the establishment of an expert working group on 
the same topic through the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP). Similar 
efforts were initiated with respect to the UNSC’s deferral powers: the AU proposed an 
amendment to the Rome Statute to empower the United Nations General Assembly to act 
if the UNSC fails to act on an ICC deferral request after six months. Thus, the AU has 
formalized its concerns and thought about potential avenues for remedy, rather than 
continuing to promote African abandonment of the ICC en masse. However, the political 
palatability and legal feasibility of African concerns and proposed solutions have failed to 
gain traction outside of the AU, which has resulted in a lack of genuine dialectical 
engagement within the institutional framework of the Court. Due to the long-term neglect 
of these concerns, the AU has reemphasized (more) local responses to international 
criminal justice–i.e. through the effective use of “national and continental judicial and 
legislative mechanisms to deal with impunity in order to ensure that justice is served in a 
fair manner.”53 This includes expanding the mandate of regional justice mechanisms such 
as the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights, to cover the same crimes as the 
Rome Statute: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression–with the 
caveat that heads of state and senior government officials are immune from prosecution 
during their leadership. However, African commitment to establish an AU-backed, 
regional international criminal court has been weak, which suggests that capacity 
building at the local level and sustained commitment to the ICC remain paramount 
prerogatives for the longevity of international criminal justice mechanisms on the 
continent.  
 
53 African Union, 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, 28-29 January 2018, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
Decision on the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.672, 3(ii). 
232 
 
8.5 Head of State Immunity and International Criminal 
Law: An overview 
Since the indictment of al-Bashir, the judges at the ICC have manifestly failed to issue 
cogent decisions on the issue of head of state immunity.54 As noted above, al-Bashir 
travelled to several States Parties on official business but was never arrested, which 
forced the Court to opine on issues of non-cooperation with respect to those states. The 
decisions reached by the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers on this issue have coalesced on 
the point that al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity from arrest, but the reasons for arriving 
at this conclusion have been inconsistent and subject to widespread criticism not only 
from the AU and relevant African states, but from the broad community of ICC scholars, 
observers, and stakeholders.55 This suggests that the AU’s points of concern were far 
 
54 See Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Al Ahmad 
Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 (4 March 2009); Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on 
the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with 
Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-140 (13 
December 2011); Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar 
Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09-195 (9 April 2014); Decision Under 
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Non-Compliance by South Africa with the Request by the Court 
for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-302 (6 July 2017); Decision Under 
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Non-Compliance by Jordan with the Request by the Court for the 
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-309 (11 December 2017); Judgment in the 
Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, ICC-02-05-01/09-397-Corr (6 May 2019).  
55 See ICC Press Release, “Al-Bashir Case: ICC Appeals Chamber confirms Jordan’s non-cooperation but 
reverses the decision referring it to the ASP and UNSC,” ICC-CPI-20190506-PR1452, 6 May 2019, 
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1452; accessed 2 January 2021. For some 
examples of scholars and observers who have criticized the ICC’s decision-making on Bashir’s immunity, 
see Ben Batros, “A Confusing ICC Appeals Judgement on Head-of-State Immunity,” Just Security (7 May 
2019), blogpost available at https://www.justsecurity.org/63962/a-confusing-icc-appeals-judgment-on-
head-of-state-immunity/; accessed 2 January 2021; Dapo Akande, “ICC Appeals Chamber Holds that 
Heads of State Have No Immunity Under Customary International Law Before International Tribunals,” 
EJIL:Talk! (6 May 2019) blogpost available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-appeals-chamber-holds-that-
heads-of-state-have-no-immunity-under-customary-international-law-before-international-tribunals/; 
accessed 2 January 2021; Dapo Akande, “ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (…At Long 
Last…) But Gets the Law Wrong,” EJIL:Talk! (15 December 2011) blogpost available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issues-detailed-decision-on-bashir’s-immunity-at-long-last-but-gets-the-law-
wrong/; accessed 2 January 2021; William Schabas, “Obama, Medvedev and Hu Jintao may be Prosecuted 
by International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber Concludes,” PhD studies in human rights (15 
December 2011) blogpost available at http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2011/12/obama-
medvedev-and-hu-jintao-may-be.html; accessed 2 January 2021; Dov Jacobs, “You have just entered 
Narnia: ICC Appeals Chamber adopts the worst possible solution on immunities in the Bashir case,” 
Spreading the Jam (6 May 2019) blogpost available at https://dovjacobs.com/2019/05/06/you-have-just-
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from baseless with respect to the legal issues surrounding immunity, particularly as it 
applies to non-States Parties, as was the case with al-Bashir. 
In the context of the ICC, the Rome Statute espouses an understanding of 
accountability whereby no-one is immune from prosecution for violations of the most 
serious international criminal crimes, namely: genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and aggression. Specifically, article 27 of the Rome Statute deals with the 
irrelevance of official capacity and says, 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar 
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.56 
 
Prima facie, Article 27 is quite clear on the issue and thus, States Parties should 
understand their obligation to waive any immunities afforded to individuals in this 
respect. However, this inclusion is novel and contradictory to longstanding international 
legal doctrines that do afford immunities to sitting heads of state and high-ranking 
officials from criminal jurisdiction both domestically and in other states.57 Taken further, 
Article 27 actually undercuts established standards of international law with respect to the 
absolute personal immunity afforded to heads of state, whether at home or in a foreign 
country on official business.58 The jurisprudence provided by the International Court of 
 
entered-narnia-icc-appeals-chamber-adopts-the-worst-possible-solution-on-immunities-in-the-bashir-case/; 
accessed 2 January 2021.  
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, (17 July 1998), Art. 27(1), (2). 
57 Roseanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 169. 
58 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, (Democratic Republic of Congo vs Belgium); 2002; ICJ: it was found 
that it is an established principle of international law that Heads of States and Governments, Foreign 
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Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case (2002) clearly established that senior government 
officials do have immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law, if the arrest 
warrant is issued by a national court.59 On this basis, Article 27 can readily be interpreted 
as a contradiction to longstanding standards of customary international law.  
However, the idea that heads of state and government are not free from criminal 
responsibility can be framed as a developing legal concept. For example, the finding by 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone that Charles Taylor did not enjoy any immunity from 
prosecution even though he was the sitting head of state of Liberia at the time is the most 
relevant articulation of this idea. It has been explained that “this historic ruling by the 
Court is a significant contribution to the modern international law norm asserting that 
Heads of State and other high-ranking government officials are not absolved of criminal 
responsibility for serious international crimes.”60 Nevertheless, there appears to be two 
fundamentally different understandings of the treatment of immunity at the national and 
international levels. The Special Court for Sierra Leone characterized these differences 
based on the fact that “the principle of state immunity derives from the equality of 
sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to international criminal tribunals which 
are not organs of a state but derive their mandate from the international community.”61 
This implies that international tribunals or courts have the ability to strip immunities that 
national courts cannot. However, all international courts and tribunals preceding the 
establishment of the ICC derived their mandates from the ideation and direct support of 
the United Nations. In contrast, the ICC is treaty-based and derives its mandate from the 
 
Ministers and Diplomatic and Consular agents enjoy immunities from civil and criminal jurisdictions of 
other States. 
59 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J 
Reports 2002. Note that this case involved the issuance of an international arrest warrant in absentia by 
Belgium against the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, alleging crimes against 
humanity. The arrest warrant was circulated through Interpol. The ICJ Judges determined that Belgium was 
required to cancel the arrest warrant because the suspect enjoyed immunity under international law as 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
60 Charles Jalloh, “Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes: The Case of Charles Taylor at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” The American Society of International Law 8.2 (2004) [emphasis added]. 
Available at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/21/immunity-prosecution-international-crimes-
case-charles-taylor-special; accessed 2 April 2021. 
61 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004, 51. 
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consent of states, independent of the United Nations. The Rome Statute has not achieved 
universal ratification, which directly challenges the argument that the ICC derives its 
mandate from the ‘international community;’ rather, it appears to derive its mandate from 
the 123 states that have voluntarily agreed to be bound by it (64 per cent of all states, at 
the time of writing). The ICC is very much limited as a result of its dependence and 
preoccupation with the principle of sovereignty and the mixed political will of states to 
uphold the norms embedded in the Rome Statute.  
On this basis, the juxtaposition of this reasoning in the context of the ICC is 
inherently problematic, since the ICC depends on the consent, membership, and 
cooperation of sovereign states in order to operate effectively. Therefore, it not only 
derives its mandate from the ‘international community,’ broadly understood, but more 
particularly from its member states (and perhaps non-member states) who feel compelled 
to cooperate to achieve particular judicial and/or political outcomes, which are fluid and 
can change over time. With the benefit of retrospect concerning the al-Bashir example, it 
is clear that the ‘modern’ norm is not upheld when it clashes with interests and objectives 
of states or regional organizations of states–in this case, the AU. Nevertheless, Charles 
Jalloh argued in 2003 that “the trend in the jurisprudence suggests that the scope of 
immunity is highly contested and will therefore continue to evolve.”62 At the time of 
writing, the scope of immunity is still contested and it is unclear that the evolution of the 
norm and/or the jurisprudence has clarified the matter in the interim, but instead 
complicated it further. While it is clear that providing immunity for heads of state and 
senior government officials who perpetrate the core crimes covered by the Rome Statute 
is ethically and morally obtuse, the legal reasoning required to settle the issue at the ICC 
has been unsatisfactory. In the absence of political will, the legal reasoning needs to fill 
in the gaps and compel states to uphold the Rome Statute, even if it runs counter to the 
political interests of its member and non-member states. The unwillingness of the UNSC 
to contribute to the Court’s overall effectiveness with tangible commitments is a 
contributing and limiting factor to this end. 
 
62 Charles Jalloh, “Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes: The Case of Charles Taylor at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.” 
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Returning to the ideational foundation of the ICC, the contestation of immunity at 
the national and international levels was something that the drafters of the Rome Statute 
were very much aware of. It has been explained that “this slowly developing tendency in 
international law [the progressive agreement that heads of state and government were not 
free from criminal responsibility] has to be contrasted with domestic law where head of 
state immunity in international criminal proceedings still might be regarded up till today 
as absolute.”63 Thus, Article 27 was met with the inclusion of Article 98, which was 
“accepted as political compromise.”64 Article 98 deals with cooperation with respect to 
waiver of immunity and consent to surrender and says, 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is 
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can 
first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for 
the surrender.65 
 
The interpretation and application of Article 98 as it relates to Article 27 has been highly 
contested by scholars, some African states, and extensively by the AU.  It seems fair to 
suggest that there is a contradictory relationship between the two articles, especially in 
light of how observers of Rome Statute negotiations have described the origins of this 
particular statutory inclusion. On this basis, the relationship between the two articles is 
 
63 Claus Kreß and Kimberly Prost, “Article 98: Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and 
consent to surrender,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ 
Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2008), 781. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 98. 
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opaque and confused the obligations of states to either arrest al-Bashir or to uphold his 
immunity under customary international law.   
It is also clear that questions regarding the interrelationship of Articles 27 and 98 
have been highly contentious in the operationalization of the Court when it has pursued 
heads of state, particularly al-Bashir. Scholars such as Dapo Akande have argued that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber manifestly failed to consider Article 98 when issuing al-Bashir’s 
Arrest Warrant. More specifically, Akande argued that “I continue to be astounded that 
the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Bashir Arrest Warrant failed to address [Article] 98, a 
provision directly applicable to the precise situation that was before them. This was 
nothing short of a dereliction of duty on the part of the judges. I really am hard pressed to 
think of a decision of an international tribunal where the tribunal simply ignores– does 
not even mention– what is perhaps the key provision which deals with the case at 
hand.”66 This omission at the earliest stages of the Court’s pursuit of al-Bashir set the 
course for recurring judicial missteps and patterns of procedural deficiency.     
 States that allowed al-Bashir to visit but failed to arrest him have provided legal 
justifications for this behavior at the Court. For example, Malawi argued that it did not 
arrest al-Bashir because he was the head of a state not party to the Rome Statute, and 
therefore was immune from arrest under customary international law. However, the Pre-
Trial Chamber decided that “customary international law creates an exception to Head of 
State immunity when international courts seek a Head of State’s arrest for the 
commission of international crimes. There is no conflict between Malawi’s obligations 
towards the Court and its obligations under customary international law; therefore, 
Article 98(1) of the Statute does not apply.”67 Thus, Malawi failed to comply with its 
obligations to cooperate with the ICC because the nature of international courts provides 
an exception to the immunity of al-Bashir, which he might enjoy under national courts. 
This conclusion is relatively consistent with the reasoning in Charles Taylor. However, it 
 
66 Dapo Akande, “Is the Rift between Africa and the ICC Deepening? Heads of State Decide Not to 
Cooperate with ICC on the Bashir Case,” EJIL:Talk! (4 July 2009) blogpost available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-the-rift-between-africa-and-the-icc-deepening-heads-of-states-decide-not-to-
cooperate-with-icc-on-the-bashir-case/; accessed 6 January 2021. 




is necessary to reiterate that the ICC is constituted by States, and not the ambiguously 
termed ‘international community’ since it is not sponsored or otherwise dependent on the 
United Nations. Even though UNSC Resolution 1593 obliged Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ 
with the ICC, it never expressly imposed obligations onto any other state regarding 
cooperation, further blurring the line between national and international obligations with 
respect to non-States Parties. Compounding this confusion, the AU required its member 
states not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, which 
effectively created the potential for trilateral conflicting obligations onto dual AU-ICC 
member states.68      
Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber also decided in Malawi that “there is an 
inherent tension between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Statute and the role immunity 
plays when the Court seeks cooperation regarding the arrest of a Head of State.  The 
Chamber considers that Malawi, and by extension the African Union, are not entitled to 
rely on Article 98(1) of the Statute to justify refusing to comply with the Cooperation 
Requests.”69 The justification for the reasoning stemmed from the evolving trend that 
head of state immunity no longer exists in the Post Second World War era, amounting to 
customary international law. This reasoning was repeated in the judgment involving the 
non-cooperation of Chad, another States Party to the Rome Statute that failed to arrest al-
Bashir when he was on its territory.70 On this basis, it has been argued by Dire Tladi that 
“the Court proceeded to decide the cases as if Article 98 was not included in the 
Statute.”71  This was picked up by the AU Commission, which stated that the decision 
has the effect of “rendering Article 98 of the Rome Statute redundant, non-operational 
and meaningless.”72 This is a highly contested issue among international legal scholars 
 
68 African Union Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII), 3 July 2009: This decision expressly required 
AU member states not to cooperate with the ICC relating to immunities for the arrest and surrender of 
President [al- Bashir] of Sudan. 
69 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (11 December 2011). 
70 Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply 
with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, (13 December 2011). 
71 Dire Tladi, “The ICC Decisions on Chad and Malawi: On Cooperation, Immunities, and Article 98,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11.1 (2013): 199.  
72 African Union Commission Press Release No. 002/201 (9 January 2012).  
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and commentators.73  Inasmuch as the origins of Article 98 can be traced back to political 
compromise as a counter to the inclusion of Article 27 in Rome, the position that a 
conflict between the two articles does not exist is ostensibly weak. The more palpable 
argument is that there is a contradictory relationship between Articles 27 and 98 as a 
result of political compromise in Rome, which has not been dealt with sufficiently by the 
Court, demonstrated by inconsistent reasoning on the issue.  Moral and political 
imperatives aside, the ICC needs to establish a sound legal position on the question, or 
else be exposed to ongoing scrutiny.  This lack of consistency has exacerbated tensions 
with the AU, further contributing to AU discontent and pushback towards the Court. 
With reference to the previous chapters, it is clear that African states wanted to avoid the 
potential for these sorts of political conflicts at the ICC from the ouset of its institutional 
design. Thus, this is a direct reflection of the concerns raised by African states at the 
Rome Diplomatic Conference with respect to the politicization of the ICC and the 
involvement of the United Nations Security Council in the function of the Court.    
This point was further aggravated by the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
abandoned its reasoning in Malawi and Chad when it advanced a new decision that the 
Security Council referral itself implicitly waived al-Bashir’s immunity by referring the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC and requiring Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court.74 
This approach has been colloquially referred to as the ‘Security Council route.’ In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that because the 
situation was referred to the ICC via Security Council Resolution 1593, this “implicitly 
waived the immunities granted to Omar al-Bashir under international law and attached to 
his position as a Head of State.”75 Three years later in the South Africa Decision, the Pre-
 
73 Jens Iverson, “Head of State Immunity is not the same as State Immunity: A Response to the African 
Union’s Position on Article 98 of the ICC Statute” EJIL Analysis (13 February 2012), available at 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/head-of-state-immunity-is-not-the-same-as-state-immunity-a-response-to-the-
african-unions-position-on-article-98-of-the-icc-statute/; accessed 3 January 2021; for an example of an 
argument that al-Bashir did enjoy immunity from arrest see Paola Gaeta, “Does President Al Bashir Enjoy 
Immunity from Arrest?” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7.2 (2009): 315-332. 
74 Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s 
Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09-195 (9 April 2014). 
75 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09-
195 (9 April 2014), 29. 
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Trial Chamber adopted another position and decided that the very nature of the UNSC 
referral made Sudan analogous to a States Party of the Rome Statute, and therefore al-
Bashir’s immunity was waived under Article 27.76 While each of these approaches arrive 
at the same conclusion, i.e. that al-Bashir does not have immunity, the pathways taken to 
get there have been wholly inconsistent. 
In his minority opinions in South Africa and Jordan, Judge Marc Perrin de 
Brichambaut offered yet another judicial avenue to lift al-Bashir’s immunity. He opined 
that immunity is lifted when al-Bashir visits states that have ratified the Genocide 
Convention, since he was a person being charged with the crime of genocide. This 
approach has been subject to scrutiny for a host of reasons, most crippling of which is the 
point that the Court’s ability to exercise its own jurisdiction would be dependent upon the 
ratification of other treaties by States Parties, compromising the institutional dependence 
of the Court.77 It is perhaps instructive to recall the uncertainty surrounding the genocide 
charge against al-Bashir in the first place. To this point, the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur that recommended the situation be referred to the ICC in 2005 
determined that genocide had not been committed in Darfur. More specifically,   
The Commission concluded that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a 
policy of genocide… The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued 
and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the 
militias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting from the 
gravity of the crimes perpetrated in the region. International offences such as the 
crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may 
be no less serious and heinous than genocide.78 
With this finding in mind, it is prudent to question if it is appropriate to strip immunity on 
the basis of a charge that might not stick or is reflective of an overzealous prosecutorial 
 
76 Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request 
by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July 2017. 
77 Leila Sadat, “Why the ICC’s Judgment in the al-Bashir Case Wasn’t So Surprising,” Just Security (12 
July 2019) blogpost available at https://www.justsecurity.org/64896/why-the-iccs-judgment-in-the-al-
bashir-case-wasnt-so-surprising/; accessed 5 January 2021. 
78 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
(Geneva: 25 January 2005), 4 [emphasis added]. 
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strategy. This is supported by the fact that the genocide charge against al-Bashir was 
initially rejected in 2009 because the prosecutor failed to adequately establish that al-
Bashir acted with genocidal intent. However, the Appeals Chamber relaxed the standard 
of proof required at the charging stage and thus, genocide was included in a second arrest 
warrant in 2010. Nevertheless, it is clear that the prosecutor has a significant amount of 
work to do before trial to substantiate the genocide charge. On this basis, using the 
genocide charge as a modicum for stripping al-Bashir’s immunity is a bad idea optically, 
politically, and legally. This is significant because it undermines the authority of the 
Court altogether, and rests authority on unsubstantiated allegations, which may or may 
not result in a guilty verdict.  
 However, the most important aspect of Judge Brichambaut’s minority opinion in 
Jordan was the point that “the issue of Omar Al-Bashir’s immunity… has given rise to 
different legal positions in the decisions of this Court. It is therefore of the utmost 
importance and urgency that the Court take a clear stance on the legal issues bearing on 
the obligation of States Parties to cooperate with the Court in the arrest and surrender of 
Omar Al-Bashir.”79 This plea demonstrates the seriousness of the issue and the 
unpredictability of the judiciary at the same time. As Dire Tladi has explained, “The ICC 
has essentially adopted an à la carte approach to the applicability of immunities in the 
Rome Statute system, in which any approach in a wide selection of options is acceptable 
as long as the option leads to the conclusion that Al Bashir must be arrested and 
surrendered.”80 From a political standpoint, such inconsistent decision-making obfuscates 
the obligations of states, and compromises the development of the norm that heads of 
state and other senior government officials do not enjoy immunity from prosecution for 
atrocity crimes.    
It is certain that the most significant problem emanating from the Court’s 
decisions with respect to al-Bashir’s immunity is the lack of judicial consistency.  While 
the overall sentiment at the Court is that the immunity of al-Bashir is uncontentious and 
 
79 Minority Opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, ICC-02/05-01/09-319-Anx (21 February 2018), 
4 (7). 
80 Dire Tladi, “Of Heroes and Villains, Angels and Demons: The ICC-AU Tension Revisited,” German 
Yearbook of International Law, 60 (2017): 65. 
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non-existent, legally and politically there has been no cogent justification for saying so 
beyond moral imperative, which is nonetheless important from an ethical standpoint, but 
not a legal one. Indeed, it has been argued that the “reversal of the Malawi and Chad 
decisions demonstrates the continuing uncertainty about this complex issue. As things 
stand, not only States and commentators but also different Chambers disagree about the 
correct interpretation of Article 98(1) in relation to Article 27(2), customary international 
law, and Resolution 1593.”81 At the Appeals Chamber in the Jordan Decision, the Court 
attempted to bridge two approaches when it decided that there is no immunity for heads 
of state in international criminal courts exercising proper jurisdiction, and also finding 
that the Security Council referral required Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ with the ICC, 
meaning that UNSC Resolution 1593 made Sudan a de facto States Party to the Rome 
Statute, and implicitly removed al-Bashir’s immunities under Article 27 as a result. This 
decision has similarly been met with disappointment and skepticism.82 From a political 
standpoint, further engraining the powers of the UNSC within the jurisdictional apparatus 
of the Court to strip immunity for heads of states of non-States Parties only contributes to 
perceptions of unfairness and renders the Court practically dependent on the UNSC, as 
opposed to its own independent authority. Resolution 1593 requires Sudan to ‘cooperate 
fully’ with the Court but does not mention whether or not it is subject to the Rome Statute 
as if it were a States Party, nor does it explicitly address the issue of immunity in its 
 
81 André de Hoogh and Abel Knottnerus, “ICC Issues New Decision on Al-Bashir’s Immunities – But Gets 
the Law Wrong… Again,” EJIL: Talk! (18 April 2014), blogpost available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-
issues-new-decision-on-al-bashirs-immunities-‒-but-gets-the-law-wrong-again/; accessed 3 January 2021. 
82 Dapo Akande, “ICC Appeals Chamber Holds that Heads of State Have No Immunity Under Customary 
International Law Before International Tribunals,” EJIL: Talk! (6 May 2019) blogpost available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-appeals-chamber-holds-that-heads-of-state-have-no-immunity-under-
customary-international-law-before-international-tribunals/; accessed 3 January 2021: “the Appeals 
Chamber, once again changes the basis on which the ICC has held that the Sudanese (now former) 
President was not immune from the arrest in ICC states parties that he visited…Indeed the Appeals 
Chamber appears to explicitly endorse the much criticized decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the 
Malawi Decision;” Asad Kiyani, “Elisions and Omissions: Questioning the ICC’s Latest Bashir Immunity 
Ruling,” Just Security (8 May 2019), blogpost available at https://www.justsecurity.org/63973/elisions-and-
omissions-questioning-the-iccs-latest-bashir-immunity-ruling/; accessed 3 January 2021: “In this confusing 
and at times apparently contradictory decision, the Appeals Chamber offers arguments that rest on 
contestable foundations, in part because of its questionable interpretations of or indifference to unfavorable 
evidence… In a case that demanded careful reasoning, the Chamber’s arguments unfortunately stretch its 
credibility by either leaving important questions unanswered, omitting relevant detail, or veering into the 
disingenuous.”    
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original resolution or another to clarify the issue.83 Reading in these authoritative 
presumptions was both legally dubious and politically unwise, especially from the 
perspective of the AU and some African states. 
The UNSC has made no attempt to clarify the role of immunities in Resolution 
1593. From a practical standpoint, the UNSC appears to be completely disengaged from 
the Court and its correlative powers emanating from Resolution 1593. It has been noted 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber that “the past 24 meetings of the Security Council of the United 
Nations following the adoption of Resolution 1593 (2005), including meetings held on 
the occasion of the biannual reports made by the Prosecutor to the Security Council of the 
United Nations, have not resulted in measures against States Parties that have failed to 
comply with their obligations to cooperate with the Court.”84 This suggests that the 
UNSC as a collective political body does not feel strongly about States Parties choosing 
not to arrest al-Bashir. Permanent five members China and Russia have expressly sided 
with the African Union and the Government of Sudan on this issue.85 This sends a 
message that informs the predictability of state behavior and tacitly suggests that there 
was no political obligation to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the Court. In the absence 
of heavy political consequences for noncooperation by the UNSC, choosing AU and/or 
regional interests over and above the ICC appears rational, since the reputational damage 
incurred by noncompliance with the Court was relatively inconsequential.     
 
83 Alexandre Skander Galand, “Why the Security Council Should Not be Involved Regarding Al-Bashir’s 
Immunity,” OpinioJuris (20 July 2017) blogpost available at http://opiniojuris.org/2017/07/20/33215/; 
accessed 5 January 2021: “The RSA [Republic of South Africa] also argued that ‘if the UNSC intended to 
remove immunity, it could have clarified the situation by adopting another resolution.’ This is indeed a 
suggestion I made in my previous post; not as sine qua non for finding that Al-Bashir’s immunity did not 
apply but simply as an aid for the ICC to uphold its position.” 
84 Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request 
by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July 2017, 51 at 138. 
85 United Nations Security Council, 7963rd meeting, 8 June 2017, S/PV.7963, 11: The representative of 
China said, “China’s position on the handling of the situation in The Sudan by the International Criminal 
Court remains unchanged. China believes that the legitimate concerns of the African Union and the 
Sudanese Government on the Court’s handling of the situation in The Sudan should be given adequate 
attention.” At 12, the representative from Russia said, “On more than one occasion, we have called 
attention to the fact that the obligation to cooperate, as set forth in resolution 1593 (2005), does not mean 
that the norms of international law governing the immunity of the Government officials of those States not 
party [to] the Rome Statute can be repealed, and presuming the contrary is unacceptable.”  
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Importantly, because Article 98 emerged as a political compromise in response to 
Article 27, the idea of circumventing this strong politicization through creative legal 
interpretation and application in the interest of moral appeal is wholly simplistic and 
deeply problematic, especially when it further engrains the power of the UNSC within the 
practical functioning of the Court. There is a direct relationship between Article 27 and 
Article 98, and this was constructed on purpose by the drafters of the Rome Statute. As 
Dov Jacobs has similarly pointed out, 
as a consequence of the [Appeals] Judgment, Article 98(1) is rendered mostly 
meaningless. Of course Article 98(1) does not actually list what immunities need 
to be respected by cooperating States, but it is somewhat difficult to imagine that 
if the drafters of the Rome Statute really thought that Article 27 removed all 
immunities, even in the horizontal relationship between States, as an established 
rule of customary international law, it would have bothered to introduce Article 
98(1) in the first place.86 
Thus, in order to pacify the uneven acceptance and diffusion of the so-called ‘modern’ 
norm that heads of state and government no longer enjoy immunity under customary 
international law, compromise was required in Rome, suggesting that this was not (and is 
not) a universally accepted custom that can bind non-States Parties to the Rome Statute. 
The issue is magnified when it is framed as a ‘modern’ norm. The expectation that this 
evolutionary moral imperative be internalized universally at such a premature stage in the 
development of international criminal law is politically and practically unrealistic. While 
universal accountability is morally and ethically altruistic, it remains legally, and 
especially politically, difficult to enforce. Article 98 cracks the door for states to preserve 
sovereignty with respect to cooperation and compliance, particularly regarding the 
obligations concerning non-States Parties by deferring to a consent-based jurisdiction 
regime. The most significant problem is the identification of conflicting norms at the 
international, regional, and domestic levels that have problematized the 
operationalization of the Court. With respect to dual members of the AU and the Rome 
 
86 Dov Jacobs, “You have just entered Narnia: ICC Appeals Chamber adopts the worst possible solution on 
immunities in the Bashir case.” 
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Statute, there is a conflicting regional standard that has been implemented through AU 
resolutions reaffirming immunities for sitting heads of state and demands for non-
cooperation with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, which is directly at 
odds with international and domestic obligations. Perhaps what is most offensive is the 
underlying feeling that the UNSC was using an African case to firmly establish the 
‘modern norm’ which may or may not have been viewed as ‘low hanging fruit’ since 
situations and leaders perpetrating crimes of comparable gravity were not targeted in the 
same way. Even if that is not the case, colonial sensitivities and concerns raised by 
African states in Rome indicate serious concern about integrating the politicization of the 
UNSC within the ICC as deeply problematic.  
Equally important, while the kneejerk reaction is to view the AU position hastily, 
it is important to take its concerns seriously. This is not a question of morality– of course 
those most responsible for serious crimes ought to be held to account.  The accountability 
norm is good, impunity is bad, and al-Bashir should be brought to justice. Inasmuch as 
these sentiments permeate all facets of the international criminal justice project, it turns 
into a normatively biased enterprise, void of sufficient analytical scrutiny. At the nexus of 
international relations and international criminal law, moral appeals are insufficient 
justifications for imposing standards or expectations that are not, as it turns out, 
universally held at any particular time, in any particular place.  It is important to situate 
the ICC within its broader context. The immunity issue was identified as being 
problematic during the course of the Rome Statute negotiations. The ICC has operated 
disproportionately in Africa and it should be unsurprising that this foreseen statutory 
conflict has come to a head through the interpretation and application of the Rome Statute 
in the case of al-Bashir.   
Notwithstanding this, the AU has not abandoned the international criminal justice 
norm. Conceptually, there is much agreement between the ICC and the AU regarding the 
importance of fighting impunity, least of all for the most serious violations of 
international criminal law. Functionally, however, the approach to immunities for sitting 
heads of state taken by the ICC might rightly be viewed as unreasonably progressive, 
since it has been routinely argued that “the case law of the ICC is contrary to customary 
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law in relation to immunities.”87 The tendency to view the AU with constructed distrust 
ought to be levied against what is at stake. Inasmuch as the AU might be framed as an 
organization designed to insulate powerful Africans by maintaining a culture of impunity, 
AU members might view the ICC with a similar distrust based on its inconsistent 
decision making, hyper-focus on African situations, and attempts to incite regime change 
by obliging African states to prioritize the Rome Statute over the prescribed interests of 
‘Africa’ without cogent reasoning. All of these stereotypes must be rightly understood as 
symptomatic of a colonial history that continues to inform identity, interests, and 
behaviors, fundamentally rooted in mutually constituted sentiments of mistrust and 
skepticism.  
 
8.6 Domestic Courts and the immunity of al-Bashir 
It is useful to highlight that domestic courts in South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda have 
opined on al-Bashir’s immunity during the course of his tenure as President and each 
determined that there was no immunity and therefore, an obligation exists to arrest and 
surrender the suspect to the ICC. The Supreme Court of South Africa found that head of 
state immunity does not apply in the context of international criminal law, and that there 
was an obligation to arrest al-Bashir while he was in South Africa, demonstrating an 
ideological polarization within political and legal branches, since the Zuma government 
facilitated his escape from the country despite a domestic arrest warrant being issued.88 
 
87 Dov Jacobs, “Some additional thoughts on African withdrawals from the ICC,” Spreading the Jam: 
International Law, International Criminal Law, Human Rights and Transitional Justice (27 October 2016) 
blogpost available at: https://dovjacobs.com/2016/10/27/some-additional-thoughts-on-african-withdrawals-
from-the-icc/; accessed 2 April 2021. Note that South Africa fundamentally relied on this argument at the 
Court. In its submissions before the Pre-Trial Chamber, see Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of 
Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July 2017, 13 (32): “the position expressed by South Africa at the 
hearing is that Omar Al-Bashir enjoys immunity from criminal proceedings, including from arrest, under 
customary international law, and since that immunity had not been waived by Sudan or otherwise, the 
Court was precluded by article 98(1) of the Statute from requesting South Africa to arrest and surrender 
Omar Al-Bashir and, consequently, South Africa was not obliged to arrest Omar Al-Bashir and surrender 
him to the Court.” 
88 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 2015 
(5)SA 1 (GP). The South African High Court also determined that there was a legal obligation to arrest al-
Bashir while he was in South Africa, but the Cabinet facilitated his escape from the country following the 
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The Kenyan Court of Appeal also found that that the government had an international 
obligation to arrest al-Bashir. It opined that “the Government of Kenya by inviting al 
Bashir to Kenya and failing to arrest him acted not only with complete impunity but also 
in violation of its international obligations.”89 The Kenyan decision also stated that al-
Bashir should be arrested if he ever returns to Kenya. Similarly, the High Court in 
Kampala questioned Uganda’s failure to arrest al-Bashir when he visited the country and 
issued a domestic warrant for his arrest, should he ever go back to Uganda.90 While he is 
no longer a sitting head of state, the Ugandan decision is symbolic in the sense that it 
overtly criticizes Museveni’s decision not to arrest al-Bashir when he was visiting 
Uganda as President of Sudan. Thus, there was not a monolithic ‘African’ position to 
oppose the ICC by insulating al-Bashir. On the contrary, every domestic African court 
that ruled on the immunity of al-Bashir determined that he had none, since he was 
properly indicted by the ICC. Despite this streamlined legal reasoning, the reality in this 
case was that regional political dynamics and protectionist leadership interests espoused 
by the AU visibly trumped international (and domestic) legal obligations.91 This was 
tacitly facilitated by the UNSC itself, since it placed no formal duty on states other than 
Sudan to cooperate with the ICC. Similarly, this case demonstrates that the consent-based 
jurisdiction of the ICC is not only at the behest of ‘states’ but more particularly, leaders 
of states, which offers significant enforcement and cooperation challenges for the ICC 
when executing arrest warrants for sitting heads of state and other senior government 
officials that may have developed relationships, working or personal, with indicted 
fugitives, which may inform interests and behaviour.    
 
AU Summit meetings, see The High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) Case Number: 
27740/2015 (24 June 2015).   
89 Civil Appeal 105 of 2012 & Criminal Appeal 274 of 2011 (Consolidated), available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/148746/; accessed 5 January 2021. 
90 Jonathan Kamoga, “Uganda arrest warrant for Bashir,” The East African (21 December 2019), available 
at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-arrest-warrant-for-bashir-1433336; 
accessed 2 January 2021; “Ugandan court issues arrest warrant for Sudan’s Bashir,” The Independent (19 
December 2019) available at https://www.independent.co.ug/ugandan-court-issues-arrest-warrant-for-
sudans-bashir/; accessed 2 January 2021. 
91 Note that under the auspice of complementarity, the Rome Statute requires States Parties to adopt 
legislation to domesticate the Statute. South Africa was the first state to adopt implementation legislation, 
namely the Rome Statute Implementation Act (16 August 2002); Uganda passed implementation legislation 
entitled the Ugandan ICC Act (10 March 2010). 
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8.7 Institutional weaknesses revealed by the al-Bashir 
 indictment 
It is important to highlight that the AU’s concerns about the operationalization of the 
Court have drawn attention to some serious institutional weaknesses (e.g. inconsistent 
judgements on complex legal issues such as head of state immunity; non-cooperation 
from states–including States Parties to the Rome Statute to enforce ICC arrest warrants; 
and a lack of UNSC involvement with respect to its own referrals to enforce ICC arrest 
warrants in both States Parties and non-States Parties), all of which need to be addressed 
in the interest of strengthening the ICC going forward. The al-Bashir indictment brought 
all of these weaknesses to the fore and created serious credibility challenges for the Court 
as a consequence.  
The effective application of the Rome Statute with respect to immunities for 
heads of state and other senior government officials has been practically and politically 
difficult for States Parties and non-States Parties alike. This contention has structured the 
division between the ICC, the AU, and several African states, and remains a fundamental 
disunity between the Court and much of the continent. Mapping the trajectory of AU 
criticisms towards the ICC on the issue of al-Bashir’s immunities during his tenure as 
President demonstrates recurring trends and points of disagreement, which ought to be 
considered through negotiation and meaningful dialogue, in order for effective resolution 
to take place. This is an important prerogative, since the AU presents an opportunity to 
(re)acquire greater Pan-African support for the ICC: a necessary step to encourage 
African states that are not signatory to the Rome Statute to consider ratifying the Statute, 
contributing to the proliferation of international criminal justice on the continent. 
Moreover, given the ICC’s hyper-focus on African situations, it would be prudent to 
consider the feedback provided by subjects of the Court’s interventions as a matter of 
institutional self-reflexivity and constructive reform. Least of all, this feedback offers a 
gauge to measure the acceptance of the international criminal justice norm embedded in 
the Rome Statute, particularly with respect to the immunity of sitting heads of state of 
non-States Parties indicted by the ICC vis-à-vis the UNSC.    
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The relevant insights are the prioritization of regional and/or domestic political 
interests in several African states that chose not to arrest al-Bashir when given an 
opportunity to do so. Also interesting is the reliance and recurrent use of human rights 
and transitional justice vernacular in the justifications for noncompliance with the ICC. 
Catchphrases such as ‘lasting peace’ and ‘reconciliation and reconstruction’ are tightly 
knit with the aims of transitional justice and by extension, the diffusion of international 
human rights.  It seems appropriate to reflect on this point. This type of discourse and 
rhetoric clearly reflects an internalization and diffusion of international human rights 
objectives and more importantly, the norms that undergird a substantial part of the 
international criminal justice project. Moreover, AU calls for more local responses to 
international crimes indicate that valuation that is placed on accountability mechanisms, 
while simultaneously refocusing the need for national capacity building and pan-African 
regional mechanisms better suited to provide ‘African solutions to African problems.’   
Moreover, the desire for streamlined integration of international criminal law 
mechanisms at the AU suggests that it is mindful of the international standards of 
appropriateness in this respect. Even if AU member states substantially fail to respect 
these norms, they are at least integrated into the regional normative foundation at the 
conceptual level.  Thus, even though the various developments at the AU can be framed 
as ‘anti-ICC,’ or ‘anti-international criminal justice,’ the AU has clearly stated that it 
remains committed to international criminal justice and the values closely associated with 
the norms that provide legitimacy, or perhaps more accurately, perceptions of legitimacy 
on the continent.  The most basic interpretation is that the AU is identifying how non-
cooperation with the ICC is actually what is required to achieve the stated goals of the 
Court, which can be seen as an attempt to prioritize regional interests and delegitimize 
the ICC simultaneously.  
Even when the AU asked its member states not to comply with the ICC in the 
arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, it still couched its opposition within the Rome Statute 
itself. Moreover, the regional position was that more human rights violations would occur 
with compliance than without it, due to the destabilizing effects of arresting sitting heads 
of state. The persuasiveness of this strategy is certainly suspicious, though worth 
considering and situating in its broader (normative) context.  
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Alternatively, reflexivity with respect to Western interpretations of ‘international 
criminal justice’ might result in an admission of bias. It is unlikely that an immunity 
provision would derail the international criminal justice project altogether. If anything, 
such a provision would allow the ICC to continue operating without the recurring 
legitimacy crises that result from failing to capture sitting heads of state. In reality, 
impunity with respect to these individuals is the norm. The same is not true for former 
heads of state, including al-Bashir, who will most likely be prosecuted for his alleged 
crimes. Nevertheless, to date, the ICC has failed to cement universal jurisdiction and 
therefore, accountability for atrocity crimes. Since the current international criminal 
justice landscape depends on state consent and cooperation to function, pragmatic 
approaches to political and legal conflicts of interest are imperative to the long-term 
success of the project.  
While it is impossible to demonstrate empirically that charging sitting heads of 
state and government officials is a risk to security and peace, it is also impossible to 
demonstrate the opposite. At a minimum, dialogue concerning this issue ought to take 
place in order to bridge the gap and normative divergence between the ICC and the AU 
on this key issue. Taken further, suppose the AU’s concerns about the arrest and 
surrender of al-Bashir were realized– it would be necessary to determine who or what 
was responsible for crimes committed as a result of the fallout of unsolicited, ICC-
provoked, regime change and/or power vacuum. The capacity of the ICC to handle 
societal and regional instability as a result of indicting a head of state remains suspect at 
best, and potentially damaging at worst.  Symbolic value aside, it is unclear that such an 
outcome is (or ought to be) compatible with the stated aims of the ICC, particularly in the 
absence of material UNSC support or involvement. 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
There is a fundamental distinction between the need for dialogue, negotiation, and 
bargaining on one hand, and non-cooperation on the other. Many of the concerns raised 
by the AU are understandable, and at least worthy of a conversation. It is well established 
that the ICC was envisioned with African perspectives in mind.  Conceptually, the Rome 
Statute is agreeable to African states; the operationalization of the Rome Statute seems to 
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be the substantive objection. Notwithstanding the ongoing disagreement concerning 
immunity for sitting heads of state, the norm of international criminal justice continues to 
be embodied by both the AU and the ICC, though with varying interpretations.   
Practically speaking, the failure on the part of the ICC to establish and maintain a 
coherent position on head of state immunities with respect to al-Bashir has tarnished 
perceptions of judicial cogency. The idea that norms can diffuse unevenly is important in 
this context. Thus, while the AU continues to embody a perspective rooted in customary 
law that supports head of state immunities, the trajectory of the evolution of the norm is 
uncertain, yet not necessarily fixed. There appears to be two potential outcomes with 
respect to AU-ICC relations: (1) the continued proliferation of non-cooperation and a 
reversion to national and/or regional court(s) to address violations of international 
criminal law that better suit African political interests; or (2) reasoned negotiation and 
bargaining between the AU and the ICC with respect to critical issues of contention, 
especially regarding the role of the UNSC and the meaning of article 98, which are 
perhaps not as ill-founded as they first seem. With respect to the status of immunity for 
sitting heads of state, al-Bashir demonstrated that the ICC has been unable to effectively 
integrate this norm into the structure of the international criminal justice regime. The 
function of the UNSC has acted as a fundamental impediment to its proliferation and 
solidification by tacitly informing the expectations and obligations of state behaviour 




Chapter 9  
9 Regional Criminal Justice Mechanisms and The Malabo 
Protocol1 
The principle of complementarity is a cornerstone of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).2 Complementarity establishes the relationship 
between the ICC and the national legal systems of state parties. Under the Rome Statute 
system, states have the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute violations of 
international criminal law. The ICC is to be ‘complementary’ to national jurisdictions, 
and act as a secondary catch-all when national justice mechanisms fail.3 ICC intervention 
is triggered when a state is unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute. In short, the 
ICC is understood as a court of last resort, to be used when all else has failed.4 Based on 
this principle, states should be scrutinized for failing to investigate and prosecute 
atrocious crimes long before the inaction of the ICC is called into question. This is 
appropriate, since the ICC is inherently (and purposefully) limited in scope.  
The ICC straddles the boundaries of international politics and international 
criminal law. It is tasked to balance the political interests of states while applying the 
Rome Statute and its ‘objective’ rule-of-law principles. Complementarity reiterates the 
political preoccupation with sovereignty by vesting national judicial mechanisms with the 
primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes. Interference on the part of the 
ICC is only permissible when a sovereign state fails in its duty to implement and enforce 
international criminal law. This could be explained by a lack of political will, a lack of 
capacity, or both. Notwithstanding the various explanations for state inaction, the 
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Sarah Nimigan, “The Malabo Protocol, the ICC, and 
the Idea of ‘Regional Complementarity,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 17.5 (2019): 1005-
1029. 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into 
force 1 July 2002); see Preamble; Arts. 1 and 17. 
3 Ibid. 
4 For a detailed summary of complementarity see Paul Seils, Handbook on Complementarity: An 
Introduction to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes (International 
Center for Transitional Justice, 2016), available at https://www.ictj.org/publication/handbook-
complementarity; accessed 14 June 2019. 
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relationship between states and the ICC is sequenced and clear.5 However, a textual 
interpretation of the Rome Statute makes it less apparent how regional mechanisms 
might fit within the complementary schema. This is increasingly relevant, given recent 
moves on the African continent to regionalize international criminal law.  
In June 2014 the African Union (AU) adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo 
Protocol).6 The Malabo Protocol extends the jurisdiction of the proposed African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to include international and transnational crimes, 
including those covered in the Rome Statute.7 The yet-to-be established ACJHR would 
sit in Arusha, Tanzania. At the time of writing, eleven states have signed the treaty;8 
fifteen ratifications are required for the treaty to come into force. While the impact of the 
Malabo Protocol can only be imagined for now, the potential role of the ACJHR within 
the broader international criminal justice project is worth thinking about. It is proposed 
here that ‘positive complementarity’ offers the most appropriate lens through which to 
analyze this role.9   
This chapter argues that regional courts such as the ACJHR can and should 
complement national courts and the ICC. The Malabo Protocol raises particular legal 
 
5 See generally Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National 
Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Leidin: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 11-30; Steven Freeland, 
“It’s a Good Idea… Isn’t It? The Impact of Complementarity at the International Criminal Court on 
Domestic Law, Politics and Perceptions of Sovereignty,” in International Courts and Domestic Politics: 
Studies on International Courts and Tribunals, ed. Marlene Wind (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018): 93-116; Max du Plessis, “Complementarity: a working relationship between African states 
and the International Criminal Court,” in African Guide to International Criminal Justice (Institute for 
Security Studies, 2008) 123-142.  
6 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
27 June 2014 (hereafter the ‘Malabo Protocol’). 
7 The core crimes refer to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, aggression. The Malabo Protocol 
also includes the following crimes: unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, 
corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, 
illicit exploitation of natural resources. Note that the Malabo Protocol not only focuses on individual 
accountability but also the role of corporate liability, see Art. 46(c): Corporate Criminal Liability.  
8 Signatory states include: Benin, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania, 
Sierra Leone, Sao Tome & Principe, Uganda.  
9 See for example International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy, 2009-
2012, 1 February 2010, at 5: ‘Positive complementary is a strong interpretation of partnership with other 
jurisdictions or a “proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings”’; Darryl 
Robinson, “Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal 
Court,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2003): 482.     
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concerns about jurisdictional gaps and immunities for heads of state and other senior 
government officials, as well as practical concerns with respect to capacity and funding.10 
While these concerns are worth noting, they are neither wholly nor partially destructive 
of the aims of the international criminal justice project in the African context or 
elsewhere. There is a need to reimagine the principle of complementarity by including 
regional courts such as the ACJHR since it presents an opportunity to prosecute crimes 
which the ICC cannot. The core atrocity crimes covered by the Rome Statute are not 
perpetrated in a vacuum. In many respects, the ACJHR offers an opportunity to prosecute 
crimes which undergird and finance genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
aggression in Africa.11 This may have a preventative or deterrent consequence and/or 
help the ICC in its own work by laying the foundation to link mid-level to senior 
offenders. This will allow for the clear and streamlined integration of regional justice 
mechanisms within the international criminal justice project, of which the Rome Statute 
System is an integral part. The ACJHR offers the potential to pivot expressions of 
international criminal justice from a concentration on international initiatives to more 
accurate reflections of local contexts and realities. Framed in this way, the idea of 
including regional institutions into the international criminal justice system could be 
important to its holism and long-term success.  
 
10 See, generally Lutz Oette, “The African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur: A Precedent for Regional 
Solutions to the Challenges Facing International Criminal Justice?” in Africa and the Future of 
International Criminal Justice, ed. Vincent Nmehielle (Eleven International Publishing, 2012); Kristen 
Rau, “Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability Avoidance? The International Criminal Court and 
Proposed Expansion of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,” Minnesota Law Review 97 (2012): 
669-708. 
11 Note that thematic understandings that other crimes covered by the Malabo Protocol demonstrably fund 
and facilitate the perpetration of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. See, on 
Joseph Kony (Uganda) using the ivory trade to buy arms and finance the LRA, Peter Fabricius, “The LRA 
rising again?” Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, 6 July 2016, available at https://issafrica.org/iss-
today/the-lra-rising-again; accessed 14 June 2019; Oil and gold have been smuggled in exchange for arms 
in Sudan, see: Human Rights Watch Report, China’s Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil (2003), available 
at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/26.htm; accessed 14 June 2019; Colum Lynch, “Russia 
Blocks U.N. Report Linking Alleged Sudanese War Criminal to Gold Profiteering,” Foreign Policy, 4 
April 2016, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/04/russia-blocks-u-n-report-linking-alleged-
sudanese-war-criminal-to-gold-profiteering/; accessed 14 June 2019. Note also that the role of corporations 
in facilitating these crimes, such as Canadian company SNC-Lavalin and its role in sustaining the Gaddafi 
regime and civil war, see Mark Kersten, “SNC’s business in Libya sustained a brutal regime. They should 
be held to account,” 8 April 2019, available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-sncs-
business-in-libya-sustained-a-brutal-regime-they-should-be-held/; visited 14 June 2019 as some brief and 
cursory illustrations of this point.   
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After all, the raison d’être of complementarity is to motivate states to dispense 
justice for the most serious crimes, while simultaneously ensuring such crimes will not go 
unpunished if states are unwilling or unable to do so. The ICC is not intended to be, nor is 
it capable of being, a standalone response to atrocity. Therefore, the inclusion of all forms 
of jurisdiction recognized by international law (including regional mechanisms such as 
the ACJHR) should be built-in to establish a positive interpretation of complementarity. 
This will contribute to the proliferation of more ‘local’ justice and restructure/redistribute 
the division of labour to meet the demands and expectations for justice at the national, 
regional, and international level(s). Reimagining complementarity to include regional 
mechanisms such as the ACJHR could reflect an important part of the constructive 
reform that the ICC needs to regain its legitimacy in Africa and beyond.  
 
9.1 The Malabo Protocol 
In 2009 the AU had identified a need to accelerate the integration of the contents of the 
Rome Statute at the regional level.12 This was to some degree, a response to the AU’s 
claims that the ICC unfairly targets Africans with selectivity and bias, jeopardizes peace 
by prioritizing justice, and reinforces a neocolonial Western power structure, especially 
since the United Nations Security Council reserves control over the ICC without three of 
its permanent members being subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.13 Mostly though, it was 
in response to ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and the concerns 
about its potentially destabilizing effects on the continent.14 This was addressed by the 
AU at the 2013 Extraordinary Session.15 The underlying impetus for fast-tracking the 
 
12 The AU had been working on the idea of including international crimes at the regional level as early as 
2004 and therefore, it cannot be framed as a direct response to the operationalization of the ICC; ICC-AU 
relations led to the AU court being fast-tracked.  
13 See generally Jean-Baptise Jeangène Vilmer, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: 
counteracting the crisis,” International Affairs 92.6 (2016): 1319-1342; Tim Murithi, “Between Political 
Justice and Judicial Politics: Charting a Way Forward for the African Union and the International Criminal 
Court,” in Africa and the International Criminal Court, eds. Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, and Moritz 
Vormbaum (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014), 179-194. 
14AU PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII), 21 July 2008. Note that Sudan has neither signed nor ratified the Rome 
Statute and the case was referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council. 
15Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court, AU Decisions and Declarations. 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1, October 2013, §10, at (iv): NOW DECIDES (iv) To fast track the process of 
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regional court was rooted in AU concern over the indictment of sitting heads of state, but 
was mostly reactionary to the operationalization of the ICC altogether.16  
In an effort to fast-track the process, the AU Assembly adopted the ‘Malabo 
Protocol’ in 2014, designed to expand the mandate of the already drafted African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) to include jurisdiction over fourteen serious 
international crimes including genocide (Article 28B), war crimes (Article 28D), crimes 
against humanity (Article 28C), and aggression (Article 28M), among other transnational 
crimes.17 The scope of the Malabo Protocol is vast, far greater than any other 
international criminal justice mechanism. For example, it criminalizes trafficking with 
respect to persons (Article 28J), drugs (Article 28K), and hazardous waste (Article 28L), 
the illicit exploitation of natural resources (Article 28L Bis) and enumerates terrorism 
(Article 28G) and corruption (Article 28I) as distinct international crimes, among others. 
In addition, the Malabo Protocol includes corporate criminal liability (Article 46C), 
which is an important inclusion especially in the African context. The Malabo Protocol 
reflects region-specific crimes, which have profound socioeconomic and political 
consequences on the continent. The ACJHR is structured to have three sections: General 
Affairs, Human and Peoples Rights, and International Criminal Law. The focus of this 
paper is solely on the third. 
The Malabo Protocol has been heavily criticized for its Article 46A bis, which 
deals with immunities and says: “No charges shall be commenced or continued before the 
Court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or 
entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, 
during their tenure of office.”18  
 
 
expanding the mandate of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) to try international 
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
16 Robert Eno, “The Malabo Protocol and Complementarity of International Criminal Justice: Challenges 
and Prospects,” in Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, ed. Evelyn Ankumah (Africa Legal Aid, 2018), 30-38, at 31. Consider also that the United Nations 
Security Council refused to consider deferral requests in the al-Bashir case in the interest of stabilizing 
peace talks/negotiations in Sudan. 
17 Malabo Protocol, Art. 28A. 
18 Malabo Protocol, Art. 46A bis. 
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This inclusion frames the argument that the ACJHR is merely an attempt to perpetuate a 
culture of impunity for leaders who commit the most egregious crimes on the continent.19 
It is worth noting that the Rome Statute lifts immunity for heads of state or government 
under Article 27 (irrelevance of official capacity).20 However, customary law provides 
immunity for heads of state and other senior government officials both at home and 
abroad.21 Therefore, Article 27 may be viewed in opposition to established international 
legal standards with respect to absolute personal immunity afforded to heads of state, 
whether at home or in a foreign country on official business.22 The juxtaposition of head 
of state immunity within the Rome Statute and customary international law is 
inconsistent at best, particularly as it applies to non-States Parties vis-à-vis United 
Nations Security Council referrals.23 It is for this reason that the AU has requested an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the status of immunity for 
heads of state and government leaders, which is yet to be delivered.24  
As such, viewing Article 46A bis of the Malabo Protocol as a digression of 
international criminal law lacks cogent justification beyond moral appeal, which is 
nevertheless important. However, the ICC is the only court that mandates the irrelevance 
of official capacity universally and has been mostly unsuccessful at implementing it.25 
 
19 See Max du Plessis, “Shambolic, shameful and symbolic: Implications of the African Union’s immunity 
for African leaders,” Institute for Security Studies, November 2014, available at 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper278.pdf; accessed 10 June 2019. 
20 The Rome Statute, Art. 27. 
21 Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, “A Seed for World Peace Growing in Africa: The Kampala Amendments on 
the Crime of Aggression and the Monsoon of Malabo,” in The International Criminal Court and Africa: 
One Decade On, ed. Evelyn A. Ankumah (Intersentia, 2016), 347-400, at 369. See also Judgment in the 
Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Corr), Appeals 
Chamber, 6 May 2019. 
22 Roseanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 169. See also Paola Gaeta, 
“Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7.2 
(2009): 315-332; Asad Kiyani, “Al-Bashir and the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity,” Chinese 
Journal of International Law 12 (2013): 467-508. 
23 The Rome Statute, Art 98: Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender, 
which may be viewed as conflicting with Article 27(1), i.e. irrelevance of official capacity. 
24 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Challenging ICC, AU seeks opinion on head of state 
immunities from top UN court, 1 February 2018, available at 
www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20180201/globaljustice-weekly-au-seeks-icj-opinion-head-state-
immunities-witnesses-take-stand; accessed 2 June 2019. 
25 The ICC has indicted al-Bashir (arrest warrant outstanding/unexecuted), Kenyatta and Ruto (charges 
dropped). Gaddafi (deceased), former head of state: Gbagbo (acquitted).  
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While there are important normative imperatives for saying that official capacity does not 
matter and there is universal jurisdiction for violations of international criminal law, there 
are also tangible political and legal difficulties with implementing this ideal. Most 
notably, the ICC lacks the ability to function effectively without the cooperation of 
states.26 While there are few, if any, noble arguments to support head of state immunity 
for international crimes, the lack of cooperation and political will to arrest and surrender 
individuals indicted by the ICC is incredibly damaging to the legitimacy and reputation 
of the Court altogether. The unfortunate current reality is such that even if the Malabo 
Protocol comes into force with Article 46A bis, it will be of little consequence to heads of 
state in Africa, whether indicted by the ICC or not.27    
 
9.2 The Peculiar Nexus of Law and Politics 
Setting up realistic expectations and reasonable parameters for the operationalization of 
international criminal law is necessary. Imposing transnational authority is only as 
effective as the commitment on the part of states to be subject to it. Thus, the diffusion of 
international norms such as the irrelevance of official capacity under international 
criminal law at the ICC is contingent on buy-in by states. Not all norms will diffuse 
evenly across time and space. Implementing strategies to facilitate meaningful dialogue 
may be useful to reach a shared understanding of ‘international criminal justice.’ Yet, it is 
unsurprising that the AU is looking inward to establish legal systems that accurately 
reflect afro-centric, regional perspectives otherwise referred to as ‘African Solutions for 
African Problems.’     
 
26 Note the ICC’s difficulty with respect to the indictment of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his 
Deputy President William Ruto. The AU decided that heads of state or heads of government could not be 
charged before any international court or tribunal during their term of office, thus contributing to 
formalized noncooperation from the AU with the ICC in such cases. Such noncooperation led to difficulty 
with evidence gathering, which resulted in the Kenyatta case being dropped. See Decision on Africa’s 
Relationship with the International Criminal Court, AU Decisions and Declarations. 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1, 12 October 2013, 1-3. 
27 There are also important arguments to suggest that indicting heads of state could be contrary to the aims 
of international criminal justice. While outside the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning the relevance 
of the ‘peace versus justice’ debate in this regard. See for example Payam Akhavan, “Are International 
Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?” Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 624-654. 
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In contrast, the Rome Statute was born out of consensus-based negotiation and 
compromises were struck in order to ensure its success.28 The nature of political 
negotiation complicates coherence to varying degrees. However, it is important to 
consider that “the aim of the [Rome] Statute is not to negate sovereignty… which 
illustrates clearly that the concerns of States with respect to their sovereign interests in 
criminal justice was at the forefront of the negotiations from the earliest stages.”29 
Complex political realities complicate the international criminal law initiative in 
substantive and uneven ways. The point is not that the ICC had (has) no moral or legal 
basis to be involved in African situations. The hypocrisy lies in the ICC’s inability to 
intervene in most other places due to political bargaining and/or alliance. This is not 
unfair to Africans, it is unfair to victims who are denied justice on political bases. The 
double standards which are clearly visible in the administration of ‘international justice’ 
reveal substantive cleavages created by deep politicization.30   
The AU-ICC narrative typically pits the organization against the institution on the 
basis of sovereign interference, the unfair and biased focus on Africans, and opposing 
interpretations of customary international law.31 Explicably, the ACJHR may (ostensibly) 
contribute to the idea of universal jurisdiction by offering an African alternative to filling 
immunity gaps and contributing to the proliferation of justice for international crimes 
committed on the continent.  It is also worth noting that there is no one monolithic anti-
ICC position shared by ‘Africa’ or the constitutive populations of AU member states. 
Most often, it is the states which have been the target(s) of ICC investigation and 
prosecution that are particularly disapproving and scathing of the institution. Curiously, 
 
28 See generally Fanny Benedetti, Karine Bonneau and John L. Washburn, Negotiating the International 
Criminal Court: New York to Rome 1994-1998, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013).  
29 Sharon A. Williams and William A. Schabas, “Article 17: Issues of admissibility,” in Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, ed. Otto 
Triffterer (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2008), 606. 
30 See generally Max du Plessis and Christopher Gevers, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy and the 
International Criminal Court: Of African Lessons, Security Council Reform, and Possibilities for an 
Improved ICC,” in Jason Warner and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., African Foreign Policies in International 
Institutions (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 199-214.  
31 See Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, “Regionalism, Regime Complexes, and the Crisis in International Criminal 
Justice,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 54 (2016): 699-775. This paper argues that the ICC’s 
institutional crisis created space for regional approaches to international criminal law. 
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even some of the strongest critics of the ICC within the AU remain members of both.32 
On this basis, it is important to consider the potential integration of the Malabo Protocol 
within the Rome Statute System under the auspice of positive complementarity.  
The AU has made efforts to work with the ICC on the idea of regional 
complementarity with respect to the ACJHR. One approach might be to amend the Rome 
Statute to include regional courts in its conception of complementarity. For example, 
Kenya has submitted a proposed amendment to the Rome Statute to the Working Group 
on Amendments with respect to the Preamble of the Rome Statute. As previously noted, 
the Preamble of the Rome Statute says: “Emphasizing that the International Criminal 
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.”33  
Kenya has proposed that it be amended to read: “Emphasizing that the 
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to 
national and regional criminal jurisdictions.”34 To elaborate, the Kenyan delegation 
explained that regional complementarity “is not a way to oust the ICC. It is the opposite. 
The regional jurisdiction gets just the first bite. National jurisdiction may be difficult to 
exercise. Rather than spring-boarding [from national to international jurisdiction], the 
ICC would be what it was meant to be, the last resort.”35 The Kenyan delegate also 
identified that the proposal to include regional courts would “allow judicial proceedings 
to take place closer to the location where the alleged crimes had been committed.”36 
Through this lens, regional complementarity is a compelling and useful concept. Framed 
 
32 See for example. Rorisang Lekalake and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, PP23: Support for the International 
Criminal Court in Africa: Evidence from Kenya, AfroBarometer, 2015, available at 
http://afrobarometer.org/fr/publications/pp23-support-international-criminal-court-africa-evidence-kenya; 
accessed 30 June 2019). In 2015, over sixty percent of Kenyans believed the ICC’s cases against Kenyatta 
and Ruto were important for fighting impunity in their country. Also note that Kenya remains a States Party 
to the ICC.  
33 The Rome Statute, Preamble.  
34 Draft 2: Withdrawal Strategy Document, AU Doc. Restricted Circulation, 12 January 2017, available at 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf; accessed 1 
July 2019; Kenya: Proposal of Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Rome, 
17 July 1998, UN Depositary Notification C.N.1026.2013TREATIES-XVIII.10, 14 March 2014. 
35 Bertram-Nothnagel, “A Seed for World Peace Growing in Africa,” 373. 
36 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, Fourteenth Session, ICC-ASP/14/34, 18-26 November 
2015, § 18.  
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as an intermediary and cooperative jurisdictional mechanism, regional courts such as the 
ACJHR may yield greater prospects for justice than national courts and the ICC alone.37    
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that national jurisdictions should 
always get the first bite. It is a state’s primary responsibility and obligation to investigate 
and prosecute these crimes. Difficulties aside, the diffusion of obligation should begin at 
the national level. This would be the best way to ensure that judicial proceedings take 
place closest to where the alleged crimes were committed and foster the greatest sense of 
‘local’ justice. National jurisdictions should necessarily endeavour to build their capacity 
in order to prosecute these crimes. This will establish agency and ownership over the 
justice process and will (likely) contribute to greater localized deterrence. Regional 
jurisdictions may serve as an effective middle-ground between national and international 
jurisdictions to prosecute cases which require specialization and high degrees of human 
capital and judicial capacity to succeed. Prima facie, more justice is better than less and 
local mechanisms allow victims to see and feel that justice has been done. Situating 
international criminal law within its broader objective(s) indicates a need to fill impunity 
gaps in new and creative ways.      
However, it would be remis to not point out that the Malabo Protocol excludes the 
ICC and international jurisdictions from its conception of complementarity. Article 46H, 
Complementary Jurisdiction (1), says:  “The jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
complementary to that of the National Courts, and to the Courts of the Regional 
Economic Communities where specifically provided for by the Communities.”38  
Article 46(H) also enumerates that the ACJHR would only have jurisdiction if the state is 
unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation and prosecution. This keeps the 
caseload down at the ACJHR while simultaneously encouraging national and regional 
courts to build their capacity and commitment to investigate and prosecute egregious 
crimes.  
 
37 Antonio Cassese, The Oxford companion to international criminal justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), at 208: “Accordingly, international criminal justice should not be understood as a domain 
reservée of international institutions. International and national prosecutions are not even alternatives in the 
proper sense, but should be conceived of as formally distinct, yet substantively intertwined mechanisms 
that pursue a common goal: the enforcement of ICL [international criminal law].”  
38 Malabo Protocol, Article 46(H). 
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 The exclusion of international jurisdictions and the ICC in particular from the 
principle of complementarity in the Malabo Protocol raises some suspicions about the 
authenticity of a vision of mutual cooperation and/or assistance. While the Rome 
Statute’s exclusion of regional jurisdictions can be reconciled by the fact that no such 
institutions existed at the time of drafting, the Malabo Protocol was drafted in 2014 
(sixteen years after the Rome Statute). This omission has subjected the Malabo Protocol 
to strong criticism. For example, Garth Abraham has argued that, “the only reasonable 
interpretation of this exclusion can be that it is a conscious snub to the ICC and aims 
specifically to protect African HOSG [heads of state and government] and senior 
government officials from prosecution.”39   
On the other hand, “Don Deya, director of PALU [Pan African Lawyers Union], 
the organisation that was tasked with drafting the Protocol, is adamant that throughout the 
process it has been clear that the ACJHR intends to cooperate with, and complement the 
ICC.”40 This inconsistency may be reflective of what Max du Plessis referred to as “a 
case of irresponsible treaty making.”41 Nevertheless, in the absence of a clearly 
enumerated formal relationship, alternative approaches are required. According to 
Knotternus and de Volder, “there are also other avenues to establish a formal relationship 
between the courts, including the auxiliary documents of the Criminal Chamber, which 
will have to regulate its procedural functioning, and the possibility of a memorandum of 
understanding or relationship agreement between the African Court and the ICC.”42 Yet, 
(outside of the immunity issue) the drafters of the Malabo Protocol seem to view the 
intended relationship between the ACJHR and ICC as a complementary one, which seeks 
 
39 Garth Abraham, Africa’s Evolving Continental Court Structures: At the Crossroads? South African 
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Papers, Democracy & Human Rights, 3 February 
2015, available at https://saiia.org.za/research/africas-evolving-continental-court-structures-at-the-
crossroads/; accessed 3 July 2019. 
40 Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice, Seeking Justice or Shielding Suspects? An Analysis of the 
Malabo Protocol on the African Court (2016), available at http://kptj.africog.org/seeking-justice-or-
shielding-suspects-an-analysis-of-the-malabo-protocol-on-the-african-court/; accessed 5 June 2019, 20. 
41 M. du Plessis, Implications of the AU Decision to Expand the African Court’s Jurisdiction, Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS) Paper 235, June 2012; available at 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper235-AfricaCourt.pdf; accessed 2 June 2019, 10. 
42 Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder, ‘The Early Formation of an African Criminal Court,’ in Africa 
and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice, eds. Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 376-406, at 385. 
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to incorporate an intermediary regional focus into the existing international criminal 
justice framework.43 This is an avenue that may yield several benefits to victims, national 
jurisdictions, regional groups of states and peoples, and the ICC;44 this ought to be given 
fair consideration by civil society, practitioners, and academics altogether.  
   
9.3 Interpreting the Complementarity Principle Positively 
and Purposively  
An understanding of complementarity based on a positive interpretation is imperative to 
the success of the ICC and the international criminal justice project as a whole. In support 
of regional complementarity, it has been argued that “a purposive interpretation of the 
[complementarity] principle can include regional courts. In assessing the admissibility of 
a case before the Court, it is important to consider whether any action, if any, has been 
taken not only in the national courts of the State, but also at regional courts.”45 Some 
judges interpret the law by looking at the words and give them their usual and natural 
interpretation, otherwise understood as the ‘textual’ or ‘ordinary meaning’ approach to 
interpretation. This approach is said to reinforce the promise of objectivity and neutrality. 
On the other hand, purposive approaches provide judges with a broader scope to develop 
the law, since the aim is to determine the “normative message that arises from the text… 
 
43 This may also be understood as a part of the AU’s peace and security agenda, see for example African 
Union Constitutive Act, Article 4(h). 
44 Admittedly, the ACJHR may or may not undermine the ICC; the important point is that the ICC has 
failed victims in some significant ways and supplemental or alternative forms of justice should be given 
full consideration. For example, consider the issue of group-based selectivity, see generally Asad Kiyani, 
“Group-Based Differentiation and Local Repression: The Custom and Curse of Selectivity,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 14 (2016): 939-957; consider also the ICC’s deference to political power 
most pointedly demonstrated by the failed Afghan Referral, see: Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, (ICC-02/17-33 12-04-2019 1/32 EK PT), Pre-Trial Chamber II of 12 April 2019 § 32(a). This 
decision has subjected the court to targeted criticism. See generally Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘Deconstructing 
the Int’l Criminal Court’s Decision on Afghanistan’, Just Security, 24 April 2019 available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/63746/deconstructing-the-intl-criminal-courts-decision-on-afghanistan/ 
accessed 1 June 2019: “The decision of the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber II refusing to 
open an investigation into crimes committed in Afghanistan establishes a new Rome Statute rule: there will 
be no investigations against suspects when they have enough raw political power to affect States Parties’ 
cooperation with the Court.” 
45 “Annex 1: Africa and the International Criminal Court–Recommendations,” in Gerhard Werle, Lovell 
Fernandez and Mortiz Vormbaum, eds., Africa and the International Criminal Court, 231. 
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interpretation shapes the content of the norm ‘trapped’ inside the text.”46 Importantly, 
judges do remain bound by the text of the statute: “That language sets the outer limits of 
any possible interpretation… one cannot read into them what they do not contain.”47 On 
this basis, it is useful to conceptualize what the ‘fundamental values’ of complementarity 
are and how its language might allow the ICC judges to incorporate regional jurisdictions 
under its purview.  
Employing a purposive approach to an interpretation of the complementarity 
principle is necessary yet challenging. The nature of the Rome Statute negotiations 
resulted in high politicization, compromise, and intentionally built-in ‘constructed’ 
ambiguities.48 At the same time, the notion that international criminal law ought to be 
approached with the same rigidity as domestic criminal law is deeply flawed. 
International criminal law requires a supportive international political environment. The 
legitimacy of the international criminal justice project is subject to scrutiny by 
individuals, states, organizations, institutions, and civil society. Therefore, although 
international criminal law is an enhanced form of domestic legal systems, its scope and 
character are markedly different.49 This is especially true of the ICC, which is a 
complicated hybrid of civil and common law systems, has six official languages, and has 
eighteen judges with unique backgrounds and perspectives (both legally and personally). 
Therefore, approaching the Rome Statute with a degree of sensible flexibility paired with 
ongoing dialectical/deliberative processes to arrive at reasoned and consistent 
interpretations of the law will be essential to the success of the ICC. 
 
46Aharon Barak, translated from the Hebrew by Sari Bashi, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 3.  
47 Ibid., 20. 
48 See Valerie Oosterveld, “Constructive Ambiguity and the Meaning of ‘Gender’ for the International 
Criminal Court,” International Journal of Feminist Politics 16 (2014): 563-580. Also consider the variance 
in opinion with respect to the apparent statutory conflict between Art. 27 and Art. 98, most relevant to Chad 
and Malawi and the non-arrest of al-Bashir. This statutory conflict has been framed as ‘political 
compromise’ struck by the negotiators in Rome, see Otto Triffterer, “Article 27: Irrelevance of official 
capacity,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, 
Article by Article – 2nd Edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (C.H. Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2008), 781. Also consider the 
significant political compromise with respect to the independence of the Prosecutor and the role of the UN 
Security Council, as cursory examples. 
49 See generally Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), at xi.  
265 
 
Practically speaking, it seems that a purposive interpretation of complementarity 
under the Rome Statute requires that the ICC be used fundamentally as a court of ‘last 
resort’ and maintain the primacy of state sovereignty. According to former ICC 
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo: “As a consequence of complementarity, the number 
of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, 
the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of 
national institutions, would be a major success.”50 Ocampo was referring to national 
institutions, though the point ought to stand for regional courts as well. Complementarity 
in its simplest form suggests that the fewer number of cases at the ICC, the better the 
court is doing, provided that the matters are being prosecuted elsewhere. Therefore, an 
intermediary between domestic and international jurisdictions seems to embody the spirit 
of complementarity. However, the idea that a regional body could act as a check on 
national mechanisms and the adjoining responsibility to prosecute extraordinary 
international crime implies a power-sharing arrangement with the ICC, since both will 
function as supranational institutions with (potentially, but not necessarily) competing 
mandates. It also requires that the regional court and the ICC be cooperative with other 
relevant institutions and each other in order to function as a ‘complement’ and provide 
mutual assistance in the truest sense. This is not impossible and could foreseeably 
strengthen each jurisdictional level if executed effectively.    
 A purposive and positive interpretation of complementarity would suggest that the 
ICC should not investigate or prosecute the same crimes as the ACJHR, if it were to be 
effective in its work. As Knottnerus and de Volder argue,  
When the African Court has already decided to investigate or prosecute crimes 
that are also covered by a preliminary examination or investigation of the ICC, the 
Prosecutor of the ICC should not proceed with a prosecution against the same 
persons on the basis that this is not in the interests of justice (Article 53) or 
possibly because these cases are inadmissible as the concerned persons have 
already been tried for the same conduct by another court (ne bis in idem, article 
 
50 The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, Informal Expert Paper, ICC-OTP 2003 available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-
907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf; accessed 20 July 2019. 
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20). The same logic should also withhold the Prosecutor of the African Court to 
address cases that fall within its jurisdiction, but have already been completed by 
the ICC.51    
The significant challenge is one of cooperation and mutual assistance at the institutional, 
governmental, and individual level(s).52 Nevertheless, the purpose of complementarity is 
to limit the involvement of the ICC and nudge states (or in this case, a regional grouping 
of states) to prosecute violations of international criminal law. A positive and purposive 
interpretation of complementarity demands a pragmatic approach at multiple levels of 
interpretation, understanding, and enforcement.     
The principle of complementarity means that international criminal justice in 
Africa is not synonymous with the ICC. While the ICC is one vehicle for the 
operationalization of international criminal justice, it is not necessarily the only one, nor 
should it be. The ICC was never intended to monopolize international criminal justice in 
Africa, or anywhere for that matter. Consider the expansion of the ACJHR as a potential 
trade-off. In the worst case, it might insulate sitting heads of state and senior government 
officials from accountability. On the other, it will expand subject matter jurisdiction to 
include crimes that are especially relevant to the continent, but beyond the scope of the 
Rome Statute.53 Consideration must be given to the idea that ‘international criminal 
justice’ could exist alongside or perhaps even outside of the Rome Statute system. One is 
not necessary ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than the other, it is simply different. It is important to 
emphasize that this remains subject to proper funding and support by states.  
To be sure, the ACJHR and the ICC have been criticized on similar grounds: 
namely, the ICC has been said to cover too many international crimes, even narrowly 
defined.54 Paradoxically, the ICC is also questioned about not covering enough serious 
 
51 Abel S. Knottnerus and Eefje de Volder, “The Early Formation of an African Criminal Court,” 386. 
52 Ibid., 385: “Other promising options to prevent jurisdictional clashes lie with the Prosecutor of the ICC 
and the future Prosecutor of the African Court… the Prosecutor of the African Court could consult with the 
Prosecutor of the ICC, and vice versa, in order to ensure that their limited resources are not spent on the 
exact same cases.” 
53 It is important to reemphasize that this refers not only to the expansion of crimes but also conceptions of 
corporate liability contained in the Malabo Protocol. 
54 See generally Roy S. Lee, ed., States’ responses to issues arising from the ICC Statute: constitutional, 
sovereignty, judicial cooperation and criminal law, Vol. 26 (International and Comparative Criminal Law 
Series, Brill Nijhoff/Transnational Publishers, 2005). 
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crimes, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, for example.55 Unlike the Rome Statute 
(which was limited by international negotiation constraints), the model espoused by the 
ACJHR expands jurisdiction in a flexible way, which is necessary to prosecute offenders 
responsible for a myriad of crimes that are harmful to civilians. The expansion of crimes 
seeks to address the underlying and/or root causes of violent conflict on the continent. 
Moreover, since the focus is on mid-level suspects, the likelihood of states obstructing 
the process allows for laying the foundation for later charges by the ICC against senior 
offenders if coordinated effectively as a robust system of international criminal law.  
The ICC is the best victims can hope for in many cases and falls somewhere on 
the ideational spectrum between ‘something is better than nothing’ and setting global 
standards for international criminal justice. Including other modes of justice will not 
delegitimize, destabilize, or dismantle the international criminal justice project as a 
whole. Rather, it could strengthen the regime by fostering a sense of local ownership, 
agency, and commitment to the project. Advancing this type of thinking depends on a 
confidence in the broad norms that underpin the Rome Statute. After all, the ICC will still 
be there to dispense justice if the ACJHR substantively fails to do so, intervening where 
and when it should– as a last resort. Manifestations of privilege associated with the rigid 
advancement of universalist ‘best-practice’ could sometimes do more harm than good. At 
a minimum, it risks stagnating the growth and development of the international criminal 
justice system and local capacity-building efforts by eschewing a monolithic 
interpretation and application which lacks local buy-in.    
Some argue that the likelihood of states establishing regional tribunals with 
overlapping subject-matter jurisdiction with the ICC should be expected over time. For 
example, Jackson says, “these may be continent wide, as with the African Court, or 
multilateral, or even bilateral, where two states establish a criminal tribunal to prosecute 
 
55 UN Department of Public Information, ‘Some Questions and Answers’, UN OLA DPI/2016 (October 
1998) available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm; accessed 5 June 2019: “States could not agree 
on a definition of terrorism at the Rome Conference.” Note also that the very idea of the ICC was presented 
by Trinidad and Tobago which asked the International Law Commission to work on an international 
criminal court with the jurisdiction to prosecute drug trafficking in 1989, see ‘Overview’, UN OLA 
available at http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm; accessed 5 June 2019. 
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crimes in a specific conflict.”56 Pragmatically, as with most courts, the ICC is limited 
with respect to funding and resources.57 After all, the Rome Statute does not restrict its 
member states from entering other treaties such as regional groupings or organizations 
with a mandate to address similar things.58 Strategic cooperation at national, regional, and 
international levels could offer more efficient, complete, and cost-effective approaches to 
justice in Africa. Setting clear expectations, engaging in mutual assistance, and building 
capacity at national and regional levels will keep the pressure off of the ICC, as 
complementarity intended.59 Thus far, an analysis and theoretical framing for thinking 
about regional approaches to international criminal law and complementarity using the 
example of the ACJHR has been presented. The following sections consider tangible 
examples to enrich the analysis above and seek to address practical concerns about the 
integration of regional mechanisms (the ACJHR in particular), into the landscape of the 
international criminal law system. 
 
9.4 Innovative Regional Approaches to International Justice 
Interestingly, the Rome Statute does not specifically address the role of ad hoc, hybrid, or 
special courts/tribunals with respect to complementarity. Although typically viewed as a 
composite of national jurisdictions, they have a distinct character from usual domestic 
courts based on ties to the United Nations and the international community more broadly. 
This is important to consider given the recent resurgence of special tribunals and hybrid 
courts as a mode of dispensing justice in Africa.60  
 
56 Miles Jackson, “Regional Complementarity: The Rome Statute and Public International Law,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 1062. 
57 Some key states have adopted a ‘zero nominal growth’ policy with respect to the ICC’s budget. Although 
the budget has been allowed to narrowly increase, its caseload, expectations, and demands push the limits 
of its resources. 
58 See Ademola Abass, “Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges,” 
European Journal of International Law 24 (2013): 933-946. 
59 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy, 2009-2012,’, 5: Some 
examples: information sharing, inviting domestic officials and lawyers to participate in OTP (or regional) 
investigations and prosecutions, sharing expertise through trainings and workshops and encouraging 
development organizations and donors to support domestic accountability efforts. 
60 Chad, South Sudan, Central African Republic. See generally Mark Kersten, “As the Pendulum Swings – 
The Revival of the Hybrid Tribunal,” in Mikkel Jarle Christensen and Ron Levi, eds., International 
Practices of Criminal Justice: Social and legal perspectives (London: Routledge, 2017).  
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The Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic (CAR) is a good 
example of this. In April 2015, the Central African Transitional Parliament adopted 
organic law 15-003 establishing the Special Criminal Court (SCC) to prosecute the most 
serious crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.61 The SCC 
employs international and national staff and applies a combination of CAR law (Central 
African Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure) alongside international legal norms 
to deliver justice for victims of the atrocious conflict(s) there. Most important, the SCC’s 
hybridity stems from its combination of law and process.   
The SCC was designed to operate alongside ICC involvement, since there are two 
ICC referrals in CAR. Situation I covers the period since 2002 (peak violence in 2002 
and 2003) and Situation II covers 2012 onwards (peak violence between 2012-2015).62 
Yet, the ICC has been limited in its indictments and prosecutions.63 Conjoined efforts on 
the part of the United Nations and the government of CAR to stabilize the country 
contributed to the establishment of the SCC, albeit through domestic legislation alone. 
Labuda argues that, “[f]rom a purely legal perspective, the SCC is indeed a state court 
operating on the basis of a national law, which in turn suggests that genuine proceedings 
undertaken by the SCC’s organs could render a case inadmissible in line with Article 17 
of the ICC Statute.”64  Nevertheless, it is important to consider how the SCC fits 
alongside the ICC in terms of complementarity since the enumeration of special or hybrid 
courts does not appear in the Rome Statute and the SCC has some distinctly international 
components in terms of staff and UN support that supersede strict interpretations of 
domestic or national court systems.        
 
61 Loi organique portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour pénale spéciale, Loi no. 
15/003, 3 June 2015. 
62See Situation in Central African Republic (ICC-01-05) May 2007; Situation in the Central African 
Republic II (ICC-01/14) September 2014. 
63 CAR I led to one prosecution at the ICC, Congolese politician Jean-Pierre Bemba who was initially 
convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity for crimes his militants perpetrated in CAR, see 
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-3343 21-03 
2016 1/364 NM T), Trial Chamber III, 21 March 2016. This was overturned on appeal by majority opinion, 
see Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment 
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-06-2018 1/80 EC A), 
Appeals Chamber, 8 June 2018. 
64 Patryk I. Labuda, “The Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic: Failure or Vindication of 
Complementarity?” Journal of International Criminal Justice 15 (2017): 175-206, at 183. 
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 The SCC’s relationship with the ICC could be considered controversial. The 
SCC’s Article 37 says that if the ICC Prosecutor exercises jurisdiction over a specific 
case, it has primacy.65 According to Labuda, “the SCC has primacy but only if the ICC is 
not involved… In terms of jurisdictional priority, the ICC comes first, then the SCC, and 
last are the ordinary CAR courts.”66 Understood in this way, the SCC contradicts the idea 
of the ICC being a court of last resort. The Special Prosecutor will be unable to 
investigate an individual that the ICC is already pursuing, or least of all will be required 
to ask the Prosecutor of the ICC for permission to engage with suspects under her 
(potential) purview, which is “irreconcilable with even the widest interpretations of 
complementarity under Article 17.”67 Complementarity requires that the ICC yield to any 
court willing or able to prosecute egregious international crimes.  
The ICC is not bound by SCC law and will continue to rely on the Rome Statute 
in its operation. Therefore, a purposive and positive understanding of complementarity 
will reaffirm the ICC as a court of last resort and encourage the Special Prosecutor to 
pursue individuals at the highest levels of responsibility at the SCC and CAR courts. This 
situation is hypothetical at present since investigations did not begin until last year, 
though a relationship between the ICC, SSC, and CAR courts could present a novel 
approach to international criminal justice in CAR and perhaps in the international 
community more broadly.  
The Habré case at the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) in Senegal is a 
notable example of universal jurisdiction and international criminal justice in Africa.68 
The EAC was a court created by the AU to see justice done for victims in Chad who 
suffered under Habré’s rule from the years 1982-1990. In effect, the EAC was mandated 
to prosecute international crimes in Dakar, Senegal “on behalf of Africa.”69 The former 
Chadian head of state was convicted of crimes against humanity. This has been 
considered a landmark case in many respects and has been described as an “excellent 
 
65 Ibid., 192. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 192-193. 
68 Judgment, Habré, Chambre Africaine Extraordinaire D’Assises (30 May 2016). 
69 Ibid.  
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example of how regional solutions in Africa could and should work.”70 This case was the 
first time that a former head of state was tried in an African court. AU Commission 
Chairperson Dr. Dlamini Zuma said that “the judgment comes at a time when the AU is 
actively fighting impunity and promoting accountability for egregious wrongs… the 
judgment by the EAC, being an African Union mechanism, is significant in that it 
reinforces the AU’s principle of African solutions to African problems.”71 The EAC was 
created inside in the existing Senegalese court structure.72 Its mandate was to prosecute 
Habré and all “person or persons most responsible” for international crimes including 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture.73 The statute relied largely 
on the definitions of crimes contained within the Rome Statute. The EAC was a mixed 
system, since the legal system in Senegal is French-based. This allowed for victims’ 
participation in the proceedings, to be represented by legal counsel, and to seek 
reparations. The process was well sequenced; Senegal and Chad signed a legal 
cooperation agreement with the AU regarding testimonies, declarations, and the 
transportation and security of witnesses and experts.74 This case demonstrates that mutual 
assistance and cooperation can be possible, but only if political will, human capital, and 
overall capacity allow.75      
Trends in international relations and international criminal law seem to suggest 
that opening up the discussion with respect to complementarity is not only appropriate, 
but necessary. It is unclear how national jurisdictions fundamentally differ from 
jurisdictions established by groups of states or international organizations such as the 
United Nations. This is not necessarily a competitive or mutually exclusive ‘national-
regional-hybrid-international’ scenario, or an inherent transfer of authority in any 
 
70 Anonymous ICC Judge, interview by author, 24 January 2019. 
71 AU Press Release, ‘AU welcomes the judgement of an unprecedented trial of Hissène Habré’ 1 June 
2016, available at https://au.int/ar/node/30728; accessed 20 June 2019. 
72 Human Rights Watch, Q & A: The Case of Hissène Habré before the Extraordinary African Chambers in 
Senegal (3 May 2016),  available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/qa-case-hissene-habre-
extraordinary-african-chambers-senegal#19; accessed 15 July 2019.  
73 Reed Brody, “Victims bring a Dictator to Justice: The Case of Hissène Habré,” 2nd ed. (Brot für die 
Welt, June 2017), 13.    
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. Funding for the EAC came from Chad (€3 million), the European Union (€2 million), the 
Netherlands (€1 million), the African Union (1 million USD), the United States (1 million USD), Belgium 
(€500,000), Germany (€500,000), France (€300,000), Luxembourg (€100,000). 
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direction. On this basis, both the ACJHR and the ICC could operate in a mutually 
cooperative manner if timed, sequenced, and prioritized strategically from the outset. 
Regional mechanisms such as the ACJHR could be an essential part of a robust system of 
global justice.76 The important thing is to make clear the expectations and roles of each 
jurisdiction now in order to best realize the shared commitment to increased justice and 
accountability in Africa for victims and perpetrators of egregious international crimes. 
The ACJHR has fifteen signatories and no ratifications,77 which nevertheless demands 
some targeted preparation and strategizing in the interim. Practical concerns aside, at a 
minimum, the enumeration of an African vision of international criminal law offers a 
meaningful lens through which to evaluate the project’s success both on the continent and 
more generally.   
   
9.5 Resolving Competing Mandates 
Informed by interviews with elites with specific relevant knowledge, an ideal distribution 
of investigatory and prosecutorial roles has been imagined. In its simplest structure, 
national jurisdictions would investigate and prosecute foot soldiers, regional jurisdictions 
would pursue rebel leaders, military commanders or intermediaries, and the ICC would 
deal with heads of state and senior government officials.78 The representation below 
highlights the distribution of responsibility which is necessarily inverted in terms of 
caseload (volume), but (more) equal in terms of maximizing jurisdictional capacity 
regarding the culpability of individuals targeted at each level. For illustrative purposes, a 
national jurisdiction could foreseeably prosecute hundreds and thousands of foot soldiers, 
the ACJHR could prosecute less than fifty commanders or leaders, and the ICC one to 
five individuals. Jurisdictional demands vary in terms of expertise, resources, and 
 
76 Sirleaf, “Regionalism, Regime Complexes, and the Crisis in International Criminal Justice,” 703.  
77 List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified, Acceded to the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol 




TS.pdf; accessed 15 July 2019).  
78Anonymous, Office of the Prosecutor: Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division, 
interview by author, 11 December 2018, The Hague.   
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capacity, depending on the seniority of individual suspects and the corresponding crimes 
being investigated and prosecuted. Parsing out an equitable distribution of jurisdictional 
fora helps to facilitate mutual cooperation and assistance and eliminates an unfair burden 
on any or all system(s). The interrelationship between the crimes covered by the ACJHR 
and the core crimes covered by the Rome Statute will establish links to root causes and a 
more holistic approach to criminal justice. The ACJHR may be beneficial in isolation, 
though its greatest strategic advantage for the development of international criminal law 
is that it offers the potential for progressive developments in the holistic investigation and 
targeted prosecution of crimes at the ICC.  
This arrangement offers some key benefits. First, national jurisdictions would 
undertake the greatest volume of cases, hopefully from all sides of the conflict. Although 
almost all courts will have difficulty prosecuting government leaders, this approach is 
highly important for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The crimes committed by foot 
soldiers would conceivably be the most intimate, direct, and localized forms of violence 
perpetrated against victims. Evidence gathering and investigation strategies, once 
capacitated, will mimic existing domestic legal approaches, including modes of 
accountability. The accused can be directly linked to the crime, easily identified, and 
evidence gathered. Victims should have the opportunity to look their perpetrator in the 
eye and see justice done; this yields greater prospects for transition, stability, and healing 
in the wake of mass atrocity.  
The significant point is that the immunity critiques only scratch the surface of 
what is at issue. Pigeonholing the Malabo Protocol in the immunity provision undersells 
its potential contribution to the continued development of a robust system of international 
criminal justice. More importantly, it is helpful to recall that the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) retains the ability to refer cases to the ICC79 if the ACJHR and national 
 
79 It is necessary to note that the current climate of international relations suggests that the United Nations 
Security Council is unlikely to refer cases to the ICC given open hostility on the part of P5 members China, 
Russia, and the United States. Political limitations and defects aside, the Security Council has the means to 
refer cases to the ICC, which remains a feature embedded in the Rome Statute System no matter how the 
global climate and approaches to international relations ebb and flow. See generally Alexandre Skander 
Galand, UN Security Council Referrals to the International Criminal Court: Legal Nature, Effects and 
Limits, vol. 5 Leiden Studies on the Frontiers of International Law, (Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2018).   
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jurisdictions fail to prosecute those most responsible for serious violations of 
international criminal law. Eight of the eleven states that have signed the Malabo 
Protocol are also States Parties to the Rome Statute and show no signs of withdrawing 
from the ICC. The Malabo Protocol simply indicates who can be prosecuted regionally 
and who cannot.80  
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) might be used to explain 
the treaty conflict and subsequent obligations of States Parties to both the Rome Statute 
and the Malabo Protocol.81 The relevant question is which provision takes priority, since 
at present the relationship between immunities (ratione personae) and a state’s legal 
obligations are profoundly unclear.82 In this regard, the interpretative rule pacta sunt 
servanda (the agreement shall be honoured) found in Article 26 of the VCLT is useful.83 
There are two primary interpretations of the rule. The first does not favour the earlier 
treaty but makes each treaty enforceable, “even though they may pose potentially 
incompatible obligations.”84 The second interpretation favours the earlier treaty. The 
important part is that under either interpretation, “Treaty I shall be honored unless a State 
makes the policy choice of breaching and incurring responsibility.”85 This implies that 
States Parties to both the Rome Statute and the Malabo Protocol will retain an obligation 
to waive immunity and surrender suspects regardless of their official capacity or else 
incur responsibility. Borgen explains, “The disagreement concerns the effect of pacta 
sunt servanda on Treaty II: Is the second treaty abrogated or should it simply be followed 
 
80 It is important to note that the ACJHR is expansive (more crimes, corporate liability) and limited in terms 
of its inability/unwillingness to prosecute sitting heads of state and government.  
81 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331. Since the parties to both treaties are not identical and the provision in the Malabo 
Protocol and the provision in the Rome Statute are incompatible, the relevant section is 30(5): Paragraph 4 
is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termination or suspension of the operation of a 
treaty under article 60 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion 
or application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another 
State under another treaty.  
82 See Guénaël Mettraux, John Dugard, and Max du Plessis, “Heads of State Immunities, International 
Crimes and President Bashir’s Visit to South Africa,” International Criminal Law Review 18.4 (2018): 
577-622.  
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331. 
84 Christopher Borgen, “Resolving Treaty Conflicts,” The George Washington International Law Review 37 




to the fullest extent possible without frustrating the first treaty?”86 Some scholars argue 
that this type of treaty conflict is resolved by the state choosing which obligation to 
fulfill, referred to as the principle of political will.87 The underlying point is that States 
Parties will be forced to make a decision to fulfill obligations to either the AU or the ICC, 
but not both concerning this particular provision. The burden and risk of breaching either 
or both treaties, it is argued, will lead states to negotiate a solution.88 However, 
abrogating Treaty II (in this case the Malabo Protocol) makes little sense. Instead, it 
should be followed to the fullest extent and prosecute everyone it can outside of heads of 
state and government in the interest of positive complementarity and international 
criminal justice more generally. 
Importantly, the UNSC retains the power to refer anyone accused of bearing the 
most responsibility for atrocious crimes to the ICC. Moreover, States Parties to both 
treaties maintain an obligation to honour the Rome Statute according to the interpretive 
rule pacta sunt servanda, even if the Malabo Protocol is being followed to the fullest 
extent possible. This suggests that sitting heads of state and government officials will 
remain captured by the Rome Statute, even if they cannot be prosecuted regionally.  
Skeptics typically situate the Malabo Protocol against the backdrop of the 
escalating crisis between the ICC and the AU. The strained relationship has had a 
profound impact on the discourse. For example, it has been explained that “the charged 
atmosphere appears to have left scant room for a detailed and comprehensive assessment 
of the drafting of the Malabo Protocol, and for a calm evaluation [of] how the interplay of 
national, regional and international jurisdiction could best advance the judicial response 
to crimes of international concern.”89 This is a problem that needs to be addressed, since 
calls for substantive consideration on the issue of integrating regional courts into an 
 
86 Ibid., 589. 
87 J. B. Bus, ‘Conflicts Between Treaties in International Law’, XLV Netherlands International Law 
Review, (1998), 231. 
88 Borgen, “Resolving Treaty Conflicts,” 589. In a related area, this has already been demonstrated through 
the dialectical exchange on the part of South Africa, in particular when it was forced to make a decision 
whether to oblige the AU or the ICC with respect to non-cooperation and surrender of al-Bashir. If the 
Malabo Protocol comes into force, States Parties could be forced to make a decision regarding which treaty 
obligation to fulfill.  
89 Bertram-Nothnagel, “A Seed for World Peace Growing in Africa,” 360. 
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understanding of the concept of complementarity with the ICC can be found in AU 
meeting transcripts as early as 2009.90 Opportunities for more (local) justice should be 
supported, not dismissed. Most important, both the AU and ICC are receptive to the idea 
of complementary regional courts, which indicates the significant potential of the 
ACJHR.91   
To be clear, the Malabo Protocol may have been accelerated due to tense relations 
between the AU and the ICC, but the AU had been working on it since 2004.92 The 
propensity to narrowly view the ACJHR as an attempt to insulate politically powerful 
Africans from the ICC provides an incomplete and/or false narrative with respect to its 
political and legal trajectory. The strategic approach identified above supports the view 
that the ACJHR could effectively maximize its jurisdictional capacity by investigating 
and prosecuting some of those most responsible for egregious crimes, even if this 
excludes sitting heads of state and government. It is highly important to prosecute rebel 
leaders, junta, military commanders, and other intermediaries between government and 
soldiers on the ground in any idealized system of international criminal justice. It is 
possible that the gap between who can be prosecuted regionally and who cannot is a 
natural one, leading some to argue that leaders’ cases cannot succeed nationally and 
regionally.93 Many of the reasons for this appear to be obvious: the political self-interest 
of individuals and states insulate those with power. Ultimately, the capacity of national 
and regional courts, as with the ICC, cannot be separated from the political will of states, 
which is necessarily tied up with sovereign interests. Until universal jurisdiction is 
adhered to, the ICC needs to endure the growing pains it is currently experiencing.       
 
90 Max du Plessis, “Implications of the AU Decision,” 4. 
91 The ICC’s receptiveness to regional courts within the international legal system and complementarity 
more broadly derive from the author’s personal interviews conducted under the promise of anonymity, 
which include Judges and staff of the OTP’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division. 
92Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission, Vol. 1: vision and mission of the African Union, AU 
Commission (May 2004) § 30: “The African Court of Justice will adjudicate in civil cases and be 
responsible for human rights protection and monitoring human rights violations. It will also constitute itself 
into a real criminal court in the long term [emphasis added].”  
93 Anonymous ICC Judge, interview by author, 24 January 2019, The Hague; see Phil Clark, Distant 
Justice: The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018). 
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A purposive approach to complementarity could alleviate some of the current 
credibility and legitimacy pressures on the ICC. Specifically, some have argued that “the 
Court is emerging as an institution where only rebels can be and will be successfully 
prosecuted.”94 However, if regional courts such as the ACJHR could effectively 
investigate and prosecute rebels, junta, or military leaders, this would free up human and 
material resources for the ICC. This could allow the Office of the Prosecutor to develop a 
more robust and targeted strategy for the successful prosecution of heads of state and 
government, which is vitally important for the longevity of the institution. The primary 
concern should always be what is best for justice, by any and all means possible.     
The distribution of jurisdictional responsibility has the potentially cumulative 
effect of uncovering more evidence and contributing to multi-level information sharing 
and capacity building. This could be mutually constitutive in strategizing complex modes 
of liability, which is required to hold heads of state and government to account at the 
ICC.95 Establishing evidentiary ties between foot soldiers, military commanders, and 
heads of state will establish linkages and culpability at various levels of perpetration. 
Looking at complementarity in this way is more relational than vertical/hierarchical, 
since each jurisdictional mechanism offers an opportunity for interdependence in order to 
bolster, support, and strengthen the other–only if effective coordination and political will 
allow. Neither the ACJHR nor the ICC would have primacy but would work together 
towards constituting what Cassese refers to as “a system of international justice.”96 
Regional agency and ownership over the international criminal justice project could 
contribute to a renewed sense of commitment to ‘international criminal law’ as such and 
work to establish a cooperative and trilateral international judicial system in African 
contexts.   
A pragmatic question considers the implications of competing obligations of 
States Parties to both the Rome Statute and the ACJHR.  Since a key aspect of 
 
94 Mark Kersten, “Some Quick Reflections on the Gbagbo Acquittal at the ICC,” Justice in Conflict, 18 
January 2019, available at: https://justiceinconflict.org/2019/01/18/some-quick-reflections-on-the-gbagbo-
acquittal-at-the-icc/; accessed 3 June 2019. 
95 The Rome Statute, Art. 25.  
96 Cassese, The Oxford companion to international criminal justice, 213.  
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complementarity is the integration of the Rome Statute into domestic law, it remains 
unclear how double signatories might implement competing obligations, particularly 
concerning the issue of immunity.97 For example, South Africa’s initial withdrawal from 
the Rome Statute stemmed from its conflicting obligations to the AU and the ICC with 
respect to the (non)arrest of al-Bashir.98 South Africa chose to uphold its regional and/or 
strategic political commitments to the AU over and above those of the ICC when it 
allowed al-Bashir to attend an African Union summit in Johannesburg and failed to arrest 
and surrender him to the Court. The traditional customary immunity that South Africa 
owed to the head of state and head delegate of Sudan at the AU summit clashed directly 
with its obligations to the ICC. This raises suspicion about the nature of competing 
obligations in international law, especially between AU-instruments such as the Malabo 
Protocol and the Rome Statute. This also brings African regional political interests and 
dynamics into the fold. The operation of international criminal law is more intersectional 
than universal inasmuch as it is dispensed alongside complex (and perhaps competing) 
political, moral, and legal realities. The (perceived) duality between the Malabo Protocol 
and the Rome Statute raise important questions about the frictions between national, 
regional, and international political and legal systems and possibilities for synergistic 
justice. 
Most telling, at the peak of the ‘ICC withdrawal movement’ in 2016, when 
Burundi, The Gambia, and South Africa had initiated procedures to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute, the most vocal critics that ‘should’ have followed suit never did (e.g. 
Kenya, Namibia, and Uganda).99 This is further confused by the fact that the Gambia has 
reversed its decision by deciding to stay in the ICC, and South Africa has also halted their 
 
97 Malabo Protocol Art. 28(e); Malabo Protocol Art. 28(g). See Amnesty International, Malabo Protocol: 
Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and Expanded African Court (2017), available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR0161372017ENGLISH.PDF; accessed 10 June 2019: 
the definition of terrorism is overly broad and the definition of unconstitutional change of government may 
potentially criminalize popular protests - both are drafted broadly and “raise serious concerns as to the 
compliance with the principle of legality established under international law.”  
98 See Franziska Boehme, “We Chose Africa:’ South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation 
within the International Criminal Court,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 11.1 (2016): 50-70. 
99 Franck Kuwonu, ‘ICC: Beyond the threats of withdrawal’, Africa Renewal Online (2017), available at 




withdrawal.100 Thus, Burundi remains the sole dissenter for transparent reasons.101 It is 
important to emphasize that the ICC is a vehicle for much more than retribution; it is a 
manifestation of norms and values and a promise to victims that even if domestic systems 
fail, the rule of law endures. The Prosecutor of the ICC maintained her commitment to 
continue with the investigation in Burundi until she left the Office of the Prosecutor in 
2021, reaffirming this promise.  
This demonstrates that African concerns with the ICC, outside of Burundi, are not 
rooted in a desire to forego international legal obligations, or the rule of law, but are 
instead a manifestation of unresolved dispute. This is further reflected in the soft 
language enacted throughout the AU’s Proposed Withdrawal Strategy, which reads more 
like a plea for reasoned deliberation and compromise than abandon.102 However, colonial 
histories and longstanding power imbalances lend to the calls for African Solutions for 
African Problems. Such structural imbalances ultimately shape a mutually constructed 
skepticism on the part of both ‘Africa’ and ‘the West,’ which will continue to make 
cooperation and trust difficult in the absence of a genuine dialectical process. The 
positive point is that neither the ICC nor the AU seem to propose that the two courts are 
in conflict or are necessarily incompatible. Nevertheless, although the ACJHR is an 
innovative and creative solution in the abstract sense, making it a tangible reality remains 
severely debilitated.   
 
100 See Max du Plessis and Guénaël Mettraux, “South Africa’s Failed Withdrawal from the Rome Statute: 
Politics, Law, and Judicial Accountability,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 15 (2017): 361-370.  
101 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Burundi on regressive path following ICC 
withdrawal vote (12 October 2016), available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCPR_BurundiICCwithdrawal_Oct2016.pdf; accessed 20 May 2019; 
Human Rights Watch, Burundi: ICC Withdrawal Major Loss to Victims: Latest Move Shows Government’s 
Disregard for Victims (27 October 2016), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/burundi-icc-
withdrawal-major-loss-victims; accessed 25 May 2019. 
102Withdrawal Strategy Document. See also Human Rights Watch, AU’s Withdrawal Strategy’ Less than 
Meets the Eye (1 February 2017) available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/01/aus-icc-withdrawal-
strategy-less-meets-eye; accessed 3 June 2019; Mark Kersten, “Not All it’s Cracked Up to Be-The African 
Union’s ‘ICC Withdrawal Strategy,’” Justice in Conflict, 6 February 2017, available at: 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/02/06/not-all-its-cracked-up-to-be-the-african-unions-icc-withdrawal-
strategy/; accessed 3 June 2019. Patryk I. Labuda, “The African Union’s Collective Withdrawal from the 
ICC: Does Bad Law make for Good Politics?” EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International 
Law, 15 February 2017, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-african-unions-collective-withdrawal-
from-the-icc-does-bad-law-make-for-good-politics/; accessed 3 June 2019.  
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9.6 An Operational, Yet Ineffective Court 
More robust critiques of the Malabo Protocol stem from practical concerns rather than 
principled ones. The funding demanded for running a regional court and the cost for 
adding the additional chamber is crippling. For example, with respect to funding, “the 
unit cost of a single trial for an international crime in 2009 was estimated to be US $20 
million. This is nearly double the approved 2009 budgets for the African Court and the 
African Commission standing at US $7 642 269 and US $3 671 766, respectively.”103 For 
the purpose of comparison, “the ICC budget [in the same year]… for investigating just 
three crimes, and not the raft of offences the African Court is expected to tackle–is more 
than 14 times that of the African Court without a criminal component; and is just about 
double the entire budget of the AU.”104 In 2012, the Pan-African Lawyers Union 
estimated that it would cost $4.42 million USD and 211 people to staff the ACJHR.105 It 
can be deduced that investigating and prosecuting international criminal cases on the 
continent is flagrantly expensive. For example, the ICC’s budget continues to increase 
annually. In 2016 the approved budget was 17.3% over what it was in 2015.106 States 
have been reluctant to increase the budget of the ICC, but minimal growth has occurred. 
In the case of the ACJHR, such a financial burden is plainly unrealistic.  
Staffing a court with prosecutors, investigators, and judges requires significant 
resources. The Protocol lacks a funding breakdown and it remains unclear where the 
money might come from. This raises concerns with respect to independence from the 
start. Furthermore, it has been argued that historic AU donors such as the European 
Union may not be willing to finance the ACJHR based on the immunity provision.107 The 
widespread disapproval on the part of the international community and global civil 
society with respect to immunities may challenge the ACJHR’s ability to secure donors, 
should the Malabo Protocol receive the necessary ratifications to enter into force.  
 
103 Max du Plessis, “Implications of the AU Decision to Expand the African Court’s Jurisdiction,” 9. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Amnesty International, supra note 96, at 9. 
106 Proposed Programme Budget for 2016 of the International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 
Fourteenth Session (ICC-ASP/14/10), 18-26 November 2015.  
107 Amnesty International, Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications, 31.  
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Looking internally, “the capacity of African states to muster the resources and 
will to guarantee these facilities–even as many of them struggle to guarantee the 
independence of their own domestic judicial institutions–is open to serious question.”108 
Furthermore, for African States Parties to the ICC and the ACJHR, the double burden of 
funding in addition to domestic obligations would be encumbering. This raises questions 
not of willingness to prosecute, but of ability. The financial burden would be 
extraordinary, which has led some to argue that the ACJHR is ‘stillborn.’109  
Regionalizing international criminal justice may require a more pragmatic 
approach than the ACJHR lays out. As du Plessis suggests, “Of course, we should all 
applaud if the AU were in due course to unveil a comprehensively funded, strongly 
resourced, legally sound, and politically backed African court that fearlessly pursues 
justice for those afflicted by the continent’s warlords and dictators, at the same time as 
fulfilling effectively its parallel human rights roles.”110 Unfortunately, the Malabo 
Protocol is unlikely to have the capacity to satisfy each of these requirements at this time 
or in the foreseeable future.  
 
9.7 Conclusion 
The prospect of the ACJHR offers a unique opportunity to forge the idea of regional 
complementarity in the Rome Statute System. However, the strained relationship between 
the AU and the ICC and insufficient resources may act as impediments to the tangible 
realization of the ACJHR separately or mixed. Against this backdrop, such assumptions 
are aggravated by the immunity provision contained in Article 46A bis of the Malabo 
Protocol, which is further confused by the absence of a clearly defined relationship 
between the ACJHR and the ICC. Each of these concerns makes the likelihood of 
integrating the ACJHR within the ICC’s complementary schema extremely difficult. 
 
108 Max du Plessis, “Implications of the AU Decision to Expand the African Court’s Jurisdiction,” 10. 
109 Anonymous, Office of the Prosecutor, interview by author (12 December 2018), The Hague. 
110 Max du Plessis, “A case of negative regional complementarity? Giving the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights Jurisdiction over International Crimes,”, EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of 
International Law, 27 August 2012, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-case-of-negative-regional-
complementarity-giving-the-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-jurisdiction-over-international-
crimes/; accessed 20 June 2019. 
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Notwithstanding this, a purposive interpretation of complementarity to include regional 
jurisdictions presents interesting opportunities for (re)thinking and (re)situating the 
principle in its broader socio-political-legal context. Perhaps more important, the 
enumeration of an afro-centric approach to international criminal law offers an important 
perspective through which to understand the strained AU-ICC relationship and way(s) 




Chapter 10  
10 Africa and the ICC Judiciary 
Various attitudes and dynamics of the ICC judges have shaped the operation of the ICC 
in visible ways. It is useful to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of the judiciary, since 
it is an essential component of the Courts legitimacy and credibility. The aim of this 
chapter is to explain some of the problems with the ICC bench, which have become a 
focal point of concern by scholars and observers of the Court.1 This has a direct 
application when viewed through the lens of Africa, since it is these judges who have 
opined on the criminality solely of Africans, at the time of writing. It is necessary to 
highlight that the problems identified within the judiciary are undergirded by assertions 
of politicization throughout the state-based nomination and election processes via the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP), which directly affects the makeup of the bench in 
discernible ways. This is directly correlated with the institutional design of the ICC as 
enumerated by the Rome Statute with respect to judicial nomination and election 
processes, but more pointedly with the way that states manipulate the judicial nomination 
and election design features of the Court for political purposes.  
It is impossible to divorce any credible evaluation of the ICC (including the 
judiciary) from its relationship with African States Parties or ‘Africa’ more broadly, since 
it is there where the Court has operated almost exclusively. It is equally important to 
acknowledge that African governments and African individuals have engaged with, and 
 
1 See generally Yassir Al-Khudayri and Christian de Vos, “Excellence, not Politics, should Choose the 
Judges at the ICC,” Open Society Justice Initiative (28 October 2019), blogpost available at 
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/voices/excellence-not-politics-should-choose-the-judges-at-the-icc; 
accessed 20 November 2020: “Nominations and elections of judicial candidates often overlook merit-based 
considerations in favor of political interests.” See also Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar: 
Improving the Nomination and Election of Judges to the International Criminal Court (28 October 2019), 
available at https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/raising-the-bar-improving-the-nomination-and-
election-of-judges-to-the-international-criminal-court; accessed 20 November 2020; Andrea Trigoso, “The 
Politics of Electing ICC Judges: Some Unpopular Thoughts,” Justice in Conflict (22 October 2020) 
blogpost available at https://justiceinconflict.org/2020/10/22/the-politics-of-electing-icc-judges-some-
unpopular-thoughts/; accessed 20 November 2020; Angela Mudukuti, “A look at OSJI’s ‘Raising the Bar: 
Improving the Nomination and Selection of Judges at the International Criminal Court,” OpinioJuris (24 
November 2019) blogpost available at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/11/24/a-look-at-osjis-raising-the-bar-
improving-the-nomination-and-selection-of-judges-at-the-international-criminal-court/; accessed 20 
November 2020; Andrea Carcano, “On the exercise of the judicial function at the International Criminal 
Court: Issues of credibility and structural design,” Questions of International Law 67 (2020): 3-23. 
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occupied important roles within, various components of the ICC’s institutional structure.2 
The so-called ‘Africa bias’ at the ICC has contributed to the proliferation of rhetoric that 
the Court is merely a forum for Europeans to prosecute Africans.3 While it is 
inappropriate to deny the complexities of colonialism and its impact on the global order 
(of which the ICC is a part), it is likewise important to emphasize the agency exercised 
by many African states and African individuals in the operationalization of the ICC, and 
in the context of this chapter, the judiciary in particular. It is also necessary to 
acknowledge ‘Africa’ and Africans as bona fide actors within the apparatus of the Court 
and its structures, rather than continuing to view ‘Africa’ through the oppressive 
rhetorical canon of European subjugation and paternalism. As Judge Solomy Balungi 
Bossa from Uganda has argued, “hundreds of African legal practitioners have made the 
International Criminal Court what it is. Frankly, it is absolutely ridiculous to accuse the 
Court of being racist.”4 With respect to the nomination and election of judges at the ICC, 
while it appears rational to criticize the ICC judges as individuals, it is also important to 
challenge the States Parties that nominate and (perhaps more importantly) elect particular 
candidates, which illuminates a deeper seated institutional and political problem.  
The reality is that at the time of writing, African States Parties had nominated 
more candidates to the ICC judiciary than any other region and had the third highest 
number of judges elected to the bench in the Court’s history. Nonetheless, at the time of 
writing, African defendants are the only ones who have been subject to ICC decisions–
many of which have been openly challenged by scholars, observers, and even the judges 
themselves. For example, consider the acquittal (on appeal) of Jean-Pierre Bemba, former 
 
2 Note, for example that former ICC Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria) served as President of the ICC 
(2018-2020); Fatou Bensouda (The Gambia) served as the first Deputy Prosecutor under Luis Moreno-
Ocampo and became the second Chief Prosecutor from 2012-2020.  
3 See for example Dr. David Hoile, “Is the ICC a tool to recolonise Africa?” New African (31 March 2017), 
available at https://newafricanmagazine.com/15261/; accessed 10 October 2020: “A hundred and twenty-
three years later, Europe appears to still be trying to steal both Africa and the Africans. They are now using 
their new creation, the International Criminal Court (ICC), to steal Africans from Africa to put on show-
trials in Western Europe.” The article goes on to argue that “Broadly, the ICC has emerged as a de facto 
European court, funded by Europe, directed by Europe, and focused almost exclusively on the African 
continent, and thereby serving Western political and economic interests in Africa.” 
4 Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, “Africa and the International Criminal Court: Then and Now,” in Africa 
and the International Criminal Court, eds. Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, Moritz Vormbaum (Springer, 
2014), 19.  
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Vice President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who was detained at the ICC 
for over ten years. Similarly, former President of Côte d’Ivoire and associate Charles Blé 
Goudé were acquitted at the trial stage when the defense successfully filed a motion that 
there was ‘no case to answer’ after eight years in ICC custody. The administration of 
justice at the ICC has been extraordinarily and unduly slow, which has had a 
disproportionate impact on African suspects, survivors/witnesses, and relevant post-
conflict societies.  
Notwithstanding this, Africans are strongly represented on the bench and have 
been just as responsible for the judgements issued against Africans as any other judge(s). 
To be sure, African judges have dealt with a significant number of situations and cases at 
the ICC at the time of writing, across all divisions.5 Africans have been both subjects and 
authors of justice at the ICC. The dynamism of this reality is important to reiterate in any 
fair assessment of how ICC judges have contributed to international criminal justice, 
most particularly in African contexts. It is worthwhile to unpack the merits of this 
assertion in the context of the ICC judiciary at its various procedural stages, in order to 
provide a meaningful analysis of how African states and Africans engage within and 
outside of the various judicial processes at the Court, including: nomination of judicial 
candidates, election of judicial candidates, and the decision-making of ICC judges. It is 
plainly visible that ‘Africa’ permeates each of these procedural stages, and African states 
and African judges have been equitably responsible for the shortcomings and deficiencies 
of the bench at the ICC to date, while being disproportionately impacted by the same.  
 
10.1 Technical Specifications: an overview of judicial 
 election processes at the ICC 
Article 36 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) sets out criteria 
for the qualification, nomination and election of judges. Judges are to be “persons of high 
 
5 More specifically, at the time of writing, Chile Eboe-Osuji sat on fifteen cases; Antoine Kesia Mbe-
Mindua sat on twenty-four cases; Solomy Balungi Bossa sat on three cases; Reine Alapini-Gansou sat on 
fifteen cases; Sanji Monageng sat on twenty-one cases; Fatoumata Dembélé Diarra sat on thirteen cases; 
Akua Kuenyehia sat on twenty-three cases; and Joyce Aluoch sat on fifteen cases. 
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moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their 
respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices.”6 Judges are nominated 
by States Parties and are elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) 
for a non-renewable (maximum) nine-year term. Typically, the ASP elects six judges per 
election cycle. The ICC bench is comprised of eighteen judges, who are the individuals 
that received the highest number of votes by the ASP. For the votes to count, a two-thirds 
majority of the States Parties must be present and voting at the election meeting.7 All 
States Parties to the Rome Statute are able to nominate one candidate for each election 
cycle. The candidate need not be a national of the nominating state, but must be a 
national of a States Party to the Rome Statute.   
Each candidate’s suitability for the position is evaluated by the Advisory 
Committee on the Nomination of Judges (ACN), the determinations of which are 
disseminated to States Parties before the election. For illustrative purposes, the ACN 
ranked the 2020 candidates into four categories:  
(a) highly qualified: the candidate excels in terms of the experience and 
knowledge about the Court and its jurisprudence; it is very likely that he/she 
would be able to make an important contribution to the work of the Court;  
(b) qualified: the candidate has some relevant experience and knowledge about 
the Court; he/she could contribute to the work of the Court;  
(c) only formally qualified: the candidate meets the requirements set out in the 
Rome Statute for election as a judge, but it is uncertain if the candidate could 
make a noteworthy contribution to the work of the Court;  
(d) not qualified: the candidate does not meet the formal requirements set out in 
the Rome Statute.8  
The Committee is composed of nine members from all five regions and their 
recommendations are based on the written and oral responses of candidates through 
 
6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), Article 36.3(a). 
7 International Criminal Court: The Judges of the Court, available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Publications/JudgesENG.pdf; accessed 4 July 2020. 
8 Report on the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of its seventh session, ICC-
ASP/19/11 (30 September 2020), 6. 
287 
 
interview-based assessments. Importantly, in December 2019, the ASP by consensus 
adopted a resolution to strengthen the advisory role of the ACN in an effort to better 
guide States Parties in the nomination and election of judges.9 Candidates provide a 
statement specifying how their experience amounts to the necessary experience in 
criminal law or international law. They also provide a curriculum vitae, which is publicly 
available on the ASP website. In sum, candidates are nominated by States Parties, are 
subject to review by the ACN, and are elected by the ASP. 
The Rome Statute breaks down specific representative requirements that directly 
influence the makeup of the ICC bench. Candidates are required to be fluent in at least 
one of the working languages of the Court, namely English and/or French.10 Further, 
States Parties are required to consider nominating and electing candidates who will 
provide a fair representation of the various legal systems of the world; equitable 
geographic representation; a fair representation of female and male judges; and no two 
judges can be nationals of the same state.11 The Rome Statute also particularizes the need 
to include judges with legal expertise on issues such as violence against women and 
children.12 To assure that the representative requirements outlined in the Rome Statute 
are upheld, the ASP has provided a series of minimum voting requirements, which 
specify how many judges are required based on professional experience, geographic 
region, and gender. These representative requirements are reiterated on the ballot paper 
during the election. In combination, the representative requirements outlined in the Rome 
Statute and implemented by the ASP provide a clear framework for a presumably diverse 
and equitable bench. Nevertheless, it is up to States Parties to nominate and elected the 
best possible candidates, while remaining mindful of these key representative factors.   
 
9 Resolution on the review of the procedure for the nomination and election of judges, Resolution ICC-
ASP/18/Res.4 (6 December 2019). 
10 Ibid., Art. 36.3(c). Note: this requirement has been viewed as a limiting factor by scholars in the Court’s 
nascency, since many defendants do not speak either English and/or French. See: Julie Fraser and Brianne 
McGonigle Leyh, eds., Intersections of Law and Culture at the International Criminal Court (United 
Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2020). 
11 Rome Statute, Art. 36(7); Art. 8(a). 
12 Ibid., Art. 36.8(b). 
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10.1.1 Practical Consequences of Judicial Nomination and Election 
Processes at the ICC 
On this cursory basis, the nomination and election of ICC judges is a highly political 
process, since they are both nominated and elected by States Parties to the Rome Statute. 
This structural politicization has the potential to complicate the overall merit and quality 
of the bench at the ICC at both the nomination and election stage(s). Arguably, the 
primacy of meritocracy is further troubled by the Rome Statute’s representative 
requirements, specifically: gender, geographical region, and legal competence.13 
Fulfilling the prescriptive representative requirements contained in the Rome Statute, by 
its very design, could restrict candidates based on arbitrary factors such as gender and/or 
region and/or legal competence. Consequentially, it is quite possible that a superior 
candidate may be unsuccessful if they do not ‘tick the necessary boxes’ as set out in the 
Rome Statute and articulated by the ASP.14 Notwithstanding this, equitable representation 
on the bench was an institutional design choice made by the drafters of the Rome Statute. 
This appears logical in the sense that it is an international court and the panel of those 
making judgements ought to reflect that fact. Nevertheless, it is similarly important to 
acknowledge that such a design choice can be a limiting factor in terms of overall quality 
and merit when strictly executed in practice, depending on the credible engagement on 
the part of states to nominate and elect the best possible candidates among the spectrum 
of qualifying factors. This is because states may nominate candidates for political or 
arbitrary reasons, which has to the potential to trouble the pool of candidates from which 
States Parties are required to choose from. This is not an inherent problem linked to the 
institutional design of the ICC per se, but with the cavalier engagement by States Parties 
 
13 Legal competence refers to the process whereby States Parties nominate candidates under either List A 
(competence in criminal law) or List B (competence in international law – i.e. human rights, humanitarian, 
etc.). See specifically Article 36(b) of the Rome Statute, which states, “Every candidate for election to the 
Court shall: (i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant 
experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings 
[List A]; or (ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as international 
humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity 
which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court [List B].” 
14 See ICC Assembly of States Parties: Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.6, “Annex I: Illustrative tables of 
minimum voting requirements” available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-
ASP3-Res-06-ENG.pdf, 6-7 accessed 2 February 2021. 
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to adequately contribute to, and improve the quality of, the ICC judiciary through 
rigorous and transparent national nomination procedures and legitimate international 
election processes. This is important because States Parties need to demonstrate credible 
commitment to the institutional robustness, legitimacy, and credibility of the ICC in all 
facets, including the judiciary in order to withstand internal and external pressures on the 
Court.   
 
10.1.2 Representative Requirements in Practice 
The Rome Statute enumerates a minimum gender requirement of at least six women or 
men on the bench. It is worth noting that the current makeup of the bench reflects a 
perfect gender balance: there are nine women and nine men on the bench following the 
2020 judicial election. The ICC has been lauded by scholars and observers as being a 
comparatively progressive international Court in terms of its gender balance, which is a 
fair assertion throughout most of the Court’s history.15 Such claims importantly 
emphasize the gendered nature of international law and international politics beyond the 
scope of the ICC, but also suggest that the gender balance on the bench can shift 
progressively or regressively over time, based on the mindful and inclusive nominations 
and elections of candidates by states.16 It is interesting to note that leading up to the 2020 
election, there were half as many women (six) as there were men (twelve) on the bench. 
For illustrative purposes, the 2020 election of six judges had nine female candidates and 
eleven male candidates who were nominated by States Parties. There were four outgoing 
 
15 See Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,” 
in International Courts and the African Woman Judge, eds. Josephine Jarpa Dawuni and Akua Kuenyehia 
(New York: Routledge, 2018), at 63: “Despite the progress made by the Rome Statute in achieving gender 
parity on the bench, the outcome of women’s access to other international benches remains uneven.” 
However, when the analysis is expanded to consider the total number of ICC judgeships, the gender 
balance appears to improve (27 total men, 20 total women). Importantly, there was a time when the ICC 
bench was comprised by a majority of women. 
16 See Nienke Grossman, “Achieving Sex-Representative International Court Benches,” The American 
Journal of International Law, 110 (2016): 82. In surveying the gender balance of international court 
benches in 2015, Grossman argues, “For courts where states were required by statute to take sex into 
account when nominating and voting for judges, a higher percentage of women sat on the bench in mid 
2015.” She concludes that among those courts (including the ICC, European Court of Human Rights, 
African Court on Human Peoples’ Rights, and the ad litem benches of the International Criminal Tribunals 
for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, thirty-two percent of the judges were women as opposed to fifteen 
percent among courts that did not require a ‘fair representation’ of women and men judges. 
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male judges and two outgoing female judges, which presented an opportunity to 
reprioritize an equitable gender balance on the bench.17 On a positive note, the Rome 
Statute safeguards the inclusion of women judges at the ICC and is reflective of a 
progressive development in the landscape of international law and international criminal 
justice. Throughout the Court’s history, of the fifty-four judges ever to be elected to the 
ICC, twenty-nine have identified as male and twenty-five as female–not a completely 
perfect balance, but a notable and progressive one, nonetheless. The voting requirements 
based on gender were illustrated by the Assembly of States Parties in Table 4 of Annex 1: 
Illustrative tables of minimum voting requirements, which suggest that if four women 
remained on the bench after 2020, at least two women must be elected by minimum 
voting requirement.  With respect to men, if eight remained on the bench after 2020, the 
minimum voting requirement would be fulfilled. Thus, it was conceivable that all 
incoming judges could have been women in this election cycle. While this did not 
happen, the ASP went above the minimum voting requirement with respect to gender by 
electing four incoming female judges. This is significant for achieving the goal of gender 
parity in the international legal landscape.  
In terms of judicial competence, candidates are elected from either ‘List A’–those 
having competence and experience in criminal law and procedure, or ‘List B’–those 
having competence and experience in international law, such as international 
humanitarian law or international human rights law.18 According to article 36.3(b) of the 
Rome Statute, 
Every candidate for election to the Court shall: 
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the 
necessary relevant experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, advocate or 
in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings [List A]; or 
 
17 The outgoing Judges were elected in 2011. The outgoing male Judges include Howard Morrison (United 
Kingdom); Robert Fremr (Czech Republic); Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria); Anthony Thomas Aquinas 
Carmona (Trinidad and Tobago). The outgoing female Judges include Miriam Defensor-Santiago 
(Philippines) and Olga Venecia Herrera Carbuccia (Dominican Republic).  
18 Rome Statute, Art. 36(3)(i); Art. 36(3)(ii). 
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(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as 
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive 
experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the 
judicial work of the Court [List B].19  
The Rome Statute requires that at least nine candidates be elected from List A and at least 
five candidates be elected by List B. At the time of writing, there were eleven judges 
elected from List A on the bench, and seven elected from List B. It is worth noting that at 
the 2020 judicial election there were four remaining judges from List B on the bench, 
which therefore required that at least one incoming judge be elected from List B to 
satisfy the minimum requirement of five. Similarly, five outgoing judges were elected 
from List A, which required that at least one incoming judge be elected from List A to 
satisfy the minimum requirement of nine. It is important to emphasize that again in the 
2020 election the ASP went above the minimum voting requirements by electing three 
judges from List B and three judges from List A. This effectively increased the 
representation of List B candidates on the bench altogether from five to seven. The 
representation of judges elected from List A decreased from thirteen to eleven, reflecting 
a rebalancing of the bench based on competence and experience. As a matter of practice, 
the bench has emphasized List A candidates as a maxim–a natural consequence of the 
construct of the Rome Statute. To be sure, of the fifty-four judges elected to the ICC to 
date, thirty-three were elected from List A and twenty-one were elected from List B. It is 
instructive to recall that the first judicial election in 2003 assembled the first ICC bench 
with eight Judges from List B and ten Judges from List A. Thus, the current bench at the 
time of writing reflects a (more) similar structure to the original judiciary on the basis of 
competence and experience.  
This was an unexpected shift because over time, the number of List B electees 
had been reduced so as to allow only for the minimum number required by the Rome 
Statute. The reasons for this were manifold; the strongest of which being that some 
observers have argued that List B should be eliminated altogether, since it facilitates the 
election of judges with no judicial training or experience (i.e. career diplomats and 
 
19 Ibid., at 36.3 (b). 
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academics).20 However, this is not a generalizable point of view and is certainly 
contentious on the basis that List A Judges have made just as many problematic 
judgements in the Court’s nascency as those elected by List B. The notion that career 
academics or diplomats offer a unique perspective beyond a nuanced criminal law 
background is not de facto incompatible with the intent and purpose of the ICC. It is 
pertinent to reiterate that it is the responsibility of States Parties to nominate candidates 
on the basis of merit, regardless of what list they are nominated from.  
In addition, the Rome Statute calls for equitable geographic representation on the 
bench. The ICC uses the five regions of the world as described by the United Nations to 
frame geographic representation: Western European and Other States Group (WEOG); 
Eastern European States; Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC); 
African States; and Asia-Pacific States. Each region ought to have at least three judges 
on the bench to be considered equitably represented. At the time of writing, the Western 
European and Other States Group had the greatest geographic representation with five 
judgeships; African States had four; the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States 
had four; Eastern European States had three; and Asia-Pacific States had two. This 
construct reflected a fair degree of regional parity, although Asia-Pacific States are 
technically ‘underrepresented’ by one seat according to the Rome Statute. 
This underrepresentation can be situated within its broader political context. 
Specifically, the 2020 election of six judges had seven nominees from Latin American 
and Caribbean States; seven nominees from African States; three nominees from Western 
European and Other States; two nominees from Eastern European States; and one 
nominee from Asia-Pacific States. In 2020, there were two outgoing Judges from Latin 
American and Caribbean States, and one outgoing judge in each other region. Thus, to 
fulfill the proposed regional voting requirements, two incoming judges ought to have 
come from Latin American and Caribbean States; one from Eastern European States; and 
 
20 Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 4: “In particular, so-called ‘List B candidates’ (those 
candidates nominated for having ‘established competence in relevant areas of international law… and 
extensive experience in a professional legal capacity’) often lack that experience [in criminal law and 
procedure]… Similarly, the fact that so many government officials, including career diplomats, have 
previously been elected to the ICC judgeships is a cause for concern.” 
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one from Asia-Pacific States. Since only two nominees came from Eastern Europe, each 
had a fifty-fifty chance of being successfully nominated on this basis alone.21 The point is 
not to criticize these candidates on their merits, but rather to question whether States 
Parties had done a sufficient job in nominating the best possible candidates for the job, 
from the greatest number of states, to create a more competitive election environment. 
Regional political dynamics should not influence a States Party’s willingness to nominate 
qualified candidates, even if another country in the region has already submitted a 
nomination. Regional apathy devalues the nomination and election process altogether, 
which has far reaching consequences for the perceptive legitimacy of the Court.  
This is particularly telling in the context of Asia-Pacific States, since the only 
candidate put forward from the region in the 2020 election was Khosbayar Chagdaa from 
Mongolia. Chagdaa had also been nominated in 2017 but was not elected. Judge Raul 
Cano Pangalangan (Philippines) was outgoing, leaving a vacancy for a judge from the 
region to maintain a balanced bench in terms of geographic representation, per the Rome 
Statute. Prima facie, the vacancy of Judge Pangalangan ought to have secured the 
successful election of Chagdaa in the interests of fair and equitable geographic 
representation on the bench. The practice of regional groups nominating only the number 
of candidates to fit the number of seats available for that group is referred to as a ‘clean 
slate.’ Mackenzie et al. explain that in the context of the ICC, States Parties are not 
formally obliged to vote for a ‘clean slate,’ “but they may decide to do so in order to 
retain regional balance.”22 This institutional flexibility allows States Parties to focus on a 
candidates overall merits, above strict regional representation requirements. With specific 
reference to Chagdaa, it is worth noting that the Advisory Committee on Nominations of 
Judges determined that he “did not have in-depth knowledge of the Rome Statute or the 
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court” and furthermore, the ACN “was not 
persuaded that the candidates’ oral proficiency in English… met the high standard 
 
21 Gocha Lordkipanidze from Georgia was elected in 2020.  
22 Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Malleson, Penny Martin, and Philippe Sands, Selecting International Judges: 
Principle, Process, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 110. 
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prescribed under article 36, paragraph 3(b)(i) of the Rome Statute.”23 On this basis, it was 
determined that Chagdaa was only formally qualified for appointment as judge of the 
International Criminal Court. Thus, the quality of the candidate was called into question 
leading up to the election. Mongolia withdrew Chagdaa after the fourth election round 
after he received eight votes of the required two-thirds majority (eighty).24 The reasons 
for Mongolia’s decision to withdraw Chagdaa are presumptive, but nevertheless it is 
apparent that his election was highly unlikely following the fourth round. Thus, States 
Parties decided to prioritize factors over and above the retainment of regional balance on 
the bench. This is a positive outcome and demonstrates that States Parties are making a 
concerted effort to emphasize merit-based judicial appointments at the ICC. In choosing 
not to elect the candidate from the Asia-Pacific region, Latin American and Caribbean 
States claimed another seat on the bench, increasing regional representation from 
GRULAC to four judges from its previous three.   
       
10.2 Realpolitik and ICC Judgeships: Financial 
Contributions to the Court 
Notwithstanding this, it is important to acknowledge the reality that at present, most ICC 
judges come from Western European and Other States–even within a statutory context 
that demands regional parity. This reality subjects the Court to criticism on colonial 
grounds, whether logical or not.25 It is most important to consider that it remains the 
ultimate responsibility of States Parties to nominate and elect candidates that can fulfill 
 
23 Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of 
its seventh session, ICC-ASP/19/11, 30 September 2020, 12, paras. 2 and 4. 
24 Note that Chagdaa received 33 of the required two-thirds majority (78) in the first round; 16 of the 
required two-thirds majority (74) in the second round; and 14 of the required two-thirds majority (79) in the 
third round. See 2020–Election of six judges–Results available at https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/elections/judges/2020/Pages/Results.aspx; accessed 1 January 2021. 
25 While it is argued that merit and attitude should be weighed more heavily than representational markers, 
the need for an inclusive and representative judiciary is essential. It is well understood in many legal 
systems that diversity among the bench is imperative for a fairer justice system. See for example Lawrence 
R. Baca, “Diversity Among Judges: Building a Better Bench,” Judges’ Journal 43 (2004): 30-35, at 30. 
The author describes his experience as being “one Indian in a sea of white justice.” Quite naturally, 
stakeholders want to see an ICC that is representative of international society. Similar arguments have been 
made in other legal contexts with respect to the need for more women on the bench.  
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the representative requirements outlined by the Rome Statute while also meeting the 
primordial merit and attitude-based qualifications that will best achieve the overall 
purpose of the ICC. However, since States Parties nominate candidates, there is 
reasonable concern about the politicization of the process (i.e. by states arbitrarily 
appointing candidates in the absence of a competitive national nomination process; the 
so-called ‘horse-trading’ or ‘vote-trading’ of candidates as a result of diplomatic lobbying 
at ICC judicial elections; and the related inquisitive suspicion that financial contributions 
by states are correlated with increased representation and influence on the bench, 
illustrated by Table 10-1, below).26  
  
 
26 See David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 81-83, at 82: “Major powers with large military, development, 
and aid budgets have significant leverage, and there is evidence that they used it during the first round of 
ICC elections. ‘Votes can be traded against promises of development assistance,’ one delegate reported to 
researchers. While the Jordanian diplomat chairing the Assembly asked states to refrain from the 
bargaining and horse-trading that had become typical in elections for other international judgeships, it 
appears the practice endured.’” Note also: the assessed contributions by States Parties are based on the 
scale of assessments used by the United Nations for its regular budget.  
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Yes 2 3 100 
Germany 16,115,590 
11% 
Yes 1 2 100 
France 12,509,604 
8% 





Yes 2 3 100 
Italy 8,751,057 
6% 
Yes 2 3 100 
Brazil 8,217,956* 
6% 
No 1 3 33 
Canada 7,234,872 
5% 





Yes 1 2 100 
 
*Brazil owed 10,475,986 Euro at the time of writing and was the only leading assessment with an 
outstanding balance owed to the Court. Brazil has a mixed record of making its payment (e.g., Brazil owed 
11,413,371 euro in accumulated assessments in 2015).   
 
The implication of this is that 39 per cent of the current ICC bench was nominated by the 
leading financial contributors of the Court (35 per cent of all-time ICC judgeships). It is 
also important to note the overarching reality that the top ten assessments comprise 72 
per cent of the Court’s total. For the purpose of comparison, the regional total for Africa 
in 2019 was 1,930,634 Euro, which comprised 1.3 per cent of the ICC’s total assessments 
for the year. The demonstrable point is that the ICC has disproportionately operated in 
African situations while being largely funded by a core group of states, mostly from 
 
27 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Nineteenth session, 
New York, 17 July 2020, ICC-ASP/19/12, Financial statements of the International Criminal Court for the 
year ended 31 December 2019, 45-46, available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP19/ICC-
ASP-19-12-ENG-FS-ICC-17Jul20-1900%20cln.pdf; accessed 30 July 2020.  
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Western Europe. While the United Nations assessment scale is largely responsible for 
this, the very construct provides circumstantial support to embolden politicized 
arguments which pit the ICC and Europe against Africa and Africans.28 This is further 
strengthened by the reality that WEOG has had sixteen all-time ICC judgeships, the most 
of any region, and the leading financial contributors from the Western European and 
Other States Group have had a 100 per cent success rate for nominees. This matters 
inasmuch as it supports the claim that that realpolitik influences judgeships and provides 
powerful states with a reasonable assurance of influence on the bench, with little 
contestation. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that African States have 
had eleven ICC judgeships (the third most, regionally at the time of writing).29 Thus, 
even though other states contribute more financially to the ICC, African states continue to 
be represented on the bench and have comprised 20 per cent of the total ICC judgeships 
to date.  
 
10.3 Regional Participation in the Nomination Process 
Strong African representation on the ICC bench can most readily be explained by the 
disproportionately high regional engagement in nomination processes. To be sure, at the 
time of writing, the African region had nominated more ICC judicial candidates than any 
other region. There had been 149 all-time nominations for ICC judges and Africa had 
submitted 47 of them, comprising 32 per cent of all-time nominations. Engagement in the 
judicial nomination process is broken down by region in Table 10-2, below.  
 
28 The United Nations Assessment scale is based upon rule 160 of the Rules of Procedure of the UN 
General Assembly (A/520/Rev.18) and is summarized as the amount of money that the General Assembly 
determines that a state is able to pay to cover the expenses of the Organization. This scale is used to 
disperse funding obligations to states at the ICC. 
29 Note that the overall breakdown of ICC judgeships by region is as follows: WEOS (16); GRULAC (12); 
African States (11); Asia-Pacific (8); Eastern Europe (6). Thus, it is apparent that Western Europe has a 
significant leg up on the other regions when considering lifetime judicial appointments at the ICC. Yet, 
even more important to note, it is a handful of core States within Western Europe and Other States that 
have nominated the bulk of the Judges–i.e. the leading financial contributors: Italy (3), France (2), 
Germany (2), the United Kingdom (3), and Canada (2) have provided the nominations for twelve of these 
sixteen Judges (75 per cent). This is significant when one considers that there are twenty-five States Parties 
to the Rome Statute in the region. Similar trends are identified in the Group of Asia-Pacific States, since 
seven out of nine Judges were nominated by a core group of States: Japan (3), Korea (2), and the 
Philippines (2), prior to its withdrawal as a States Party to the Rome Statute.   
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Group of Western 
European and Other 
States 
25 56 28 19 16 64 
Eastern European 
States 
18 67 22 15 6 30 
Asia-Pacific States 20* 50 19 13 11 61 
Latin American and 
Caribbean States 
28 54 33 22 10 38 
African States 33 64 47 32 10 24 
 
 *This analysis includes the Philippines because it successfully nominated two candidates (one in 2011 and 
one in 2015), prior to its withdrawal from the Rome Statute on March 17, 2018.  
 
This breakdown is important for any analysis of the ICC judiciary inasmuch as it 
demonstrates the level of active regional engagement by States Parties to contribute to the 
makeup of the bench. The level of apathy across regions is quite striking when one 
considers the contributive value of the ICC. Perhaps more practically, it is curious that 
any States Party would be willing to subject its nationals to the Court without seeking 
adequate representation on the bench. It is logical that African States and Latin American 
and Caribbean States have contributed the greatest percentage of nominations by region, 
since it is comparatively more likely for the Court to be involved in these regions. Least 
of all, GRULAC and African States have had the greatest first-hand experience with the 
types of crimes covered by the Rome Statute, which might create a greater normative 
valuation to the work of the Court and increased support. This is important because both 
Latin American and Caribbean States and African States continue to nominate the most 
candidates, reflecting regional engagement and a generalized ability to claim credible 
commitment to the work of the ICC. Such engagement also provides a strong counter to 
the influence of powerful states throughout the judicial nomination and election 
processes, which is an important objective for small and middle power states operating 
within international institutions such as the ICC.   
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Notwithstanding this, it is necessary to highlight that regional representation in 
the African context has not been wholly equitable. Table 10-3 illustrates African regional 
nominations, at the time of writing, based on geographic location and regional affiliation, 
namely membership to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
South African Development Community (SADC); and East African Community (EAC).  
 










































































































On this basis, while there has been Francophone representation from Africa on the bench, 
the majority of African judges have been English-speaking, and none have represented 
Arabic-speaking North Africa, though Tunisia is the only State Party that could nominate 
a potential candidate from the region, and it has done so three times, including in the 
2020 election, unsuccessfully. The Horn has also not been represented on the bench, 
although Djibouti is the only country from the region that is also a State Party to the 
Rome Statute, and it has never nominated a candidate. Central Africa remains 
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unrepresented as well, even though Central African Republic and the Congo have each 
nominated a candidate, unsuccessfully. What is perhaps more curious is the fact that most 
African judges have come from West Africa (five) and West African states are more 
widely represented than the States Parties in the South African Development Community 
(SADC) that were so actively involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute from the 
earliest stages. SADC States Parties have made a combined eleven nominations: 
Botswana (1); Democratic Republic of the Congo (3); Lesotho (1); Madagascar (2); 
Mauritius (1); South Africa (2); and Tanzania (1). Therefore, SADC as a whole has had a 
27 per cent success rate of successfully nominating a candidate to the ICC. This is 
important inasmuch as it demonstrates that historical involvement in the drafting of the 
Rome Statute is not a definitive marker of representation on the bench.  
The same trend holds when the analysis is expanded to consider nominations from 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). For example, Senegal 
was especially active in its commitment to the Rome Statute project and hosted the 
African regional conference in 1998 in Dakar to mobilize regional support for the 
treaty.30 Since then, Senegal has nominated three candidates to the ICC bench and has 
had a zero per cent success rate. Sierra Leone has similarly nominated three candidates 
and only one was elected (in 2020). ECOWAS states have collectively nominated twenty 
candidates, including: Benin (2); Burkina Faso (1); Ghana (3); Mali (1); Niger (2); 
Nigeria (3); Senegal (3); Sierra Leone (3); and The Gambia (2). This amounts to a 25 per 
cent sub-regional success rate in the nomination of judicial candidates at the ICC. The 
significance of this is that ECOWAS states have demonstrated a particularly strong 
commitment to the nomination of candidates, even in the face of repeated defeat. This 
demonstrates a strong commitment to the ICC and a keen interest in contributing to its 
development. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to Tunisia, which has 
 
30 Note that this pattern does not hold when consideration in given to Trinidad and Tobago, the country that 
initiated the entire ICC project from the beginning in 1993. Trinidad and Tobago have nominated five 
candidates and four have been elected thus reflecting an 80 per cent success rate – the most of any States 
Party in the Latin American and Caribbean States region. Consider that Colombia has nominated four 
candidates and has a zero per cent success rate. It is important to note that Trinidad and Tobago is a 
regionally dominant contributor to ICC judgeships. 
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nominated a candidate on three occasions unsuccessfully but continues to engage in the 
nomination and election process on a consistent basis. 
This might be contrasted with the experience of the states in the East African 
Community (EAC), particularly Kenya and Uganda. Kenya has nominated one candidate 
and Uganda has nominated two candidates to the ICC bench. All three of these 
candidates were ultimately elected to the ICC judiciary. The fact that Uganda is the only 
African States Party that has been represented on the ICC bench more than once is 
noteworthy (Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko in 2007 and Solomy Balungi Bossa in 2017). 
Perhaps also important, Judge Nsereko was first nominated unsuccessfully in 2003, but 
was re-nominated in 2007 and elected. As such, all three individuals that have been 
nominated by States Parties from the EAC were eventually elected. Kenyan candidate 
Joyce Aluoch was elected in 2009, the same year that the Prosecutor began to investigate 
the post-election violence in Kenya. Indeed, the most distinguishable marker that 
separates the EAC experience is the fact that the ICC has been involved in both the 
Kenyan and Ugandan contexts. This is relevant, since ICC involvement in a state may 
prompt increased political motivation to be represented on the bench. The ICC has 
similarly been involved in the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Mali. An extra-regional example of this is Georgia, since it is a state subject to ICC 
activity and has similarly successfully nominated a judicial candidate in 2020. It is 
perhaps explanatory to consider that such representation could also be viewed as a way to 
increase institutional trust in those regions where the Court is actively involved, although 
such conclusions are plainly speculative and circumstantial, but nevertheless appear to 
present a patterned consistency in rates of electoral success among a particular group of 
states.  
It also worth highlighting that all of the African States Parties to the ICC also 
belong to the African Union (AU). This informs voting patterns at ICC elections since, 
“the African Union always votes as a bloc.”31 It has been explained that “gathering the 
support of such a major voting bloc can go a long way in securing a judicial seat, but 
banding together is also seen as important for the furtherance of African states’ priorities 
 
31 Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 40. 
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at the ICC, especially in the face of the prominent influence of major donor states.”32 On 
this basis, while sub-regional considerations are perhaps relevant, it is similarly important 
to acknowledge a bigger ‘pan-African’ presence, intended to counter the influence of 
powerful states such as those in Western European and Other States. This reality may 
provide additional explanation as to why African representation on the ICC bench has 
continued to proliferate over time, since African states constitute the greatest number of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute. 
 
10.4 Politicization and National Nomination Processes 
Representative concerns only scratch the surface of the problematic politicization during 
the judicial nomination and election process at the ICC. For example, William Pace from 
the Coalition for the International Criminal Court has explained that, “unfortunately, 
governments don’t always nominate the best people… often for political reasons.”33 This 
sentiment was echoed by Stef Blok, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
who said that “many states… frequently put mediocre judges up for election.”34 Since the 
judges that were elected through such processes have been responsible for dispensing 
international criminal justice exclusively against Africans thus far, this is a very real 
problem–especially when it is situated within its broader political context. The optics are 
bad, and the stake are high, which makes improving the quality of the bench a 
fundamentally important concern for any supporter of the ICC and international criminal 
justice, more broadly. The intersecting need for states to nominate and elect 
representative and qualified judges is a practical concern that continues to loom over the 
ICC and directly impact the Court’s legitimacy and institutional credibility. 
Notwithstanding this, it is also important to acknowledge that African States have 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sophie van Leeuwen, “Election: We might not get the best ICC judges,” Justice Hub (15 September 
2014), interview available at https://justicehub.org/article/election-we-might-not-get-the-best-icc-judges/; 
accessed 1 July 2020. 
34 Stef Blok, “The International Criminal Court must do better. Reforms are urgently needed,” The 
Washington Post (2 December 2019), available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/02/international-criminal-court-must-do-better-
reforms-are-urgently-needed/; accessed 30 July 2020. 
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similarly nominated subpar candidates, which is counterintuitive at a minimum.35 The 
reality that the ICC has an established track record of involvement in African contexts 
should be enough motivation for African states to nominate high quality candidates, since 
the likelihood of them dealing with African situations and cases is extraordinarily high. 
This is a problem that begins and ends with States Parties and will require institutional 
and domestic political reform to overcome. The ICC has provided institutional guidance 
on judicial nomination procedures and has advised Foreign Ministers of ICC States 
Parties to  
place a particular emphasis on those candidates who possess substantial practical 
experience in criminal trials; can meet the many demands associated with 
adjudicating complex and time-intensive cases; and demonstrate a willingness to 
learn, including through ongoing trainings. We believe that candidates who 
possess these qualities, in addition to satisfying the Rome Statute criteria, will be 
best equipped to meet the challenges ahead.36 
These institutional recommendations are general and provide minimal guidance to 
governments in the nomination process. General assertions about a ‘willingness to learn’ 
fail to adequately address the importance of assembling a bench of individuals with the 
right personality. According to one current ICC trial judge, the right personality would be 
someone with the need to understand colleagues, which requires a genuine curiosity 
about other systems and backgrounds and a commitment to learning about different 
approaches to law and to life.37 Another ICC judge “highlighted the need for a general 
 
35 See for example Audu Emakpe (pseudonym), “Justice Ishaq Bello’s Nomination is a Poor Choice for 
ICC Job,” International Justice Monitor (30 September 2020), blogpost available at 
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2020/09/justice-ishaq-bellos-nomination-is-a-poor-choice-for-icc-job/; accessed 
20 October 2020. This blogpost highlights that Nigeria’s nomination of Ishaq Bello in 2020 was “shrouded 
in secrecy… smacks of cronyism, a trait that the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has 
become notorious for. Applications were not invited from suitable candidates. Civil society organizations 
were shut out. No interview was conducted.” Note that the ACN determined that Bello was only formally 
qualified for appointment as judge of the International Criminal Court, since he limited knowledge of the 
workings of the Court. 
36 ICC: Recommendations for Nominating and Electing Candidates to Serve as Judges, Letter to Foreign 
Ministers of ICC States Parties (18 May 2011), circulated by Human Rights Watch, available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/18/icc-recommendations-nominating-and-electing-candidates-serve-
judges; accessed 10 October 2020. 
37 Anonymous ICC Judge, interview by author, 12 December 2018, by Skype. 
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awareness of different legal cultures and the ability to work in cross-cultural legal 
environments as useful skills in the ICC context.”38 These are personality and character 
traits that are difficult to discern in the absence of a thorough screening and vetting 
process at the national level. 
 It is likewise problematic that there is an overarching theme of secrecy 
surrounding national nomination processes that has been well-documented in the 
literature. For example, career academic and women’s rights activist Akua Kuenyehia 
from Ghana described her inaugural 2003 nomination and election in detail. In the 
context of her experience with the government of Ghana, she described:  “I did not hear 
about the vacancy [for ICC judge]; I had a call from the Attorney-General. I went to see 
him, and he told me ‘the President has asked us to nominate you for the ICC.’ I told him I 
was not interested and he said ‘well, that means you are turning the President down.’ 
That made me take the matter seriously, and I decided to accept the President’s 
nomination.”39  Kuenyehia was nominated under List B. She did not have any judicial 
experience but had taught international law at the University of Ghana and had worked 
on international committees relating to women’s human rights issues throughout her 
career. In this context, it is relevant to note Article 36(8)(b) of the Rome Statute: “States 
Parties shall also take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on 
specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence against women or children.”40   
 
38 Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges, 59. 
39 Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,” 63-
64. 
40 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 36(8)(b). Note that Judge Joyce Aluoch 
(Kenya, elected in 2009 by List A) had experience at the Court of Appeals in Kenya but had also chaired 
the African Union Committee of Experts on the Rights of the Child (2001-2005) and was a member and 
vice-chair of the UN Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (2003-2008). Judge Adelaide 
Sophie Alapini-Gansou (Benin, elected in 2017 by List B) was a founding member of WILDAF-Benin 
Network (Women’s Rights and Development in Africa), working as legal counsel to women victims of 
violence for the Women’s Rights and Development Centre. Judge Navanethem Pillay (South Africa, 
elected in 2003 by List B) advocated for women’s rights throughout her career, including co-founding the 
international women’s rights group Equality Now in 1985; Judge Fatoumata Dembélé Diarra (Mali, elected 
in 2003 by List A) is the founding president of the Office on Relief for Impoverished Women and Children 
and Observation of the Rights of Children and Women (ODEF), and also participated in several sessions of 
the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana, 
elected in 2009 by List B) was a long-time women’s rights activist. Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa (Uganda, 
elected in 2017 by List A) had experience representing indigent women and children in Uganda. In 
combination, this suggests that African candidates with demonstrative experience with women’s and/or 
children’s rights have had a particularly good chance of being elected to the ICC bench. This applies 
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 Thus, Kuenyehia was a particularly attractive candidate based on her career-long 
experience with promoting women’s human rights and might have been viewed as highly 
electable by the Ghanaian government. However, regardless of her objective suitability as 
a candidate for ICC judge, the unilateral and unsolicited decision-making on the part of 
the government is particularly striking. In the absence of a broad dissemination of the 
note verbale, other potential candidates could never know that the position was available, 
which inherently limits the prospect for a competitive and rigorous nomination process 
among those with a genuine desire to fill the position.41 Such an approach to ICC judicial 
appointments reemphasizes the deeply political nature of the process as a whole and 
places an emphasis not necessarily on merit first but on political nepotism and/or power 
and influence. Mackenzie et al. explain that “ICC nomination rules are meant to insulate 
nominations from political influence. In practice, a recurring theme across the interviews 
was the strong vested interest of governments in strictly controlling the nomination 
process in order to influence the composition of international courts… Personal 
relationships and alliances frequently come into play.”42 This reality supports the notion 
that states guide nomination processes for reasons of self-interest and not for the broad 
interest of the ICC, as such.   
The lack of transparency within domestic nomination procedures has been a topic 
of concern for scholars of the ICC. For example, it has been argued by scholars such as 
Grossman that   
little to no statutory guidance to states exists for selecting candidates at the 
national level. States are left to craft their own procedures, with no international 
or domestic oversight. Even on courts where some guidance is provided (such as 
the ICC and ICJ [International Court of Justice]), scholars have raised doubts that 
it is followed. A series of interviews about selection procedures on these courts 
 
similarly to the African male judges, each of which cite a demonstrable commitment to gender and/or 
children throughout their scholarly works or civil service.  
41 Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,” 64. 
Note that the government of Ghana did consider three candidates for evaluation and Kuenyehia was 
selected based on assessments by The Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney-General and Minister 
of Justice and the Judicial Council. The Attorney-General and a bipartisan Parliamentary Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Issues made the final decision on what candidate to select. 
42 Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges, 65. 
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showed that ‘few well-informed insiders appear to be familiar with the details,’ 
and processes varied significantly across states and were ‘marked by their lack of 
transparency and accountability.’ One interviewee described the process of 
nominating judges to the ICJ and ICC as ‘not very institutional-like, [more] a 
friendship thing.’ Others wrote that ‘one cannot apply to become an international 
judge’ but rather must be ‘called’ and that perhaps the most important factor is 
‘being on the radar screen of, and appreciated by, one’s own government, 
particularly by some key civil servants.’43 
In the context of ICC judicial nominations, it makes sense that governments would want 
to nominate a predictable and familiar candidate to the bench. It is likely for this reason 
that many judicial nominees have experience working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
or other similar posts. These candidates provide a modest degree of judicial insulation, 
should government actors or their allies become the subject(s) of interest at the Court. 
These candidates also have particular knowledge about government interests that other 
candidates would lack.  
Some scholars have referred to such nominations as a form of ‘cronyism.’ For 
example, Nigeria’s nomination of Justice Ishaq Bello in 2020 was subject to scrutiny on 
the basis that “[t]he process that led to Bello’s nomination is shrouded in secrecy. It 
smacks of cronyism, a trait that the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has 
become notorious for. Applications were not invited from suitable candidates. Civil 
society organizations were shut out. No interview was conducted. Nigeria should not be 
allowed to infect the world with her cronyism.”44 These trends undergird recent efforts by 
the ASP to bolster national nomination processes, specifically by encouraging States 
Parties to take responsibility for national procedures for nominating candidates to the 
Court and by expanding the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges’ (can) 
mandate to provide provisional assessments on the suitability of potential candidates 
prior to their nomination.45 Using Ishaq Bello as an example, tcanACN determined that 
“[b]ased on both his professional experience and his answers during the interview, and 
 
43 Nienke Grossman, “Achieving Sex-Representative International Court Benches,” 90. 
44 Audu Emakpe (pseudonym), “Justice Ishaq Bello’s Nomination is a Poor Choice for ICC Job.” 
45 ICC-ASP/18/Res.4, Annex II (c); 8 bis. 
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bearing in mind particularly his lack of detailed knowledge of the workings of the Court, 
the Committee concluded that the candidate was only formally qualified for appointment 
as judge of the International Criminal Court.”46 Bello was not elected in 2020. While 
these trends are positive in that they acknowledge the deficit on the part of States Parties 
to adequately safeguard national nomination processes, it remains up to States Parties to 
genuinely commit to fixing the problem.47  
Even still, this is a multilayered problem inasmuch as States Parties engage in 
vote-trading and aggressive diplomatic lobbying leading up to and during the election. 
The influence ocanhe ACN is limited in the sense that it only provides guidance to the 
ASP and does not directly inform how States Parties will vote for a particular candidate. 
Problematically, it has been explained that “[m]any individuals who participate in the 
ICC process believe it to be even more politicized than other international judicial 
elections.”48 Practically, the politicization of judicial nomination processes takes the form 
of aggressive diplomatic campaigning and vote-trading practices.  
Campaigning for judicial nominees at the ICC is a well-established political 
practice. According to Mudukuti, “[c]andidates engage in expensive and time consuming 
campaigns, visiting embassies, travelling to UN Headquarters in New York, meeting 
diplomats and anyone else… relevant for their successful election.”49 In this light, it is 
well-documented that ICC election procedures are riddled with “a toxic campaigning 
culture… campaigning dynamics often override merit-based considerations: candidates 
with the strongest campaign, rather than those most qualified, are most likely to be 
elected.”50 This practice is particularly problematic, in part because not every state can 
afford to engage in such aggressive lobbying efforts, but mostly because it erodes notions 
 
46 ICC-ASP/19/11, 12, para. 7. 
47 See, for example Nino Jomarjidze, “Electing the 2020 ICC Judges: challenges related to nomination of 
Georgian judicial candidate,” International Justice Monitor (15 September 2020) Commentary available at 
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2020/09/electing-the-2020-icc-judges-challenges-related-to-nomination-of-
georgian-judicial-candidate/; accessed 10 October 2020. The Georgian nomination procedure, which it is 
argued “was indeed a step forward. However, the identified flaws raise concerns that the process as a whole 
may have been tailored to fit a specific person. These weaknesses further confirm that more should be done 
at the national and international levels to encourage credible national nomination processes and to enhance 
the quality of judicial nominees.” 
48 Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges, 101. 
49 Mudukuti, “A look at OSJI’s ‘Raising the Bar.’ 
50 Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 5. 
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of electing a candidate based on merit alone. To illustrate this reality, Judge Akua 
Kuenyehia from Ghana explained that she “did not actively lobby for her election. In fact, 
she did not go to New York as most candidates do to personally lobby to be elected.”51 
Kuenyehia was elected on the first ballot in the 2003 election. However, in this case, the 
government did a significant amount of lobbying. It was explained that “[t]hough 
Kuenyehia was not present during the elections, it is a fact that the Head of the Ghana 
Mission, the Foreign Minister, and other diplomatic representatives from Ghana did an 
enormous amount of lobbying on her behalf.”52 This example effectively demonstrates 
the reality of a strong campaign culture surrounding ICC judicial nomination procedures, 
even if not engaged with by the candidates themselves.     
Perhaps even more egregious is the practice of vote-trading. More specifically, 
vote-trading implies that “a state will vote for a candidate in exchange for a vote in the 
same or another election (for the same or another body), or in exchange for other benefits 
or inducements.”53 The ‘other benefits or inducements’ could include development aid. 
As Mackenzie et al. explain, “[o]ne interviewee who was part of a delegation in the first 
ICC elections told us that the practice of vote-trading in exchange for aid was more 
prevalent in the ICC than the ICJ [International Court of Justice] elections.”54 This is 
particularly problematic since such deals reinforce political power structures rooted in 
realpolitik. These sorts of ‘deals’ are fundamentally incompatible with the objectives of 
the ICC and severely bind less powerful states to the political goals of more powerful 
states. This reality may further explain why Western European and Other States have 
such a strong success rate for the election of their nominees at the ICC. Although this 
practice has been discouraged by the ASP Bureau, evidence suggests that it continues to 
take place.55  
 
51 Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia,” 64. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges, 122. 
54 Ibid., 124. 
55 Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 38: “Yet vote trading has persisted. (One diplomat noted 
that, since an ICC judgeship is generally a highly valued position, the ‘cost’ for nominating states that seek 
to have their candidate elected is that they have to lower their political ambitions in other for a when 
entering into similar vote-trading arrangements elsewhere).” 
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Addressing this complex problem will require a widespread culture change within 
and among the ICC States Parties. It is redundant to point out that this is a problem that 
should never exist if States Parties were truly commitment to the institutional success of 
the ICC. Still, this points to a much bigger issue: the indifference on the part of States 
Parties with respect to the ICC’s posterity and credible development and the overarching 
and contradictory influence of power politics in the operationalization of the Court, 
which privileges developed states and binds the less powerful, including those in Africa. 
    
10.5 Repeat Nominations, African modes of Engagement, 
and ACN Determinations 
Many African States have demonstrated a particularly keen commitment to the 
candidates put forward for judicial election. This is most pointedly illustrated by the fact 
that African States have re-nominated unsuccessful candidates six times in the history of 
ICC judicial elections at the time of writing.56 Four of these candidates were elected on 
their second attempt, namely: Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko (Uganda, initially nominated 
in 2003 and successfully elected in 2007); ICC President Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria, 
initially nominated in 2009 and successfully elected in 2011); Antoine Kesia-Mbe 
Mindua (Democratic Republic of the Congo, initially nominated in 2011 and successfully 
elected in 2014); and Reine Adelaide Sophie Alapini-Gansou (Benin, initially nominated 
in 2014 and successfully elected in 2017). In the 2020 election, there were two repeat 
nominations from African States. First, Gberdao Gustave Kam from Burkina Faso had 
been nominated as an ICC judge three times (2009, 2011, and 2020) under List B; and 
Raymond Sock from The Gambia was initially nominated in the first judicial election in 
2003 and was nominated again seventeen years later at seventy-four years of age under 
List A in 2020. Neither candidate was successfully elected in 2020.  
 
56 To date, ten candidates have been nominated as an ICC Judge more than once. This includes: Khosbayar 
Chagdaa (Mongolia, List A, 2017, 2020); Gberdao Gustave Kam (Burkina Faso, List B, 2009, 2011, 2020); 
Ariela Peralta Distefano (Uruguay, List B, 2017, 2020); Ramond Sock (Gambia, List A, 2003, 2020); Reine 
Adelaide Sophie Alapini-Gansou (Benin, List B, 2014, 2017); Zlata Durdevic (Croatia, List B, 2014, 
2017); Dragomir Vukoje (Bosnia and Herzegovina, List A, 2009; 2017); Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua 
(Democratic Republic of Congo, List B, 2011; 2014); Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria, List A, 2009; 2011); 
Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko (Uganda, List A, 2003; 2007). 
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In 2020, the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges considered Kam 
from Burkina Faso to be ‘qualified’ for the job and considered Sock from The Gambia to 
be ‘only formally qualified.’ Of the seven African candidates nominated during the 2020 
election cycle, the ACN determined two to be ‘highly qualified’–Haykel Ben Mahfoudh 
nominated by Tunisia under List B and Miatta Maria Samba nominated by Sierra Leone 
under List A.57 Both states had nominated candidates twice before, with no success. This 
is significant inasmuch as both states continued to nominate candidates, and more 
importantly, provide ‘highly qualified’ candidates in the ACN’s view. This further 
demonstrates that Tunisia and Sierra Leone remain committed to the integrity of the ICC 
through their national judicial nomination and election processes. Positively, Miatta 
Maria Samba was successfully elected in the third round of the 2020 judicial election. 
Haykel Ben Mahfoudh remained in the election until the final (eighth) round but was 
ultimately defeated by Althea Violet Alexis-Windsor from Trinidad and Tobago 86 to 32 
(79 votes constituted the two-thirds required majority).     
It is worth noting that the reasons for Kam’s classification as ‘qualified,’ as 
opposed to ‘highly qualified’ by the ACN have been met with criticism from some 
observers. For example, Owiso and Nakandha explain that “[d]espite having extensive 
international judicial experience spanning decades as Roster Judge at the International 
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda… as 
a Judge at the ICTR... and as President Judge of the Extraordinary African Chambers that 
conducted the Hissène Habrè trial, the Committee deemed him simply ‘qualified.’”58 In 
reaching its determination, the Committee said that “[t]he candidate demonstrated some 
general knowledge of the Rome Statute but nonetheless he had only very limited 
knowledge of the Rome Statute framework… The Committee was disappointed that… 
 
57 The ACN determined that Ben Mahfoudh and Samba were highly qualified; Kam was qualified; and 
Bello, Tall, Milandou, and Sock were only formally qualified. This raises questions about the quality of the 
candidates that African States sometimes nominate, which may require meaningful reflection in upcoming 
election cycles. 
58 Owiso Owiso and Sharon Nakandha, “’Grading’ the Nominees for the International Criminal Court 
Judges Election 2021-2030: The Report of the Advisory Committee on Nomination of Judges – Part 1,” 
Opinio Juris (9 October 2020) blogpost available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/09/grading-the-
nominees-for-the-international-criminal-court-judges-election-2021-2030-the-report-of-the-advisory-
committee-on-nomination-of-judges-part-i/; accessed 20 October 2020. 
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the candidate did not appear to be familiar with the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Court or of its procedures.”59 However, when evaluating Kam’s professional 
experience, it is difficult to determine only that he is merely ‘qualified’–particularly when 
evaluated against the other candidates nominated under List B that achieved the 
designation of ‘highly qualified.’60 This is heightened by the fact that the ACN 
considered Tunisian candidate Haykel Ben Mahfoudh ‘highly qualified’ under List B, 
while concurrently reporting that “sometimes his answers were inaccurate, for instance 
regarding the role of victims’ participation, or were controversial (e.g. in relation to trials 
in absentia).”61 It becomes increasingly unclear why it is acceptable for one candidate to 
misunderstand the Rome Statute but not for another.  
Kam’s nomination was further questioned by the Committee on the basis that 
“while the candidate had significant judicial experience in international criminal 
tribunals, he had been nominated as a candidate for List B. The candidate did not provide 
any explanation for his inclusion on List B rather than on List A.”62 This may explain 
why the Committee was more likely to determine that diplomats and academics under 
List B were ‘highly qualified’ in the absence of judicial experience.63 Yet, it remains that 
the majority of List A candidates have experience in domestic criminal law contexts and 
rarely in international criminal law contexts.  
Two other African nominees with ‘extensive judicial experience in international 
criminal tribunals’ have been successfully nominated under List B: judge Navanethem 
 
59 Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of its seventh session, ICC-
ASP/19/11 (30 September 2020), 21, paras. 3-4. 
60 Ibid. 
61 ICC-ASP/19/11, p. 20. 
62 Ibid., 21. 
63 Owiso Owiso and Sharon Nakandha, “‘Grading’ the Nominees for International Criminal Court Judges 
Election 2021-2030.” Note that the List B candidates that were deemed ‘highly qualified’ include: María 
del Socorro (Mexico) who has primarily worked for the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Affairs on issues 
ranging from human rights, international cooperation, and climate change; Sergio Ugalde Godinez (Costa 
Rica) who has experience as an Associate Professor of International Law at the University for Peace and as 
the Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Netherlands (including attending ASP meetings as a country 
representative) alongside other diplomatic experience in relevant areas such as advocate and co-agent at the 
International Court of Justice, and work on the prohibition of chemical weapons; Ariela Peralta Distefano 
(Uruguay) whose professional experience includes being the Executive Secretary for Institute of Public 
Policies on Human Rights and other extensive experience in human rights work; Haykel Ben Mahfoudh 
(Tunisia) who is a career academic, teaching and researching on relevant subjects such as international 
human rights.  
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Pillay from South Africa was appointed to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda before her election to the ICC; and judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was occupied a seat on the bench at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia before his election to the ICC. Moreover, it 
has been established that “in cases where a candidate possesses sufficient qualifications 
for both lists, he/she should choose on which list to appear.”64 As such, it is relatively 
uncontroversial to assert that Kam’s experience is primarily in international law and 
therefore makes him an appropriate candidate to consider under List B based on the 
historical standards of ICC nomination and election processes. The ACN appears to 
mischaracterize the categorization of the lists in this respect and calls into the question its 
priorities in making determinations about the suitability of candidates on the basis of 
arbitrary or else generally insignificant factors.  
It is unclear whether or not such a determination is in line with the object and 
purpose of List B. Denying qualified candidates’ proper assessment under this category 
only contributes to the inflammation of arguments from those opposed to the inclusion of 
List B altogether. The Committee ought to have determined whether or not Kam 
demonstrated a willingness to learn about the Rome Statute framework, the jurisprudence 
of the ICC, and/ or its procedures instead of expecting a candidate with perfect 
knowledge from the beginning. Personality and character traits should be just as 
important, if not more, as knowledge-based markers when assessing candidates. 
Moreover, List B is not meant solely to include academics and diplomats.65 Individuals 
with the necessary experience in international law can take many forms and should not be 
approached with such rigidity if merit is to take primacy throughout the judicial election 
process.  
 
64 Zhu Wen-qi and Sureta Chana, “Part 4. Composition and administration of the Court, Article 36: 
Qualifications, nomination and election of judges,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court -Observers’ Notes, Article by Article – 2nd edition, ed. Otto Triffterer (C.H 
Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2008), 946. 
65 Note that there are some good arguments to suggest that academics can contribute meaningfully to the 
bench. See Mackenzie et. al., Selecting International Judges, 53: “academics can make an important 
contribution to a complementary and balanced bench, by assisting judges with backgrounds as practitioners 
or diplomats to understand the underlying theory of the arguments being made” and at 52: ‘Professors are 
very good candidates because officials of government are necessarily very much influenced by the 
positions of their countries, whilst the professors have, I would say, more liberty.”   
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10.6 Quality Concerns and the Power of Interpretation 
It is necessary to understand why the quality of the judges at the ICC has become a 
central concern in the Court’s nascency.66 To be sure, at various junctures, (some) ICC 
judges have acted inappropriately. Notable examples include French Judge Marc Perrin 
de Brichambaut, who made highly unprofessional comments during a presentation at 
Peking University Law School in 2017, i.e. describing “The Africans” as “a group of 54 
countries who provide the suspects and accused” to the Court. ICC President Chile Eboe-
Osuji led a lawsuit at the Geneva Tribunal of the International Labour Organization in an 
effort to sue his own Court for a 26 per cent increase in pay with the knowledge that the 
institution did not have a budget for internal litigation or salary increases.67 Japanese 
diplomat-turned-judge Kuniko Ozaki requested to return to diplomatic life as the 
Japanese ambassador to Estonia during the Ntaganda case, risking a mistrial after six 
years of ongoing litigation.68 And the Pre-Trial Chamber decided not to open an 
investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, asserting that to do so was ‘not in the 
interests of justice,’ despite the Prosecutor’s substantive submissions to the contrary.69  
 
66 See generally Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar; Yassir Al-Khudayri, “Raising the Bar 
Further: Professional Development for ICC Judges,” International Justice Monitor  (10 June 2020), 
blogpost available at https://www.ijmonitor.org/2020/06/raising-the-bar-further-professional-development-
for-icc-judges/; accessed 1 July 2020; Douglas Guilfoyle, “Part II – This is not fine: The International 
Criminal Court in Trouble,” EJIL: Talk! (22 March 2019), blogpost available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ii-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/; accessed 24 
June 2020; Darryl Robinson, “The Other Poisoned Chalice: Unprecedented Evidentiary Standards in the 
Gbagbo Case? (Part 1),” EJIL: Talk! (5 November 2019), blogpost available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-other-poisoned-chalice-unprecedented-evidentiary-standards-in-the-gbagbo-
case-part-1/; accessed 24 June 2020; Kevin Jon Heller, “Judge Ozaki Must Resign – Or Be Removed,” 
OpinioJuris (29 March 2019), blogpost available at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/29/judge-ozaki-must-
resign-or-be-removed/; accessed 24 June 2020; Joseph Powderly, Judges and the Making of International 
Criminal Law (Brill/Nijhoff: 2020).  
67 Marlise Simons, “In the Hague’s Lofty Judicial Halls, Judges Wrangle Over Pay,” The New York Times 
(20 January 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/world/europe/hague-judges-pay.html; 
accessed 20 November 2020. 
68 Kevin Jon Heller, “Judge Ozaki Must Resign – Or Be Removed.” 
69 See generally Tjitske Lingsma, “ICC Judges at Centre of Controversy,” Justiceinfo.net (16 May 2019) 
blogpost available at https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/41447-icc-judges-at-centre-of-
controversy.html; accessed 20 October 2020; Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber II: ICC-02/17 (12 April 2019); Transcription écrite de 
l’intervention de Monsieur le Juge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut à la Peking University Law School 
(Bejing), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_02039.PDF; accessed 20 October 
2020; Kevin Jon Heller, “Problematic Statements by the French Judge at the ICC,” OpinioJuris (5 March 
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Compounding these problems, the judges as a collective have manifestly failed to 
issue cogent decisions on several complex and important legal issues, which has troubled 
the effective development of international criminal law altogether and cast doubt on the 
credibility of the ICC in the process.70 There is indeed reason to be critical of the social 
and professional quality and overt displays of self-interest demonstrated by some ICC 
judges. At their core, judges must be committed to the stated intent and purpose of the 
ICC above their own self-interests if the Court is to truly be effective. This is particularly 
the case because the ICC is financially and politically overburdened. Hostility towards 
the Court on the part of states (whether signatory/ratifier or not) requires a shared 
normative commitment to the importance and significance of international criminal 
justice, even when it is under pressure from both internal and external factors.71 
Governments need to ensure that they nominate candidates with the right mindset and 
belief in the norms that undergird the ICC if it is to regain and rebuild its institutional 
credibility.  
The importance of this issue cannot be overstated: ICC judges are responsible for 
dispensing international criminal justice in situations and cases where all else has failed. 
This has both direct and far-reaching implications for suspects, victims, communities 
(local and international), civil society, political leaders, and other relevant actors. The 
Rome Statute is constructed by words, but it is up to the judges to give those words 
meaning by providing a direct application and (perhaps more importantly) a specific 
interpretation of its values and ideals. It is fundamentally important that ICC judges 
create legal principles with tangible and practical utility. This can only be achieved if 
judgements create the necessary jurisprudence and establish predictable or at least 
 
2019) blogpost available at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/03/problematic-statements-by-the-french-judge-
at-the-icc/; accessed 20 October 2020; Marlise Simons, “In the Hague’s Lofty Judicial Halls, Judges 
Wrangle Over Pay.”  
70 This is meant to include the inconsistent standard of proof used by the Trial and Appeals division in 
Bemba (which led to a successful appeal), or the manifestly diverse opinions issued on al-Bashir’s 
immunity during his tenure as head of state of Sudan, as two obvious cursory examples. 
71 This refers to the Africa-ICC crisis, which led to the withdrawal of Burundi in 2017 from the Court but 
triggered formal opposition from other African states and the African Union; the withdrawal of the 
Philippines from the Court in 2019 following the opening of an investigation into alleged crimes against 
humanity perpetrated during the war on drugs; and the United States issuing sanctions and travel bans on 
ICC staff in 2020 in response to opening an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan.   
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consistent legal standards and reasoning. Logistically, judges preserve the integrity of the 
Court by upholding the rights of the accused to a fair trial and are ultimately responsible 
for ensuring due process throughout proceedings. The spectrum of duties is both 
profound and complex. International criminal justice is a passion project which ICC 
judges must share if the Court is to maintain its place in the international global 
landscape. This is especially because the ICC is not yet a universal institution and states 
retain the ability to be subject to its jurisdiction or not. Work remains to be done to ensure 
that international criminal justice and the accountability provided by the ICC is wholly 
enmeshed in the global order and continually strengthened over time in an evolutionary 
trajectory.  
In order achieve this aim, it is essential that states nominate judicial candidates 
who are qualified and committed to doing what is required to uphold the legitimacy of 
the Court and the value of international criminal justice in general. Quite naturally, the 
‘international’ aspect of the ICC complicates the makeup of the bench in significant ways 
based on individual judges’ identity, which could be informed by a myriad of factors 
such as the representative factors including gender, education, personal background, 
professional experience, and nationality. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the ICC 
judiciary establish a coherent professional culture, which is best achieved by adopting an 
overarching spirit of collegiality and mutual respect in the face of fundamental 
difference. As former ICC Judge Akua Kuenyehia explained, “working with the Rome 
Statute was a novelty for all of us– the civil and common law divide was always a big 
problem for all of us… now I think nothing of it, but the blending of the traditions has 
been a big challenge, and I had to sit down and understand that this is a new institution 
and we are doing something new, and so we had to give each other a chance.”72 Giving 
each other a chance remains a vitally important mindset for the optimal operation of the 
ICC bench across all divisions. 
Thus, despite the multiplicity of individual differences, the judges must share a 
genuine commitment to the goals of international criminal justice mechanisms–broadly 
understood. This is the collective responsibility of the bench and of the Court itself. This 
 
72 Josephine Jarpa Dawuni, “Akua Kuenyehia: Leaving a Mark Along the Journey for Human Rights,” 68. 
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does not imply that a conviction should necessarily follow a trial at the ICC as a 
guaranteed mode of accountability. Rather, the right to a fair trial is an essential 
component of institutional credibility and integrity. As Richard Goldstone has argued, 
“the fairness of any criminal justice system must be judged by acquittals and not by 
convictions.”73 This points to the prioritization of institutional credibility, rather than a 
strict focus on datapoints such as conviction rates, as a better marker of the Court’s 
success.   
At the same time, the unconventional nature of international crime requires a 
degree of sensible flexibility and logical consistency in order to develop appropriate 
judicial standards over time. This requires a particular mindedness and the ability to have 
reasoned discussion amongst the bench and across divisions, which is required to 
streamline the development of international criminal law at the ICC. Such a judicial 
approach has a rich history in international human rights law, in particular at the 
European Court of Human Rights, otherwise understood as “interpretive decision-
making.” Although the Rome Statute attempts to restrain or as Powderly says, ‘corset’ 
interpretive powers, such an approach must be used to adjust ambiguous or flawed 
legislation.74 This is compounded by the reality that the Rome Statute is the result of 
multilateral diplomacy. In many respects it is up to the judges to make determinations 
about the ‘real’ meaning of the Statute where it is otherwise and intentionally ambiguous. 
It is clear that the nature of the political negotiations in Rome led to the construction of a 
Statute where a literal and/or textual interpretation of the law would be extraordinarily 
difficult for judges to employ as best practice when adjudicating contentious matters, 
which complicates the professional environment at the ICC in distinct and complex ways.  
 
73 Richard Goldstone, “Acquittals by the International Criminal Court,” EJIL: Talk! (18 January 2019), 
blogpost available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/acquittals-by-the-international-criminal-court/; accessed 20 
November 2020.  
74 See generally Joseph Powderly, ‘Curb Your Creativity:’ The Rome Statute and the Attempted Institution 
of Interpretive Restraint in Judges and the Making of International Criminal Law, ed. Joseph Powderly 
(The Hague: Brill Nijhoff, 2020), 454-541.  
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10.7 Rome Conference involvement and its influence on 
 judicial suitability  
Some judicial nominees have appealed to their experience in drafting the Rome Statute as 
a basis for their successful election as an ICC judge. For example, French candidate Marc 
Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut who was successfully elected from List B in the 2014 
election explicitly referenced his involvement in Rome as a basis for his competence and 
suitability to serve as an ICC Judge. Specifically, his curriculum vitae stated:  
I was responsible for coordinating the French contribution to the preparatory work 
for the International Criminal Court and I led the French delegation to the Rome 
conference. I was directly involved in shaping some key parts of the Statute 
regarding crimes, complementarity and victims. I was able to sign the Statute of 
Rome on behalf of France. I was thus able to acquire a solid understanding of the 
choices and compromises that prevailed during the drafting of the Statute which is 
of great value for further contributions of its future development… Many others 
who negotiated the Statute of Rome have performed, and continue to perform with 
distinction, these eminent functions.75 
Notwithstanding this perspective, other observers view direct involvement in the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute as a hinderance to objectivity and neutrality on the 
bench. Some argue that “[m]any of those interpreting the Statute, including several of the 
judges, ‘remember’ what the drafters meant at Rome, and this colours their understanding 
of the various provisions.”76 The significance of this polarization lies in the ability of 
judges to arrive at reasonable conclusions, rooted in the text of the Rome Statute and not 
politicized interpretations or understandings above all else.  Since his election to the ICC 
bench, Judge Marc Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut has explained that 
 
75 ICC Judicial Nomination Curriculum Vitae of Marc Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut, available at 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Elections/EJ2014/ICC-ASP-EJ2014-FRA-CV-ENG.pdf; accessed 
20 October 2020.  
76 William A. Schabas, “Georghios Pikis on the Rome Statute,” PhD studies in human rights (9 February 
2011), blogpost available at http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2011/02/georghios-pikis-on-rome-
statute.html; accessed 20 October 2020. 
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the judges are still finding their way around the multiplicity and myriad of 
problems which derive from the way that the Statute was worded the way that the 
Rules of Procedure were worded and then the reality of the variety of cases and 
situations they have to deal with. Judges come from different backgrounds, they 
have different personalities, they do not spontaneously converge on everything. 
There is serious debate within Chambers, there is serious debate among 
Chambers, and there is serious debate among the College of Judges. Setting up 
broad case law is still a work in progress.77  
On this basis, in the absence of a culture of respect, appropriate judicial standards will be 
impossible to establish and uphold. Of additional significance, the statements made by 
Judge Brichambaut after his election signal that his involvement at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference has not been enough to overcome widespread disagreement on complex legal 
issues brought forward in practice.  
Interpretive decisions must reflect the ethos that undergirds the Rome Statute. 
However, it is important to note that this approach does not allow judges to reach 
decisions carte blanche; the Rome Statute, the facts of the case, and jurisprudence will 
necessarily restrict a judges’ interpretive powers. While the Rome Statute affirms a 
commitment to nullum crimen sine lege, it also allows judges to rely not only on the 
Rome Statute and ICC documents, including the travaux préparatoires, but general 
principles of international law and decisions arising from national legal systems.78 This 
casts a wide net and grants a significant amount of flexibility to judges. Interpretation and 
development of the law contained in the Rome Statute is unavoidable in this context, 
within its legislative and procedural limits. Some ICC Judges assert that the problem is 
not that there is not enough flexibility in the judges’ interpretive powers, but rather that 
there is too much flexibility, which results in inconsistent outcomes and contributes to an 
 
77 Marc Pierre Perrin de Brichambaut, CILRAP Conversations, interview at Peking University, Beijing, (20 
May 2017), available at https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/170520-perrin-de-brichambaut/ at 3:33. 
78 Annex, List of Authorities A. Travaux Preparatoires, ICC-01/04-01/06-2120-Anx 14-09-2009 1/3 IO T 
OA16, list available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2009_06602.PDF; accessed 10 October 
2020; Caroline Davidson, “How to Read International Criminal Law: Strict Construction and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court,” St. John’s Law Review 91.1 (2017): 37-38. 
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increased lack of cohesion among the bench.79 It is fundamentally important that judges 
continue to engage in teambuilding, ongoing trainings, and genuine dialectical processes 
in order to progress as a unified component of the Court.  
It is also important to consider that the judicial nomination and election cycle as 
enumerated in the Rome Statute itself can contribute to a divisive environment. As 
current Trial Chamber Judge Kimberly Prost has explained, “as the ICC is designed to 
support a diverse bench, it requires a three-year cycle term where six judges depart, and 
six new judges arrive. This makes it difficult to foster a judicial culture and can lead to 
fractured decision-making. As a result, the consistency of decision-making suffers… the 
onus falls upon judges to create practices that can be institutionalized in order to facilitate 
the decision-making process.”80 This concern highlights the need for judges to work 
together to establish best practices and collegiality in order to achieve consistent 
outcomes, over time. This will only be possible if States Parties nominate open-minded 
and constructive candidates. 
 
10.7.1 List B Judges: Evaluating the Concern(s) 
The current ICC bench has eleven candidates from List A and seven candidates from List 
B at the time of writing.81 For clarity, the inclusion of List B allows for judges with no 
competence or experience in criminal law, even though the ICC is solely focused on 
violations of the most heinous acts of criminality. List B candidates are required to have 
competence and experience in relevant areas of international law (i.e. humanitarian law, 
human rights law). To be sure, List B candidatures have been significantly more 
contentious than those from List A. This is largely because the loose wording of List B 
has facilitated the successful nomination and election of career diplomats and academics, 
including two who had no formal legal training or experience prior to their posts at the 
 
79 Anonymous ICC Trial Judge, interview by author, 12 December 2018, by Skype.  
80 Amna Farooqi, “A Prescription for Optimism–Judge Kim Prost on the Future of the International 
Criminal Court,” Global Justice Journal 2(17 January 2020), available at 
https://globaljustice.queenslaw.ca/news/a-prescription-for-optimism-judge-kim-prost-on-the-future-of-the-
international-criminal-court; accessed 20 November 2020. 
81 See, ASP Resolution ICC-ASP/3/Res.6 at Table 2. Minimum voting requirements for list B (there must 
be at least five judges elected by List B on the bench at all times) and with reference to Table 1. Minimum 
voting requirements for list A, there must be at least nine judges elected by list A on the bench at all times. 
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ICC.82 This practice has been the subject of serious criticism, and observers such as the 
Open Society Justice Initiative have suggested that List B should be abandoned altogether 
because “the fact that so many government officials, including career diplomats, have 
previously been elected to ICC judgeships is a cause for concern.”83  
It is necessary to consider why it is inherently ‘bad’ to elect government officials 
and diplomats to the bench. According to Mackenzie et al.,  
by profession, [diplomats] are successful because they make concessions, this 
way or the other. The mentality of a diplomat, I think, is not at all what I would 
consider to be compatible with the mentality of a judge. There are certain 
exceptions, but it remains very odd for me that a diplomat would change his 
mental behaviour when he sits as a judge. He will always be a diplomat trying to 
make concessions one way or the other, always in the middle of the road.84 
Perhaps more practically, it has also been raised that “the ex-diplomat has been a 
government representative, so he is not neutral.”85 In combination, these criticisms raise 
 
82 Note that Kuniko Ozaki from Japan (Asia-Pacific region) was a career diplomat, having worked in the 
Ministry of Justice, she had experience drafting law and worked with the United Nations. She never 
attended law school but self-identifies as an ‘academic lawyer’ meaning that she has experience with 
research, teaching, and publishing at various universities on international legal subjects. See: Kuniko Ozaki 
Statement of Qualifications (11 August 2009), available at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CFC0FBB-
3B82-40DD-ACF8-8ACDC4EA8D3E/0/ICCASPEJ22009JPNSTENG.pdf; accessed 20 June 2020. Note 
also that French candidates often have a unique educational experience. In France, judges are formally 
selected through competitive examinations which allow them to attend the Ecole Nationale de la 
Magistrature, which formally trains judges and prosecutors, sometimes without any conventional 
lawyering experience. The emphasis is on education in the French context. Thus, at the ICC, the French 
judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut is similarly referred to as a career diplomat since he worked for the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence and served in the UN Secretariat. He also 
worked as a Legal Advisor to the French Foreign Ministry, helped France negotiate the Rome Statute and 
taught international law subjects at the university level. This is experience is markedly different from that 
of a conventional criminal lawyer and serves as a useful example in differentiating between candidates 
selected from List A and List B. See Marc Perrin de Brichambaut Statement of Qualifications, ‘French 
candidate for election as a judge of the International Criminal Court,’ (25 July 2014) available at 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Elections/EJ2014/ICC-ASP-EJ2014-FRA-ST-ENG.pdf; accessed 
20 June 2020.  See also Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges, 51: “The interviews revealed 
criticisms of the election of some judges appointed to the ICC to date, with particular concerns raised about 
individuals who did not appear to have academic legal training, and those with no knowledge of 
international criminal law or litigation experience. Some interviewees felt that the appointment of such 
judges could compromise the legitimacy of the court and even potentially raise grounds for appeal.” 
83 Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, (2019), 4.  




important points about neutrality and the suitability of diplomats to serve on the ICC 
judiciary.   
The Open Society Justice Initiative opines that at the 2020 ICC judicial election, 
the absolute minimum number of List B candidates should be elected to sustain the 
minimum total number of five. As a matter of practice, it is argued that “until such a time 
as List B is eliminated, the number of candidates elected from List B should not exceed 
the minimum number required.”86 It is important to consider the merits of such a 
recommendation, which provides a useful analytical basis to evaluate the unified 
performance and identity of the ICC bench. The twenty-one judges elected to the ICC 
from List B are listed in Table 10-4, below. 
 
Table 10-4: Judges Elected by List B at the ICC (2003-2020) 
 
86 Open Society Justice Initiative, Raising the Bar, 8. 
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As a cursory observation, the Rome Statute was negotiated by diplomats and the 
inclusion of List B facilitates the potential nomination of those who drafted it. This 
anomaly could reasonably raise legitimacy concerns and create suspicion about the 
intended purpose of List B altogether. It is perhaps ethically ambiguous for an individual 
to both draft the law on behalf of government and then interpret, implement, and enforce 
it from a neutral unbiased perspective as a judge. The decisions made by the ICC today 
will bind future judges in their decision-making–an objective reading of the law in the 
Court’s nascency is a central point of concern. On a broader scale, the notion that an 
individual could contribute to drafting the law and subsequently be tasked to interpret it 
raises paternalistic concerns, which could stagnate the development of the law if it is not 
looked at with fresh eyes. This concern is heightened by the fact that List B nominees are 
not strictly required to have any criminal law experience and would be tasked with 
opining on and developing complex matters of (international) criminal law–a clear 

















































































































departure from government-based diplomatic negotiations. It is worth noting that of the 
fifty-four judges elected to the ICC bench at the time of writing, twelve are also 
diplomats who attended the Rome Conference.87 Four of those twelve are current ICC 
judges (two of which were elected in 2020): Maria del Socorro Flores Liera (Mexico, List 
B); Gocha Lordkipanidze (Georgia, List B); Kimberly Prost (Canada, List A); and Marc 
Perrin de Brichambaut (France, List B).  
Altogether, eight of the twelve judges who attended the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference were elected from List B.88 This matters since four of the diplomats-turned-
judges had enough expertise in criminal law to be elected from List A, which disturbs the 
argument that diplomats at the Rome Conference simply included List B as a collective 
strategy to facilitate future employment opportunities for themselves or other career 
diplomats–though this indeed has happened, albeit on a limited basis. 22 per cent of all 
judges attended the Rome Conference; 38 per cent of all judges elected by List B 
attended the Rome Conference. The marginal uptick in the percentage of List B judges 
who also attended the Rome Conference is logical, since List B was designed to include 
exactly the sort of individual that would have been involved in the drafting of the Rome 
Statute and thus have the necessary competence and experience in international law. 
Whether it is appropriate to elect individuals with direct experience drafting the law that 
they are subsequently tasked to interpret raises a far more important question and is one 
which requires serious ethical and practical consideration. Similar concerns can be raised 
about diplomats who represent their governments at the ASP, since these individuals will 
have particular experience with the inner workings of the Court and potentially be guided 
by national approaches or policies towards them.   
 
87 These judges include Erkki Kourula (Finland), Hans-Peter Kaul (Germany), Silvia Fernández de 
Gurmendi (Argentina), Phillippe Kirsch (Canada), Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Samoa), Mauro Politi (Italy), 
Kimberly Prost (Canada), Raul Cano Pangalangan (Philippines), Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (France); 
Maria del Socorro Flores Liera (Mexico); Gocha Lordkipanidze (Georgia); Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko 
also attended, not as part of a state delegation but as a part of civil society and the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court. 
88 This includes Judge Hans-Peter Kaul (Germany); Judge Raul Cano Pangalangan (Philippines); Judge 
Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (France); Judge Phillipe Kirsch (Canada); Judge Erkki Kourula (Finland); 




Expanding the analytical focus, of the fifty-four judges elected to the ICC, 
eighteen have been elected from List B.89 Thirty-three per cent of the candidates elected 
from List B come from African States. This can be compared to 22 per cent from Latin 
American and Caribbean States; 17 per cent from Western European and Other States; 17 
per cent from Asia-Pacific States; and 11 per cent from Eastern European States, 
respectively. Prima facie, it is unclear why the majority of the List B nominations have 
come from African States and why this has not been the subject of any substantive 
analysis. However, it is important to note that this pattern is beginning to change. At the 
time of writing, there were four African judges on the bench: two were elected from List 
A and two were elected from List B. However, in total, eleven judges have been elected 
from African States at the ICC: six were nominated from List B, and five were nominated 
from List A.90 Nevertheless, in its historical regional context, it remains true that the 
majority of African judges at the ICC have been elected from List B.  
Only three of the eleven African judges elected to the ICC are men, two of whom 
were elected from List B. Of the seven women elected from List B to date, four are from 
African States, two are from Asia-Pacific States, and one is from Latin American and 
Caribbean States. Of the nine women currently on the bench, seven were elected from 
List A, which is significant only inasmuch as gender representation would be largely 
unaffected by the dissolution of List B candidatures in the future, should it be 
implemented. Expanding the analysis, there have been twenty-four women elected as 
ICC judges to date and eighteen of them were elected from List A. Thus, the general 
trend indicates that women most often are successfully elected from List A, and the 
 
89 These judges include Maria del Socorro Flores Liera (GRULAC), Gocha Lordkipanidze (Eastern 
European States), Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godinez (GRULAC), Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (WEOS), 
Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua (African States), Péter Kovács (Eastern European States), Raul Cano 
Pangalangan (Asia-Pacific States), Reine Alapini-Gansou (African States), Kuniko Ozaki (Asia-Pacific 
States), Sanji Monageng (African States), Claude Jorda (WEOS), Navanethem Pillay (African States), 
René Blattmann (GRULAC), Hans-Peter Kaul (WEOS), Akua Kuenyehia (African States), Daniel David 
Ntanda Nsereko (African States). 
90 The judges representing African States that were elected by List A include Joyce Aluoch, Fatoumata 
Dembélé Diarra, Solomy Balungi Bossa, Chile Eboe-Osuji, and Miatta Maria Samba. It is interesting to 
highlight that four out of the five judges elected from African States by List A are female. The overall 
analytical value of this point is ambiguous at this time but remains an interesting feature of African 
representation on the ICC judiciary.  
325 
 
elimination of List B would have only a minimal impact on gender representation on the 
bench–perhaps with the exception of African women based on overall election trends.     
Another observed trend is that all but none of the current judges elected from List 
B, at the time of writing, have been assigned to the Pre-Trial division, which is 
responsible for issuing arrest warrants and/or summons to appear based on evidence 
submitted by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).91 The Pre-Trial Division is also 
responsible for authorizing investigations into situations under consideration by the 
Office of Prosecutor proprio motu. Thus, the current construct of the bench is such that 
List B elects largely serve as the institutional ‘gatekeepers’ and can therefore be seen as 
mostly responsible for triggering Court (in)action at the earliest procedural stages. Only 
two judges currently appointed to the Pre-Trial Division were elected from List A.92 Only 
one List B candidate has been assigned to another division (Appeals). Thus, 86 per cent 
of the List B candidates have been assigned to the Pre-Trial Division and make up the 
majority of the division altogether. This was not always the case–previous judges elected 
from List B were assigned to different divisions including two that were assigned to the 
Trial division and three African judges that were assigned to the Appeals division. This is 
significant inasmuch as it effectively demonstrates a strong institutional shift in the 
assignments of judges to particular divisions over time, apparently based, at least in part, 
on judicial competence and experience. Indeed, at the time of writing, two African judges 
were assigned to the Pre-Trial Division; one African judge was assigned to the Trial 
division; and one African judge was assigned to the Appeals Division. This division of 
African representation within Chambers further demonstrates African representation 
throughout the Court’s institutional construction. In the same vein, the composition of the 
Court is a reflection of broader institutional choices that are subject to evaluation. 
 
91 Marc Perrin de Brichambaut and Gocha Lordkipanidze were the only judges elected from List B to be 
assigned to another division at the time of writing (both were assigned to Appeals), which were new 
assignments by the President in 2021. Judge Brichambaut was moved from the Pre-Trial division and Judge 
Lordkipanidze was beginning his first term.   




On this basis, the contemporary approach to appoint the overwhelming majority 
of List B Judges to the Pre-Trial division could be subject to scrutiny when situated 
within Article 39(1) of the Rome Statute, which says: 
As soon as possible after the election of the judges, the Court shall organize itself 
into the divisions specified in article 34, paragraph (b). The Appeals Division 
shall be composed of the President and four other judges, the Trial Division of not 
less than six judges and the Pre-Trial Division of not less than six judges. The 
assignment of judges to divisions shall be based on the nature of the functions to 
be performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges 
elected to the Court, in such a way that each division shall contain an appropriate 
combination of expertise in criminal law and procedure and in international law. 
The Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall be composed predominantly of judges 
with criminal trial experience.93 
Considering the reality that two out of six judges appointed to the Pre-Trial Division at 
the time of writing had criminal trial experience (List A)–this is a significant imbalance 
in need of restructuring. When levied against the problematic decisions that the Pre-Trial 
has made, most egregiously in unanimously deciding not to allow the Prosecutor to open 
an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, it becomes presumptive that putting 
politically minded individuals in the Pre-Trial Division yields politically reasoned 
decisions. This is especially so because Pre-Trial Chamber II acknowledged that the 
Prosecutor had fulfilled the procedural requirements to authorize an investigation, yet 
unanimously denied her request because such an investigation was determined not to be 
in the ‘interests of justice’ based purely on political (not legal) factors.94  
 
10.8 The Situation in Afghanistan  
In Afghanistan, the Pre-Trial Chamber Judges included Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe 
Mindua (List B); Judge Tomoko Akane (List A); and Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala 
 
93 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 39(1) [emphasis added].  
94 Pre-Trial II, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (12 April 2019), ICC-02/17. 
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(List A). Thus, both List A Judges appointed to the Pre-Trial Division were responsible 
for this problematic and widely criticized decision.95 This is highlighted by the fact that 
the Prosecutor was unanimously authorized to open an investigation in Afghanistan on 
Appeal.96  All five judges appointed to the Appeals Division in this case were elected 
from List A.97 On Appeal, it was determined that: 
the Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in considering the 
‘interests of justice factor’ when examining the Prosecutor’s request for 
authorization to open an investigation. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the Pre-
Trial Chamber should have addressed only whether there was a reasonable factual 
basis for the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation, in the sense of whether 
crimes have been committed, and whether the potential case(s) arising from such 
investigation would appear to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. Noting that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision contained all the necessary factual findings and had 
confirmed that there is a reasonable basis to consider that crimes within the ICC 
jurisdiction have been committed in Afghanistan, the Appeals Chamber decided 
to authorize the opening of an investigation itself, rather than to send the matter 
back to the Pre Trial Chamber for a new decision.98 
On this basis, the Pre-Trial Chamber asked broader, political questions that they were not 
tasked to consider in deciding to authorize the Prosecutor’s investigation or not. This 
resulted in flawed decision-making and a problematic outcome that compromised the 
legitimacy and credibility of the ICC as a whole. Taken in its entirety, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber essentially concluded that the investigation in Afghanistan would be politically 
 
95 Christian de Vos, “No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big Implications,” 
International Justice Monitor (15 April 2019) blogpost available at https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/no-
icc-investigation-in-afghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/; accessed 10 October 2020); Mark 
Kersten, “The ICC was wrong to deny prosecution request for Afghan probe,” Aljazeera (12 April 2019) 
available at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/12/the-icc-was-wrong-to-deny-prosecution-
request-for-afghan-probe/; accessed 10 October 2020. 
96 Judgment on the appeal against the decision on the authorisation of an investigation into the situation in 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-138 (5 March 2020), Appeals Chamber, available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/17-138; accessed 21 October 2020. 
97 This included Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa; Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza; Piotr Hofmanski; Howard 
Morrison; and Chile Eboe-Osuji. 
98 Afghanistan: ICC Appeals Chamber authorises the opening of an investigation, Press Release (5 March 
2020), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1516; accessed 21 October 2020. 
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difficult because of the alleged perpetrators involved–i.e. the United States military and 
intelligence agencies, and should be avoided altogether. It was argued that “the 
investigation in Afghanistan would inevitably require a significant amount of resources… 
such a stillborn investigation will result in the Prosecutor having to reallocate its financial 
and human resources, putting in jeopardy more realistic investigations and 
prosecutions.”99  
This is particularly problematic when viewed through the lens of Africans who 
have been the subject of ICC intervention, even under contentious political 
circumstances. For example, in the situation in Burundi, the Pre Trial Chamber 
authorized the Prosecutor to open an investigation proprio motu even though “the 
Government of Burundi has interfered with, intimidated, or harmed victims and 
witnesses… the Government of Burundi is suspending international cooperation in 
connection with the alleged crimes.”100 Note that in Burundi, the Pre-Trial Chamber was 
composed of two judges from List B (Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua and Judge Raul 
C. Pangalangan) and one judge from List A (Judge Chang-ho Chung). The comparatively 
uneven application of the Rome Statute in the situations in Afghanistan and Burundi can 
best be understood as politics disrupting law. The implicit notion that African situations 
and cases are ‘more realistic’ is highly contentious and reiterates the manifestation of 
realpolitik– even in the minds and decision-making processes of judges themselves.  
It is also necessary to point out that the Pre-Trial Division had, at the time of 
writing, authorized the Prosecutor’s request to open an investigation in every African 
situation requested, including the situations in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya–neither of which 
were particularly ‘politically stable’ environments, which directly impacted the 
Prosecutor’s (in)ability to secure a conviction in both cases due to a lack of evidence and 
widespread witness tampering. The decision not to authorize an investigation in the 
situation in Afghanistan risked emphasizing the Court’s biased treatment of Africans and 
 
99 Concurring and Separate Opinion of Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua,(31 May 2019), ICC-02/17, para. 
32 [emphasis added] available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_03049.PDF ; accessed 
12 January 2021. 
100 Public Redacted Version of ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization 
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi,” ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp (25 October 
2017), para. 13-14. 
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African situations by denying justice elsewhere. In the same vein, victims in Afghanistan 
could rightly question why the crimes committed against them were not worthy of ICC 
intervention when crimes committed in Africa are.  
The ICC’s commitment to justice cannot be understood as contingent on the 
actors or states involved, even in the face of extreme political backlash.101 This uneven 
application of international criminal justice fuels disdain and lack of trust at the state and 
individual levels, generally, and specifically. It should not be up to ICC judges to weigh 
the political consequences of upholding the Rome Statute, it simply must be upheld.  
Importantly, while the current construct of the Pre-Trial Division lends itself to 
synonymity with List B judges, it is important to note that in the Afghanistan decision, 
two of the three judges were elected from List A and the decision was reached 
unanimously. Such decisions reiterate that it is a judges’ character that is at the core of 
his or her suitability and aptitude for the job, which is not contingent on whether or not 
they have criminal law or international law experience per se. The ultimate point 
demonstrated by this example is that List A judges are just as capable of making ‘bad’ 
decisions as those elected from List B. In reality, the Pre-Trial Chamber with a majority 
of List B judges authorized the Prosecutor’s investigation in Burundi, regardless of the 
difficult political circumstances surrounding such a decision.102 It is the responsibility of 
 
101 Note, generally, that The United States authorized sanctions and travel restrictions against International 
Criminal Court employees investigating the situation in Afghanistan, including Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 
and Phakiso Mochochoko (Head of the Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division), and 
others attempting to investigate alleged crimes committed by US citizens in Afghanistan since 2003, for 
example. 
102 It is important to note that African Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua (List B) was a member of Pre-
Trial Chamber in both the Burundi and Afghanistan decisions. It is necessary to point out the relative 
inconsistency in his reasoning. In his dissenting opinion in the situation in Afghanistan, Judge Antoine 
Kesia-Mbe Mindua said at paragraph 25 “since the Prosecutor has not determined that initiating an 
investigation in the Burundi situation ‘would not serve the interests of justice’ and, importantly, taking into 
account the views of the victims which overwhelmingly spoke in favour of commencing an investigation, 
the Chamber considered that there were indeed no substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice.” The same approach was taken by the Prosecutor in Afghanistan. Judge 
Kesia-Mbe Mindua’s dissenting opinion at para. 27 says that “…the Prosecutor has identified no substantial 
reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation into the situation would not serve the ‘interests of 
justice.” Thus, the Pre-Trial Chamber took it upon itself to render an investigation into the situation in 
Afghanistan to be not in the interests of justice for practical (political) reasons. It remains unclear why this 
was not done in Burundi (or any other African situation) but was done in Afghanistan. This sort of uneven 
application of the Rome Statute and hyper focus in African situations is thematic no matter whether 
situations are referred by the United Nations Security Council (i.e. the referral of the situation in Darfur and 
the denial of the referral of the situation in Syria) or when the Prosecutor seeks authorization from the Pre-
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the ICC to enforce the principles enumerated in the Rome Statute, not to cower to 
powerful States that might interfere with its operational effectiveness. The ultimate blame 
should always lie with those bearing the most responsibility for the perpetration of the 
most serious international crimes–never with the institution designed to respond to them. 
The only way that the ICC will continue to gain international respect and strength is to 
consistently and credibly fulfill its mandate head on, rather than succumbing to political 
pressure by a handful of powerful states. To this end, judges must be able to reasonably 
divorce politics from law, even though the ICC is a practical function of both. The 
political consequences of their decisions should be a distant or moot consideration in 
their judicial reasoning, which requires a particular temperament based on principles of 
objectivity, neutrality, and rationality above all else.   
 
10.9 Conclusion 
The substantive and widespread criticism of the ICC judiciary by scholars and observers 
are well-founded and complex. These problems can be explained in structural terms–i.e. 
by the design of the Rome Statute itself (specifically its provisions with respect to judges) 
 
Trial Chamber to open an investigation proprio motu. This is problematic optically and practically. Further, 
this sort of judicial inconsistency raises serious questions about the objectivity and neutrality of Judge 
Kesia-Mbe Mindua and the rationality of Trial Chamber III as a whole in reaching its decision in the 
situation in Afghanistan. Worth noting, Pre-Trial Chamber III noted in its Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation into the Situation in the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17 (12 April 2019) at para. 27 that “A high number of victims of 
the situation have come forward to present their views on whether the Chamber should authorise the 
commencement of the Prosecutor’s investigation into the situation. Overall, the Court has received a total 
of 794 representations in Dari and Pashto, as well as Arabic, English and German of which 699 were 
transmitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber on behalf of the following victims: 668 representations on behalf of 
6,220 individuals; 17 representations on behalf of 1,690 families; 13 representations on behalf of several 
millions of victims, including 26 villages; and 1 representation on behalf of an institution.” It is similarly 
curious as to why the victims that spoke overwhelmingly in favour of opening an investigation in Burundi 
were heard, but those in the situation in Afghanistan were not. This sort of piecemeal or fragmented judicial 
reasoning is wholly problematic, particularly when viewed with the broader aim to establish coherent legal 
standards and jurisprudence. Judge Kesia-Mbe Mindua’s dissenting opinion at paragraph 53 says that “The 
Chamber, which is sensitive to the victims’ situation, has taken such a decision also in their interests, in 
preserving the Court’s credibility. The Judges’ decision is a legal determination, even though they have 
taken into account certain factors linked to the security on the ground and to the States cooperation or lack 
of cooperation. It should be stressed that the ICC Judges are not politicians and they are guided only by law 
even though the Court operates in a highly political environment. To sum up, this decision not to authorise 
the investigation is a legal one and it is beneficial to international criminal justice.” This opinion is 
flagrantly riddled with logical inconsistencies and ill-founded determinations that caused irreparable 
credibility and reputational harms to the Court before this decision was unanimously reversed on Appeal.      
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and, perhaps even more so in political terms–i.e. the way that states employ the Rome 
Statute vis-à-vis the Assembly of States Parties to maximize particular interests, 
particularly in the judicial nomination and election stages. Once elected, some judges 
have acted inappropriately, and even more egregiously, the judges as a collective have 
largely failed to arrive at cogent decisions in an efficient manner, best exemplified by 
extraordinarily long detainment periods for suspects and the myriad of acquittals and 
overturned decisions at various stages that have disproportionately affected Africans both 
directly and indirectly.  
Against this backdrop, Africans have been subject to the decisions of ICC judges, 
yet have always had equitable representation on the ICC bench, at the time of writing. 
African governments continue to engage in ICC judicial nominations and elections at an 
extraordinarily high levels of engagement. This is reflected by high nomination numbers 
across the region and the associated increase in representation of African judges on the 
bench throughout the Court’s history. This activism and engagement on the part of 
African states within the ICC functions as an effective counter to the power of developed 
states within the institution. Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge ‘African’ 
inclusion in the ICC judiciary, including on the part of states and individuals. Such an 
acknowledgement illuminates that the shortcomings observed with the bench are shared 
and will require collective international commitment to remedy in the years ahead 
through more robust and exhaustive national nomination procedures. What is perhaps 
most important to highlight is that African states continue to engage within the 
framework of the ICC by seeking representation on the judiciary, which reiterates that 
there is indeed African ownership over the type of justice being dispensed by the Court. 
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Chapter 11  
11 Conclusion 
This dissertation has answered four interrelated questions. The first asked what kind of 
International Criminal Court African states wanted out of an International Criminal Court 
(ICC or Court) before and during the Rome Statute negotiations in 1998. The second 
inquiry interrogated why African states have ratified the Rome Statute more than states 
from any other region even though they did not get the kind of Court that they wanted. 
The third question asked about the origins of the criticisms levied by African states 
against the ICC. Finally, the dissertation answered why African states have chosen to 
commit and/or stay committed to the Court by signing, ratifying, and implementing the 
Rome Statute despite the compromises reached in Rome and significant criticism levied 
against the ICC since.   
This dissertation has argued that African states were among the group of states 
that viewed the ICC and the Rome Statute as a means to restructure the global order and 
hierarchy of states but also those that viewed international criminal justice as an 
important normative prerogative for the protection of international human rights and 
security. This informed the idealized ‘African’ vision of the ICC pre-Rome and during 
the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998. The compromises reached at the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference were largely the result of concerns raised by the Permanent Five 
members of the United Nations Security Council, particularly elements that threatened 
the existing power structures and global hierarchy thereto. This was an unfortunate 
political dilemma, since states such as China, Russia, and the United States never ratified 
the Rome Statute, and have given no indication that they ever plan to, at least at the time 
of writing. Therefore, for the states that have chosen to be bound by the Rome Statute 
System, it is a system that reflects the status quo, especially the post-war power dynamics 
that have permeated the global order in critical respects. In the context of the ICC, this 
includes the ability of the Security Council to refer and defer cases at the ICC, as well as 
the omission of nuclear weapons from the list of prohibited weapons used in war. In 
seeking to better understand why African states would sign, ratify, and implement the 
Rome Statute into domestic law despite these significant compromises in the Court’s 
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architecture, the dissertation argued that African normative commitment, agency, and 
activism in the Rome Statute negotiation processes, coupled with the comparatively high 
regional experience with the sorts of crimes covered by the Rome Statute (especially the 
Rwandan genocide) were catalysts for African ICC support. When addressing the 
sustained commitment of African states to the ICC despite widespread criticism during 
the Court’s operational years, the dissertation made two arguments: (1) For the most part, 
African states have remained strongly committed to the international criminal justice 
norm even when actively criticizing the ICC, or when attempting to regionalize 
international criminal justice within the AU. And (2), the dissertation argued that the 
ability of African leaders to manipulate the ICC to achieve domestic political ends is a 
significant factor that has affected sustained institutional commitment in several African 
contexts.  
The overarching argument made throughout the dissertation is that African 
involvement in the establishment of the ICC, its engagement with the resultant Court in 
terms of high ratification rates, self-referral of cases, and the continent’s representation 
within all major branches of the Court (including prominent positions within the judiciary 
and the Office of the Prosecutor) supports the notion that the Court is as much ‘African’ 
as it is global. While Afro-centric concerns illuminate some serious institutional 
weaknesses, attempts to regionalize international criminal justice offer an opportunity to 
bolster the international criminal justice regime, strengthen the norms that undergird it, 
and proliferate the intended aims of justice and accountability for atrocity crimes that are 
most relevant to the continent as part of a robust system of international criminal justice.  
The dissertation also argued that African criticisms of the ICC need to be taken 
seriously because of the significant long-term regional involvement, engagement, and 
commitment to the success of the project. There are normative reasons for doing so–that 
is, to create a better and stronger ICC that reflects the policy preferences of its member 
states. But there is also a more practical reason for doing so. The holism of the institution 
depends on the support of states and the Court’s sustainability will be in jeopardy if it 
fails to acquire the necessary political will and cooperation of its member states to be 
effective. Despite claims that the ICC is an objective and neutral legal institution, in 
reality it is not. Rather, it is deeply embedded in the complexities of the international 
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political arena. Failure to acknowledge and adequately respond to the issues raised by the 
states in which it operates (or seeks to operate), especially in historically disenfranchised 
parts of the Global South (and Africa in particular), unnecessarily feeds a narrative of 
paternalism and neocolonialism, which contributes to the manifestation of a serious 
legitimacy crisis at the ICC.     
 The basis of the dissertation emanates from a conceptualization of an Afro-centric 
vision of a prospective ICC. In doing so, the dissertation provided a novel analysis of 
African positions on highly contested issues at the Rome Diplomatic Conference based 
on the statements of delegates in the plenary meetings. These statements were situated 
within the context of regional meetings conducted by the South African Development 
Community in 1997, the African Regional Conference for the Establishment of an ICC in 
Dakar, Senegal in 1998, and the participation of African diplomats in the Preparatory 
Committee meetings at the United Nations leading up to the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference. This content analysis provided a holistic account of an ‘African’ vision of an 
ICC, which offered a theoretical basis to consider the significance of the compromises 
that were ultimately integrated into the final package and text of the Rome Statute.  
 The remainder of the dissertation relies upon this conceptualization of an 
‘African’ vision of an ideal ICC, since it uses the negotiated deficits as explanatory 
factors to better understand and explain contemporary criticisms on the part of the AU 
and some African states with the Court’s operationalization. Relying on the ICC’s 
indictment of Omar Al Bashir, the dissertation examined how the United Nations 
Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC triggered sensitivities and 
reiterated the pervasive inequalities that dominate the international political order which 
subjugate African states and Africans to the beneficial exclusion of others. This point of 
view was (and has continued to be) compounded by two distinct factors: (1) the Security 
Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC but has not done so in situations of 
comparable gravity based solely on political factors and manifestations of realpolitik; and 
(2) the indictment of a sitting head of state of a non-states party to the ICC deeply 
infringed upon the principle of the sovereign equality of states. Both of these objective 
realities are directly related to the concerns of politicization and revealed the seriousness 
of imbedding hierarchical political inequalities into the architecture of the ICC, which 
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African states cited before and during the Rome Statute negotiations as a high priority 
issue with respect to the Court’s construction. The legitimate difficulties that the AU had 
with ICC’s indictment of Al Bashir, and the lack of genuine discourse with respect to 
those difficulties, contributed to the proliferation of anti-ICC rhetoric and policy, 
including the more problematic objection and opposition to the indictment of leaders of 
states parties (e.g. Kenya). This policy decision on the part of the AU rested on 
normatively shaky ground and subjected the more legitimate arguments launched by the 
AU to discreditation on the basis that it was attempting to protect African leaders at any 
cost. Notwithstanding this, the dissertation placed an emphasis on the more substantive 
concerns with the ICC’s behaviour in African situations and contexts, utilizing the 
disparity between institutional expectations and reality as an explanatory and analytical 
tool.           
 Similarly, the AU’s attempts to regionalize international criminal justice was 
examined and considered not as a competitor institution promoting an opposing court, but 
instead as a compatible one under the auspice of complementarity. The dissertation 
focused on the overall value of including an afro-centric international criminal justice 
mechanism within the international criminal justice system. It argued that ‘Africa’ values 
international criminal justice and the norms that undergird the project. As such, the 
African Court could offer an intermediary mechanism at a level that rests between the 
state and the international sphere to address violations of international criminal law that 
disproportionately affect the continent. Relying on ‘Africa’s’ longstanding commitment 
to the ICC, the dissertation argued that the AU regional court is another manifestation of 
normative commitment to the aims and values of international criminal law, and ought to 
be adequately and fairly considered as an integrative response both to concerns raised 
about the function of the ICC, but perhaps more importantly to its inherent deficiencies 
and limitations, based on the scope of the Rome Statute itself. Indeed, the African Court 
incorporates more crimes than the Rome Statute, and conceptualizes a form of 
international criminal justice that encapsulates continentally relevant criminal activities 
and behaviours. It is argued that immunity for sitting heads of state, as provided by the 
Malabo Protocol, does not eliminate the ICC’s waiver of immunity and even if it did, 
makes little material difference in the practical exercise of justice (at the time of writing). 
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Thus, the ideation of an international criminal court on the part of African states is once 
again re-imagined in the context of an African Court and provides important insight into 
a regional conceptualization of the purpose and utility of international criminal courts.         
 Lastly, the dissertation argues that African states remain committed to the ICC 
through high engagement within the Court’s structures, and the judiciary in particular. It 
was argued that African states have been adequately represented on the ICC bench 
throughout the Court’s history. The dissertation systematically demonstrated that African 
states have exercised high levels of engagement by nominating the highest number of 
judicial candidates for appointment out of any region. The overall point was to evidence 
that African states and African individuals have continued to be involved in the highest 
levels of the Court’s operationalization. As such, the ICC has woven African 
representation into its institutional fabric at all stages of its evolution and development. 
The utility of this argument is that it offers a formidable challenge to the assertion that the 
Court is ‘European’ or neocolonial and instead recasts the narrative to both acknowledge 
and appreciate the vitally important role of African governments and African individuals 
in the Court’s day-to-day function. Consequently, Africans are equitably responsible for 
the institutional shortcomings of the Court, which have become apparent throughout its 
operationalization primarily in African contexts. Nevertheless, the fact that African 
governments continue to seek representation on the ICC bench demonstrates a preference 
for involvement within the ICC, as opposed to outright abandon or rejection of the 
project altogether. This offers formidable support for the notion that African states 
remain committed to the ICC and the norms that undergird the international criminal 
justice project, whether for reasons of political self-interest or otherwise.  
 
11.1 Understanding African Discontent  
This dissertation argues that African states were deeply, authentically, and meaningfully 
involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute and had a vision of an ideal international 
criminal court heading into the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998. The compromises 
reached in Rome were substantial in key areas and can be linked to the contemporary 
discontent and criticism levied by some African states and the AU against the resultant 
ICC. Normative commitment to international criminal justice stemming from the regional 
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experience with widespread human rights violations and judicial responses to the same in 
the context of Rwanda fostered broad support from African governments and individuals 
for the establishment of a permanent court. This support was sustained even though the 
weaknesses in the Court’s institutional design were well-known by African delegates.  
This project argued that African states remain committed to ‘international 
criminal justice’ broadly considered, including the ICC, even while actively criticizing it. 
Since the ICC has operated disproportionately in African contexts, it is important to 
meaningfully evaluate the concerns raised by those most affected by its activities, in the 
interest of constructive reform. It is well acknowledged that the Rome Statute is an 
imperfect treaty and the compromises reached in Rome were substantial. Therefore, the 
dissertation argued that meaningful engagement and dialogue are required to bolster the 
institutional strength of the Court, and to remedy the ostensive issues in its structure or 
else application.  
The strength of employing a content analysis combined with in-depth interviews 
of those involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute allows for a conceptualization of the 
kind of court that ‘Africa’ really wanted. This formulation allows not only for a measure 
of the seriousness of the compromises reached in the final package presented in Rome, 
but also offers a greater understanding of how African states imagined the ways in which 
an ICC could fit within, or even shift, the global hierarchy and political landscape. The 
disappointment that some African states and the AU have expressed towards the ICC can 
be explicably traced back to the disparity between the ‘African’ conceptualization of an 
ideal ICC and what was ultimately negotiated in Rome in key respects. At the same time, 
the dissertation demonstrated that African governments were very much aware of the 
limitations of the final package presented in Rome, but chose to commit to the Court 
anyway.  
 While the dissertation acknowledges and evaluates the merits of the concerns 
raised by some African states and the AU, it primarily focuses on explaining the root 
causes of this discontent, which it argued, stem in large part from the deficiencies in the 
Court’s institutional design as a reaction to the interests of the most powerful states. 
Perhaps the greatest irony is that the powerful states that vehemently guided the 
negotiations on key issues such as the powers of the United Nations Security Council to 
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refer and defer cases, and the glaring omission of nuclear weapons from the prohibited 
list, are not States Parties to the Rome Statute (and do not appear to plan to join) and are 
largely insulated from its jurisdictional reach. Thus, states that choose to be members of 
the ICC have committed to an institution designed and heavily influenced by the 
constraints of realpolitik. In many respects, African states saw the ICC as an opportunity 
to reorder international politics. Instead, the negotiated Rome Statute reflected a 
reshuffling of the same stacked deck that privileges the most powerful states. This 
narrative is supported by the fact that the United Nations Security Council has been 
willing to refer African situations involving non-states parties to the Court, but not others, 
including serious situations involving members of the Security Council where it could 
reasonably be concluded that the types of crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute had 
been committed. Even so, the choice to commit to the ICC by so many African states 
suggests that beyond rationality or self-interest, norms also inform (and continue to 
inform) policy preferences and guide behaviour domestically, regionally, and 
internationally.  
Yet, African commitment to the Rome Statute and cooperation with the ICC 
provide different measures of normativity. Indeed, African states have been unwilling to 
cooperate with the ICC when it has attempted to target leaders whether in a States Party 
or otherwise, suggesting that an uneven application of the Rome Statute and/or 
intervention into the affairs of sovereign states is generally not agreeable unless it 
coalesces with domestic political interests. The dissertation highlighted the ability of 
African governments to instrumentalize the ICC and emphasized the ways in which 
African states have worked within the Rome Statute System to leverage various political 
objectives, suggesting that it is not only traditionally powerful states that are able to 
manipulate the Court’s overall ability to operate effectively. Thus, the ICC’s reliance on 
the cooperation and political will of states to be effective is a limiting factor not only as it 





11.2 Avenues for Reform 
This dissertation has implications in terms of policy and theory. Perhaps more 
importantly, it also provides a new framework through which to view prospective 
avenues for constructive reform at the ICC on the basis of African concerns and 
criticisms stemming from the Court’s operationalization in its nascent years.  While a 
substantial amount of literature has evaluated various aspects of the ‘Africa-ICC crisis,’ 
few have considered the seriousness of ‘Africa’s’ historical involvement in the 
development of the ICC project, or considered this involvement as an explanatory tool to 
make better sense of the institutional weaknesses cited by some African states and the 
AU from 2005 onwards. The point is not to accept the criticisms levied against the Court 
by some African states and/or the AU wholesale. Rather, the dissertation simply provides 
a means to recast and resituate the problems with the ICC in their relevant historical 
context, which reveals the far more deep-seated and complex political dynamism at play.  
 Focusing on the genuine efforts of African governments and African individuals 
to promote the international criminal justice project allows for a better understanding as 
to why the AU has voiced opposition towards the Court and has attempted to regionalize 
international criminal justice. The dissertation considered the ideological disparity 
between what the ICC was hoped to be and what it actually is as fundamentally 
explanatory of the pan-African response. Thus, efforts to regionalize international 
criminal justice at the AU court are better understood as a secondary attempt to integrate 
an African vision of an ICC into the international political landscape. While aspects of 
this vision are open to skepticism, on the balance it offers particular insight into the most 
pressing institutional issues with the ICC from an African perspective.  
 In the context of norm theory, African involvement with the ICC can be framed 
both progressively and regressively. However, the dissertation focused on the ways in 
which African commitment to the ICC, involvement within the ICC’s institutional 
apparatuses, and criticism of the Court’s operationalization and behaviour can each be 
framed separately and in tandem as generally advancing the international criminal justice 
norm. While diffusion may happen in different ways across time and space, the 
overwhelming evidence suggests that African states remain heavily committed to the 
Court and the international criminal justice norm that undergirds it. Thus, the findings of 
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the dissertation suggested that African states have provided incredibly useful insight into 
the Court’s institutional shortcomings. If the problems illuminated by some African states 
and the AU are responded to with meaningful and measured consideration, such insights 
could reasonably contribute to the increased robustness and strength of the ICC 
altogether. On this basis, there is a need to consider the utility of the criticisms levied 
against the Court based on its behaviour and operationalization, if not to integrate 
responses to those problems either in terms of treaty reform or within the general 
procedural processes at the Court through its various organs and institutional channels. 
Most of all, the dissertation demonstrated that many of the institutional weaknesses of the 
ICC stem from the behaviour of states both inside and outside of Africa, and not 
necessarily with the Court per se. 
 
11.3 Future Research 
The Africa-ICC relationship offers multiple pathways for a continued research agenda. 
As the ICC moves past its hyper-focus on African situations and has recently opened 
investigations into alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan, the State of Palestine, 
Bangladesh/Myanmar, and Georgia, it faces another onslaught of opposition, criticism, 
and challenges. It would appear in many respects that African concerns with the ICC 
have been acknowledged and taken seriously, based on the decision of the Prosecutor to 
pursue cases elsewhere, particularly in the incredibly difficult political contexts 
referenced above. It is important for the Court’s holism to intervene whenever it is in the 
interest of justice to do so, no matter the political circumstance. Yet, in the context of an 
ongoing research agenda, it will be useful to consider whether or not the problems 
identified by African states are shared by states in other regions. Comparative analyses in 
this respect could offer further explanatory value and provide a means to consider areas 
for institutional reform. The ability of the ICC to achieve its stated goals and to contribute 
to the proliferation of justice in a global context can be better analyzed based on its 
involvement in a truly ‘international’ sense. Further, whether or not the ICC is actually 
able to do its job in contexts outside of Africa and outside of the context of self-referral, 
especially of rebels or warlords, by states, will be a definitive marker of the state of the 
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international criminal justice and accountability norm as well as the principle of the 
sovereign equality of states, broadly understood.  
 Beyond these areas of research, whether or not the ICC has actually contributed to 
localized deterrence, the bolstering of national justice mechanisms, or the achievement of 
transitional justice and/or post-conflict reconstruction efforts can only be judged 
retrospectively with the benefit of time. Thus, the effects of the ICC on the contexts in 
which it has operated–only in Africa at the time of writing, can be better understood as 
part of a holistic research agenda stemming from a place of institutional self-reflexivity 
and honest evaluation about the Court’s success in terms of its ability to advance human 
security, human rights, and justice at multiple levels of engagement. It will be important 
to monitor whether African responses to the ICC, particularly in terms of the 
establishment of a regional court to prosecute international crimes, becomes prioritized 
by African governments in the future, and relatedly, to evaluate whether more local 
responses better achieve the stated goals of international criminal justice mechanisms.  
 In terms of whether the compromises reached in Rome were too significant, it will 
be necessary to evaluate whether or not the ICC is able to achieve its purpose without the 
support of the most powerful states. The Rome Statute can be rightly framed as a civil 
society and middle and weak power state achievement; how this can explain institutional 
effectiveness will be a continuous task for future research. Moreover, whether or not the 
negotiated Rome Statute fails to encapsulate all that it ought to either terms of the content 
of the Statute itself or its jurisdictional reach, will be revealed by the need to establish 
even more nested institutions, such as regional courts with a similar mandate to the ICC, 
or a spurt of the establishment of ad hoc or hybrid tribunals as a response to gross and 
widespread human rights violations (i.e. the United Nations’ establishment of the 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism in Syria–IIIM in 2016). Thus, 
whether or not the ICC holds a necessary place in the international political and legal 
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